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Abstract
The NHS is under increasing pressure to cut costs while delivering high quality care. At the  
same tim e, the demand for healthcare services has grown, driven in part by the increasing 
number of older people in the population. NHS Trusts are adopting clinical decision support 
systems (CDSSs) to help decision making at the point of care. CDSSs are said to bring 
benefits such as improvements in guideline adherence, clinical processes and user 
performance but evidence of these benefits is not always available and their effectiveness 
in terms of improving patient outcomes is often open to  question. This thesis presents 
research that was carried out in a large teaching NHS Trust looking at the evaluations of 
three CDSSs. Semi structured interviews were carried out w ith key informants who were  
involved in their adoption, use and evaluations. Documentary analysis and observations 
were also used to augment the interviews. Most evaluations were carried out informally 
by the developers and were primarily driven by external regulatory pressures rather than  
patient outcomes and organisational needs. Evaluation documentation was inadequate or 
missing, thus making it difficult to systematically assess these evaluations. This thesis 
contends that evaluations are im portant to  provide decision makers in NHS Trusts with 
adequate information to make decisions about CDSSs and computerised healthcare 
information technologies in general. NHS Trusts need to  build organisational capacity and 
readiness to  enable them  to effectively carry out evaluations that will provide meaningful 
information to gain better understanding of CDSSs and to inform their successful adoption, 
im plementation, usage and to justify the resource allocation. This research shows that 
CDSS evaluations investigated took a predominantly narrow view. It thus provides evidence 
for the need for a more systemic approach to evaluation.
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This thesis looks at the evaluations of three computerised clinical decision support systems 
that were undertaken in a UK National Health Service (NHS) Trust. A clinical decision 
support system (CDSS) is software that uses an inbuilt knowledge base to help physicians, 
healthcare staff, patients and carers to make informed clinical decisions at the point of care 
based on person-specific information. CDSSs aim to enhance healthcare delivery by using 
tools such as alerts, suggestions, reminders, and prompts to help users make better 
informed decisions. The purpose of the research was to  systematically assess the  
evaluations of CDSSs that were implemented by a large NHS Trust in order gain an 
understanding of how these systems were evaluated and the w ider implications of these 
evaluations.
This chapter provides an overview of the NHS and its drive to  adopt computerised 
healthcare information systems to support clinical processes and improve clinical decision­
making. Chapter 2 reviews the literature that is relevant to  this research and Chapter 3 
presents the methodology that was used to  undertake it. Chapter 4 looks at the background 
to  the settings in which the research was undertaken and Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present case 
studies of the evaluations of three different CDSSs, and Chapter 8 provides a cross case 
comparison. Chapter 9 presents the findings of the research and looks at them  in the  
context of the most relevant factors of the literature review before making suggestions for 
future research.
In this chapter, Section 1.1 describes how the NHS was established and how it is organised. 
It also highlights some of the key challenges facing the NHS. The role that computerised 
health information systems were expected to play in supporting the NHS is discussed in
Section 1.2. The pressures faced by NHS organisations to e ffective ly  use these systems are 
discussed in Section 1.3.
1.1 The NHS and the challenges facing it
The UK NHS was established in 1948 follow ing social reform s th a t sought to  deliver 
universal healthcare for free  at the  point o f delivery. Since its founding, th e  NHS has been  
a battleground fo r all political parties. It has faced m any reform s relating to  its structure  
and funding through various m odernisation and perform ance im p ro vem en t initiatives. The 
NHS is divided into prim ary and secondary care services. Figure 1.1 shows th e  d iffe ren t 
providers and com missioners of NHS services in England. Their roles will be discussed in 
turn .
WKKk■■
155 Acute Trusts (including 100 Founda 
usts)
10 Am bulance  
Trusts (including 5 
Foundation Trusts)
J lllflilC f!
853 for profit, n o t-fo r-p ro fit and independent sector organisations providing  
care to NHS patients from  7 ,331  locations
Figure 1.1 Providers and commissioners o f NHS services in England (adapted from  NHS Confederation, 2015)
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1.1.1 Clinical Commissioning Groups
The trad itional NHS system had several NHS Health Trusts th a t m anaged hospital care, 
com m unity  care and m ental health services in England. The D ep artm en t o f Health, 
Strategic Health A uthorities and Primary Care Trusts had responsibilities fo r all planning  
and delivery of NHS services. These statu tory  responsibilities w ere  transferred  to  NHS 
England in April 2013. The NHS Trust D evelopm ent A uthority  (TDA) now  provides support, 
oversight and governance for all NHS Trusts in England. Clinical Com m issioning Groups 
(CCGs) are groups o f G eneral Practices w ho have a responsibility fo r th e  planning and 
designing of healthcare services for local populations. There are 209 CCGs in England. Their 
com m issioning role involves the  allocation for and purchasing o f health and care services 
including: urgent and em ergency care; planned hospital procedures; m enta l health  and 
learning disability; rehabilitation  care and com m unity  services. NHS England has overall 
responsibility to  ensure th a t CCGs adequately  com mission healthcare services fo r th e ir  
local populations and also th a t they m eet th e ir financial obligations. Figure 1.2 shows the  
key e lem ents  o f the  NHS commission cycle.
Continuously evaluate services ta
* Actively manege of current services
* Benchmark wth peers
- inform the pfenning of future services Monitoring Assessor*!
The commissioning cycle
Collect and analyse population level date 
Demographics, prevalence and incidence 
of conditions, morbidity, etc 
Prioritise the health needs of the population 
Consult with multiple stakeholders 
{dixm m, padents, public, etc)
- Agree contracts with providers based on 
outcomes, not activity
- Determine appropriate contract length 
and key outcomes
* Think about novel ways of contracting
Securing Planning
V
Create a vision for services considering:
* rbevMtesarrineedsoffiepseulation
* Current services and performance
* Different population groups
* Opportunities for service tramfamtafbn
Figure 1.2 The NHS commissioning cycle (adapted from  Adlington et al. (2013)
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1.1.2 Primary Care Services
Primary Care services provide the first point of contact for most people seeking access to  
healthcare services in England. From 1948 to  2004, every GP principal was responsible for 
delivering care to  registered patients within their practice and following up those w ith long­
term  conditions. Since 2004, patients were required to  register with a General Practice 
rather than individual GPs. Additionally, patients can also access care through NHS call 
centres (such as the NHS 111 telephone services), walk-in centres, GP-led out of hours 
clinics, district and community nursing services, private sector organisations that are 
contracted by the NHS and voluntary sector organisations among others. There are around 
8000 GP Practices in England and 853 third sector organisations (for profit and not for 
profit) that provide healthcare services to  patients from  7331 locations across England.
1.1.3 Acute NHS Trusts
NHS secondary care services include acute district hospitals, Acute Teaching NHS Trusts 
and NHS Foundation Trusts. There are 155 acute NHS Trusts in England, including 100 NHS 
Foundation Trusts. Their services are primarily commissioned by the CCGs within their local 
areas. Acute NHS Trusts are responsible for managing hospitals and ensuring th at they  
provide high quality care and financial management. They are also responsible for 
employing multi-disciplinary clinical and non-clinical workforce, including doctors, nurses, 
physiotherapists, allied healthcare professionals, administrative staff, cleaners, managers 
and information technology technicians amongst many others. Acute Teaching NHS Trusts 
are linked with local universities to provide training for clinical professionals such as 
doctors, nurses and scientific staff among others. Some Acute NHS Trusts provide specialist 
services and may act as regional or national centres for certain conditions w ithin their 
hospitals. They may also provide community based care in partnership w ith com m unity
clinics and health centres. NHS Foundation Trusts were introduced in April 2004. Unlike 
Acute NHS Trusts, they are independent legal entities that are accountable to the  
populations they serve under unique governance arrangements rather than direct 
accountability to the government. They also have financial freedoms that allow them  to  
raise capital from both private and public sectors and to set their own performance criteria. 
NHS Foundation Trusts are required to work closely w ith their boards of governors, who 
include members of staff, patients and local partners. All NHS Foundation Trusts are 
overseen by M onitor, the new NHS regulatory body.
There are 56 M ental Health NHS Trusts, including 43 Foundation Trusts. M ental Health NHS 
Trusts provide health and social care services for people with mental health problems. 
These services can be provided through mental health hospitals, GPs, specialist care 
services and other primary care providers. There are 34 community care providers that 
provide non-acute health and social care services in England. They include 15 NHS Trusts, 
3 Foundation Trusts and 16 social enterprises. There are 10 Ambulance Trusts in England, 
including 5 Foundation Trusts, which provide access to emergency healthcare from  primary 
to  secondary care. The NHS Trust Development Authority (TDA) helps Acute NHS Trusts 
through their transition to  Foundation Trust status. The TDA took over the responsibility 
for the governance, quality and performance management of Acute NHS Trusts following  
the abolition of Strategic Health Authorities in 2013. NHS England and CCGs also get 
support and advice from Clinical Senates and Strategic Clinical Networks. Clinical Senates 
are advisory groups that are made up of clinical leaders and experts from  various 
healthcare, social care and public health settings and sometimes patients. There are 12 
Strategic Clinical Networks in England. They provide expert advice on particular diseases 
and help to  improve clinical pathways that can be adapted into clinical practice to help
reduce variations in healthcare services. They also provide guidance on innovations that 
need to be adopted, advice to  clinical leaders to  support w ider decision-making and 
strategic planning. The NHS also has special health authorities which provide health 
services across England. They include the National Blood and Transplant Authority, NHS 
Business Services Authority and the NHS Litigation Authority. Although they work 
independently, these authorities may be subject to ministerial direction where necessary.
1.2 Challenges facing the NHS
Over the past tw o decades, there has been a shift in disease patterns from  acute to  chronic 
conditions, with conditions such as diabetes, hypertension and asthma requiring 
systematic monitoring in dispersed community settings. There has also been a significant 
increase in life expectancy in the UK. This has led to  challenges relating to  an aging 
population, such as multiple chronic illnesses (comorbidity) and the related prescription of 
multiple medications (polypharmacy), which come with additional risks of drug interactions 
and allergies (Greenhalgh, 2007). This group of patients has become particularly 
burdensome for the NHS to manage because they require constant trans-disciplinary follow  
up between both primary and secondary services. There have been calls to  enhance the  
integration of primary and secondary care organisations to  allow collaboration on 
innovative service delivery models and more effective communication to reduce 
duplication and to ensure continuity of care. This has led to  the developm ent of integrated  
services, where geographically dispersed multi-disciplinary team s work together to  deliver 
services. Concerns about the quality of healthcare and patient safety in the 1990s and the  
early 2000s led to the new public management era, which emphasised a growing culture 
of accountability, surveillance, regulation and performance m anagem ent in NHS
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organisations. This led to increased scrutiny of all clinical processes. NHS Trusts were  
required to  undertake and publish audits relating to  various aspects of patient care. 
Regulatory bodies such as the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence and the  
National Patient Safety Agency and professional bodies such as the Royal Medical Colleges 
have led the efforts to  enforce this culture at organisational and individual levels
1.3 Role of technology in meeting the demands placed 
upon the NHS
Following the 1997 general election, the Labour government introduced reforms th at were
aimed at modernising public services through service integration, increased efficiencies,
promoting accountability and transparency and delivering user-focused services (Darling,
1998; Newman, 2006). They sought to  achieve these extensive NHS modernisation goals
through large-scale IT systems and empowering service-users to make choices about their
health. The modernisation drive was given a boost by Sir Derek Wanless's report, Securing
Our Future Health  (Wanless, 2002), which recommended that the NHS should substantially
increase investment in integrated large-scale IT systems to  support the required
improvements in the quality of care and efficiency. One such large-scale project was the
National Programme for IT (NPfIT), which benefitted from unprecedented economic
growth from  the late 1990s and early 2000s which helped to  fund public services. However,
like many developed economies after the financial crisis in 2008, the UK entered a deep
recessionary period, which prompted the government to rethink NHS and w ider public
sector funding. In 2009, the Departm ent of Health subsequently issued a five year plan
which required NHS Trusts to save nearly £20 billion by 2014 while at the same tim e
improving quality of care and efficiency. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition
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government continued these austerity measures following their election in 2010, leading 
to  sustained pressure on the NHS to implem ent more cost-saving measures w ithout 
compromising patient care.
There is widespread agreement that demand for NHS care will continue to  grow due to  
factors such as the increasing proportion of elderly people in the population, medical 
advances and the rising expectations of the public for medical investigation and treatm ent. 
However, this increase in demand will not be matched by increases in resources. The 
combined consequences of greater demand and economic pressures will mean that 
successful innovation and continuous improvement will become even more essential if the  
health systems are to stand a chance of meeting the demands placed upon them . The 
Carruthers review and subsequent report (Liddell et al., 2011) focused on the need to  
encourage innovation of services, especially in the context of the push for improved quality 
and productivity. Many of the service changes the report identified as necessary rely on the  
development and implementation of innovative technologies. In order to produce these 
technologies it is necessary for the health technology innovation process to be able to  
satisfy previously ignored or unarticulated clinical needs rapidly and precisely.
Liddell, Ayling and Reid's report entitled Innovation Health and W ealth , Accelerating 
Adoption and Diffusion in the NHS (Liddell et al., 2011: 7) points out that:
The purpose of the NHS, and everyone working in it, is to promote health and wellbeing, 
and to provide high quality healthcare, free at the point of delivery to everyone who needs 
i t . ... Innovation has a vital role to play in fulfilling this purpose by improving the quality of 
care for patients, releasing savings through productivity, and enabling the NHS to make 
its contribution as a major investor and wealth creator in the UK.
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Liddell e ta l. (2011 :7 )
However, despite major technological advances over the past three decades and their 
potential and demonstrated benefits, very few  computerised healthcare information  
technologies are widely adopted and used in NHS clinical settings. Cooksey (2006) noted 
that healthcare organisations often struggled to adopt innovative technologies. Similarly, 
Lord Darzi, in his 'once in a generation review' of the health service in England noted:
The NHS does not always make best use of innovation. ... Despite some excellent work 
taking place locally, there remains some reluctance within the NHS to adopt new products 
and processes
Darzi (2007: 40)
The NHS technology landscape has often shifted in response to the technological advances, 
and is driven by the government through its arm's length bodies and regulatory authorities, 
as well as developers and commercial vendors. Increasing media and public scrutiny of NHS 
services has led to pressures on NHS organisations to  deliver high quality services and adopt 
new ways of working within an increasingly cost-constrained environment.
1.3.1 Making effective use of technology within the NHS
Technology adoption in health services is often a complex process, especially in trans- 
disciplinary environments such as hospitals. These complexities may be related to the  
technologies themselves or specific problems in adopting such technologies. Traditional 
technologies such as pharmaceutical products have been reported to be much easier to  
adopt due to their self-containment and limited organisational effects (Departm ent of 
Health, 2008; Eaton, 2008). In contrast, healthcare technologies such as surgical devices
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and clinical decision support software have been found to be m ore complex to adopt  
because the  intended users often need to gain new skills and knowledge about them  and 
must also be willing to  change the ir habits and practice. The w ider organisational effects of 
such technologies may affect the existing professional hierarchies, result in shifts in 
responsibilities and bring about radical service redesign. Various NICE guidelines have 
recom m ended th a t  NHS Trusts should im plem ent clinical decision support systems to  help  
frontline staff to make better informed decisions at the  point of care. However, there  are  
a range of barriers tha t  affect the adoption of innovations in healthcare. Figure 1.3 shows 
some of the  barriers to  innovations tha t  w ere  identified in a D ep artm en t of Health report.
LACK OF EFfECTlVl 
AND SYSTEMATIC
INNOVATION DIFFUSION







Figure 1.3 Barriers to  innovation in the NHS (from Liddell, Ayling and Reid (2011))
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1.3.2 Knowledge gap
Since the 1960s, there have been repeated calls for a "gold standard" approach to  evaluate 
the effectiveness of healthcare interventions, including clinical decision support systems. A 
response to these calls has been the so called "hierarchy of evidence" which is based on 
randomised control trials and other experimental designs. Some have argued, however, 
that experimental methods do not provide sufficient information regarding why some 
interventions work and others do not, and have called instead for an "eclectic" range of 
evaluation methods. It is fair to  say that half a century later, disagreements still remain 
regarding what can and cannot be evaluated, the context of evaluation, the role of 
evaluation, the focus and methodologies for evaluation, and that there are still 
methodological, technological, organisational and human barriers to effective CDSS 
evaluations.
1.3.3 Thesis Aims and objectives
The aim of this research project was to explore how CDSS evaluations are carried out in 
selected NHS settings with a view to adding new knowledge to the existing CDSS evaluation  
literature.
The objectives were to:
1) Critically appraise CDSS evaluation literature
2) Fully identify the gap in knowledge and develop appropriate research questions
3) Develop robust research methodologies and carry out the research
4) Systematically analyse data collected
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5) Discuss the research findings and draw firm conclusions and recommendations 
for research and practice
1.3.4 Research questions
In order to make this contribution to the CDSS evaluation literature, the following research 
questions were framed:
1. What are the key factors that affect CDSS evaluations in a typical NHS hospital setting?
2. How do these factors relate to the model of evaluation that was developed from the CDSS 
literature review?
3. To what extent do evaluations affect decisions to adopt CDSSs in healthcare settings and 
which evaluation methods are most likely to inform CDSS adoption decisions and why?
The next chapter will look the literature relating to the evaluation clinical decision support 
systems.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the literature that is relevant to  research looking at the evaluation 
of clinical decision support systems and thus provides information about the context for 
the research as well as helping to identify the research opportunity more clearly and 
support the development of a research strategy. In Section 2.2, broad definitions of 
evaluation are given, noting their influences across various disciplines. Section 2.3 gives a 
wide overview of the evaluation landscape across various disciplines, highlighting key 
approaches such theory-based, decision making and naturalistic evaluation models, and 
information systems and health information systems evaluation approaches. In Section 2.4, 
clinical decision support systems are defined, noting their types and taxonomy, range of 
uses and the approaches and methods that are commonly used to evaluate them . Section 
2.5 gives an overview of the key findings from  the literature review and concludes with the  
research questions.
2.2 Evaluation models and definitions
There are many models and definitions of evaluation. In this section, various definitions of
evaluation are discussed in the context of established education-based evaluation models
such as theory based evaluation, programme evaluation, decision making evaluation and
evaluation approaches that are commonly used for healthcare interventions and
information technology. Models used to evaluate education programmes in the 1960s and
1970s have shaped the w ider field of evaluation over the last four decades, including the
evaluation of healthcare interventions. Stufflebeam and Shinkfield (2007) noted that
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because of the many evaluation approaches and activities, the definition of evaluation has 
changed over the years. Earlier definitions of evaluation primarily focused on the  
achievement of set objectives as defined by Tyler (1942). Tyler's study of schools in the  
1930s led to  the development of a model that sought to  determ ine w hether a program  
achieved its goals as the primary role of evaluation. However, Stufflebeam and Shinkfield 
(2007) rejected Tyler's definition, arguing that it steered evaluation activity towards the  
attainm ent of outcomes. They noted that some program objectives may be flawed and not 
worthy of achievement. They also argued that a broader evaluation approach looking at a 
program's goals, structure and process was required, particularly in cases w here program  
im provem ent or w ider adoption/adaptation by other service providers was param ount.
Evaluation models that were developed to provide accountability in large healthcare, 
education and welfare reform programs in the USA in the 1970s looked beyond Tyler's 
approach (Stufflebeam, 1973b; Stufflebeam, 1973a; Scriven, 1972). This led to  a shift in the  
definition of evaluation towards professional judgem ent, particularly the collection and 
analysis of information that can be used for decision making (Stufflebeam and Shinkfield, 
2007). Suchman (1967) noted that although evaluation of a program's goals remained  
im portant, the intervening processes that led to  the observed outcomes w ere more 
essential. Schuman further argued that evaluations should test hypotheses regarding a 
program's activities, objectives and processes. Similarly, Scriven (1972) argued that other 
outcomes were equally as important as the programme's stated goals, noting th at  
evaluations should look at both intended and unintended outcomes. He advised evaluators 
to  avoid the rhetoric about programs such as brochures, proposals and other professional 
materials and instead only focus on the actual outcomes. Scriven (1972) also popularised 
form ative and summative evaluations in the 1970s to distinguish between the tw o  roles
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that evaluators can play during a programme's lifecycle. Formative evaluations focus on 
the assessment of the program during its development while summative evaluations assess 
the outcomes of a completed program (Scriven, 1972). However, Stufflebeam and 
Shinkfield (2007) argued that distinguishing these tw o roles was not as clearly demarcated 
in practice as suggested by Scriven, although this distinction continues to be widely drawn 
on. They argued that evaluation should instead focus on collecting and analysing quality 
information for decision makers (Stufflebeam and Shinkfield, 2007).
Other definitions of evaluations are based on the methodology employed, for example 
experimental designs which look at the comparative outcomes of d ifferent programs or 
interventions, services or products (Stufflebeam and Shinkfield, 2007). Some argue that 
establishing causality is the primary purpose of evaluation and that it can only be achieved 
through experimental approaches (Cochrane, 1972; Liu and W yatt, 2011b). Cochrane 
(1972), advocated for w ider use of randomised controlled trials as the "gold standard" for 
evaluating health and social care interventions to assess their effectiveness and efficiency. 
Cochrane's work throughout the 1970s and 1980s resulted in the establishment of the  
Cochrane library database of systematic reviews and the elevation of randomised 
controlled trials to  the top of the "hierarchy of evidence" in evaluating outcomes of 
healthcare interventions (Evans, 2003). Using this model, assessing the quality or 
effectiveness of healthcare interventions or health services is measured through  
predefined outcomes, which can be at an individual level, for example quality of life 
im provem ent or system level such as cost-effectiveness or disease burden (Jefford et al.,
2003). However, Donabedian's (2005) paradigm for quality and outcome assessment 
recognised that some outcomes such as patient attitudes, satisfaction and social 
restoration may not be easily defined and measured. Stufflebeam and Shinkfield (2007: 8)
also noted that controlled experimental designs were not feasible in most cases, and that 
they could be counterproductive or fail to  address key issues about "needs, goals, plans, 
processes, side effects" among others. They argued that evaluators should consider a wide 
range of available methods to  "reach defensible judgments of programs" rather than  
equate w ith any one particular method.
Another widely used definition of evaluation is that of the United States Joint Com m ittee  
on Standards for Educational Evaluation (1994: 3) which stated that "evaluation is the  
systematic assessment of the worth or m erit of an object". According to  Stufflebeam and 
Shinkfiled (2007), this definition entails value judgments and thus requires a set of 
defensible guiding principles. Accordingly, these guiding standards may also be used to  
assess the m erit of a program or intervention. However, evaluations such as form ative and 
descriptive studies do not necessarily assess the m erit or worth of an object. Am m enworth  
et al. (2004: 2) defined evaluation as "the decisive assessment of defined objects, based on 
a set of criteria, to  solve a given problem". This definition is focused on resolving a given 
problem through a systematic assessment of defined objects that contribute to the  
problem. Similar to Stufflebeam and Shinkfiled's (2007) approach, Am m enworth et al.'s 
(2004) definition focused on the collection and assessment of information related to  the  
problem, then assessing the worth rather than defining evaluation according to  a 
programme's worth.
This section has shown that there is no widely accepted definition of evaluation. Some
definitions focus on the stated objectives of a program or intervention, while others
depend on the context and methods used. Stufflebeam and Shinkfiled (2007) suggested
that evaluators should adopt an eclectic approach that considers the objectives, context of
evaluation and various methods to develop and guide programs towards successful
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outcomes. This entails an im portant role for evaluation that goes beyond just providing 
feedback to  decision makers at the end of the program.
2.3 Approaches and methods of evaluation
This section looks at the approaches and methods of evaluation identified in the literature  
from the disciplines of education, information systems, health and social care and clinical 
decision support systems.
2.3.1 Theory based evaluations
Weiss (1972) advocated for evaluation models to  be developed and tested to  assess the
ultim ate objective of a program through an assessment of a chain of events. This early work
by Weiss led to the development of program theory evaluation. According to  Rogers et al.
(2000a), program theory evaluation consists of tw o basic elements. Firstly, developing an
explicit theory or model of how the programme causes the intended observed outcomes.
Secondly, performing an evaluation guided by the model. According to Coryn et al. (2011),
evaluation theories describe and prescribe how evaluations should be conducted, including
such issues as purposes, users and uses of evaluations, who performs the evaluation
process and to  w hat extent, choices of strategies and methods, as well as the roles and
responsibilities of evaluators amongst other things (Fournier, 1995; Smith, 1993). Chen's
(1990) seminal book brought the concept of theory driven evaluations back to prominence,
leading to further conceptual, methodological and theoretical contributions (Chen and
Rossi, 1992; Rogers et al., 2000a; Rogers et al., 2000b; Weiss, 1997; Weiss, 1995; Weiss,
1998; Weiss, 2004). Theory driven evaluation has also been referred to as programme
theory evaluation, theory based evaluation, theory guided evaluation, theory of action,
theory of change, program logic, logical frameworks, outcomes hierarchies, and latterly
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realist or realistic evaluation (M ark et al., 1998; Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Rogers et al., 
2000a; Rogers et al., 2000b) and program theory evaluation science (Donaldson, 2007).
Instead of asking "what works" or "does this programme work", realist evaluation seeks to  
ask "w hat works for whom in w hat circumstances and in w hat respects, and how?" (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997). Pawson and Tilley argued that programs are theories that are embedded  
into the social systems where they are delivered. They also noted that programs were  
active in the sense that they are produced and require the engagement of individuals in an 
open system that is often affected by various external events (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). 
Their "context-mechanism-outcome" (CMO) configuration breaks down systems into their 
key components and processes to gain an understanding of social interactions which 
enable the evaluator to test and refine theories. This approach was used by Greenhalgh et 
al. (2009) in an organisational case study evaluating large scale service transform ation in 
healthcare. Through realist evaluation, they drew useful lessons about how specific 
preconditions make specific outcomes likely, although it did not necessarily produce 
predictive guidance for the evaluators. Realist evaluation considers the complexity of 
programs or interventions to determine "what works for whom " rather than just looking 
at the stated objectives or cause and effect as advocated by proponents o f experimental 
methods. Theory-based evaluations marked a significant shift from  objectives-based and 
outcomes-based evaluations. Instead, they focused on key contextual and other 
contributory factors that resulted in the observed outcomes.
2.3.2 Decision making evaluation models
Also in the 1970s, some researchers developed decision-making evaluation models which 
focused on how evaluation results were used. Stufflebeam (1973a) viewed evaluation as a
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process that provided decision makers with meaningful and useful information regarding 
decision alternatives. His "context, input, process, and product" (CIPP) model described 
four types of evaluation activities. These evaluation activities are shown in Table 2.1. The 
CIPP model thus systematically assesses what needs to be done, how it should be done, 
w hether it is being done and w hether the program is successful. Stufflebeam (2007) also 
stated that Scriven's form ative evaluation related primarily to  decision making, while 
summative evaluation was more focused on accountability.
Evaluation type Evaluation activities
Context evaluation Assessment of the problems, needs and opportunities available in the 
program’s setting
Input evaluation Assessment of competing strategies and the work plans and budgets
Process evaluation Monitors, documents and assesses a program’s activities
Product evaluation Examines the program’s impact on the target audience, the quality and 
importance of outcomes and the program’s sustainability and 
transferability
Table 2.1 Stufflebeam's CIPP model
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Patton's (1978) utilisation focused evaluation model addressed the concern that decision 
makers often ignored evaluation findings by developing a general approach to evaluation 
based on tw o essential requirements. First, Patton argued that decision makers and 
audiences of evaluation reports should clearly be identified. Second, he recommended that 
evaluators should work with decision makers to  decide about all aspects of evaluation, such 
as the evaluation questions, research design, data analysis, interpretation and 
dissemination of results. Cronbach (1980) also contributed to the discourse of decision­
making evaluation. He stressed that decision-making was political and mostly involved 
various actors rather than lone decision-makers. Cronbach suggested that the evaluator 
should take the role of a teacher who educates and advises the client throughout the  
evaluation process. During this process, the evaluator should constantly give feedback to  
the client rather than just w ait for the final report. Unlike Stufflebeam and Patton, 
Cronbach did not think it was the evaluator's role to  determ ine the program's worthiness 
nor recommend appropriate courses of action. However, in practice the d ifferent roles of 
evaluators and decision makers may not be clearly distinguishable.
Another widely used education-based evaluation approach is the four level model 
developed by Kirkpatrick (1994). Although it primarily focuses on the corporate human 
resource development, it has been adapted to evaluate teacher professional developm ent 
programs (Guskey, 2000) and the assessment of health information m anagem ent courses 
and programmes (Rouse, 2011). This model is comprised of reaction, learning, behaviour, 
and results. Reaction refers to  the measurem ent of participants' satisfaction w ith the  
program, usually through a survey. Learning relates to the measurem ent o f the extent to  
which participants' attitudes change, their knowledge or skills improve through attendance  
of the program using course exams, tests or surveys. Behaviour relates to the m easurem ent
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of the extent to which participants' behaviour changes as a consequence of attending the  
course. This evaluation looks at the extent to  which lasting change has occurred as a result 
of attending the course. The extent can be measured through improvements in 
productivity, management or quality. Kirkpatrick recommended the use of control group 
comparisons to assess a program's effectiveness at the behaviour and results levels. This 
model was influenced by scientific approaches such as randomised controlled trials, which 
maintain that effectiveness is reliably measured by eliminating bias in the evaluation 
process by controlling the environment (Cochrane, 1972). Decision making evaluation  
models shifted the emphasis of evaluation from outcomes and objectives of programs to  
other contributory factors in the lifecycle of a program or intervention. Such factors provide 
essential information regarding how a program or intervention works and how it results in 
the observed outcomes.
2.3.3 Naturalistic evaluation approaches
Naturalistic evaluation approaches take the view that it is better to evaluate in the context 
of the phenomenon rather than in artificial conditions (Stake, 1975). They also allow the  
evaluator freedom  to select appropriate methods to  collect, analyse and interpret data. For 
example, Stake's (1975) responsive evaluation approach sought to  address the concern 
that existing approaches did not sufficiently look at the needs of the evaluation client. Stake 
advocated that evaluators should learn from the anthropology and journalism traditions  
and use various qualitative methods to  observe, collect data and report on program  
activities and satisfy the information needs of the target audience. He also recommended  
that evaluators should present the different value judgments. Eisner's (1979) 
connoisseurship model drew from the field o f art criticism to support the evaluator's 
judgm ent of the quality of an educational program. This model is comprised of educational
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connoisseurship and educational criticism. The form er involves application of background 
experience to aid the evaluator in appreciating the merits of an educational program. The 
latter is dependent on the evaluator's ability to  verbalise a program's features to  make it 
easily understandable for those who lack the fine appreciation of connoisseurs. Guba and 
Lincoln's (1989) fourth generation evaluation approach highlighted the inherent problems 
with previous generations of evaluation approaches. They noted the difficulties in 
negotiating the political and ethical dilemmas, gaps, imperfections and often inconclusive 
deductions. They argued that the failure and lack of utilisation of evaluation results 
em anated from the unquestioned reliance on the positivist paradigm of research (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1989). Fourth generation evaluators seek to build an intricate understanding 
of the program they are studying through human, political, social, cultural and contextual 
issues that are involved. The focus of fourth generation evaluation is to  build a rich 
description of the program and to communicate the appraisal of the program to its 
stakeholders. Data collection methods used in this approach include field notes, key 
inform ant interviews, case histories and surveys. Naturalistic evaluation approaches 
emphasise the significance of the natural evaluation context rather than creating an 
artificial environment for evaluation. They advocate for methodological pluralism to ensure 
that key issues such as contextual, human, political and cultural issues are taken into 
account in any evaluation activity.
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2.3.4 Information Systems evaluation approaches
M um ford (1983) highlighted the social and technical nature of information systems and 
recommended the development of systems that would enhance job satisfaction. She 
argued that human factors were often not taken into account when introducing computer 
systems into organisations, resulting in failure to achieve the desired outcomes. Klecun and 
Cornford (2005) noted that the traditional focus of information systems' evaluation had 
been on im m ediate usability needs, their technical aspects, performance, reliability, 
robustness and security and cost-benefit assessments. They argued that evaluation of 
information systems remained "controversial, biased, incomplete and superficial" (Klecun 
and Cornford, 2005). Walsham (2006) argued that the increasingly pervasive and complex 
nature of information systems and their use as tools for organisational change entailed new  
demands from evaluation activities. Klecun and Cornford (2005) also noted that the  
complexity of new systems introduced new sociotechnical aspects that were difficult to  
evaluate. Land (2000) recommended that information systems evaluations should include 
wider perspectives at technological, economic, organisational and individual levels. Land 
suggested the use of a modified version of Kaplan and Norton's (1995) balanced scorecard 
to  cover a range of issues such as customer, financial, internal efficiency, learning and 
growth and employees' perspectives. Martinsons et al. (1999) also looked at how the  
balanced scorecard could be adapted to the managem ent of business functions, 
organisational units and individual information systems projects. Other researchers looked 
at aspects such as alignment of new technologies w ith strategic and business goals, 
understanding of formal and informal work structures, diversity and competing interests 
of stakeholder groups and their information needs (Symons, 1991; Smithson and 
Hirschheim, 1998). Cornford and Klecun-Dabrowska (2001) looked at ethical issues and the
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effects of new systems on legitimate interests of stakeholders. Others found evidence of 
evaluation being used for legitimising vested interests (Friedman and W yatt, 2006; Rigby, 
2001).
The concept of benefits realisation management, or simply benefits m anagement or 
benefits realisation in IT projects relates to  how resources are utilised to  make desirable 
improvements (Sapountzis et al., 2008). It also aims to  align project outcomes w ith business 
strategies, and actively manage the benefits throughout the life cycle of the investment 
(Ward and Daniel, 2006). This concept was introduced in the late 1980s (Farbey et al., 1993) 
and has become an increasingly im portant factor in planning for how benefits from IT 
projects are realised and measured (Glynne, 2007). The increasing use and complexity of IT 
systems (Ashurst and Doherty, 2003; W ard and Elvin, 1999; Bradley, 2010) and the need to  
ensure that benefits from investments are realised and that decision makers are held to  
account have also contributed to the popularity of this method (Sapountzis et al., 2008). In 
the UK, the McCartney report, Successful IT: Modernising Government in Action and the  
CSSA report Getting it Right fo r  Government (Wheeler-Carmichael, 2000) stated that 
programs can only be regarded as successful if their intended benefits are realised. Reiss 
(2006) also noted that most unsuccessful programs were characteristically vague regarding 
their expected benefits. Over the past decade, benefits realisation has gained popularity in 
healthcare settings because of the challenges in ascertaining w hether benefits have been 
achieved due to complex interplay between m ulti-stakeholder teams and various IT 
systems. The benefits realisation model requires expected benefits to  be outlined from  the  
outset and a project is only considered successful if the intended benefits have been 
realised. A key elem ent of this method is the need to  consider the essential roles th a t each
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stakeholder plays and manage all stakeholder groups and where necessary, assign benefits 
to  d ifferent stakeholder groups.
Another widely used technology evaluation approach is health technology assessment 
(HTA). HTA is defined as a "tool to  review technologies and provide evidence of the value 
these technologies can deliver to  patients and their families, health system stakeholders, 
and to  society more broadly" (INAHTA, 2015). According to Drummond et al. (2008), HTA 
seeks to  inform decision makers regarding the benefits, risks and costs of new and existing 
technologies. This method has historically been used to produce information that can be 
used by a wide range of decision makers. However, the focus of HTAs has shifted to  
informing particular resource allocation decisions regarding healthcare technologies, 
evaluating costs and benefits as well as paying attention to  the decisions influenced by the  
HTA (Drummond et al., 2008). There is increasing awareness of the importance o f human, 
organisational and social factors that may affect the introduction of new technology 
(Kaplan, 2001a; Kaplan, 2001b). Kaplan (2001b) argued that there should be a shift in 
attitudes around health information technology evaluation from the traditional focus on 
technical and economic issues to sociotechnical issues. She noted that no single method  
could adequately provide decision makers with all the information that was required to  
make informed decisions about health information systems.
2.3.5 Health information systems evaluation approaches
Haux et al. (2004) defined health information systems as systems that process data and
knowledge in healthcare environments. According to W inter et al. (2001), health
information systems include the overall information processing undertaken in an
organisation, including both the technologies and their users. Ledley and Lusted are widely
accredited for introducing computer systems into healthcare for the purposes of
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supporting clinical decision making. Their seminal paper (Ledley and Lusted, 1959) outlined 
the use of statistical and probabilistic inferences to support differential diagnosis for 
clinicians. Their individual influences in the 1960s and 1970s w ere equally significant; as 
Ledley w ent on to  invent the whole body CT scanner, while Lusted became a leading scholar 
in medical technology. W arner et al. (1961) published a mathematical model based on 
Lusted and Ledley's (Ledley and Lusted, 1959) work to diagnose congenital heart defects, 
which compared favourably when evaluated against experienced cardiologists. However, 
they noted the high sensitivity to  false positive findings and errors in the system, and 
emphasised the need for accurate interpretation of clinical information. They advocated 
for an independent "gold standard" approach to judge the performance of the system. A 
few  years later, Collen and colleagues (1964) developed a computerised differential 
diagnosis system at Kaiser Permanente that was based on Ledley and Lusted's analog 
com puter card system. Later on, Bleich (1968) developed a system to suggest therapy for 
acid-base disorders, using clinical information such as arterial blood gases and vital signs. 
The system also had the ability to prompt the user w here vital information was missing. It 
was unique in the sense that it added therapy to  diagnosis by providing an evaluation 
summary and proposed management plan based on submitted information for review by 
the clinician. W right and Sittig (2008) suggested that the algorithmic and closed nature of 
the clinical domain of acid-base disorders made it possible for such a system to succeed. 
These early systems were primarily viewed from a technical perspective, w hereby the  
primary focus of their evaluation was on accuracy of diagnosis rather than the  
sociotechnical aspects.
Most of the systems that were developed in the 1970s followed the same model; whereby  
the user inputs factual clinical information, and the system suggests a therapy, diagnosis or
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both. Evaluation of these systems focused on the technical capability of the system, 
appropriateness of the underlying rules compared w ith experienced clinical users and 
improvements in clinical performance. For example, in a controlled trial, de Dombal et al. 
(1972) investigated the merits of a computerised system based on a probabilistic model for 
diagnosing acute abdominal pain, and based on the analysis, establish the need for surgery. 
The authors concluded that despite the system being far from  perfect, it matched the  
performance of senior clinicians and significantly improved decision making resulting in a 
50% reduction in errors. The 1970s also saw the introduction o f artificial intelligence, using 
expert system modelling techniques to develop systems to  support diagnostic decision 
making. In 1974, Shortliffe (1975) developed MYCIN, an antibiotic prescribing system that 
used rules from its knowledge base to evaluate the clinical information provided and 
suggest optimal therapy. Initial evaluations of MYCIN suggested acceptable therapy in 75%  
of cases, which improved as more rules were added to  the knowledge base. M iller (1983) 
developed the interactive ATTENDING system at Yale, which required the user to input 
clinical information and suggest a management plan. ATTENDING would then evaluate 
both the clinical data and the user's suggested plan, and then propose a plan for the  user 
to  review. This method was called "critiquing", and it led to  "critiquing systems" that would 
later be used in the development of ventilator management, hypertension and other 
clinical domains (M iller, 1986). M iller et al. (1982) developed the INTERNIST-1 system, which 
was a shift from previous systems that were characterised by limited functionality in 
narrow clinical areas. INTERNIST-1 achieved reasonable success in its efforts to provide 
decision support across the vast spectrum of internal medicine using an expansive 
knowledge base. Despite its lack of commercial success, INTERNIST-1 is credited for 
introducing the abstraction methods which are now widely used in complex diagnosis
based on the concepts of evoking strength, frequency and im port functions. INTERNIST-1 
evolved into the Quick Medical Reference system, an expert consultant program that can 
also be used as an electronic textbook and interm ediate level diagnostic spreadsheet 
derived from  primary medical literature on diseases, diagnoses, findings, disease 
associations and lab information (M iller, 1989). Apache III was the first system to achieve 
commercial success. It was developed in the 1980s as a prognostic scoring system for 
decision support and quality assurance in intensive care units (Knaus et al., 1991). During 
the same period, Barnett et al. (1987) developed DXplain at Harvard Medical School. 
DXplain was an evolving diagnostic decision support system that explained its reasoning by 
using clinical findings to produce and rank possible diagnoses to explain the clinical 
presentation. DXplain used its extensive knowledge base to  provide further advice on w hat 
clinical information to collect, while also highlighting usual and unusual characteristics of 
proposed diagnoses. A unique characteristic of DXplain was its user-friendly design that 
was suited for use even by physicians with no prior computer skills.
Most systems described in this section were developed in large medical and teaching  
centres in the USA. They were categorised as medical diagnostic decision support systems 
and were used by small teams of doctors within small patient groups. The m ajority of these 
systems were experimental in nature and were mostly limited to  specific clinical areas. 
Their evaluation had a narrow focus, and was limited to validating their technical and 
clinical effectiveness. Most of the early legacy systems were confined to  the clinical settings 
where they had been developed, and satisfactorily fulfilled local decision-making 
requirements but lacked the ability to transfer or exchange data within and across 
organisations. However, in the 1990s, there was a shift towards often-dispersed m ulti­
disciplinary teams (Sittig, 1994). Also, the introduction of integrated care pathways
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facilitated the developm ent of systems to cater for the evolving needs of modern 
healthcare settings. These changes led to a shift in the classification and w ider use 
healthcare technologies and resulted in the introduction of clinical decision support 
systems to acknowledge the w ider use of these systems beyond the small medical teams. 
However, some continue to  refer to  these systems interchangeably as health information 
systems, health information technology, medical informatics and lately e-health  
technologies (Bath, 2008). Liu and W yatt (2011b) noted the ubiquity of health information  
systems in the delivery and management of healthcare services. They noted that although 
there were many arguments supporting their development and w ider use, there was little 
evidence from  the use of these systems based on structured evaluations. Most studies 
published in the 1990s were pilot studies, which although im portant, were not undertaken  
in real clinical environments and did not look at the long-term effects of these systems 
(Rigby et al., 2001; Kaplan, 2001b). Karsh et al. (2010) argued that these systems may not 
have the purported benefits on quality of care and costs, van Gem ert-Pijnen et al. (2011) 
also noted the mismatch between postulated benefits and actual outcomes. Karsh et al. 
(2010) argued that success of these systems should not be measured on adoption or usage 
metrics, but instead on their impact on population health. Furthermore, they suggested 
that comparative effectiveness methods, such as the return on investment of each 
healthcare technology initiative compared with other alternatives would be a more 
appropriate evaluation strategy. The narrow focus of most evaluations and limited 
evaluation methodologies resulted in failure to identify the impact of CDSS on the broader 
healthcare systems (Karsh et al., 2010).
It has been noted that in practice, many health information systems are not evaluated at 
all (Talmon et al., 1999) and where evaluated, not adequately evaluated (Kaplan, 2001b;
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Friedman and W yatt, 2006). W yatt and Keen (2001) also observed that although health 
information systems were often regarded as part of modernisation processes, they were  
left unevaluated for years following implementation. This, they argued, results in 
"technology lock in" and inflexibility. Furthermore, some systems which may initially be 
effective may be overtaken by the changing healthcare environm ent and thus require 
repeated evaluations (W yatt and Spiegelhalter, 1990). Since the early 2000's, there have 
been active discussions in health informatics and related disciplines focusing on the  
applicability and relevance of randomised controlled trials, which are strongly rooted in the  
medical tradition (Kaplan, 2001b; Am m enwerth et al., 2004; Heathfield et al., 1998; W yatt 
and Spiegelhalter, 1990; Liu and W yatt, 2011b). Proponents of the RCT argue that it is the  
most robust method to measure outcomes of health informatics applications (Friedman 
and W yatt, 2006; Liu and W yatt, 2011b). However, Kaplan (2001b) noted the lack of explicit 
theory to inform many CDSS evaluations, especially the "insulation" of CDSS evaluations 
from the w ider informatics discipline. Also, these methods do not address the  
sociotechnical issues raised by Mum ford (1983) or the organisational perspectives 
highlighted by Symons (1991) and Smithson and Hirshheim (Smithson and Hirschheim, 
1998).
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2.4 Evaluation of clinical decision support systems
The notion of clinical decision support systems (CDSS) is fairly new. In the past, CDSS have 
been referred to as medical decision support systems, w ith reference to  the medical 
profession who were initially the main users of these systems. CDSS are part of the w ider 
information systems. There is no widely accepted definition for CDSS. Some definitions 
narrowly and precisely relate to a specific clinical encounter, where a decision is made at 
the point of care (Hunt et al., 1998; Sim et al., 2001), while others broadly cover wider 
healthcare settings and multiple technologies (Osheroff et al., 2007). The diversity of CDSS 
definitions may also reflect the characteristics of the underlying technology being defined, 
and the clinical settings where it is intended for use. The following CDSS definitions have 
been selected to illustrate the different dimensions found in the literature:
Software that is designed to be a direct aid to clinical decision-making in which the 
characteristics of an individual patient are matched to a computerised clinical 
knowledge base, and patient-specific assessments or recommendations are then 
presented to the clinician and/or the patient for a decision.
Sim et al. (2001: 528)
Any electronic system designed to aid directly in clinical decision-making, in which 
characteristics of the individual patient are used to generate patient-specific 
assessments or recommendations that are then passed to the clinician for 
consideration.
Hunt et al. (1998 :13 39 -1340)
Provides clinicians, staff, patients or individuals with knowledge and person-specific 
information, intelligently filtered or presented at appropriate times to enhance health
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and healthcare. It encompasses a variety of tools and interventions such as 
computerised alerts and reminders, clinical guidelines, order sets, patient data reports 
and dashboards, documentation templates, diagnostic support, and clinical workflow 
tools.
O sh ero ffe ta l. (2007:141)
Sim et al.'s (2001) definition considers the individuality of the patient and specifies the  
function of the knowledge base, while also considering the patient as a potential decision­
maker. In contrast, Hunt and colleagues' (1998) definition is more typical of a 
practitioner/patient relationship whereby the CDSS supports decision-making by the  
form er. Osheroff et al.'s (2007) definition expands the role of CDSS to cover w ider clinical 
processes and population health, and thus analogous with current trends in healthcare. 
However, as highlighted by Berlin et al. (2006), even seemingly specific definitions amount 
to  naught if the complexities and heterogeneity of CDSS design, function and use, as well 
as host organization circumstances are not taken into account. As such CDSS definition  
depends on the type of CDSS, the intended use and users, and targeted population (Berlin 
et al., 2006). In the literature, CDSS is often used interchangeably with medical informatics, 
health informatics, health information systems, health information technology and other 
sub-categories to describe the various computerised health information technologies that 
are used to support healthcare professionals and systems (Bath, 2008). However, CDSS is 
more inclusive of other healthcare professionals besides physicians, who w ere the targeted  
user group of most systems up to the 1990s.
2.4.1 Types and taxonomy of CDSS
The early CDSSs such as MYCIN and INTERSIT-I were designed to simulate expert human
thinking. These systems were adapted in the 1970s and 1980s to  support real clinical
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settings through knowledge based systems, i.e., assisting clinical decision-making rather  
than providing answers. The user would thus play an active part and interact with the  
systems, and select appropriate  and discard inappropriate  inform ation, rather than  
passively receive outputs (M il ler and Masarie, 1990). This was an im portan t  developm ent  
tha t  acknowledged the value of the decision-maker's knowledge and expertise, consistent 
with findings from  research on cognition and medical expertise (Klein and Calderwood,  
1991; Miller, 1983; Miller, 1986; M iller, 1994; M iller and Masarie, 1990; M iller  et al., 1982).  
According to  Berner (2007), most CDSSs are comprised of the  knowledge base, the  
inference or reasoning engine and a mechanism to com m unicate  w ith  the  user using the  
steps in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 Structure of CDSS (adapted from  Berner, (2007))
Using a taxonom y they had developed previously (Berlin et al., 2004), Berlin et al. (2006)  
described the  characteristics of CDSSs reported in RCT-based studies b e tw een  1998  and  
2003. The authors observed tha t  CDSSs varied in design, function and use, context of use, 
knowledge and data sources, nature of decision support offered, in form ation delivery, and 
w ork flow  impact. They found that CDSS w ere  widely heterogeneous and cautioned against
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generalisation based on results from randomised controlled trials to  different clinical or 
workflow settings. Their taxonomy was unique because it primarily focused on evaluation 
of CDSS. Other taxonomies have focused on technical issues (Kuperman et al., 1999) and 
information technology management perspectives (Teich, 1999) in line with trends in CDSS 
research. Berner (2007) also noted the diversity of systems that can potentially support 
clinical decision making, ranging from healthcare literature databases such as Medline, to  
tools incorporated in health information systems to perform financial and administrative 
analyses and sophisticated data mining techniques for both administrative and clinical data 
analyses. She argued that although retrospective approaches may be used in the  
development of guidelines, critical pathways or protocols used in clinical practice, they  
should not be considered CDSS.
The distinctions are important as vendors often will advertise that their product 
includes decision support capabilities, but that may refer to the retrospective type of 
systems, not those designed to assist clinicians at the point of care.
Berner (2007:4)
A fram ework developed by Metzger, Perreault and colleagues (2002; 1999) distinguished 
CDSSs across three dimensions as follows:
•  Timing of the decision support, i.e. before, during or after the clinical decision is 
made
•  How active or passive the CDSS is, i.e., w hether the CDSS actively provides alerts or 
passively responds to physician input or patient-specific information
•  How easily CDSS are integrated into workflow processes
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Berner (2007) noted that other distinctions between CDSS relate to w hether they are 
standalone or integrated with existing patient records systems, and w hether the decision 
support provided is general or specialty specific. She also noted the trend towards 
marketing of in-house developed (non-commercial) patient record systems, and 
incorporation of decision support functions into vendor developed computerised patient 
record systems and physician order entry systems to  cater for the growing demand for 
CDSS. This section has shown that CDSSs vary significantly in their types and classifications. 
The heterogeneity has implications for CDSS evaluation because results of evaluations may 
not be easily generalisable to  other clinical contexts. This is particularly im portant because 
randomised controlled trials and other experimental evaluation approaches which are 
favoured by many CDSS evaluators emphasise the importance of generalisability of such 
results into comparable areas.
2.4.2 Benefits and uses of CDSS
Bright et al. (2012: 2) described "classic CDSS" as "alerts, reminders, and order sets, drug
dose calculations that automatically remind the clinician of a specific action, or care
summary dashboards that provide performance feedback on quality indicators". Other
CDSSs are used for diagnosis, reminder systems for prevention, disease m anagement, drug
prescribing and dosing (Garg et al., 2005a). Classen and Bates (2011) reported that
healthcare was "beginning to  catch up" with other major industries in the adoption of
information technologies. This followed a report by Hsiao et al. (2010) th at almost 50% of
USA outpatient practices and 44% of hospitals were now using electronic health records.
Kaplan and Harris-Salamone (2009b) had also observed an increasing interest to invest in
healthcare technologies in most developed countries aimed at benefiting from  improved
quality of healthcare and reduced costs. They noted other drivers including improved and
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standardised processes of care, integration of healthcare systems and dealing w ith the 
burdens of an aging population. In the UK most initiatives for the adoption and 
im plem entation of healthcare technologies, and by inference CDSS are driven by the  
Departm ent of Health and other arm's length bodies such as the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) through clinical guidelines (NICE, 2010a). The 
literature shows that CDSSs have the potential to  improve care (Kaplan, 2001b; Friedman 
and W yatt, 2006; Black et al., 2011), particularly for systems designed for guideline 
adherence and those that aid physicians to  make diagnostic decisions (Kaplan, 2001b). 
However, concerns have been raised regarding the fast rate at which new technologies are 
developed, often with little evidence of their effectiveness apart from  early adopters' 
anecdotal accounts (Friedman and W yatt, 2006). This also presents a challenge about how  
to  evaluate existing and newly developed technologies. Am m enworth and colleagues 
(2004) argued that evaluating these systems should involve the interaction between the  
users and the relevant information processes, as well as the context in which they are used. 
However, these perspectives are often ignored in most evaluations and as noted by Kaplan 
(2001b), methods used in w ider information systems' evaluation are little used in 
healthcare.
Some CDSSs are adopted for their potential to reduce errors through evidence-based  
medicine. Sim et al. (2001: 527) defined evidence-based medicine as "the practice of 
medicine based on the best available scientific evidence", and noted that its use with CDSS 
"therefore promises to  substantially improve healthcare quality". The concept of evidence 
based medicine grew from efforts to  standardise healthcare interventions in the 1980s. 
Ellwood (1988) called for "outcomes management", whereby all stakeholders would make 
"rational choices" using standards and guidelines and continually collecting, analysing and
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utilising patient information to  improve outcomes. This led to  the development of 
guidelines to reduce variations in practice and improve the evaluation of healthcare 
services (Roper, 1988). However, (Schwartz and Mendelson, 1991) described the  
introduction of evidence based medicine as the "era of cost containment". Harrison and 
Wood (2000) described evidence-based medicine as "scientific bureaucratic medicine", 
and argued that this policy was designed to  manage demand as a means to control 
healthcare costs in the NHS, rather than the purported clinical benefits. They argued that 
scientific bureaucratic medicine was based "on the assumptions that valid medical 
knowledge is derived from accumulated research evidence and that such knowledge 
should be implemented through clinical guidelines" (Harrison and W ood, 2000: 25). Clinical 
guidelines used in the NHS, such as the NICE guidelines are primarily based on evidence 
from randomised controlled trials, systematic reviews and other experimental methods. 
However, they have been criticised for often ignoring issues such as the potential effects 
of interventions such as changes in job roles and work redesign. For example, a study by 
Lomotan et al. (2012) highlighted that even within the specialist area of paediatric 
pulmonology, a guideline-based CDSS may not m eet the needs of a small number of expert 
sub-specialists who have completely different skill-sets to  their contemporaries in the same 
departm ent. Other studies have found that physicians were non-compliant w ith guideline 
based CDSS (Durieux et al., 2000). Some studies have found that physicians poorly comply 
with guidelines, regardless of w hether they are CDSS based or not (Trivedi et al., 2002; 
Bright et al., 2012). Some studies have also found little evidence w hether CDSS assist 
physicians w ith diagnosis (Black et al., 2011; Bright et al., 2012). Patel and colleagues' (Patel 
and Kaufman, 1998; Patel et al., 2002; Patel et al., 2000) studies of physicians' cognition
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concluded that although CDSSs helped to  change their behaviour, it was unclear w hether 
the thinking behind the behaviour had changed.
A systematic review by Garg et al. (2005a) found that CDSS improved practitioner 
performance in the majority of studies but patient outcomes remained "understudied and, 
when studied, inconsistent". They also noted that improvements in practitioner 
performance w ere often associated w ith CDSS that prompted users in comparison with  
those that required users to activate the system. Additionally, they also found that 
evaluations undertaken by CDSS developers had higher incidence of practitioner 
im provem ent compared with those where the authors were not the CDSS developers. 
There have been efforts to standardise practice using CDSS following the Institute of 
Medicine (IO M ) report (Kohn et al., 2000a) that highlighted the underuse, overuse and 
misuse of healthcare leading to  variations and poor quality of care, and gaps in the  
translation of knowledge into practice in the USA. In light of these concerns, some CDSSs 
focused on improving care through changing clinicians' behaviour through reminders and 
alerts at the point of care, implementing treatm ent plans and patient education (Kaplan, 
2001b). Some CDSSs have been developed to reduce clinical errors (Bates e t al., 2001; Bates 
and Gawande, 2003), and to  improve efficiency and quality of care (Am m enwerth et al.,
2004).
2.4.3 Approaches to CDSS evaluation
Greenhalgh and Russell (2010a) observed that evaluations of health inform ation
technologies were largely based on "positivist", "interpretivist" and "critical" philosophical
assumptions. Positivist approaches take the view that an objective and measurable reality
exists, and that such phenomena as project goals, outcomes, and form ative feedback can
be precisely and unambiguously defined (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). Proponents o f this
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approach also argue that facts and values are clearly distinguishable, and it is possible to  
generalise the relationship between input and output variables (Friedman and W yatt, 
2006). They further argue that scientific testing is necessary to prove the worth of new  
drugs and healthcare interventions alike, including CDSS (Catwell and Sheikh, 2009; 
Friedman and W yatt, 2006).
Health information systems should be evaluated with the same rigor as a new drug or 
treatment program, otherwise decisions about future deployments of ICT in the health 
sector may be determined by social, economic, and/or political circumstances, rather 
than by robust scientific evidence
Catwell and Sheikh (2009:1)
However, others (Heathfield et al., 1998; Kaplan, 2001b) argued that RCT-based CDSS 
evaluations are inappropriate because CDSSs are different from drugs and pharmaceutical 
products. Apart from the high costs of undertaking RCTs, they argued that the RCT method  
lacked external validity because results may not be relevant to a w ider range of subjects or 
different contexts where CDSS usage may be different. Interpretivist approaches assume 
that reality is socially constructed, because people's perceptions on issues are different, 
and they assign different values and significance to facts (Klein and Myers, 1999). They 
argue that reality is never objectively or unproblematically knowable, and th at the  
researcher's identity and values are inevitably implicated in the research process. Critical 
approaches assume that critical questioning can generate insights about power relations 
and interests within organisations (Klecun and Cornford, 2005). They argue th at one 
purpose of critical evaluation is to ask questions on behalf of less powerful and potentially  
vulnerable groups, such as patients. The interpretivist and critical approaches view  
evaluation as "social practice", whereby one actively engages with the social situation, and 
considers the role of participants in framing and enacting with the situation (Pawson and 
Manzano-Santaella, 2012; Klecun and Cornford, 2005). According to Greenhalgh and 
Russell (2010a), interpretivist and critical approaches emphasise the need for "reflexivity", 
consciously thinking about issues such as values, perspectives, relationships, and trust.
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They also refute the notion that rigour can only be achieved scientifically but instead, argue 
th at the social factors can augment scientific considerations.
... rather, they hold that as well as the scientific agenda of factors, variables, and causal 
relationships, the evaluation must also embrace the emotions, values, and conflicts 
associated with a program...
Greenhalgh and Russell (2010a: 1) 
Greenhalgh and Russell (2010a: 1) noted that while health information systems lie on the  
"technical" and "scientific" side, the "dreams, visions, policies, and programs have 
personal, social, political, and ideological components, and therefore typically prove fuzzy, 
slippery, and unstable when we seek to  define and control them ".
Kushner (2 002 :16 ) argued that although the positivist evaluation model is "elegant, in its 
simplicity, appealing for its rationality, reasonable in asking little more than that people do 
w hat they say they will do, and efficient in its economical definition of w hat data count", it 
has several shortcomings. They argued that the multiple and often-contested goals of 
positivist evaluation, which leave it w ithout a fixed goal that serves as a referent for 
comparison as its main shortcoming. An example is Geenhalgh and Russell's (2010) study 
of the Summary Care Record in England, which found that the programme had numerous 
divergent goals.
Politicians were oriented to performance and efficiency targets, doctors saw the main 
goal as improving clinical quality in out-of-hours care, and civil liberties lobbyists 
perceived the program an attempt by the state to encroach on individual privacy
Greenhalgh and Russell (2010a)
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Other shortcomings of the positivist model are instability of outcomes, unreliability of the  
causal link between process and outcome, indefinable characteristics of program success 
and counterproductive measurement of failure (Kushner, 2002). Greenhalgh and Russell 
(2010a: 2) argued that while experimental designs remain useful in many contexts, 
evaluation of health technologies required a paradigm shift to  effectively deal with 
"politicised situations where goals and success criteria are contested". Based on their 
experiences undertaking the Summary of Care Record study, the authors suggested a "set 
of guiding principles" for health technology evaluation based on social practice rather than  
scientific testing. The principles emphasise the need to consider the following aspects:
•  Establishing the role of the researcher
•  Setting out a governance process
•  Allowing interpersonal and analytic space for dialogue
•  Taking an emergent approach
•  Understanding the dynamism of the macro-level context
•  Understanding the dynamism of the meso-level context
•  Considering the individuality of actors involved
•  Consider the expectations and constraints inscribed in the technologies
•  Using narrative as an analytic tool to  synthesise findings
•  Including critical events in relation to the evaluation itself
The authors argued that while positivist approaches remain largely relevant in clinical 
environments, they cannot ignore the "complex and fast moving socio-political arena".
Differences in underlying philosophical position may lead to opposing quality criteria 
for "robust" evaluations. Some eHealth [and by extension CDSS] initiatives will lend 
themselves to scientific evaluation based mainly or even entirely on positivist
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assumptions, but others, particularly those that are large-scale, complex, politically 
driven, and differently framed by different stakeholders, may require evaluators to 
reject these assumptions and apply alternative criteria for rigour. The precise balance 
between "scientific" and alternative approaches will depend on the nature and context 
of the program and probably cannot be stipulated in advance.
Greenhalgh and Russell (2010a: 4)
2.4.4 Strategies for CDSS evaluation
Kaplan (2001b) noted a tacit theoretical perspective in CDSS evaluation studies that leans 
towards quantitative methodologies and focus on measurable variables through 
comparison of CDSS with other alternatives. A systematic review by Am m enworth and de 
Keizer (2005) found that the majority of CDSS studies (79%) undertaken since 1982 were  
explanatory, and focused on testing a pre-defined hypothesis. Only 2% of the studies were 
exploratory studies focused on generating a hypothesis. The majority of exploratory studies 
evaluated organisational and social issues. During the same period, 83% (n=820) of studies 
used quantitative methods and only 5% (n=44) used qualitative methods. They noted that 
studies using combinations of quantitative and qualitative methods were increasing. The 
majority of exploratory studies used qualitative methods. Additionally, qualitative methods 
were mostly used for evaluating the organisational and social impacts of IT. In contrast w ith  
Kaplan's (2001b) literature review, Am m enworth and de Keizer (2005) reported that since 
1982, evaluation studies undertaken in clinical settings were steadily on the increase and 
few er studies were now being undertaken in laboratory environments. They also found 
that most studies undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s primarily addressed a single 
evaluation focus, for example appropriateness of care, efficiency of w ork processes, 
software quality and quality of patient care. However, Rahimi and Vimarlund (2007: 398)
observed th at CDSS evaluation studies "have been conducted w ith different aims, and their 
results are therefore difficult to  compare". Similarly, Klecun and Cornford (2005) 
highlighted some of the challenges faced by evaluators of health information systems, 
which they primarily attributed to the differences between the traditions of medicine and 
information systems.
The question of evaluation remains a major contentious issue, and perhaps even more 
so in the field of health informatics where the traditions of medicine meet and mingle 
with the information systems field... there is little agreement on the essential role of 
evaluation, a 'best way' to evaluate, on what and how to evaluate, whom to involve 
and within what paradigm to proceed.
Klecun and Cornford (2005: 229)
Klecun and Cornford (2005) suggested an evaluation approach broadly based on critical 
theory to highlight fundamental issues relating to  the evaluation process and content. They 
argued that such an approach would also take into account "social, political and historical 
conditions" under which systems are developed and used. Additionally, power and political 
issues and structural constraints would also be addressed through reflective engagem ent 
and communication between stakeholders. They also acknowledged that the evaluation  
process could be constrained by vested interests, and the potential for evaluation to  
redistribute power (Klecun and Cornford, 2005).
Thus in the role of the researcher or evaluator (or both), we need to consider how our 
activity exposes, expresses, challenges or enforces some interests, while downplaying 
others, and to question our own alliances and assumptions.
Klecun and Cornford (2005)
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2.4.5 CDSS evaluation methods
Concerns have been raised regarding that most health information systems were not being 
rigorously evaluated using methods applied in other safety-critical environments such as 
the airline and railway industries (Smith, 1992; Friedman and W yatt, 1996; Friedman and 
W yatt, 2006). Others have called for more experimental methods, particularly randomised 
controlled trials to measure the outcomes of CDSSs. W yatt and W yatt (2003) discussed the  
characteristics of three evaluation designs commonly used by healthcare organisations. 
W yatt and W yatt argued that due to the high costs of implementing large scale CDSS 
projects and their potential risk of harm to  users and patients, the RCT was the best method  
to  measure their effectiveness. Table 2.2 shows the typical evaluation methods that W yatt 
and W yatt noted are commonly used to  evaluate health information technologies and the  
circumstances where they would be most appropriate.
Simple before-after Controlled before- 
after
Randomised trial
Typical use Local audit Regional decisions National policy setting
Study role To describe what 
happened
To suggest the cause To determine the cause 
and size of the effect
Approximate minimum 
detectable effect
Large (>50% change) Medium (>30% change) Small (?10% change)
Chance of bias Very high Medium Low if well designed




The more organisations 
the better
Estimated lowest cost Low Low/Medium Medium/High
Table 2.2 Characteristics of three major types of evaluation study designs [Adapted from Wyatt and Wyatt 
(2003)]
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Am m enworth et al. (2004) noted that the tim ing of an evaluation was also an im portant 
indicator in deciding the appropriate evaluation method. They argued that appropriate 
evaluations should be undertaken throughout the lifecycle of the technology. They 
suggested that techniques such as software verification and validation would be essential 
during the development stage, while pilot and feasibility studies could be used for 
evaluating implem entation. This could be followed by cost benefit and cost effectiveness 
studies. Lastly, monitoring studies could then be used to  track how the system is working  
over longer periods of tim e.
2.4.6 Pilot evaluation studies
van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001) described pilot studies (also called feasibility studies) as 
smaller versions of a full scale study. These are im portant for pre-testing specific research 
instruments such as questionnaires or interview schedules to assess w hether they work as 
intended and that further study is worth pursuing (Friedman and W yatt, 2006; van 
Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001). Friedman and W yatt (2006: 366-367) described feasibility 
studies as "proof of concept" evaluation that can inform decision makers w hether a CDSS 
can be implemented and w hether it can deliver the expected benefits. These studies also 
help to  identify the immediate effects of an intervention and highlight where changes may 
be necessary. Pilot studies have also been used for patient safety oriented usability testing 
and validation of CDSS developed to  offer automatic prompts to physicians to  deliver 
treatm ent (Marcilly et al., 2012). However, van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001) noted th at 
while a pilot study does not guarantee the success of the main study, it does increase the  
likelihood of success.
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2.4.7 Before and after evaluation studies
Friedman and W yatt (2006) defined before and after studies as comparative studies 
w hereby a variable is measured during a baseline period and again after an intervention  
has been implemented. Measurements of the nature and frequency of the problem being 
studied can then be used to specify a new system or for later comparisons. Following 
im plem entation of a new system, measurements can then be taken to  establish w hether 
the problem has been resolved, as well as justifying the expenditure and judging the 
potential value of expenditure on future systems (W yatt and W yatt, 2003). They also noted 
that before and after studies can provide decision makers with valuable information. 
However, they argued that the 'after' results may be affected by other events going on in 
the organisation or human error, thereby making it difficult to attribute cause and effect. 
This potentially affects the quality of information available to decision makers.
"When studies generate the results we want, we take them at face value, and fail to 
register even major defects in study design. However, when they go against us, we 
launch investigations to find out why, and uncover all possible biases. Surely the 
rational approach is to start out with a more rigorous, bias free study design, so that 
whatever the result, we are satisfied with it and not left with lingering doubts about 
the real cause of the findings"
W yatt and W yatt (2003)
Friedman and W yatt (2006) also highlighted the risk of bias and difficulties in reliably 
inferring cause and effect associated with before and after studies. They argued th a t this 
method causes the fallacy of the "after the event, therefore because of the event" 
(Friedman and W yatt, 2006).
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2.4.8 Controlled before and after evaluation studies
Controlled before and after studies are often used as an alternative to  randomisation to  
improve attribution of cause and effect foilowing introduction of an intervention (Friedman 
and W yatt, 2006). This is done by introducing an external control, such as a similar 
organisation or patient group. However, W yatt and W yatt (2003) argued that even the task 
of finding a suitable external control may be challenging, especially collecting the pre and 
post im plem entation data. Additionally, the external control may not be as similar to  the 
baseline as initially perceived, and may not be subject to the same factors. To counter this 
predicament, W yatt and W yatt (2003) recommended adding an internal control to  
strengthen the study by reducing bias.
2.4.9 The Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT)
The randomised controlled trial (RCT) is the primary method for testing new drugs and 
related pharmaceutical products (Kaplan, 2001b; Friedman and W yatt, 2006). The RCT is 
an experimental study in which all factors that can potentially be manipulated by the  
investigator are controlled by randomly allocating participants to d ifferent study groups 
(Friedman and W yatt, 2006). The RCT has also been used to evaluate interventions in other 
fields such as social care, education and criminal justice (Oakley et al., 2006; Zoritch et al., 
1998). Liu and W yatt (2011b) argued that the RCT was the only method th a t reliably 
allowed for the estimation of small but useful changes resulting from  healthcare 
interventions, including CDSSs. However, Heathfield et al. (1998) noted that evaluating  
CDSS using RCTs had not provided significant evidence for improved patient outcomes or 
cost effectiveness. They also noted that RCTs are difficult to  generalise and that the ir scope 
is limited, thus provide little detail for decision-making.
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Liu and W yatt (2011b) made a compelling case for the use of RCTs in evaluating CDSS 
outcomes on the basis that this method minimises bias and produces robust estimates of 
their impact. They argued that CDSSs that expose subjects to risk and those that come at a 
higher cost require robust evaluation using RCTs. Furthermore, they highlighted the shift 
towards evidence based policy making and need to demonstrate cost-effectiveness of all 
healthcare interventions. Garg et al. (2005a) also argued that claims that CDSS improve 
patient outcomes should be confirmed through clinical trials. However, Am m enworth et al. 
(2004) argued that the evaluation of CDSSs are often broader and more complex than  
would be the case when undertaking clinical trials or diagnostics studies. They noted that 
the primary focus of clinical trial designs is to  objectively measure the impact of a 
therapeutic intervention on an individual patient. In contrast, evaluations o f information  
systems measure quality, as well as effects on the structure, process and outcome of 
patient care. They also noted that the introduction of information systems takes tim e and 
the effects may not be immediately measurable. Others have also noted that users need 
tim e to get used to the systems and effectively exploit their benefits within their workflows 
(Palvia et al., 2001). Additionally, changes in work processes and staff, and modifications 
and additions to  the system may result in changes in the intended uses, thus resulting in 
an often-changing evaluation target (M oehr et al., 2006). Additionally, w here organisations 
im plem ent a system in various departments, its usage and integration into w orkflow  may 
differ in different settings. Am menworth et al. (2004) argued that these changes and other 
factors make it challenging to control a typical healthcare environm ent in the same way as 
would be done in a clinical trial or to  directly attribute causality between observed 
outcomes and interventions.
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Lehmannm and Ohno-Machado (2011) noted th at while RCTs were the generally accepted 
form  of evaluation of healthcare outcomes, they were not always appropriate for ethical 
and economic reasons. They argued that emerging research methods such as comparative 
effectiveness w ere more relevant for evaluating CDSS. Comparative effectiveness research 
involves conducting new research or looking at available evidence of the benefits and 
harms of different interventions from existing research and provides information for 
decision makers (AHRQ, 2015). Lehmannm and Ohno-Machado (2011) noted that using 
comparative effectiveness research, evaluators could identify when RCTs were the most 
appropriate method or identify other suitable alternatives. Furthermore, they argued that 
most non-RCT studies did not expose patients, clinicians or other stakeholders to  added 
risks like RCTs and were often less expensive to undertake. Examples include quantitative  
and qualitative evaluations and simulations of real clinical environments. Apart from  
documenting CDSS impact on clinical outcomes and processes, reports from these studies 
could also guide CDSS development as well as influencing future adoption decisions 
(Lehmannm and Ohno-Machado, 2011).
2.4.10 Systematic Reviews
Friedman and W yatt (2006) described a systematic review as a secondary research method  
focused on answering a predefined question. It involves an exhaustive search and critical 
appraisal of relevant literature, extraction of data about methods and results and synthesis 
of results using appropriate methods. Proponents of RCTs argued that decision making by 
policy makers should primarily be based on evidence from  RCTs and systematic reviews of 
relevant trials (Friedman and W yatt, 2006; Liu and W yatt, 2011b). However, Friedman and 
W yatt (2006) noted systematic reviews were expensive to undertake and took much longer 
to conduct than commonly used evaluation methods. However, W yatt and W yatt (2003)
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also argued that the cost of conducting systematic reviews were smaller compared with  
the potential costs of implementing an inappropriate system. Table 2.3 shows a range of 
CDSS systematic reviews that were carried out over the past tw o  decades. Most of these 
systematic reviews were based on RCTs that were published in the English language. The 
m ajority of these reviews looked at the technical and clinical effectiveness o f the CDSSs as 
well as improvements in the performance of the users. Very few  RCTs looked at patient 
outcomes and a few  reported improvements in patient outcomes. The CDSSs w ere found 
to  be heterogeneous, and difficult to  compare. Due to  this heterogeneity, the majority of 
the studies used narrative synthesis, instead of pooling results or carrying out m eta­
analysis, thus making it difficult to generalise results. Consequently, most of the systematic 




















































































The primary focus of form ative evaluations is to provide adequate inform ation aimed at 
improving decision making about the CDSS under study (Friedman and W yatt, 2006). This is 
im portant because the development of CDSS requires a lot of planning and at times repeated  
rounds of prototype development and testing (Smith, 1993; Smith, 1998; Smith, 1992; W yatt 
and W yatt, 2003). Formative evaluations are essential for providing feedback or user 
comments to the development team , which can then be used to make the necessary revisions 
during the developm ent stages (Am m enwerth et al., 2004).
2.4.12 Summative evaluations
According to Friedman and W yatt (Friedman and W yatt, 2006), summative evaluations help 
decision makers to  determ ine w hether the information technology has solved the problem it 
was im plem ented to solve. Summative evaluations are also im portant for documenting 
generic lessons regarding why a system has succeeded or failed, and also provide lessons for 
future adoption decision making (W yatt and W yatt, 2003).
2.4.13 Monitoring as a form of evaluation
Sittig (1994) argued that the increasing use of clinical software  
(including CDSSs) would entail that they required monitoring to  assess their continued safety 
and clinical effectiveness. Friedman and W yatt (2006) even called for the regulation of clinical 
software in the same way as medical devices. Regulators such as the UK Medicines and 
Flealthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MFIRA) and the USA Food and Drug Administration  
(FDA) have now developed guidelines for the evaluation of clinical software (MFIRA, 2014).
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2.4.14 Frameworks for CDSS evaluation
The International Medical Informatics Association (IM IA) Working Group has held various 
workshops involving experts from various disciplines to  address evaluation issues and 
promote evaluation as a methodology. The IM IA Working Group highlighted the lack of 
com m itm ent to evaluation by decision makers in healthcare (Talmon et al., 1999). They 
sought to  identify areas where they could make a difference, particularly by defining a 
methodology repository and developing a fram ework to  help evaluators select the most 
appropriate methods. However, Rigby (2001) argued that although useful, developing 
methodologies and repositories alone would not achieve the required results. Instead, he 
argued that evaluations require adequate resourcing and com m itm ent at national and local 
level. Furthermore, the "natural opposition to  undertaking evaluation" should be directly 
addressed, especially by promoting the benefits of evaluations (Rigby, 2001 :12 02 ).
Holle and Zahlman (1999) proposed a four phase model that includes a technical pilot study, 
feasibility study, controlled effectiveness study and cost effectiveness study. Talmon and et 
al. (1999) suggested the eight phase VATAM model, which looked at the entire technology 
lifecycle through the following stages: conception, design, development, integration, early 
use, exploitation, routine use and end life cycle. Other frameworks include the Health 
Informatics Systems Evaluation (HIS-EVAL) (Am m enwerth e t al., 2004), the Guidelines for 
Good Evaluation Practice in Health Informatics (GEP-HI) (Nykanen et al., 2009) and the User- 
Centered Health Informatics Evaluation fram ework (Eisenstein et al., 2011). All three  
evaluation groups were made up of multidisciplinary teams who were tasked by the European 
Federation for Medical Informatics to  develop and standardise evaluation guidelines for 
health informatics applications, covering topics ranging from  study exploration to  conclusion
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(Nykanen et al., 2009). The User-Centered Health Informatics Evaluation fram ew ork  
recognised the need to adapt methods used in other fields and sought to  revise economic 
evaluation, usability engineering and socio-technical analysis for use in health informatics 
evaluation (Eisenstein et al., 2011).
2.5 Contextual and organisational issues related to 
evaluations
It has been noted that the context of CDSS use is often ignored by evaluations (Heathfield et
al., 1998; Kaplan, 2001b). However, CDSS are complex social systems which affect and are
affected by different actors, clinical settings and organisational environments where they are
introduced (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2010a; Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Greenhalgh et al.
(2010a) noted that it was essential to not only identify causal mechanisms that result in
clinical outcomes, but also investigate and classify the contexts where CDSS are used. Kaplan
(2001b) highlighted that most CDSS evaluations focus on isolated criteria or single outcomes
and consequently fail to identify complex processes that contribute to  the observed
outcomes. The relationships between system characteristics, professional/individual/user
characteristics, organisational characteristics and patient interests could also be explored as
part of more comprehensive evaluations (Klecun and Cornford, 2005). Others have argued
that CDSS evaluation should be more focused on organisational issues especially to  support
the organisational decision making processes (Lehmannm and Ohno-Machado, 2011).
However, the context of CDSS evaluation differs between clinical areas and across
organisations. This distinction is im portant because if affects how CDSS evaluation results are
used or generalised across various settings (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2010a). Various
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researchers have looked at organisational issues that affect the adoption and evaluation of 
healthcare technologies (Campion Jr et al., 2010; Kaplan, 2001b; Lluch, 2011). These range 
from existing organisational culture, structural issues and the intended users of the 
technology. Examples include the systems which are in place to  enable technology adoption, 
social and professional issues and organisational readiness to adopt new technologies. 
Additionally, contextual issues that provide insight into how technologies are used and their 
effectiveness in specific clinical settings have brought new perspectives to  both adoption and 
evaluation literature (Campion Jr et al., 2010; Lomotan et al., 2012).
A systematic review by van Germert-Pijnen et al. (2011) concluded that most healthcare 
technologies often fail to demonstrate sustainable success in clinical settings. They attributed  
these failures to the tendency to disregard the interdependencies between technology, 
human aspects and the socioeconomic environment, which often results in technologies that 
have a low impact on clinical settings. They also noted widespread failures in project 
management, minimal involvement of end-users, lack of project scope and definition, 
ownership and responsibilities of those involved. Chaudhry et al. (2006) also reported that 
healthcare professionals were often sceptical and hesitant to  accept CDSS, arguing th at they  
do not adequately support their work or result in patient benefits, van Germ ert-Pijnen et al. 
(2011) advocated for a holistic approach in the design and implem entation of healthcare 
technologies that takes into account the complexity of healthcare and the rituals and habits 
of all stakeholders. They argued that such an approach would require careful coordination  
between various multi-disciplinary members involved, patients and other stakeholders. 
Kaplan (2001b) argued that the scope of CDSS evaluations should be widened to  take into 
account social, organisational, professional and other contextual considerations. She argued
that unlike RCTs and other experimental designs, such evaluations would focus on the 'fit; of 
CDSS into the professional and organisational processes, rather than just focusing on 
measures of system performance and changes in physicians' behaviour. Similarly, Rahimi and 
Vimarlund (2007) noted that evaluation approaches such as user testing, cognitive studies, 
ethnography studies or socio-technical analyses would be more appropriate for assessing the 
effects of new systems on the organisation and its personnel. This also echoes the suggestion 
by Brooks et al. (2008) for shifting towards a more patient-centric approach to  health 
informatics and their evaluations.
2.5.1 Existing technology infrastructure
Existing technology infrastructure relates to the hardware, software, internal and external 
networks and related facilities that enable the adoption, use and evaluation of IT systems. 
Since the 1990s, information technology infrastructure has been identified as a critical factor 
in an organisation's ability to  successfully adopt new technologies, optimise existing 
technological resources and competitively use IT resources (Snyder and Fields, 2006; 
Broadbent et al., 1999b; Broadbent et al., 1999a). Some models have been developed to  
assess the flexibility and responsiveness of an organisation's technology infrastructure. For 
example, Byrd and Turner (2000), explored the operationalisation of the concept of 
technology infrastructure flexibility and its value to  the organisation. Chung et al. (2003) 
identified technology infrastructure flexibility as a core aspect of an organisation's ability to  
survive in fast changing business environments. They identified compatibility, connectivity, 
modularity and IT personnel as the key components that required strategic alignment to  the  
im plementation of IT resources. Others have explored the impact of technology enabled 
business process redesign (Broadbent et al., 1999b). Assessment of existing technology
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infrastructure is essential is essential for CDSS evaluators because it may inform their 
evaluations as well as providing baselines to work from.
2.5.2 Organisational readiness for technology adoption
Organisational readiness has been identified as an im portant factor for change management. 
W einer (2009) described organisational readiness for change as a multi-level and m ulti­
faceted construct that involves a shared com m itm ent and collective belief of capability to  
im plem ent change by the organisation's members. It involves an assessment of an 
organisation's readiness to  adopt new ways of working, especially those that involve complex 
change. The assessment can be at individual, professional group, departm ent or across the  
organisation, to establish the organisational capacity to work together towards the set 
objectives. Many strategies have been developed to assess organisational readiness for 
change involving collective behavioural change through systems redesign and involving 
multiple and simultaneous changes in work flow, staffing, decision making, communication  
and incentive systems (Holt et al., 2010). W einer's (2009) theory of organisational change 
focuses on a thorough assessment of task demands, resource availability and situational 
factors of each change project. W einer argued that when organisational readiness for change 
is high, its members are more likely to implem ent change, exert greater effort, exhibit greater 
persistence and display more cooperative behaviour, thus resulting in effective 
im plem entation and produce anticipated results. Using this model, im plem entation success 
depends on both change efficacy and contextual factors. Success is depended on the existing 
organisational culture and its members' collective belief th a t they have the capability to  
im plem ent the change effectively. Savory and Fortune (2013) also highlighted the importance
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of ensuring technology fit to the social context of the host organisation, existing 
organisational culture and the need for acceptance of the new technology.
2.5.3 External technology context
The past tw o decades have seen a significant increase in the adoption of new technologies in 
the NHS and healthcare systems in most developed countries. Friedman and W yatt (2006) 
observed that most technologies were small standalone systems that were not w idely used 
beyond the clinical areas where they were developed. In the UK, the introduction of NICE 
guidelines and related national initiatives has led to increased demands for standardised care 
across the NHS. Some NICE guidelines have recommended computerisation of various aspects 
of care to deliver guideline adherent healthcare services (NICE, 2010a; NICE, 2007). This has 
put many NHS Trusts under immense pressure to  find technological solutions to  support their 
organisations' efforts in implementing guidelines.
2.6 Purposes of CDSS evaluations
The purposes of CDSS evaluations vary considerably. W yatt and Spiegelhalter (1991) grouped 
CDSS evaluation purposes into ethical, legal and intellectual categories. Others have grouped  
evaluation purposes into technical, clinical, economic, performance and regulatory categories 
among others (Bright et al., 2012). There have been calls for rigorous evaluations to  support 
decision makers in making decisions about CDSS adoption (Am m enwerth et al., 2004; Karsh 
et al., 2010). Others have also highlighted the high costs of these systems and the need for 
decision makers to  justify expenditure on them  (Friedman and W yatt, 2006) and comparing  
them  with other alternatives (Karsh et al., 2010). Indeed, in one case, it took a com puter crash 
for clinicians to  find that it was quicker and easier to ask patients rather than use a
computerised system (Krakau and Fabian, 1999). W yatt and W yatt (2003) noted that decision 
makers in healthcare organisations are often pressurised by vendors, clinicians and the  
general public to  develop and im plem ent CDSSs. Others have found that decision-makers do 
not often have adequate information about these systems to make informed decisions about 
their adoption (W yatt and Keen, 2001; Black et al., 2011; Lehmannm and Ohno-Machado, 
2011). W yatt and W yatt (2003) noted that these systems are technology, rather than clinically 
driven and developers often do not see the need to  evaluate these systems.
A systematic review by Kaplan (2001b) reported that most CDSS evaluation studies primarily 
focused on system accuracy rather than clinicians' performance when using these systems or 
assessing the impact of system use on patient care. Other studies have looked at physician 
perceptions of CDSS and others looked at the functionality of the CDSS and underlying 
knowledge base (Bright et al., 2012; Boonstra and Broekhuis, 2010). Heathfield et al. (1998) 
noted that CDSS evaluations were politicised and focused primarily on economic benefits 
rather than quality of life. They argued that consequently, most evaluations focused on 
justifying past expenditures and rebuilding trust with key stakeholders. Different stakeholders 
may have different priorities about which aspects of the system are evaluated. For example, 
W yatt and W yatt (2003) noted that organisational priorities for evaluating a new test ordering 
system would relate to  w hether the system saves money, reduce risk exposure or improve 
patient satisfaction. Clinical staff may be concerned about w hether the system is easy to  use, 
quicker than paper forms, clinical efficacy and effect on clinical decision making (clinical 
freedom ). Concerns for laboratory staff would be w hether tests ordered are appropriate and 
the volume of orders. Patients would be concerned about the tim e it takes for their tests and 
obtaining results. Heathfield et al. (1998) argued that CDSS evaluations should not only look
at accountability, but instead should aim to  improve understanding of their role in healthcare. 
Furthermore, they argued that CDSSs should help to  support the im plem entation of systems 
that deliver clinical and economic benefits.
This section has looked at the range of CDSS evaluation purposes found in the literature. The 
evidence suggests CDSS evaluations that look at a wide range of purposes are likely to  provide 
useful information to decision makers than those with a narrow purpose (Heathfield et al., 
1998; Kaplan, 2001b; Karsh et al., 2010).
2.7 Benefits of CDSS evaluations
Despite the many challenges facing evaluators, Rigby noted that there were organisational, 
ethical and professional benefits of "rigorous evaluation studies" (Rigby, 2001). M any health 
information systems that were being implemented by organisations (including CDSSs) were  
novel in nature and involved significant changes in ways of working (Boonstra and Broekhuis, 
2010; Rigby, 2001). Their introduction often involved many issues, such as hardware and 
associated devices and operational policies and procedures. Their novelty also exposes 
organisations and patients to potential risks (W yatt and W yatt, 2003; Am m enwerth et al., 
2004; Karsh et al., 2010). Rigby (2001) argued that organisations had a moral im perative to  
generate and share knowledge about these systems through evaluations.
Others have argued that the scarcity of resources invested in healthcare systems should give
further reasons for healthcare organisations to evaluate these systems and ensure their
optimal and efficient use (Friedman and W yatt, 2006; Rigby, 2001). Healthcare managers and
policy makers have a duty of care to both the healthcare systems and clients they are
responsible for and to account for their use of public money (Rigby, 2001; Friedman and
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W yatt, 2006). Rigby argued that this duty of care can only be ethically delivered through  
evidence-based approaches, which he argued, were scarce in health inform ation systems. 
This paucity of evidence was attributed to  the lack of investment in evaluation studies, which 
were largely based on false assumptions about the benefits of these systems (Karsh et al., 
2010; Rigby, 2001; Rigby et al., 2001). Beauchamp and Childress (2001) discussed the  
responsibilities of healthcare organisations and healthcare professionals regarding their duty 
to do no harm to patients in their care. Another benefit of CDSS evaluation is to  identify 
unanticipated, unwanted and harmful effects for patients [Karsh et al., 2010], and to reduce 
wastage of resources (Friedman and W yatt, 2006). Rigby (2001) argued that it was imperative  
for organisations to  monitor these consequences using evaluations and making the necessary 
changes as appropriate to  ensure successful implementation.
There have been calls for healthcare policy and clinical practice to be evidence based, rather 
than anecdotal evidence or claims by suppliers about the efficacy of these systems (Friedman 
and W yatt, 2006; Liu and W yatt, 2011b). In the UK, regulatory organisations such as the MHRA  
and NICE have issued guidelines and standards based on the current evidence to  classify and 
evaluate CDSSs (MHRA, 2014). NHS Trusts are required to audit their performance against 
these guidelines and standards. These audits are seen as im portant for standardising 
healthcare systems, promoting ethical practice and ensuring that avoidable adverse events 
do not occur (Rigby, 2001). Rigby noted that the development of business cases and technical 
specifications for CDSSs was often complex and tim e consuming. However, he noted th at 
sometimes these processes were not done effectively, which in turn resulted in organisations 
repeating similar mistakes in the future. Rigby argued that organisations had an ethical 
responsibility to  evaluate their systems to ensure that suboptimal processes w ere not
repeated in the future. Rigby also noted that the longer the health information systems were  
in use, the deeper there was organisational com m itm ent to their continued use. He argued 
that in such situations, organisations would be wary of making any changes, however 
necessary that would be seen as disruptive to  their continued use of existing technologies. 
There was therefore an ethical imperative to minimise operational disruption and resource 
wastage through structured evaluations that would help to identify the necessary changes 
and im plem ent remedial actions timeously (Rigby, 2001).
There are many benefits of evaluating CDSS. They range from  organisational, ethical, 
professional, economic and patient benefits amongst others. The literature suggests that 
CDSS evaluations that show clear benefits are likely to reduce barriers to evaluation and also 
likely to result in better decision making regarding their adoption and use.
2.8 Barriers to CDSS evaluations
Barriers to CDSS evaluation include organisational, technological, human and methodological. 
Various CDSS evaluation studies suggest that there are disagreements regarding the role of 
evaluation, focus of evaluation and methodologies for evaluation studies (Kaplan, 2001b; 
Klecun and Cornford, 2005; Black et al., 2011). There are also questions regarding w hat can 
or cannot be evaluated (Burkle et al., 2001) and when, and how to evaluate (Friedman and 
W yatt, 1996). Klecun and Cornford (2005: 230) also noted the controversy and challenges 
surrounding any evaluation activity, particularly establishing the context of evaluation, ("who  
is evaluating and why"), the process ("how the evaluation is done") and the content ("w hat is 
evaluated"). Furthermore, they noted that CDSSs were often introduced simultaneously with  
other organisational change programs, thus making it difficult to  isolate effects between
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them . Kaplan and Shaw (2004: 217) noted that evaluation results may be viewed as site 
specific, and that the "methodological complexity of the undertaking, motivation, and ethical 
considerations" may lead others to  abstain from  conducting evaluation altogether or 
accepting evaluation results. Healthfield et al. (1998) noted the scarcity of credible 
evaluations of healthcare technologies. They argued that in part, this was a result of the  
assumptions that were made by decision makers that healthcare IT was beneficial on the basis 
of anecdotal evidence. Additionally, they noted that little or no credence was given to 
previous experiences or evidence from the evaluations in related disciplines (Healthfield et 
al., 1998).
The failure of CDSSs has often been attributed to  the lack of involvement of clinicians in their 
developm ent and implementation (Heathfield et al., 1998; W yatt, 1994a; W yatt, 1994b; 
W yatt, 1994c). Heathfield et al. (1998) argued that many clinicians lacked the knowledge 
about evaluation issues to be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of evaluation 
studies and meaningfully interpret their results. They noted that although a growing number 
of clinicians were now involved in the developm ent and procurement of CDSSs, there was 
little useful information to support their decision making from  evaluation studies. Most 
evaluations focused on economic and clinical outcomes, and ignored the fact th a t these 
outcomes were minimal and that results were difficult to  transfer to  other healthcare 
contexts (Heathfield et al., 1998). Am m enworth et al. (2004) identified the complexity of the  
evaluation object, the evaluation project and the motivation for evaluation as the three key 
problems facing evaluators of health information systems. They argued that evaluation  
approaches should endeavour to address these problems through the formulation of relevant 
questions, employing suitable methods and tools and utilising them  appropriately. They
noted that evaluation problems could be attributed to  the use of non-systematic study 
designs and poor managem ent of the evaluation process. Klecun and Cornford (2005) also 
highlighted the increasingly complex nature of health information systems, both at 
technological and organisational levels. They noted that most systems involved various 
stakeholders and often spanned across professional and organisational boundaries, with  
wide-ranging potential to instigate changes in work practices and service delivery.
Am m enworth et al. (2004) argued that evaluation studies should look at various issues, such 
as the hardware or software, information processes and the interaction of health information  
technology with the users. They argued that evaluators needed to address the underlying 
social and behavioural processes, rather than just the technical and clinical aspects. Others 
have also noted the importance of issues such as CDSS integration w ith clinical workflow, 
implem entation, the quality of information produced, training and ongoing support, the  
extent of usage and w hether users were motivated to  use the system (Berg, 1999; Palvia et 
al., 2001). Heathfield et al. (1998) highlighted the challenges involved in undertaking  
evaluations in real clinical environments. They noted that the main challenge was reconciling 
the perceptions and expectations of the various stakeholders involved, such as physicians, 
nurses, patients, administrators and funding agencies. They noted that stakeholders often  
had different perceptions about successful implementation of healthcare technologies, which 
could lead to multiple and possibly conflicting evaluation questions (Heathfield e t al., 1998). 
Furthermore, many external influences such as regulatory authorities, legislation and macro- 
economic issues w ere also likely to compound the complexity of evaluation projects 
(Friedman and W yatt, 2006; Am m enwerth et al., 2004). Tierney et al. (1990) noted that study 
designs from clinical trials could inform the evaluation of healthcare technologies.
Am m enworth and colleagues (Ammenwerth et al., 2004) also suggested the use of 
established traditions o f designing, executing and reporting of healthcare technology studies 
based on clinical trials. However, others argued that simply adopting scientific approaches 
was not enough to resolve the challenges that were encountered when evaluating healthcare 
technologies (Heathfield et al., 1998; Kaplan, 2001b; M oehr et al., 2006). Furthermore, some 
studies found that many failed healthcare technology studies were not published, thus 
making it difficult to establish why healthcare technology evaluators faced so many 
challenges (Tierney et al., 1990; Am m enwerth et al., 2004; Karsh et al., 2010).
Am m enworth et al. (2004) noted the following barriers that affect CDSS evaluations:
•  Unclear, conflicting or changing evaluation goals during study
•  Large efforts needed for the preparation and execution of the study
•  Complex and sometimes contradictory results
•  Dependence of the evaluation results on the motivation and expectations of users
•  Uncertainty w hether evaluation results can be generalised to other environments
W yatt and W yatt (2003) presented the challenges in evaluating large health information
systems. They noted that regardless of the potential benefits, some decision makers may
argue that the resources could be better allocated elsewhere, for example on training and
improving the quality of patient care. Kaplan and Shaw (2004: 216) described evaluation as
inherently political, noting "what happens when a technology is introduced is affected by
organisational and implementation processes, as well as affecting them ". Leys (2003) also
noted the political nature of the "needs, values and interests" of various stakeholders
affected by evaluation. M ay et al. (2003) also raised concerns that evaluations may be used
for political justification to adopt or discontinue technology projects, rather than the
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purported scientific grounds. Rigby (2001) highlighted many barriers to  CDSS evaluation, 
which he argued were based on misconceptions about the effectiveness of CDSS. He noted 
that while the continuous developm ent of CDSS was highly beneficial to  practice, it was often 
influenced by subjective, "personalised demands and ideas" of individual professionals. He 
argued that this could be alleviated by using structured evaluation studies. However, he also 
cautioned that this could be seen as diversion of resources from "constructive uses". He 
argued that evaluations could be disruptive and could also affect the professionalism, 
integrity and tim e awareness of those involved in the development and im plem entation of 
these systems (Rigby, 2001). Similarly, W yatt and W yatt (2003) looked at challenges faced by 
organisations when evaluating health information systems. They highlighted the complexity 
of the environments into which health information systems w ere introduced and sought to  
provide methodological solutions that would result in appropriate evaluations. Following a 
critique of commonly used evaluation methods, they concluded that experimental studies 
were most appropriate for evaluating large scale systems and where information was 
required for policy decisions.
A report by the NHS Confederation noted that healthcare organisations w ere struggling to  
effectively im plem ent healthcare technologies because of top down initiatives and cultural 
barriers to their use (NHS Confederation, 2011). The report highlighted the challenges of 
introducing technologies into human systems, whereby there were multiple stakeholders 
with multiple interests. Boonstra and Broekhuis's (2010) systematic review identified that 
adopting a change management perspective could potentially reduce barriers to  the  
acceptance and usage of CDSS by physicians. They developed a taxonomy of barriers which 
were broadly categorised as financial, technical, tim e, psychological, social, legal,
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organisational and change process. In particular, they noted that barriers were often  
interrelated and organisational and change process barriers were the key mediating factors 
for other barriers.
Liu and W yatt (2011b) highlighted the increasing importance of evaluation in health policy 
form ulation regarding expenditure on healthcare technology. However, despite the  
professed benefits of CDSS, studies looking at patient outcomes have not reported significant 
improvements [Kaplan, 2001]. Furthermore, many studies have found it difficult to  establish 
which patient outcomes had been affected by CDSS introduction. According to Am m enworth  
et al. (2004), healthcare information systems were often associated with high costs, and 
amounted to  nearly 5% of healthcare organisations7 expenditure. The potential risk of their 
failure thus may have undesirable consequences on healthcare organisations, patients and 
users. However, healthcare organisations often fail to adequately assess the unwanted  
consequences of CDSS (Karsh et al., 2010; Kaplan and Harris-Salamone, 2009b). Karsh et al. 
(2010) highlighted many examples whereby CDSSs exposed patients and users to potential 
and actual harm. They argued that many decision makers made assumptions about the  
effectiveness of CDSSs based on anecdotal evidence rather than systematic evaluations. They 
noted that many CDSS failures remained largely unevaluated and underreported, despite 
their potentially harmful effects and cost implications. Additionally, they also noted that most 
studies generally reported positive results, and did not address unintended and unwanted  
effects, which may result in less informed decisions (Karsh et al., 2010).
This section has looked at barriers to the evaluation of CDSS in healthcare settings. M any of
the barriers relate to  the lack of systematic CDSS evaluations that take into account
sociotechnical issues that are brought to bear on the introduction of CDSS into healthcare
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organisations. These issues are difficult to  address using randomised controlled trials and 
other experimental methods which are favoured by many CDSS evaluators. To reduce barriers 
to  CDSS evaluation, it is necessary to consider the broader range of effects that come with  
their introduction into healthcare settings, particularly the human aspects and the context in 
which the evaluation is undertaken.
2.9 Trends in CDSS evaluation
From the early legacy systems in the early 1970s, various methods have been used to evaluate 
CDSSs but none have emerged as providing a de facto standard. A review of CDSS evaluation  
trends by Kaplan and Shaw (2004) noted the inclusion of lessons learned and prescriptions 
for success in evaluation studies in the 1970s. The early 1980s saw an increasing interest in 
management issues, user satisfaction, and adoption and diffusion of information systems in 
medical informatics literature. They also cited the im portant links between various disciplines 
such as diffusion and communication studies, evaluation research and change management, 
noting how they shaped the development of medical informatics and health information  
systems in general. Various reviews of CDSS evaluation studies have been undertaken from  
different perspectives (Garg et al., 2005a; Kaplan, 2001b; Am m enwerth and De Keizer, 2005). 
However, despite their attempts to  classify the subspecialty of interest, these studies tend to  
use terminology interchangeably and constantly refer to medical informatics, and by 
extension, medicine as the main field of study.
Kaplan (2001a) reviewed CDSS evaluation studies based on laboratory experiments and RCTs 
with a focus on changes to clinical practice and patient outcomes. The author also included 
27 papers that are frequently referenced by other CDSS experts in her review. Kaplan
concluded that randomised controlled trials were the dominant approach used to evaluate 
CDSS, w ith a primary focus on changes in clinical or practitioner performance that could affect 
care. Using a different approach, Am m enwerth et al. (2004) investigated the trends of medical 
informatics evaluation studies from 1982 to  2002 with a focus on types of systems evaluated, 
evaluation methods, and country of origin. The authors found a significant rise in the number 
of evaluation studies in medical informatics between 1982 and 2002, but noted that 
explanatory research and quantitative methods remained dominant. They observed that the 
number of technically focused laboratory studies was declining and areas of increasing 
interest during this period were appropriateness and efficiency of patient care, user 
satisfaction and quality of software applications. They also noted an increase in studies that 
focused on quality of care processes and patient outcomes. They attributed this shift to 
maturation of medical informatics as a discipline. Am m enworth and de Keizer's (2005) 
systematic review concluded that evaluation studies were increasingly considered im portant 
for the planning, development, implementation and operation of healthcare technologies. 
Friedman and W yatt (2006) deemed the quality of evaluation studies as insufficient, while 
Garg et al. (2005a) noted that the methodological quality of CDSS evaluation studies had 
improved o vertim e.
Delpierre et al. (2004) reviewed the impact of computer-based patient record systems from  
2000 to  2003 on medical practice, quality of care, and user and patient satisfaction. They 
defined computer-based patient record systems as "computer software designed to  be used 
by clinicians as a direct aid in clinical decision making", for example offering online advice, 
providing information or reminders to clinicians at the point of care. The authors reported a 
better understanding of the relationship between systems and medical practice, and noted
an increase in practitioner and patient satisfaction, which they argued, could lead to  
significant changes in medical practice. However, consistent with previous reviews, they  
noted that the "impact of computer-based patient record systems on medical practice and 
quality of care was not well demonstrated" (Delpierre et al., 2004: 414). They also identified  
other shortcomings such as lack of qualitative factors to explain the characteristics of the  
systems, disease and clinical setting where it developed and /or used, and stakeholder 
relationships, which may affect their use.
Com puter-based patient record systems increased user and patient satisfaction, which  
m ight lead to  significant im provem ents in medical care practice. How ever, th e  studies on 
the  im pact o f com puter-based patient record systems on patien t outcom es and quality  
o f care w ere not conclusive. A lternative approaches considering social, cultural, and 
organizational factors may be needed to  evaluate the usefulness o f com puter-based  
patient record systems
Delpierre e t al. (2004: 407)
Rahimi and Vimarlund (2007) reviewed the methodologies and findings of IT-based systems 
in medical informatics from 2003 to  2005. The authors observed that most studies focused 
on economic and organisational issues, and that results focused on "mostly positive outputs 
such as user satisfaction, financial benefits and improved organisational work" (Rahimi and 
Vimarlund, 2007: 397). They also noted the lack of evidence to  support effective decision­
making regarding evaluation and lack of a standardised fram ew ork to  evaluate the impact of 
systems in clinical settings.
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This review shows th a t there  is no standard fram ew ork  fo r evaluation effects and outputs  
o f im plem entation  and use o f IT in the healthcare setting and th a t until today no studies 
explore the  im pact o f IT on the healthcare systems' productivity and effectiveness.
Rahimi and Vimarlund (2007: 397)
A meta-level synthesis performed by Lau et al. (2010) reviewed health information systems 
evaluation studies published from 1994 to  2008 covering medication management, 
preventive care, health conditions, data quality and care process/outcome. They noted 
varying degrees of improvement of quality of care across the topics, notably high positive 
results in systems linked with guideline adherence such as immunisation and health 
screening, but no significant improvement in disease m anagement and provider productivity. 
They concluded that key success factors influencing the success of CDSS included "having in- 
house systems, developers as users, integrated decision support and benchmark practices, 
and addressing such contextual issues as provider knowledge and perception, incentives, and 
legislation/policy" (Lau et al., 2010: 637). The majority of recent systematic reviews have 
concurred w ith findings from the studies discussed above, notably little benefit of CDSS to  
patient outcomes (Jaspers et al., 2011a; Bright et al., 2012), and significant im provem ent in 
practitioner performance (Jaspers et al., 2011a). However, Jaspers et al. (2011a) also noted 
that improvement in practitioner performance was markedly higher with drug ordering and 
preventative care rem inder systems, because they required minimum patient data that were  
largely available before the decision support was generated. In contrast to  Lau et a l/s  (2010) 
review, Bright et al. (2012: 2) observed that both locally and commercially developed CDSS 
were effective at improving healthcare processes across diverse settings but concluded that 
evidence for "clinical, economic, workload, and efficiency outcomes remains sparse". Findings
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and recommendations from  various CDSS evaluation studies and systematic reviews have 
remained largely unchanged over the past decade.
The mismatch between health information systems research and practice highlighted by 
Coiera (2003; 2006) remains a central them e of most studies. Some have suggested that 
understanding how CDSSs are developed and what problems they are intended to resolve 
may be the key to this continued disconnect (Friedman and W yatt, 2006; Kong et al., 2008). 
Kushniruk (2001) argued that findings from medical cognition and expertise studies provide 
im portant insights into the diversity of intended users of CDSSs in clinical settings, and the  
need to ensure that CDSSs are developed to cater for the needs of different stakeholders and 
their work settings. Studies by Klein and Calderwood (1991), Gaba and Howard (1995) and 
others in the 1990s set the trend towards studying reasoning, problem solving and decision­
making in naturalistic settings, with practitioners making routine decisions in their w ork  
contexts. Leprohon and Patel (1995) investigated the relationship between decision-making 
strategies and the decision-maker's underlying knowledge. The authors found that when  
faced with high urgency situations, triage nurses in emergency departments resorted to  
simple rules that resulted in accurate decisions, but often-retrospective explanations of their 
actions did not correspond with decisions made. However, they noted that accuracy in the  
development of action plans and ability to assess the state of the presenting situation was 
evident in moderate to low urgency scenarios.
The development of various models and increasing research to  better understand cognitive 
processes involved in decision-making in complex healthcare provides essential tools for the  
design and evaluation of CDSS and w ider information systems in healthcare. As noted by 
Hammond (1998), decision-makers in high task complexity environments tend to simplify the
decision problem, using heuristic strategies based on previous experience and expertise. Patel 
■and colleagues (2000) also argued for better understanding of cognitive process involved in 
decision-making, noting the existence of an inherent mismatch between the way humans and 
computers process information, with potentially detrim ental effects upon clinical decision­
making. Kushniruk (2001) noted that the majority of medical cognition studies have focused 
on diagnostic reasoning and problem solving, with particular focus on cognitive processes 
leading to  treatm ent choice. He noted that most studies applied traditional approaches from  
judgm ent and decision literature, particularly the subjective expected utilities and decision 
outcomes theories. However, as highlighted by M iller (1994), most decision situations are 
often unstructured and semi-structured due to  the individuality of patient presentation and 
complexity of disease classifications. Naturalistic studies by Klein and Calderwood (1991) and 
Gaba and Howard (1995) showed that expertise is an essential factor in complex decision­
making under uncertainty, and that decision problems were mostly unstructured. They 
argued that using the expected utilities model as a foundation for technologies to  support 
clinical decision-making would be tantam ount to assuming that decision problems w ere  
structured and easily definable. However, as highlighted in previous sections, decisions that 
are made in clinical environments are fraught with uncertainties. Kong et al. (2008) noted that 
medical decision-making, reasoning and problem solving under uncertainty w ere becoming 
essential considerations for CDSS developers. They also highlighted the associated challenges 
of developing effective CDSS to support decision-making.
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One o f the  main challenges in representation o f and reasoning about medical knowledge is how  
to  rationally handle those uncertainties so th a t a CDSS can support clinicians to  make correct 
and reliable diagnosis and tre a tm e n t decisions. Some identified issues include the  
representation o f associated uncertainty in clinical dom ain knowledge, reasoning under 
uncertainty, th e  support o f non-exclusive m ulti-part diagnosis and systematic clinical evaluation
Kong et al. (2008 :159 )
This entails an understanding of w hat problem the CDSS is intended to resolve, how it resolves 
the problem, and under w hat circumstances might be valuable for CDSS evaluators (Friedman 
and W yatt, 2006). In the next section, the key findings identified in this literature review will 
be discussed, followed by the research questions.
2.10 Key findings of the literature review
As long ago as 1961 W arner et al. (1961) called for an independent "gold standard" approach
to judge the performance of CDSSs. This led to  the elevation of the RCT and other
experimental designs to the top of the evidence hierarchy in healthcare evaluations
(Cochrane, 1972; Friedman and W yatt, 2006; Evans, 2003) but nevertheless the question of
how best to evaluate CDSSs remains unresolved. This literature review has revealed that CDSS
adoption in healthcare settings remains poor. Also where they w ere adopted, CDSSs w ere not
being fully utilised to adequately support clinical decision-making. In some cases, CDSS w ere
not evaluated at all. Kaplan's (2001b) systematic literature review highlighted that decision
makers in healthcare organisations were not getting enough information from evaluations to
support CDSS adoption decisions. Kaplan (2001b) argued that this was because RCTs and
other experimental methods that were used at the gold standard approach for evaluating
87
CDSSs were not geared to  explain the low adoption and why CDSSs were not fully used or 
accepted in the clinical settings. The literature review has shown that the majority of 
systematic reviews of CDSS evaluations tend to include only RCTs and other experimental 
methods on the basis that they are more objective than qualitative and other none- 
experimental studies. However, most CDSS systematic reviews only include RCTs that were  
published in the English language only. This practice introduces publication bias, whereby  
evidence from  unpublished papers and those in languages other than English are excluded. 
Also due to study and CDSS heterogeneity, most of the RCT-based studies use narrative 
synthesis instead of pooling findings together or conducting meta-analyses. Inevitably, this 
often leads to  inconclusive results and sometimes cautious conclusions. Unsurprisingly, many 
CDSS studies do not explain how their findings impact on practice. As noted by Kaplan 
(2001b), this may suggest that the focus on RCTs and other experimental methods is too  
narrow and leads to  researchers and decision-makers alike not gaining adequate information  
about CDSSs to help them  to make informed decisions in practice. This literature review has 
identified five key factors of CDSS evaluation. In Figure 2.2, these factors have been used to  
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The context of CDSS evaluation has been identified as very im portant but the literature review  
revealed that it is largely ignored in published evaluation studies. This results in evaluators 
and decision makers failing to fully comprehend the complex interplay between CDSSs and 
the different actors and the organisational settings into which they are introduced. Lack of 
consideration for the evaluation context disregards the sociotechnical effects of CDSSs in 
environments w here they are introduced.
Purposes of evaluation
The literature review has shown that CDSS evaluation purposes vary considerably. The main 
purposes of CDSS evaluation identified in the literature review include technical and clinical 
efficacy; user performance and accuracy of clinical decision making; satisfying regulatory 
authorities; assessing cost effectiveness; and justification of IT investment to key 
stakeholders.
Approaches and methods
CDSS evaluation approaches can be broadly classified as positivist, interpretivist and critical. 
Positivist methods focus on eliminating bias with a view to objectively and precisely establish 
and measure cause and effect. Interpretivist methods take into account the social 
construction of reality and contend that the researcher's identity and values are inevitably 
part of the research process. Critical approaches seek to  question the status quo, with a view  




The literature review highlighted human, organisational, technological and methodological 
barriers to  CDSS evaluation. Examples include disagreements regarding the role, focus and 
which methodologies that should be used for evaluation studies.
Benefits of evaluation
The literature review has identified many ethical, economic, professional and organisational 
benefits of evaluating CDSSs. Most CDSSs are novel and healthcare professionals and 
organisations have a moral duty to evaluate their effects in clinical environments and share 
this knowledge with the w ider healthcare community.
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This research project will aim to make a contribution to  the CDSS evaluation literature 
across all five of the key factors that form the basis of the CDSS evaluation fram ework  
shown in Figure 2.2. In order to  do this it will examine the following three research 
questions:
1. W hat are the key factors that affect CDSS evaluations in a typical NHS hospital 
setting?
2. How do these factors relate to the CDSS evaluation fram ework that was 
developed from  the CDSS literature review?
3. To w hat extent do evaluations affect decisions to adopt CDSSs in healthcare 
settings and which evaluation methods are most likely to  inform CDSS 
adoption decisions and why?




This chapter sets out the process that was followed to investigate the evaluation of three  
clinical decision support systems (CDSSs) adopted by a UK National Health Service (NHS) 
Trust. In Section 3.1, a brief introduction to  the research problem is given and the research 
questions outlined. In Section 3.2, the research strategies that were considered are 
discussed. The chosen research strategy is discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes 
how the research was carried out, including the data collection and ethics approval 
processes. In Section 3.5, data analysis techniques within and across cases are outlined. 
The researcher's reflection on how the research was undertaken and the researcher's 
background and motivation to carry out this research is discussed in Section 3.6.
3.1 Introduction
The literature review reported in Chapter 2 has shown that despite major technological 
advancements and evidence of their potential to improve care, CDSSs are not widely 
adopted and where adopted, their acceptance and usage in clinical settings is low. Most 
CDSS evaluation studies use randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and other experimental 
methods that mainly focus on economic, technical and clinical effectiveness. Kaplan 
(2001b) noted that these evaluation methods do not address how and why CDSS are 
poorly adopted and reasons why they are not widely used in clinical settings. Others have 
also suggested that current evaluation methods may not be providing decision makers 
with adequate information to make successful adoption decisions (Bright et al., 2012). 
This research looked at three CDSSs adopted by a large teaching NHS Trust; a home grown  
system that was developed by a multi-disciplinary team  of clinicians, ICT departm ent 
developers and project managers and senior Trust managers; a bought-in system that
underwent significant customisation to  the study Trust's clinical processes and another 
bought-in system with minimal customisation.
3.1.1 Research questions
The research sought to answer the following questions that were developed from  the key 
issues identified in the literature review:
•  W hat are the key factors that affect CDSS evaluations in a typical NHS hospital 
setting?
•  How do these factors relate to the CDSS evaluation fram ework that was developed  
from  the CDSS literature review?
•  To w hat extent do evaluations affect decisions to  adopt CDSSs in healthcare 
settings and which evaluation methods are most likely to  inform CDSS adoption 
decisions and why?
3.2 Research strategies considered
Research strategies that were considered for this study include methods that are
commonly used in healthcare research such as experimental, survey, archival analysis,
history and case study as discussed by Yin (2009b) (See Table 3.1). Experimental methods
such as the randomised controlled trial (RCT) focus on contemporary issues, particularly
the "how" and "why" research questions and require control of the research variables.
RCTs are widely used to  measure the effectiveness of new drugs and other pharmaceutical
interventions, cost effectiveness of treatm ents and interventions and m easurem ent of
clinical performance (Kaplan, 2001b; Greenhalgh and Russell, 2010b; Liu and W yatt,
2011a). Proponents of RCTs argue that they are the most robust method to  measure
outcomes and elim inate bias (Liu and W yatt, 2011a). Furthermore, they also argue that
RCTs can be replicated in different settings and that results are generalisable (Friedman
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and W yatt, 2006; Liu and W yatt, 2011a). However, others argue that this method's 
reliance on controlling the research subjects and environm ent creates an artificial setting, 
which is often detached from  real life clinical environments (Kaplan, 2001b; Greenhalgh 
et al., 2009). Additionally, the rigidity of the RCT design limits the researcher's ability to  
take into consideration serendipitous circumstances in the course of research, such as 
unexpected data sources and changing research questions in light of new information 
(Creswell, 2007). The RCT design was not chosen because the researcher sought to 
observe the evaluation of CDSSs in their 'natural environm ent' of the hospital, with all its 
complexity and thus had no control of any variables.
Form of research 
question




Experiment How, why? Yes Yes
Survey Who, what, where, 
how many, how much?
No Yes
Archival analysis How, why? No Yes/No
History How, why? No No
Case study How, why? No Yes
Table 3.1 Relevant situations for different research methods [Adapted from Yin (2009b)]
Survey research is a quantitative method that involves the systematic collection of 
information from a selected sample to establish a representative picture of a large 
population (Ovretveit, 1998). According to Yin (2009b), survey research helps to  answer 
research questions looking at "who", "what", "where", "how many" and "how much" (see 
Table 1.0). Unlike RCTs, surveys do not require control of behavioural events. Other 
advantages of survey research include their low cost, efficiency and generalisability 
(Fowler Jr, 2013). However Fowler also noted that a poorly designed survey may result in 
poor sampling, which in turn may present inaccurate information to  decision makers.
Additionally, poorly designed survey questions may result in inadequate answers and 
potential omissions. Furthermore, the sample may be distorted because of nonresponse 
caused by failure to contact respondents or their refusal to participate. Respondents may 
also fail to  respond to some questions, thus potentially distorting the sample and 
generalisability of the results. Other limitations of surveys relate to their inability to  
generate new hypotheses by themselves or identify any variables that have been left out 
(Fowler Jr, 2013). The survey method was not chosen because of the potential limitations 
of the sampling techniques and its focus on quantitative variables. Furthermore, the  
survey method does not answer research questions relating to "how" and "why" research 
phenomena occurred as discussed by Yin (2009b).
Archival analysis is a method that involves the collection of data from  archival records
such as com puter files, service and organisational records and previously completed
surveys (Yin, 2009b). Archival records provide a static and perm anent record that may
otherwise not be found through other methods. However this method is tim e consuming,
and records may not be available, may be incomplete or the researcher's access to  them
may be restricted or denied. Archival analysis was not chosen as the primary research
method because of potential challenges in accessing records due to commercial sensitivity
and information governance issues. However, where the documents were made available,
they were used to  support the chosen research methods. According to Yin (2009b), history
research method also deals with the "how" and "why" research questions and does not
require control of behavioural events. Sources of evidence such as primary sources, eye
witness accounts and documents are used to collect information and then w rite  accounts
of the past. The main disadvantage of history research is that primary data sources may
be unavailable or incomplete and eye witness accounts inaccurate. Additionally, historical
research deals only with events of the past. The historical research method was also not
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chosen as the primary method because of its limitation to  past events and the potential 
challenges in obtaining information from  primary sources.
According to  Yin (2009b), the case study method helps to answer research questions such 
as "how" and "why" (see Table 3.1). Unlike RCTs, case studies do not require control of 
behavioural events and are primarily conducted in the natural environm ent of the  
research problem. Case studies are widely used in psychology, medicine and nursing 
(Creswell, 2007). However, Flyvbjerg (2011) argued that case studies are generally held in 
low regard in academia or simply ignored and their "very status" as a scientific method is 
also questioned due to their perceived lack of reliability and validity. For example, Liu and 
W yatt (2011a) argued that in evaluating informatics applications, case studies can only be 
used for exploratory studies and hypothesis generation due to their subjectivity. However, 
Eisenhardt (1989) discussed how case studies can also be used for systematic hypothesis 
testing and theory building. Flyvbjerg (2011: 302) noted that "much of w hat w e know  
about the empirical world has been produced by case study research, and many of the  
most treasured classics in each discipline are case studies". Walsham (1995) also noted 
the increase in the number of in-depth case studies that focused on human actions and 
interactions around the development and use of computer-based information systems in 
the 1990s. Leading journals such as MIS Quarterly have now adopted a more pluralist 
approach and now include qualitative studies in their publications.
3.3 Justification for chosen research strategy
This research adopted an interpretive case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Klein and
Myers, 1999; Walsham, 1995). This was done to allow an in-depth look at the evaluations
that were undertaken for each CDSS from the perspectives of the key actors involved.
Walsham (2006) argued that our knowledge of reality and how we make sense o f the
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world is a social construction by human actors. It was therefore im portant to  undertake 
the research within the settings where CDSS are used and collecting information from the  
key actors involved. Also, as noted by Yin (2009b) [see Table 3.1], interpretive case studies 
are the preferred method for answering "how" and "why" research questions, and in 
circumstances where the researcher has little control over events, or where the focus of 
the study is in a real life context. This research study m et all the three circumstances cited 
by Yin and furtherm ore, the popularity of case studies in psychology and case analysis in 
medicine and nursing (see Creswell, (2007)) and the increasing importance of case studies 
in information systems research make it relevant to this study. Flyvbjerg (2011) noted the  
closeness of the case study method to real life situations and the wealth of details that 
can be acquired through the researcher's access to  multiple sources of evidence. Fie 
argued that this exposure helps to  improve our understanding of human behaviour and 
also improve the researcher's learning process and developm ent of the necessary skills to  
undertake good research. Similarly, Yin (2009b) also noted that case studies are 
undertaken in natural environments, thus bringing the researcher closer to  the research 
phenomena as they unfold in practice. Furthermore, case study m ethod allows the  
involvement of more actors as the case develops, rather than restrictions imposed by 
quantitative methods such as randomisation. The importance of the researcher's learning 
process through observation of events in their natural setting, regardless of the potential 
subjectivity and unreliability of case study research has also been highlighted (Campbell, 
1975). Critics of the case study method argue that generalisations cannot be made from  
case studies (Liu and W yatt, 2011a; W yatt and W yatt, 2003). Flowever, Flyvbjerg (2011) 
noted that im portant scientific works such as Galileo's rejection of Aristotle's law of 
gravity, developments in physics by Newton and Einstein and much of Charles Darwin's 
work were all based on case studies. Fie further argued that carefully chosen cases can
result in landmark scientific development and that formal generalisations are not the only 
sources of scientific knowledge. Others have suggested that the researcher's subjectivity 
could be limited by engaging with participants and clarifying issues during fieldwork  
(Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009b). Eisenhardt (1989) also suggested choosing atypical or 
extrem e cases to  improve the richness of research data and internal validity. Flyvbjerg 
(2011: 311) argued that often it is easier to  rem em ber and make decisions based on 
meaningful stories from  case studies rather than "meaningless data" from  quantitative 
studies. Fie also noted that stories are easy to understand and act on than reading 
"meaning into data" from quantitative studies and then "making up stories". These 
reasons made interpretive case study the most appropriate method to undertake this 
research.
3.4 How the research was carried out
This section describes how the research was conducted. The selection criteria and brief 
background to the three CDSSs is given in 3.4.1. Data collection methods are discussed in 
3.4.2 and the processes of obtaining ethics approval described in 3.4.3. The first stage of 
the actual research involved the gathering of background information through informal 
discussions with key stakeholders in the study Trust to  identify potential technologies and 
gain access. For all three CDSSs, relevant clinical pathways and policies, governm ent policy 
and guidance from regulatory and professional bodies were reviewed. The background 
information that was collected and used to  support the main research is outlined in 
Appendix 1.
3.4.1 Case selection
The research was undertaken in one of the largest teaching NFIS Trusts in the UK (see
Chapter 3 for detailed Trust description). The study Trust was selected because of its size
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and status as one of the largest teaching hospitals in the UK. It also has many similarities 
with various other comparable NHS Trusts serving similar socio-economic groups in other 
UK cities of similar size, thus will be representative to other NHS settings. The study was 
undertaken in a single Trust to  maintain the same context for all three CDSSs. The cases 
w ere selected on the basis of being theoretically interesting as suggested by Eisenhardt 
(1989). Although all three cases involved CDSSs, they were atypical in their respective 
backgrounds and adoption circumstances. The selected CDSSs were similar in that they  
processed individual patient information and provided recommendations to the decision 
maker at the point of care. All three cases were based on NICE guidelines that were related  
to  their individual clinical domains and additional guidance from relevant professional 
bodies. However, the CDSSs were on different parts of the internally versus externally  
developed CDSS continuum. T1 (see Chapter 4) was internally developed, while both T2 
(Chapter 5) and T3 (Chapter 6) were externally developed. However, T3 underwent 
significant customisation to suit the study Trust's clinical work processes and was 
integrated with existing legacy systems from the outset. The study Trust's ICT departm ent 
was involved in the development, implementation and evaluation of T l ,  and also worked  
closely w ith the developing company to  implement, customise and monitor T3. However, 
they only had minimal involvement in the adoption, implementation and monitoring of 
T2. The research study was guided by Yin's (2009b) "embedded design", w ith "m ultiple  
units of analysis" in a single study. The embedded case design allowed each of the three  
CDSSs to  be treated as a case on its own, within its own context, as well as the w ider 
context of the study Trust. The study Trust was therefore the primary case, and the three  
CDSSs were the embedded units of the research study. The context of the study Trust was 
im portant because all three CDSSs were used within the same organisational 
environm ent, which helped to control some extraneous variations and lim it the case
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The cross case analysis (see section 5.2) brought all three CDSSs 
together, in the context of the study Trust and other units of analysis such as professional 
groups and clinical departments.
3.4.2 Data collection
Data were collected using a range of methods such as semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders, documentary analysis and observations (Yin, 2009b). Flexibility was 
maintained throughout the data collection process in order to  take advantage of 
em ergent issues and unique case features [see Eisenhardt (1989)]. The snowball sampling 
technique was used to identify the key individuals who were involved in the development, 
adoption, use and evaluation of the CDSSs and other sources of data as the case studies 
progressed (Biernacki and W aldorf, 1981). This technique allowed the researcher to  follow  
up new leads to  identify and interview new participants as the research developed.
Direct observation (site visit)
Observations included site visits whereby research participants or key stakeholders 
showed the researcher how the CDSSs were developed or adopted, how they were  
supposed to be used and a tour of some of the clinical environments w here they were  
used. In all three cases, the researcher was guided by a senior departm ental m em ber who 
described the CDSS and demonstrated how it was intended to be used. The site visits 
provided an understanding of the individual CDSSs, the environm ent w here they were  
being used and the background and supporting processes within the relevant clinical 
areas. Unlike interviews, the site visits provided unstructured observational data in the  
natural setting where the CDSS were used, which was essential to augm ent both the  
interview and documentary data as highlighted by Yin (2009b).
103
Semi-structured interviews
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with key stakeholders, including senior 
managers and senior clinicians, clinical line managers, nurses and junior doctors. Semi­
structured interviews were selected as the main data collection method to gain in-depth 
insights by drawing on information from a few  key informants as recommended by Denzin 
and Lincoln (2009). These interviews allowed the researcher flexibility in terms of the  
order in which topics were considered, while also maintaining a clear list of issues to  be 
addressed and questions to  be answered. Additionally, these interviews had the added 
advantage of giving the interviewees opportunities to  "develop their ideas and speak 
more widely on the issues raised by the researcher" (Denscombe, 2003: : 167). 
Interviewees were also given an opportunity to  pursue their ideas or train of thought, and 
to use their own words, thus providing more in-depth information on them es or topics 
introduced by the researcher. Allowing the interviewee to "speak their mind" enabled the  
in-depth investigation of complex issues, particularly as personal accounts of experiences 
and feelings were im portant to  this study. The interviews were conducted like "normal 
conversations", but with a specific purpose and structure, starting w ith introducing 
questions regarding a key dimension of the respective CDSS, and allowing interviewees to  
give detailed descriptions of their experiences or understanding of the issue. This was 
followed by follow up questions on related issues to maintain the them e or establish 
causal links between issues as the interview progressed (Kvale, 1996a).
Denscombe (2003) noted that interviews rely mostly on the ability to conduct a 
conversation and do not require setting up complex equipm ent to collect data. These key 
informants were carefully selected based on their involvement in the adoption, use and 
evaluation of the selected CDSSs. Interviews were also appropriate for this study because
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it involved the collection of information that could be considered as sensitive as noted by 
Denscombe (2003), for example power relations between various stakeholders in the  
study Trust so it was im portant to make participants feel at ease. As selected CDSSs were  
adopted and evaluated by a few  individuals, there was value in conducting interviews with  
targeted stakeholders to access privileged information that the researcher would 
otherwise not be able to obtain anywhere else (Denscombe, 2003).
Most interviews were conducted on a one on one basis, in part because having one source 
of information made it fairly straightforward to locate specific ideas w ith individual 
participants. There was also flexibility to adjust research topics and questions during and 
between interviews as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), as well as developing new lines of 
enquiry to  clarify data accuracy and relevance at the point of collection. The interviews 
were conducted in a conversational, open ended style as suggested by Denscombe (2003). 
However, the research purpose and structure was maintained, starting w ith introducing 
questions regarding how participants first found out about the CDSS. This was generally 
followed by participants liberally giving detailed descriptions of their first experiences 
with the respective CDSSs, progressing to key contextual events which they experienced  
but often had not revisited. In most cases, several of the indicative questions were  
answered in the initial exchange, allowing the researcher to  present follow  up questions 
on related issues and establish causal links as necessary. The indicative interview  
questions were used to guide data collection and provide insights into interrelated and 
causal links. Examples of indicative interview questions that were used are provided in 
Appendix 2. These questions were used as a guide for the interviews but w ere adapted  
depending on the interviewee's role and responsibility within the organisation and the  
specific CDSS being considered. These questions evolved as the research progressed to
explore new leads and were informed by previous interviews and documentary evidence.
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(See Appendices 1.1 to  1.4.) The interview questions were structured to capture key 
intervals of the adoption stages as described by Friedman and W yatt (2006) and key 
evaluation factors identified in the literature review (see Appendix 3).
Interviews were audio recorded with the consent of individual participants to  provide "a 
more accurate rendition"' and perm anent record, which could be listened to again and 
again (Yin, 2009a: 109). Audio recording also allowed the interviewer an opportunity to  
focus on the interview dynamics, rather than writing notes, which could itself be a 
distraction during the interview and could result in incomplete responses (Kvale, 1996b). 
The researcher was mindful of the potentially disconcerting and threatening nature of 
audio recording and possibility of interviewees giving less honest answers (Walsham, 
2006). To minimise this risk, all interviewees were given the opportunity to  accept or 
decline, and to pause the recording in cases where they felt that issues under discussion 
w ere sensitive (Walsham, 2006). According to  Kvale (1996a), audio recording also allows 
the interviewer an opportunity to concentrate on the topics and dynamics o f interview, 
as well as offering a "decontextualized" version of the interview that can be re-listened to  
again and again. However, because interviews are a speech only record, field notes were  
also used to capture non-verbal and other relevant contextual factors to  augm ent the  
audio record. All interviews were fully transcribed im m ediately after they w ere carried 
out. However, as the participants were specifically targeted key stakeholders, the need 
for accurate data was a key imperative. There was a possibility that this could not be 
achieved using shorthand notes, which may itself be a distraction during the course of the  
interview and may result in incomplete responses. Field notes were essential for noting 
the interviewer's im m ediate impressions during the interviews, and capturing the  
contextual factors and non-verbal cues and relevant contextual factors as recommended  
by Eisenhardt (1989). Field notes are also less intrusive compared with audio recording.
This also helped to  augment the audio record (Yin, 2009b). As noted by Yin (2009b), 
interviews may be affected by poor articulation of questions and answers, response bias, 
and deliberate or unintentional inaccuracies. Other common pitfalls of interviews include 
tim e required to  carry out interviews, open form at of data, interviewer effect arid 
reliability issues, and inhibitions on the part of the interviewees (Yin, 2009b). To counter 
these pitfalls, interview questions were tested in pilot interviews in the initial stages of 
the research and refined to  maintain a conversational style, while retaining specific focus 
as suggested by Denscombe (2003). Additionally, interview questions were adapted to  
operationalise evaluation concepts and suit participants' professional roles to  allow the  
gathering of unique perspectives based on their experiences. As interviews are considered 
verbal reports (Yin, 2009b), they were corroborated with organisational documents 
related to  the CDSSs, published and unpublished data and direct observations as discussed 
in succeeding sub-sections. By targeting key stakeholders, the researcher sought to  gain 
an understanding of their priorities, opinions and ideas regarding how CDSSs were  
evaluated and how evaluations affected them  and their work environments. Interviewees  
were given an opportunity to  "expand their ideas, explain their views and identify w hat 
they regarded as crucial factors" (Denscombe, 2003: 189). The researcher also had the  
flexibility to adjust and develop new lines of enquiry as the interviews progressed, and 
opportunities to  check the validity of data for accuracy and relevance at the point of 
collection. As interviews were prearranged with carefully selected respondents, the  
response rate was 100%. The researcher sought to  build on the "personal elem ent"  
offered by the interview method, whereby "people tend to enjoy the rather rare chance 
to  talk about their ideas at length to  a person whose purpose is to  listen and note the  
ideas w ithout being critical" (Denscombe, 2003 :190 ).
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Documentary analysis
Documents are an essential aspect of healthcare for clinical, professional, administrative 
and regulatory requirements. Yin (2009a) noted the usefulness of documents for 
strengthening the internal validity of case study research. This is achieved by augmenting  
other sources of evidence, triangulation purposes, and understanding communication 
channels between various professional groups. According to  Yin (2009b), documents are 
a "stable, unobtrusive and exact" source of data that offers a broad coverage over tim e, 
which also provide insights into key events and settings. However, they can be difficult to  
retrieve or access, may be incomplete, and may contain reporting bias. Access to relevant 
documents was granted by the study Trust's relevant senior managers and clinicians. 
Documents reviewed included letters, clinical audits, Trust reports and policies, clinical 
pathways and national guidelines, training materials, internal m emorandum, email 
newsletters and Intranet communications, the study Trust's annual reports and quality 
accounts for the relevant periods, and technology strategy briefings (see Appendix 1). 
Additionally, archival documents such as historic policy and service reports, lists of key 
people, press releases, previously undertaken surveys and audits were also accessed to  
gain fresh insights, triangulate evidence sources and improve internal validity (Yin, 2009b). 
M ost archival documents were publicly available on the study Trust's website and intranet 
and reports from regulatory bodies. Appendices 1.1 to  1.4 shows the range of relevant 
documents and related artefacts that w ere used to support the data collection process.
3.4.3 Ethics approval
Before undertaking the research, ethics approval was sought from  The Open University 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). This process involved the submission of a 
research protocol, which included a literature review and research methodology, a
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participant information sheet (PIS) detailing the purposes and conduct of the research, 
how data and participants' rights would be protected and an informed consent form  (ICF) 
that was signed by both the researcher and each individual participant. The documents 
that were submitted for the HREC ethics application are provided as Appendices 4 and 5. 
Following HREC approval (see Appendix 6) all the documents listed above were submitted  
to  the study Trust's Research and Development departm ent. The researcher also had to  
complete the Gafrec guidance form as required for all research projects that involve 
collecting data within the NHS (see Appendix 7). The research project was approved by 
the study Trust's Research and Development departm ent on condition that the research 
protocol was adhered to. Meetings were subsequently held with senior managers and 
clinicians from  the relevant departments who confirmed their com m itm ent to the project 
and approved access to the settings where the selected CDSSs had been adopted.
3.5 Data analysis techniques
As recommended by Eisenhardt (1989), data collection and data analysis frequently  
overlapped to gain familiarity with the data and make preliminary assumptions at the  
point of collection. This process helped to speed up the data analysis process and allowed 
flexibility, such as changing data collection techniques w here necessary. Changes included 
adding interview questions to probe new lines of enquiry and addressing new issues as 
they emerged (Eisenhardt, 1989). Corbin and Strauss's (1990) grounded theory approach 
was adopted to allow the researcherto continually immerse w ith the data to gain a deeper 
understanding of each case as the research developed.
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3.5.1 Within case analysis
The case analysis adopted an approach based on Eisenhardt's (1989) w ithin case analysis. 
This technique involves commencing data analysis during the data collection stage. It 
enables the researcher to manage large volumes of data collected from  interviews and 
aides a detailed, descriptive write up of each case as recommended by Miles and 
Huberman (1984). Consequently, a "rich familiarity" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540) can be 
established which helps to  accelerate cross case analysis. Flyvberg (2011: 301) described 
this form  of analysis as more detailed, complete and richer "depth fo r the unit of study 
than cross unit analysis". W ithin case analysis was im portant because it allowed the  
researcher to undertake "intensive analysis" of each CDSS. Field notes and running 
commentaries recorded during the research process were also an im portant part of the  
data analysis process (van Maanen, 1988). These notes covered observations, analysis and 
summaries of daily activities, such as emergent ideas, thoughts, initial impressions and 
perceptions were immediately recorded in a descriptive m anner (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Interview  and documentary data were framed into the key them es identified from  the 
literature review as suggested by Yin (2009b). This was followed by iterative analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) of interview data using bullet points, spreadsheets and tabular 
displays, lists of issues according to interview respondents and professional groups and 
comparing extrem e/polar themes (Miles and Huberman, 1984). The lists, spreadsheets 
and tables were also im portant because they allowed the researcher an opportunity to  
condense several pages of narrative interview data into manageable form ats. Summaries 
of field notes w ere also compared with interview data and formal sources to  confirm or 
refute the researcher's initial impressions. Documentary analysis of process maps and 
organisational structures were also performed to establish any causal links or gain fresh 
insights that may have been missed by the interviews (Yin, 2009b).
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Using Yin's (2009b) "embedded multiple unit analysis", all three CDSSs landed themselves 
to  three levels of analysis; the study Trust, the respective CDSSs, and professional levels. 
Data analysis mainly focused on the CDSS evaluations undertaken in each case, but also 
paid attention to organisational, professional and social factors as suggested by Kaplan 
(2001b) and Greenhalgh and Russell (2010b). O ther considerations included external 
influences from the government and regulatory bodies such as NICE, current and previous 
evaluations of related systems within and outside the study Trust, previously undertaken 
clinical audits and surveys relating to  the service supported by the CDSS. Roger's (1995) 
five stage adoption process (awareness, persuasion, decision, implem entation, and 
confirmation stages) were used to provide structure to data collection and analysis. Each 
CDSS was w ritten up using a descriptive fram ew ork [Lynd and Lynd, 1929] to identify 
causal links between different issues as outlined below [Yin, 2009]. The following form at 
was maintained as discussed by Eisenhardt (1989):
•  Descriptive background of each CDSS as described by the stakeholders and 
through documentary evidence
•  Collating evidence from supporting documents and the environm ent where the  
CDSS was used, associated health information systems, non-computerised  
systems such as paper-based clinical pathways, protocols and other relevant 
sources of data
•  Perceptions and expectations of the key stakeholders about CDSS evaluation, as 
well as their knowledge and experiences
•  Assessment of the interactions and responsibilities between d ifferent 
stakeholders and professional groups in relation to CDSS usage and evaluation
•  A narrative of how the CDSSs were evaluated at different stages of their adoption  
lifecycle
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•  Assessment of opportunities for learning from evaluations at 
practitioner/clinician, departm ental and organisational levels
•  Discussion and analysis of issues emerging from  each study
•  Cross study analysis of similarities and differences between identified themes
3.5.2 Cross case analysis
Cross-case analysis commenced with detailed chronological descriptions of each CDSS. 
Summaries from each case were categorised using different formats such as lists, 
Microsoft Word® tables for direct comparisons to  match patterns, establishing divergent 
issues and identifying frequency of issues (See Appendix 8). Comparable issues that were  
identified in the literature, such as perceptions of CDSS user groups, barriers to evaluation, 
evaluation methods, and level of decision support were used for cross-case 
categorisation. Lists of similarities and differences between the cases and unique insights 
from  each data collection technique were used to corroborate evidence. These divergent 
techniques (Eisenhardt, 1989) were applied to analyse data beyond initial impressions 
during data collection and those from the within case analysis stage. Emergent issues such 
CDSS effects on workflow patterns, contextual differences and influences from  national 
initiatives such as clinical guidelines supporting individual CDSSs were also explored across 
the cases.
To conclude the cross case analysis, summaries of field notes and running commentaries
for each case were compared for similarities and differences, taking advantage of the
already established fam iliarity with each case as an individual entity (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Key comparable dimensions across cases related to  CDSS links with guidelines and the
extent of such links, w hether arbitrary or opportunistic; ownership of evaluation, for
example whether centralised (NHS-wide or study Trust) or autonomous within the
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respective departments or sub-speciaiist; resources made available for evaluation in 
relation to CDSS investment; stakeholders involved and the effect of clinical hierarchy or 
other organisational hierarchies; and the decision processes supported by the CDSSs. 
Timelines of external and internal activities and critical events were analysed case by case 
and across cases to enhance them atic analysis. Conflicting evidence was investigated to  
gain an understanding of the differences and establish previously unidentified patterns 
where applicable. Ensuing contradictory evidence was clarified with stakeholders and 
other relevant sources such as the literature and official reports.
3.6 Reflection on conduct of the research
Undertaking this research project was an im portant learning curve. As a trained nurse and 
clinical researcher with prior experience working in various NHS clinical settings, I had a 
fairly good understanding of the NHS organisational and clinical structures. Throughout 
the 2000s, I experienced first-hand the transform ation of various NHS services through 
advances in technology and related innovations 'borrowed' from  other service industries 
and saw their mixed results and the effects they had on users and other stakeholders. I 
was always fascinated with technological innovations and wanted to further understand 
their w ider implications beyond the clinical settings in which I was working.
Identifying a researchable question within the area of interest was challenging, 
particularly because of the limited methodologies used to  study this topic and the novelty 
of CDSSs in the UK. However, qualitative studies o f CDSSs by researchers such as Kaplan 
(Kaplan, 2001b), Greenhalgh and Russell (2010b) and others gave the researcher an 
opportunity to identify gaps in the literature. The researcher took the advice suggested 
by Eisenhardt (1989) to  w rite field notes and running commentaries of the research as it
progressed. Additionally, all the interviews were also fully transcribed by the researcher.
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This process was very tim e consuming. However, it proved w orthw hile because the need 
for accurate data from specifically targeted stakeholders was a key imperative for this 
study. Also as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), field notes helped to  develop meanings 
during data collection, and allowed comparisons with transcribed interview data during 
within case and cross case analysis. The early analysis also allowed flexibility w ith data 
collection such as responding to  emerging issues by adding new interview questions 
[Harris and Sutton, 1986], excluding or including interview participants and taking 
advantage of new opportunities as they emerged to gain an in-depth understanding of 
each case (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gersick, 1989). Most interviews w ere performed on a one to  
one basis. However, on tw o occasions (T3), tw o participants were interviewed at the same 
tim e due to  tim e pressures on their part. Although this was not planned, it resulted in the  
collection of in-depth data because the participants discussed their individual and 
collective perspectives of w hat they considered to  be key events, and reminded each 
other of critical events in the adoption and evaluation processes. One of the im m ediate  
concerns was w hether interviews would be audio recorded or summarized straight after 
the interview. The researcher was concerned that participants would feel uncomfortable 
with audio recording, especially since some of the issues discussed could potentially be 
viewed as sensitive. However, all interviewees consented to  audio recording and this 
allowed the researcher to focus on the interviews and engage w ith the participants rather 
than writing notes during the interview. Interview participants were eased into the  
interviews by asking introductory questions regarding how they first came into contact 
with the respective CDSSs. All participants were willing to discuss their experiences and 
thoughts, mostly chronologically but in some cases the researcher had to  refocus the  
interviews back to the indicative schedule. M any reflected on how the CDSSs affected  
them  individually as well their teams and work streams.
Chapter 4 Background to study sites
This chapter introduces the study site and describes the regulatory systems that affect the  
evaluation of CDSSs in NHS settings. In the UK, NHS organisations and healthcare 
professionals are regulated by numerous government and independent bodies that have 
different, overlapping and sometimes competing interests and expectations. It is 
necessary to discuss the effects of these bodies on the evaluations of CDSSs that are 
carried out by NHS organisations. Section 4.1 outlines the regulatory structure of 
healthcare in England, highlighting recent changes and the efforts to improve technology 
adoption and utilisation to support health service provision. Section 4.2 focuses on the  
regulation of health and social care professionals in England, particularly the role of 
professional and collegiate organisations in shaping and implementing governm ent 
agenda. The study site (study Trust) is introduced in Section 4.3, noting its structure and 
technological landscape.
4.1 The regulatory structure of healthcare in England
The Departm ent of Health is a ministerial departm ent that is responsible for developing 
policy and allocating funding for healthcare in England. To that end, tw enty-three agencies 
and public bodies support it. It ensures the delivery and continuity of services and 
provides accountability to parliament, the public and taxpayers. The key areas covered by 
the Departm ent of Health include public health, the National Health Service (NHS), social 
care and public safety emergencies (see Figure 4.1). Its priorities for 2014 /15  include 
addressing the challenges of an ageing population through reform of social care and 
integrating services for older people; improving standards in healthcare delivery; utilising 




•Supporting people to make better health choices 
•Minimise the risk and impact of illness
■ammmm The National Health Service
•Supporting NHS organisations to deliver services that meet patients' needs 1
Social care
• Provide a social care system that adequately supports those in need 1
Public safety and emergencies
• Fund and support local emergency services such as the police, fire and ambulance 
•Set national standards to ensure that service delivery is effective and consistent
Figure 4.1 Key functions of the Department of Health
The Departm ent of Health W hite Paper, The new  NHS: modem, dependable (Departm ent 
of Health, 1997) highlighted variations in the quality of care provided by NHS Trusts. It 
also noted the slow response to the Bristol Royal Infirmary case (Teasdale, 2002), which 
had resulted in "serious lapses in quality". These failures led to the establishment of the  
Commission for Healthcare Im provem ent to offer guidance to NHS organisations on 
Clinical Governance. In 2003, the Healthcare Commission was established to combine the  
Commission for Healthcare Im provem ent and the National Standards Commission, which 
was an independent body responsible for the inspection and regulation of residential and 
domiciliary care. The Healthcare Commission also worked closely w ith the Audit 
Commission to improve efficiency in NHS organisations through assessment of their 
performance against national standards, inspecting NHS providers and recommending  
special measures where performance was found to  be poor. The Healthcare Commission 
was accountable to parliament and commissioners, and published annual reports on the
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state of NHS services. The use of audits to assess conformity to  national standards has 
remained a key m ethod of evaluating NHS services.
NHS England is a departm ent of the Departm ent of Health responsible for funding and 
delivery of NHS services and improving health outcomes for people in England. It works 
closely with the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and associated organisations and 
NHS providers to  improve decision-making and quality of healthcare. It also gives advice 
to patients about their health and lifestyle through the NHS Choices website. Additionally, 
NHS England also sets the agenda for technology, systems and data managem ent in the  
NHS through the following streams:
•  Strategic systems and technology
•  Data and information
•  Information governance
•  The care.data programme (better information means better care)
•  Care.data advisory group
Through the Strategic Systems and Technology Directorate, NHS England form ulates  
policy for NHS information technology and informatics to  guide commissioners, providers 
and suppliers to  make informed investment decisions, identify alternative approaches and 
deliver the highest quality of care to patients. This Directorate also aims to  support the  
developm ent of systems that fit existing clinical workflows and enables healthcare 
professionals to  effectively undertake their roles as well as benefitting patients and the  
public. The key deliverables of the Strategic Systems and Technology Directorate include 
facilitating the adoption of innovative and safe methods of record keeping, enabling 
access to patient records across specialty and institutional boundaries, enabling and 
supporting individuals to access their health records online, launching the Choose and
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Book service and making eReferrais available to  patients and healthcare professionals by 
2015. The Technology Directorate also sought to  support hospitals to  im plem ent systems 
for safe and effective prescribing for patients and making integrated digital care records 
available to users at the point of care. Another im portant role of the Technology 
Directorate is the commissioning of national information technology infrastructure to 
support NHS services such as the national Spine System, which enables the sharing of 
information across NHS services, the N3 Network and NHSmail, which is a secure email 
service. Although NHS organisations are responsible for developing their individual 
technology strategies, changes in priorities at national level may affect local initiatives in 
both positive and negative ways. National priorities may also dictate technology 
evaluations that are undertaken at local level.
4.1.1 Parliamentary regulation of healthcare
The Health Select Committee is one of nineteen Select Committees which were  
established by the House of Commons under the Standing Order No. 152 to  work w ith  
Government Departments. The Health Select Committee oversees the operations of the  
Departm ent of Health and its associated bodies through examination of policy, 
administration and expenditure and any other relevant subjects on enquiry. The Health 
Select Committee has the power to send for "persons, papers and records", and can insist 
upon the attendance of witnesses, production of papers and other relevant materials. The 
UK parliament currently has more than 500 All-Party Parliamentary Groups that are 
concerned about diverse issues such as animal welfare and civil liberties and venous 
thromboembolism. These groups are comprised of cross party M em bers of Parliament 
and peers from the House of Lords. To ensure formal recognition by th e  House of 
Commons, each group must have tw enty members at all times from  both the governing
118
party and opposition. The all-party groups often act as pressure groups for their selected 
issues and help to  keep the government, the opposition and Mem bers of Parliament 
informed of parliamentary and outside opinion. The All-Party Parliamentary Thrombosis 
Group was set up in 2006 to prom ote the awareness of venous thromboembolism (blood 
clots) amongst parliamentarians. Their role expanded to venous thromboembolism  
prevention nationally, focusing on spreading awareness, assessment, m anagement and 
prevention of venous thromboembolism. The group publishes research reports and hosts 
headline events and advocates for best practice in venous thromboembolism prevention  
across the NHS. It worked closely with the Departm ent of Health to im plem ent the  
National Venous Thromboembolism Prevention Programme (see Chapter 5). They also 
survey all acute NHS Trusts in England against national standards for venous 
thromboembolism prevention and identify areas requiring improvement. For example, in 
2013, each NHS Trust was given an individualised scorecard, outlining its compliance and 
allowing them  to benchmark their performance against other NHS Trusts (See Chapter 5).
4.1.2 Independent regulatory bodies
A number of independent regulatory bodies work closely with the Departm ent of Health 
to  regulate, develop and im plem ent policies and guidelines across the NHS. The National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was originally set up in 1999. Its aim was to  assess 
and approve the most clinically and cost effective drugs and treatm ents for use in NHS 
Trusts in England and Wales. In 2005, NICE merged w ith the Health Development Agency, 
forming the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence. Its m andate expanded to  
developing public health guidance to  help prevent ill health and prom ote healthier 
lifestyles. In 2013, NICE became a Non Departmental Public Body, and its responsibility 
extended to developing guidelines and standards in health and social care for England as
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set out in the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Although sponsored by the Departm ent of 
Health, NICE is operationally independent of the government. Independent committees  
of experts make NICE guidelines and recommendations and its Board and Senior 
M anagem ent Team are responsible for developing its strategic policies and operational 
decision-making. Guideline development committees primarily use evidence from  
randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews because these methods are deemed  
to  provide the highest quality of evidence. By August 2014, NICE had developed 850  
guidelines covering a diverse range of topics such as venous thromboembolism, acutely ill 
patients in hospitals, prostate cancer and medicines adherence among others.
NICE has seven Directorates covering clinical practice, public health, health technology
evaluation, communications, health and social care, evidence resources and business,
planning and resources. The Centre for Health Technology Evaluation develops guidance
and technology appraisals on the use of new and existing treatm ents and procedures in
the NHS, such as medicines, medical devices, diagnostic techniques, surgical procedures
and other interventions. Its research and developm ent team  is responsible for developing
and improving methods used in guideline developm ent and commissioning relevant
research. The Health and Social Care Directorate is responsible for improving quality in
the NHS through quality standards and their implementation in practice. It is also
responsible for NICE Pathways, which are online tools that combine all NICE guidelines,
quality standards and other related materials into easily accessible formats. The Health
Technologies Adoption programme also falls under the Health and Social Care Directorate.
It facilitates the adoption of selected medical and diagnostic technologies in the NHS. The
Evidence Resources Directorate manages databases that provide authoritative evidence
and best practice relating to  new medicines in development. This Directorate is also
responsible for the Information M anagem ent and Technology and the Inform ation
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Resources teams. These teams are responsible for NICE digital services and identifying, 
selecting and appraising new evidence. Although NICE Pathways are supposed to  be used 
within the context of individual NHS Trusts and their existing initiatives, in most cases, 
they are applied as de facto "how to" guides in clinical areas. This may have implications 
for the evaluations that are carried out by NHS Trusts because they may primarily focus 
on issues that are receiving the most attention at national level, while missing useful 
information on relevant contextual issues.
The Health and Social Care Information Centre is part of the Departm ent of Health 
Informatics Directorate, which replaced the NHS Connecting for Health in March 2013 
[HSCIC, 2014]. Its primary role is to be the authoritative source of data and information  
relating to health and social care. It also supports the delivery of IT infrastructure, 
information systems and standards to  improve patient outcomes. Its catalogue of data 
includes official statistics, results from surveys, audits and reports that are collected from  
various sources in health and social systems. The Health and Social Care Inform ation  
Centre also produces guidance from hospital based information including clinical audits 
and data quality resources for clinicians, Hospital Episode Statistics, Patient Reported 
Outcome Measures, Secondary Uses Service, and the Summary Hospital M ortality  
Indicator (The Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2015).
Another im portant regulatory body is the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA). This is an executive agency of the Departm ent of Health responsible for 
regulating medicines in the UK. The MHRA also produces guidance on medical devices and 
stand-alone medical software, as well as outlining requirements for CE marking for stand­
alone software that is used as a medical device. Stand-alone software (software medical 
device) is defined as software which has a medical purpose at the tim e of it being placed
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onto the market (MHRA, 2014). It does not include software that is incorporated into an 
existing medical device, such as software that controls the function of a heart scanner, 
which is deemed to be part of the device. However, the regulation of software medical 
devices is limited by the intended purpose as defined by the manufacturer. The Medical 
Device Directive defines a software medical device as "software... intended by the  
m anufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of: diagnosis, prevention, 
monitoring, treatm ent or alleviation of disease, diagnosis, monitoring, treatm ent, 
alleviation of or compensation for an injury or handicap, investigation, replacem ent or
modification of the anatomy or of a physiological process, control of conception.....
(MHRA, 2014). T2 and T3 (see Chapter 6 and 7 respectively) are both registered with the  
MHRA. Before and after registration of a software medical device, developers are required 
to  carry out various evaluations throughout the lifecycle of the software medical device's 
developm ent and im plementation, focusing primarily on the technical and clinical 
efficacy, as well as post implementation longitudinal data collection to show that the  
device is safe for use in clinical areas. However, it is up to  individual developers to  decide 
w hether or not their device requires registration, and thus effectively may have an effect 
on which evaluations are performed, if at all.
Dr Foster Intelligence was launched in 2006 as a joint venture with the D epartm ent of
Health. Its aim is to improve the quality of health and social care by monitoring the
performance of the NHS and providing healthcare information to  the public. Dr Foster
Intelligence works collaboratively with various stakeholders such as NHS organisations,
the Departm ent of Health, local government, academia and the private sector. Its Dr
Foster Unit at Imperial College London is responsible for developing methodologies that
facilitate the identification of potential problems in clinical performance as well as
highlighting areas of achievement. Dr Foster Intelligence also helps providers and
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commissioners to  benchmark the quality and efficiency of health services, and cost and 
clinical effectiveness against key indicators. Examples include the Dr Foster Care Quality 
Tracker which collates latest data from multiple sources and is linked with the Care Quality 
Commission's Hospital Intelligent M onitoring indicators. The Care Quality Tracker is an 
"early warning system" that enables NHS Trusts to  timeously identify and investigate 
alerts before notifications are raised by the regulators. NHS Trusts can also m onitor and 
measure their quality outcomes and patient safety through Dr Foster's Real Time  
Monitoring tool and the hospital standardised mortality ratios (HSMR). Dr Foster 
Intelligence affects all three CDSSs selected for this research through HSMR monitoring  
and its proximity to the Departm ent of Health, and specifically the VTE risk assessment 
tool because Dr Foster undertook audits looking at how individual NHS Trusts were  
implementing government policy (see Chapter 5). Dr Foster's influential position has an 
impact on evaluations that are carried out by NHS Trusts because they are required to  
submit information on their performance monthly and in some cases, they are ranked 
according to the results. However, some NHS Trusts (including the study site) have 
questioned the credibility of DR Foster Intelligence methods of collecting information and 
presenting results. They argued that these methods failed to take into consideration other 
key performance criteria and relevant contextual issues.
Another key Departm ent of Health body is the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). The
NPSA aims to identify and reduce risks, and improve the safety of care provided to
patients by NHS organisations in England and Wales. Confidential reports on patient
safety incidents are reported by NHS organisations through the National Reporting and
Learning System. These reports are then analysed by clinicians and patient safety experts
to identify risks and opportunities to improve patient safety and provide feedback and
guidance as necessary. The NPSA works collaboratively with the Royal Medical Colleges,
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NHS staff and related organisations, patient groups, the Departm ent of Health and its 
agencies, academia and other stakeholders. The NPSA developed a root cause analysis 
methodology, which seeks to identify systemic and process failures in clinical areas, learn 
from  them  and im plem ent action plans to  ensure that they do not recur. The NPSA root 
cause analysis methodology is widely used across the study Trust, particularly by the  
Clinical Governance and Audit and Effectiveness departments in collaboration with  
departm ental Clinical Directors and Nurse Managers as a de facto evaluation method for 
investigating serious adverse events. This method was also adopted by the study Trust's 
Thrombosis Committee to investigate all cases of venous thromboembolisms that 
occurred within 90 days of a hospital admission (See Chapter 5). Results from  these 
investigations were shared across the study Trust's clinical specialties to  learn from  
failures and improve processes where recommended.
4.2 Professional regulation and collegiate societies
Healthcare professionals in the UK are regulated by a number of bodies such as the  
General Medical Council (GMC) and the Nursing and M idwifery Council (NMC) among 
others. The GMC and NMC are independent regulators responsible for registering doctors 
and nurses respectively in the UK. Their key roles include; keeping up to date registers of 
doctors and nurses respectively; fostering good practice and promoting high standards of 
relevant education and training. The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges brings together 
expertise from its members and Specialty Faculties to improve health and patient care 
through education, training and setting quality standards. Its work is primarily 
commissioned by the Departm ent of Health and crosses boundaries between NHS 
organisations and the Royal Colleges and Faculties and primarily focuses on the following  
areas:
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•  Promoting high standards of education, training and professional development of 
its members
•  Revalidation, governance and administration
•  Undertaking quality improvement initiatives in collaboration with the Departm ent 
of Health and other related bodies
•  Advising and helping the government to develop and im plem ent health policies
•  Monitoring standards and promoting evidence based practice through clinical 
guidelines and performance audits
•  Representing members and engaging with key stakeholders
The regulatory organisations (GMC and NMC) and Royal Medical Colleges supported the  
governm ent initiatives that led to the development and im plem entation of all three CDSSs 
that are included in this research. In addition there was also support from  a number of 
specialty collegiate societies such as the British Society for Haematology (see Chapter 5), 
the British Society of Urological Surgeons (see Chapter 6), and the Intensive Care Society 
(see Chapter 7).
The British Society for Haematology is the main professional body for Haematologists in 
the United Kingdom with about 1500 members. Its primary role is to  advance the practice 
and study of haematology and bring together people who are interested in the subject. 
Its official journal is the British Journal of Haematology. It also publishes guidelines from  
the British Committee for Standards in Haematology, which provides Haematologists with  
up to date information on the diagnosis and treatm ent of haematological conditions. The 
Society actively supported the Departm ent of Health's VTE Prevention programme which 
resulted in the development and implementation of the T1 (see Chapter 5). The British 
Association of Urological Surgeons is a professional organisation for urological surgeons
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which aims is to  promote high standards of practice in urology to improve patient 
outcomes through education, research and promotion of clinical excellence and audits. It 
supported the developm ent and implementation of T2, as well as encouraging NHS Trusts 
to  adopt the system and facilitating the necessary funding and commissioning (See 
Chapter 6). The Intensive Care Society is the main professional body for intensive care 
professionals in the UK. It aims to deliver high quality critical care services to  patients 
through the production of guidelines and standards, organising national meetings, 
training courses and focus groups. It also represents the interests of intensive care in the  
Royal Colleges and the Departm ent of Health and other related organisations. The 
Intensive Care Society's APACHE II study in the early 1990s compared intensive care units 
in the UK and found significant variations in outcomes (Rowan et al., 1993). This led to  the  
setting up of the Intensive Care National Audit and Research Centre (ICNARC) in 1994 to  
provide an independent national resource for the monitoring and evaluation of intensive 
care through its National Audit Programme. Also in 1994, the ICNARC Case Mix  
Programme was set up to audit patient outcomes from  adult, general critical care units in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The ICNARC Clinical Trials Unit designs and conducts 
research to improve the care and outcomes of critically ill patients using randomised 
controlled trials, observational studies, systematic reviews and methodological studies. 
The Intensive Care Society was instrumental in the adoption of early warning scoring 
systems that led to the development of T3 (see Chapter 7). The National Cardiac Arrest 
Audit (NCAA) was jointly set up by ICNARC and the Resuscitation Council (UK) in 2008 for 
in-hospital cardiac arrest from all acute UK hospitals. Data collection started in October 
2009 and comparisons of outcomes following resuscitation are now published in the NCAA 
reports. The aims of the IQNARC audit are to:
•  improve patient outcomes;
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•  decrease incidence of avoidable cardiac arrests;
•  decrease incidence of inappropriate resuscitation; and
•  promote adoption and compliance w ith evidence-based practice
The regulatory bodies and collegiate societies discussed in this section all work very 
closely w ith the Departm ent of Health. These organisations actively lobby the government 
and command significant influence in the developm ent and implementation of healthcare 
policies. There is a general consensus amongst these organisations that evidence based 
practice, informed primarily by randomised controlled trial based studies and systematic 
reviews provide the best form  of evidence to  develop guidelines and healthcare policies. 
However, in practice, very few  studies of this nature are carried out and the advisory 
bodies and committees of organisations such as NICE, NPSA and other related agencies 
use their expertise and experiences to inform practice. This has im portant implications for 
evaluations undertaken by NHS Trusts, which tend to use methods such as peer reviews, 
auditing and benchmarking against national standards. However, in reality, it would 
appear that decision makers trust the judgem ent and expertise of their fellow  clinicians 
together with national guidelines.
4.3 Introduction to the study Trust
The study Trust is one of the largest acute teaching NHS Trusts in England, catering for 
over one million people. At the tim e of data collection (from January 2012 to  February 
2014), it was working towards Foundation Trust licensing with M onitor. Attaining  
Foundation Trust status gives NHS Trusts independence from the Departm ent o f Health. 
The study Trust has tw o hospital sites, a district general hospital providing services to  the  
local population and a tertiary centre, which provides complex specialist services to the  
local population and regional commissioners. The study Trust is the principal teaching
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hospital for a local Medical School, with whom they collaborate on medical education and 
clinical research. It is one of the busiest NHS Trusts in the UK. In 2013 /14 , 574,242 people 
were seen in outpatient departments, 176,485 in the Accident and Emergency 
departm ent 142,389 inpatients and day cases, 5,995 babies delivered and 41,157  
operations were performed in its theatre departments. During the same period, the study 
Trust invested £200, 000 to  upgrade equipm ent in theatre departments; £1 million to  
refurbish the Cancer Centre and introduced new innovative treatm ents such as the  
Intensity M odulated Radiotherapy. In September 2013, the study Trust launched its 
"Getting Emergency Care Right" campaign, which reportedly resulted in 7, 000 more 
patients being seen, receiving their treatm ent and being discharged within four hours in 
comparison with the same period in the previous year.
The study Trust has an Information and Computer Technology (ICT) departm ent, which is
responsible for developing, implementing and maintaining electronic clinical systems,
working with third party suppliers and specialised departments. In 2005, the study Trust's
ICT departm ent developed an award winning clinical results reporting system. It is an
electronic patient record system (EPRS), which is widely used by doctors and an increasing
number of nurses to obtain patients' clinical history, ordering tests, viewing blood results
and radiology reports amongst other uses. The EPRS is accessible through the study Trust's
intranet on desktop computers at nurses' workstations as well as computers on wheels in
ward areas. The ICT Department also provides training and support to  users, as well as
working with the Clinical Governance, Audit and Effectiveness and Information
Departments to produce information for internal decision makers and regulatory
authorities. Like many NHS organisations, the study Trust uses various indicators to
monitor its performance through peer reviews and audits against national standards such
as the NICE Pathways. Peer reviews are commonly used to  evaluate clinical pathways and
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operational documents to  ensure conformity with published standards such as NICE 
guidelines and reduce variability in the study Trusts' departments. Clinical audits are used 
to  establish w hether the structure, processes or outcomes of services being provided 
m eet national standards. W here shortcomings are identified, action plans are developed 
and changes implemented at ward, departm ental or Trust-wide levels, w ith provisions for 
continuous monitoring to ensure full compliance. Clinical audits are part of the study 
Trust's w ider Clinical Governance fram ework, which is used to  improve the quality of care 
provided and patient outcomes. The study Trust's Audit and Effectiveness departm ent 
keeps a registry of internal audits and its facilitators provide expertise and support to 
clinicians and managers to undertake and report clinical audits systematically. Root cause 
analysis techniques are used to systematically investigate claims, complaints and patient 
safety incidents to  identify their cause, learn from them  and ensure that similar incidents 
do not occur elsewhere. The study Trust and wider regulatory structure discussed in this 
chapter applies to all case studies selected for this research.
4.3.1 Selected clinical decision support systems
The next three chapters will describe the selected CDSSs, the clinical environments where  
they were used and evaluations that were carried out in respect to these CDSSs. Relevant 
aspects of the regulatory systems described in this chapter will be discussed in each 
individual case.
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Chapter 5 T l Risk Assessment Tool
This chapter looks at the evaluations that were carried out for an electronic risk 
assessment tool (T l)  using the CDSS evaluations fram ework that was developed in the  
literature review. T l  was used to assess patients who were at risk of developing venous 
thromboembolism (VTE) in acute hospital settings. A brief overview of the w ider venous 
thromboembolism landscape is given in the introduction, noting some key studies. A 
wider overview of the management of VTE across the NHS is given is Section 5.2, noting 
the developm ent of related national guidelines that affect VTE management. The study 
Trust's overall m anagement of VTE and T l's  developm ent and im plem entation are 
discussed in Section 5.3. The evaluations that were carried out for T l  are discussed in 
Section 5.4. The key aspects of these evaluations are discussed in Section 5.5, noting 
similarities and differences w ith those identified in the CDSS evaluation fram ework.
The participants who were interviewed for this study are identified as follows:
1. T l  Project Lead Consultant -  TILeadConsultant
2. T l  Project Lead Nurse -T IL ead N u rse
3. T l  Project Implementation N u rse-T llm p lem entationN urse
4. T l  Lead D eve loper-T ID eve loper
5. T l  Charge Nurse -  TIChargeNurse
6. T l  W ard Sister (Medicine) -  TlW ardSister
7. T l  W ard M a n a g e r-T lW a rd M a n a g e r
8. T l  Senior House O fficer-T1S H O
9. T l  Senior R egistrar-T IR eg istrar
10. T l  Advanced Nurse Practitioner -T 1 A N P
11. T l  W ard Sister (Combined Specialties) -T lW a rd S is te r l
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5.1 Introduction
VTE is a common condition in hospitalised patients. It relates to  the form ation of blood 
clots (thrombosis) in the deep veins of the legs causing deep vein thrombosis, which may 
travel up the blood stream into the lungs and cause pulmonary embolism. It causes 
complications that are sometimes fatal and places considerable resource burden on 
healthcare systems worldwide (Anderson and Spencer, 2003; Geerts et al., 2008; Geerts 
et al., 2001; Geerts et al., 2004).
5.1.1 Venous thromboembolism clinical interventions
Commonly used preventative VTE treatm ents (thromboprophylaxis) for hospital in­
patients at risk include anti-embolic compression stockings and low molecular weight 
heparin such as Enoxaparin®. However, tw o major studies; the m ulti-centre CURVE (Kahn 
et al., 2007) study and the multi-national ENDORSE (Cohen et al., 2008) studies, concluded 
that most eligible high-risk patients did not receive appropriate thromboprophylaxis  
treatm ent despite strong evidence of its safety, efficacy and cost effectiveness. 
Consequently, Douketis and Moinuddin (2008) argued that VTE remained a major and 
often unrecognised cause of complications and death in hospitalised patients. Although 
there was some disagreement (see, for example, Vardi and Haran (2012)), the m ajority of 
published studies and influential collegiate groups such as the British Thoracic Society, 
British Committee for Standards in Haematology, the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists, the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network and the American College 
of Chest Physicians cited overwhelming evidence in support of thromboprophylaxis unless 
contraindicated. They also developed specialty specific guidelines for VTE m anagem ent. 
In February 2005, the UK House of Commons Health Select Committee enquiry estim ated
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that over a third of hospital in-patients in England were at risk of developing VTE, leading 
to 25 000 avoidable deaths annually and considerable long term  disability (Health Select 
Com m ittee, 2005). The enquiry identified significant inconsistencies in the application of 
existing VTE guidelines, particularly the administration of thromboprophylaxis. The Health 
Select Committee enquiry also concluded that there was lack of awareness of VTE as a 
clinical problem across the NHS.
5.2 Overview of VTE Management in the NHS
Following the House of Commons report (Health Select Committee, 2005), collaborative 
work commenced involving the newly formed All-Party Parliamentary Thrombosis Group, 
the Departm ent of Health, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
and the Royal Medical Colleges. They sought to  develop a systematic approach to VTE 
m anagement across the NHS. Their aim was to educate and spread awareness of VTE as a 
clinical problem and to highlight the effectiveness of thromboprophylaxis. Furthermore, 
all NHS Trusts were tasked with developing multidisciplinary Thrombosis Committees and 
specialist thrombosis teams to champion VTE and to implem ent protocols locally using 
the existing clinical governance frameworks and audit systems. Following the Health 
Select Committee enquiry, the Departm ent of Health commissioned NICE to develop VTE 
guidelines for surgical patients. In addition, the Health Select Committee also suggested 
that national guidelines should be developed for adult surgical in-patients, covering risk 
assessment, effective thromboprophylaxis and patient counselling. They recommended  
that VTE demonstration sites should be set up to  showcase NHS Trusts that had a proven 
track record for excellent VTE management, including education, audit and quality control 
systems. Moreover, the Healthcare Commission was tasked with inspecting VTE 
compliance in NHS hospitals to  ensure that all recommendations had been put in place
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and that guidelines were being followed. Around the same tim e, the Departm ent of 
Health's Chief Medical Officer w rote to all NHS England Medical Directors announcing the  
appointm ent of a multi-stakeholder independent expert working group to develop and 
im plem ent a national VTE treatm ent and prevention strategy. He also recommended that 
all NHS Trusts should im plem ent existing guidance from  collegiate groups while the NICE 
guidelines were being developed.
5.2.1 Guidelines for prevention and treatment of VTE
This section outlines in detail the VTE England Programme Timeline for rolling out national 
VTE m anagement programme (VTE England, 2012), and the implications of national 
events for NHS Trusts. The first NICE guidelines for the prevention and treatm ent of VTE 
were published in April 2007. These guidelines covered in-patients undergoing surgery 
and were primarily based on existing evidence from randomised controlled trials. NICE 
recommended effective risk assessment and use of both mechanical and pharmacological 
thromboprophylaxis where indicated. The NICE VTE Guideline Developm ent Group also 
proposed high quality monitoring of VTE-related adverse events and emphasised the need 
to ensure effective translation of research into practice in order to  curtail the various 
uncertainties and inconsistencies that had been highlighted in the House of Commons 
Health Select Committee report. The independent expert working group also published 
its report in April 2007. It recommended m andatory VTE risk assessment for all 
hospitalised patients. In a letter sent to all NHS England Medical Directors, the Chief 
Medical Officer supported the independent expert working group's recommendations 
and announced plans to im plem ent a national, systems-based VTE prevention strategy 
across NHS Trusts in England. This strategy became known as the VTE Prevention England 
programme. It was headed by NHS England's Director of Patient Safety, working closely
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with the All-Party Parliamentary Thrombosis Group, the Departm ent of Health, the 
national VTE Board, NHS commissioners and Medical Directors from all NHS England 
Trusts.
In January 2010, NICE published revised VTE guidelines and quality standards aimed at 
systematically improving the structure, processes and outcomes of NHS Trusts' VTE 
m anagement efforts. Unlike the 2007 guidelines, which only focused on surgical patients, 
the new NICE VTE guidelines required that all adult hospital in-patients should be risk 
assessed on admission, and whenever their condition changed during their stay in hospital 
and on discharge as specified in the revised Departm ent of Health's VTE risk assessment 
tem plate. In April 2010, the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges issued a statem ent in 
support of ongoing government initiatives for VTE prevention, the updated NICE 
guidelines for VTE and quality standards, the national VTE risk assessment tem plate and 
the then newly proposed Commissioning for Quality and Innovation fram ework. The 
academy reiterated to  its members and fellows the importance of effective VTE risk 
assessment in primary and secondary care, as well as appropriate documentation, 
prescription and administration of thromboprophylaxis where indicated. The Academy 
members were tasked w ith auditing their local systems in line w ith the Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation goals. Additionally, healthcare professionals were encouraged to  
ensure that VTE prevention became an integral component of undergraduate and 
postgraduate medical teaching, and w ider dissemination through e-learning modules and 
other promotional materials.
In February 2012, the updated American College of Chest Physicians guidelines were  
released. They focussed on improving risk stratification methods for medical patients and 
those undergoing surgery, as well as advice for long distance travel and the use of new
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anti-throm botic treatm ents. The Departm ent of Health issued further detailed VTE 
guidelines in March 2013. The new guidance stressed that VTE compliance data should 
include all patients admitted to  hospital who had been risk assessed using the specified 
criteria. Around the same tim e, the NICE pathways for VTE were published. The pathways 
brought together existing NICE VTE guidelines, quality standards and all published 
materials used to  support the national VTE prevention programme. In line w ith previous 
All-Party Parliamentary Thrombosis Group recommendations, the national VTE Board 
issued a commissioning toolkit to  help commissioners make appropriate decisions locally 
to support effective VTE prevention using the NICE Quality Standards and Outcomes 
Framework. Further guidelines were issued by NHS England through a 'frequently asked 
questions' press release for commissioners and the NICE Quality Standards for VTE 
prevention aimed at improving and speeding decision making processes and audit 
systems at local level. VTE risk assessment and root cause analysis data collection and 
reporting were now a central feature on NHS Trusts' quality agendas. Figure 5.1. shows 
the Departm ent of Health's national paper based VTE risk assessment tool.
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( D H j  Department 
of Health
RISK ASSESSMENT FOR VENOUS THROMBOEMBOLISM (VTE)
Mobility -  all patients j Tick 
(tick one box)
Tick Tick
Surgical patient Medical patient expected to have 
ongoing reduced m obility relative 
to  normal state
M edical patient NOT expected to 
have significantly reduced mobility 
relative to normal state
Assess for thrombosis and bleeding risk below Risk assessment now complete
Thrombosis risk
Patient, related Tick Admission related Tick
Active cancer or cancer treatment Significantly reduced mobility for 3 days or more
Age > 60 Hip or knee replacement
Dehydration Hip fracture
Known thrombophilias Total anaesthetic 4- surgcal f irm  > 90 minutes
Obesity (SMI >30 kg/m?) Surgery involving pelvis or lower limb w ith  a total 
anaesthetic + surgical time > 60 minutes
One or more significant medical comorbidities 
(eg heart dfsease;mefabolic.endocnne or respiratory 
pathotogies;acute infectious diseases; inflammatory 
conditions)
Acute surgical admission w ith  inflammatory or 
intra-abdominal condition
Personal history o r first-degree relative w ith  a history 
o f VTE
Critical care admission
Use of hormone replacement therapy Surgery w ith  significant reduction in m obility
Use o f oestrogen-containing contraceptive therapy
Varicose veins w ith  phlebitis
Pregnancy or < 6 weeks post: partum (see NICE 
guidance for specific risk factors)
Bleeding risk
Patient related Tick Admission related Tick
Active bleeding Neurosurgery, spina! surgery or eye surgery
Acquired bSeedmg disorders (such as acute liver failure) O the r procedure w ith  high bleeding risk
Concurrent use o f anticoagulants known to  increase the 
risk o f bleeding (such as warfarin w ith  INR >2) i ^
lum bar punciute/eptduml/zpim i anaesthesia 
expected within the next 12 hours
Acute stroke lum bar punctyre/epldural/spmal anaesthesia 
w ith in  the previous 4 hours
Thrombocytopaenia {ptate§ets< 75x1 ©VI)
Uncontrolled systoUc hypertension (230/120 mmHg or 
higher)
Untreated inherited bleeding disorders (such as 
haemophilia and von Wdtebmnd's disease)
Figure 5.1 Department o f Health national VTE risk assessment tem plate  (The Departm ent o f Health, 2010)
5.2.2 Patient safety initiatives for VTE prevention
In Septem ber 2008, the  D epartm ent of Health published a national VTE risk assessment 
tem pla te  to be adapted by NHS Trusts and used for all patients on admission to  hospital. 
This was followed by the  influential M ap  of Medicine's  VTE prevention pathway, which
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presented step-by-step criteria for the various specialty work streams within NHS 
hospitals and incorporated a VTE e-learning package. M ap of Medicine's pathways 
collated evidence from wider literature and guidance from  various regulatory and 
professional bodies into step-by-step processes that could be im plem ented locally at Trust 
level. Around the same tim e, the King's Thrombosis Centre launched its website to  provide 
a central resource for VTE prevention by sharing best practice across the NHS. The King's 
Thrombosis Centre was selected to  lead the Exemplar Centre Network to  showcase good 
practice in VTE management as part of the national VTE treatm ent and prevention  
programme. The Exemplar Centre Network recommended various innovative methods to  
improve VTE prevention such as electronic VTE risk assessments, web-based learning 
modules, advocating for the inclusion of VTE risk assessment as a key performance  
indicator fo r NHS Trusts' clinical scorecards and developing the VTE Link Nurse Network  
to  champion VTE prevention at ward level. By the end of 2013, 26 NHS Trusts across 
England had been accepted into the VTE Exemplar Centre Network.
In January 2009, the World Health Organisation published a surgical patient safety
checklist to  be used for all patients admitted into theatre as part of its global initiatives to
prom ote surgical safety. The checklist was adapted for NHS Trusts in England and W ales
by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) into a single page document to  identify the
patient and the procedure to be undertaken and to  document every phase of the surgical
process from  anaesthesia, the actual surgical intervention itself and post-surgery
management, including VTE risk assessment. The inclusion of VTE in the W orld  Health
Organisation checklist was im portant because it acknowledged VTE's significance as a
patient safety issue on a global scale. Also in 2009, the independent expert working group,
in collaboration with e-Learning for Healthcare launched the e-Learning Venous
Thromboembolism (e-VTE) website. The website provided interactive VTE learning
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resources using various media and case studies to support traditional learning methods. 
It was designed to be a reference source for clinicians to enable them  to understand and 
effectively risk assess patients and administer appropriate thromboprophylaxis. 
Continuing with the patient safety them e, the 'National NHS VTE Leadership Summit' was 
held in June 2009 to discuss developments in VTE prevention since the publication of the  
Health Select Committee report in 2005. Another Leadership Summit was hosted by the 
Health Services Journal in March 2011, in collaboration w ith the All-Party Parliamentary 
Thrombosis Group and the Departm ent of Health. This followed the recently published 
second quarter results of the national VTE audits, which showed some marginal 
improvements but fell far short of the set targets. (See Table 5.1.)
5.2.3 Dr Foster Intelligence hospital ratings
In November 2010, Dr Foster Intelligence published its Good Hospital Guide (Dr Foster, 
2011). The Good Hospital Guide rated NHS Trusts based on percentages of VTE risk 
assessments that had been carried out. The guide revealed that most NHS Trusts were not 
achieving the mandated 90% CQUIN goal. Indeed, some NHS Trusts were even failing to  
provide any information at all regarding VTE risk assessments undertaken. Around the  
same tim e, the Departm ent of Health issued the first quarter results of VTE data 
submitted by 159 acute NHS service providers. Out of 2.7 million patients adm itted, only 
47% had been risk assessed on admission in July and although this increased to 57% by 
the end of the quarter, it was still significantly below the target of 90%. On the backdrop 
of these compliance results, the Operating Framework for the NHS in England 2011 /2012  
specified that VTE prevention would remain a national CQUIN goal. The NHS Outcomes 
Framework also included VTE incidence as a quality indicator. Subsequently, the NPSA 
published a 'How to Guide' to  VTE risk assessment. The guide aimed to  build on existing
138
resources developed by various stakeholders for the national VTE prevention programme. 
VTE Prevention England also launched an iPhone application based course designed to  
help pharmacists, nurses and junior doctors to  understand VTE prevention, treatm ent and 
audit processes. A subsequent report by Dr Foster Intelligence argued for the introduction 
of clinical coding on admission to distinguish pre-existing conditions from hospital- 
acquired events such as VTE and thus improve accuracy of reported data.
5.2.4 Incentives for VTE management in the NHS
In 2011, various initiatives were implemented to support the national VTE prevention 
programme. The first of these initiatives was the NHS England operating fram ew ork for 
2010 /11  that specified VTE as a national Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 
(CQUIN) fram ew ork goal. The CQUIN payment fram ew ork was initially set up in 2008 to  
provide additional incentives to  NHS providers for achieving set goals on specified quality 
standards agreed with commissioners. The VTE CQUIN goal required NHS Trusts to  
achieve at least 90% valid risk assessments for all adult in-patients. Performance against 
this target was to be measured monthly through a census of all patients adm itted to  
hospital. Failure to m eet the target was to be punished by withholding a percentage of 
payments against the Trust's contract value. M onthly CQUIN compliance reporting  
commenced in June 2010. Table 5.1 shows the results of VTE data that was collected by 
the Departm ent of Health. The results show that most acute NHS Trusts were compliant 
with the minimum percentage required to  secure CQUIN funding. However, it was not 
clear how these data were collected. The majority o f NHS Trusts did not have CDSSs like 
T l.  The project leaders argued that it was likely that these data were overstated because 
of the large numbers of patient cohorts who were excluded from VTE risk assessments.
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Our Strategic Health Authority were producing reports where they were ranking 
high... It was interesting and slightly frustrating. You start seeing some Trust where 
you know their processes start reporting 98% [CQUIN compliance] success rates and 
when you talk to them, you realise they don't count day surgery and don't consider 
such patients as in-patients... That's actually not the spirit of what NICE want... It 
seems to me no one is looking hard at the figures.
TILeadConsultant
Also, T l  project leaders noted that many NHS Trusts w ere only carrying out audits of VTE 
CQUIN compliance on discharge, rather than census counting of all patients adm itted as 
required by the Departm ent of Health. They also expressed frustration at the lack of 
enforcem ent by the government.
The UK Thromboprophylaxis Forum questions the accuracy of these figures [other 
NHS Trusts' compliance audits]... There is no question about our figures, we capture 
everyone [every patient] and we know exactly when they are risk assessed... Other 
[risk assessment by other NHS Trusts] risk assessments are done by coders after 
discharge... Some do random checks of say 100 notes [patient notes]... It should be 
every single patient, that's how the government wanted it... We do that but we are 
[ranked] number 14 in the country, and realistically, our methods are robust and we 
should be ranking higher... More should be done at national level. The technology is 












2010/11 Quarter 2 (December 2010) 919,192 524,650 57.1%
2010-11 Quarter 3 (4 March 2011) 2,865,803 1,959,683 68.4%
2011-12 Quarter 1 (2 Sept. 2011) 3,057,451 2,572,284 84.1%
2011-12 Quarter 2 (2 Dec. 2011) 3,225,261 2,846,014 88.2%
2011-12 Quarter 3 (2 March 2012) 3,247,984 2,945,876 90.70%
2011-12 Quarter 4 (8 June 2012) 3,327,261 3,076,885 92.5%
2012-13 Quarter 1 (7 Sept. 2012) 3,250,115 3,035,060 93.4%
2012-13 Quarter 2 (7 Dec. 2012) 3,292,886 3,090,323 93.8%
2012-13 Quarter 3 (1 March 2013) 3,330,310 3,132,820 94.1%
2012-13 Quarter 4 (7 June 2013) 3,299,470 3,107,117 94.2%
2013-14 Quarter 1 (6 June 2014) 3,331,811 3,179,055 95.42%
2013-14 Quarter 2 (August 2013) 1,101,051 1,052,689 95.6%
2013-14 Quarter 3 (November 2013) 1,133,722 1,087,129 95.89%
2013-14 Quarter 3(2 May 14) 3,408,617 3,262,454 95.71%
2013-14 Quarter 4 (4 July 2014) 3,442,924 3,303,424 95.95%
2014/15 Quarter 1 (5 September 2014) 3,418,985 3,282,421 96.0%
Table 5.1 VTE risk assessment data collection for NHS acute providers (the Department of Health)
Another key initiative was the NHS Standard Contract for Acute Services Guidance for 
2010 /11  (Departm ent of Health, 2010). The new contract required all NHS Trusts to  
undertake root cause analysis and to report all confirmed cases of hospital acquired 
thrombosis occurring within three months of an admission episode to commissioners. 
Root cause analyses for VTE also became a CQUIN goal, with separate auditing, reporting 
and payment arrangements between NHS providers and commissioners. The Departm ent 
of Health issued additional guidance on how to use the CQUIN payment fram ew ork for 
both VTE prevention and root cause analyses, and again restated the governm ent's
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com m itm ent to  improve patient outcomes. In support of this initiative, the National 
Patient Safety Agency published tools that were aimed at helping NHS Trusts to  utilise the  
root cause analysis methodology effectively in order to learn from incidents and improve 
patient safety. The NHS Standards Contract re-stated the government's com m itm ent to  
the VTE prevention project. VTE risk management standards were included for the first 
tim e in mental health and learning disability services providing both acute and community 
care. In April 2011, the nursing and midwifery leaders from VTE Exemplar Centres 
launched the National Nursing and M idwifery Network website. The website supported 
the national VTE prevention programme by raising awareness and sharing best practice 
among the public and healthcare professionals. Around the same tim e, the All-Party 
Parliamentary Thrombosis Group published results from its fifth annual audit looking at 
NHS Trusts' VTE policies. The audit was based on a freedom  of information request sent 
out to all Acute and Foundation NHS Trusts. The audit revealed that most NHS Trusts had 
w ritten VTE policies and were compliant with most of the NICE VTE standards apart from  
reassessment of bleeding risk after 24 hours and providing patients w ith verbal and 
w ritten information on discharge. It also highlighted the continuing improvements in VTE 
risk assessment data. However, many NHS Trusts reported challenges in data collection 
and sought guidance on cohort exclusions for low risk patients. They also called for 
outcomes-focussed reporting based on percentages of at risk patients receiving 
thromboprophylaxis instead of census reporting for all admissions as required by the  
CQUIN fram ework. NHS standard contract provisions, VTE audits and root cause analysis 
reporting were found to be poor. Some NHS Trusts suggested a national registry for VTE 
related death rates to improve the collection and reliability of data. Key recommendations  
of the report included the continuation of root cause analysis and VTE CQUIN goals, and 
outcomes based data collection.
The new Operating Framework for NHS England 2012 /13  confirmed its com m itm ent to  
VTE prevention by maintaining VTE CQUIN goals. It also included the Patient Safety 
Therm om eter as an additional CQUIN goal to  monitor improvements in VTE prevention. 
At the end of 2012, the All-Party Parliamentary Thrombosis Group issued a report 
analysing its work since inception in 2005. The report highlighted the challenges faced, 
successes and the need to maintain the gained m om entum  in national VTE prevention. 
Their annual survey results published in the same month highlighted various challenges, 
especially the fact that a quarter of NHS Trusts were still failing to achieve the 90% CQUIN 
targets for VTE risk assessments. They also noted the lack of clear outcome measures, 
commissioning difficulties and failure by NHS Trusts to  provide patients and the public 
with adequate information. NHS Trusts, primary care providers and commissioners were  
urged to  share information and utilise the NICE Quality Standards to  improve patient 
outcomes. The All-Party Parliamentary Thrombosis Group restated its com m itm ent to  
being a 'critical friend' to the national VTE prevention programme and helping to  embed  
VTE prevention into routine NHS practice. The NHS Standard Contract for 2 0 13 /1 4  also re­
stated that NHS Trusts should continue to perform VTE risk assessments and root cause 
analysis for hospital acquired thrombosis.
This section has outlined the key events that shaped the national VTE prevention  
programme and the roles of main stakeholders. In the next section, the study Trust's 
responses to national events and initiatives are discussed. The developm ent of T l  will also 
be described and the way national level initiatives and guidelines affected decision making 
in the study Trust will be considered.
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5.3 Management of VTE in the study Trust
The study Trust provided treatm ents for various VTE related conditions in accordance with  
patient presentations and specialty specific work streams. The treatm ent regimens were  
mapped into electronic clinical pathways that were available on the study Trust's Intranet. 
The pathways also explained the roles and responsibilities of the multi-disciplinary teams 
and the need to include patients and their carers in VTE m anagement through education 
and counselling. Like many NHS Trusts at the tim e, the study Trust did not have a 
systematic approach to VTE m anagement in place prior to publication of the Health Select 
Committee report in 2005. Following publication of the All-Party Parliamentary 
Thrombosis Group recommendations, the study Trust formed a multidisciplinary 
Thrombosis Committee in 2006 (co-chaired by TILeadConsultant) that was tasked with  
improving the overall m anagement of all VTE-related issues across the Trust, with  
particular emphasis on preventing hospital acquired thrombosis. The Thrombosis 
Com m ittee was a perm anent com m ittee that m et quarterly to  review national VTE 
prevention initiatives and form ulated local responses in the form of clinical pathways and 
audits. It was also responsible for updating operational documents and Trust-wide  
dissemination of new evidence. The Thrombosis Com m ittee also oversaw the  
developm ent and peer review of local VTE policies and protocols to  ensure their 
concurrence with national guidelines, the latest research evidence and the views and 
recommendations of professional bodies. Figure 5.2 shows the study Trust's electronic 
VTE risk assessment operational processes and the roles and responsibilities of the  




























































5.3.1 Roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders
VTE m anagement in the study Trust relied on effective multidisciplinary working between
senior managers and clinicians, doctors, nurses and pharmacists (see Figure 5.2). Doctors
were primarily responsible for performing VTE risk assessments, prescribing
thromboprophylaxis and routinely reviewing and leading responses to changes in the
patient's condition while hospitalised. The risks of developing VTE were weighed against
those of bleeding by assessing the patient's current clinical problems, pre-existing
conditions and checking kidney function and platelet count to determ ine their suitability
for pharmacological treatm ent. In cases where there were no contraindications, a small
dose of Enoxaparin® was prescribed for administration once per day to prevent VTE
occurrence. W here a patient had already developed VTE, pharmacological treatm ent was
based on assessment of possible contraindications, measurement of body weight and
relevant blood tests. Patients who were unsuitable for pharmacological trea tm ent were
fitted with antiembolic compression stockings to help stop the pooling o f blood in the
legs. Nurses were responsible for administering thromboprophylaxis and w ere also
required to alert doctors when patients had not been risk assessed; when prescribed
doses might be inappropriate; and when a patient's condition changed. Additionally,
nurses were responsible for providing patients with VTE advice on discharge, including
teaching patients and their carers how to fit antiembolic compression stockings at home
correctly. Doctors and nurses were also required to educate and counsel patients on how
to avoid VTE occurrence during their stay in hospital and following discharge. Pharmacists
were responsible for routinely checking patients' drug charts to  ensure th at prescribed
medications were suitable and that there w ere no contraindications. W here anomalies
were found, pharmacists advised doctors and nurses but could also make necessary
amendments on drug kardexes to ensure patient safety. M ost clinical specialties
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undertook ward rounds daily, in which medical teams, senior nurses and pharmacists 
visiting each patient to: review patients' progress and response to treatm ents; make 
adjustments to prescribed medications where necessary; make referrals to  other 
specialties where required; make plans for discharge where appropriate; and the like.
5.3.2 Paper based VTE risk assessment tooi
VTE prevention efforts in the study Trust were initially focussed on risk assessment and 
thromboprophylaxis for patients undergoing surgery in line with existing guidelines at the  
tim e (NICE, 2007). In 2008, the study Trust adapted the Departm ent of Health's paper- 
based VTE risk assessment tool. The paper-based tool was widely promoted through 
medical grand rounds, Intranet newsletters, departm ental multidisciplinary meetings, 
Trust mandatory training and medical teaching. However, TILeadConsultant noted that 
there was significant resistance to  the paper-based VTE tool, particularly from  surgical 
specialties who believed that their patients would be exposed unnecessarily to  the risk of 
bleeding and post-surgery complications related to pharmacological thromboprophylaxis.
It's not an immediate cause and effect, like if I do this, the patient is going to get 
better in hospital. It is all about deferred consequences... One of the major challenges 
was getting some groups of Consultants and junior staff to realise the clinical benefit 
[of VTE risk assessments] and also that there was no option. This is a nationally driven 
process with major implications if we don't do it. It was a lot of effort and there were 
a lot of - shall I say heated discussions - with some departments about the benefits 
or otherwise as perceived... Unfortunately, the House of Commons paper was 
unhelpful because the data they generated was quite frankly, ludicrous. They quote 
25,000 deaths per year and if you extrapolate that, it would mean that we were 
having well over 100 deaths per year in this Trust. We certainly were not having that.
I would dispute that figure and most people agree it is inaccurate. Yes it will be
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thousands, but not 25,000, and unfortunately if you start with a figure which is 
ridiculous, people will not buy in, whereas if it had been more realistic, it would have 
been better.
TILeadConsultant
Tlim piem entationNurse also argued that the resistance in some specialist areas may have 
been fuelled by genuine concern for the specific patient groups as well as individual 
"agendas".
There was a lot of resistance from the orthopaedics department, not only here [the 
study Trust], but countrywide. There was also resistance in neurology, 
understandably, due to the nature of their patient population and other surgical 
specialities... Obviously they have their own agenda and their own viewpoints and it 
depends whether the Consultant or other clinicians are on board.
T lim piem entationNurse
TILeadConsultant also noted that most clinical departments did not use the paper-based 
tool and regarded it as additional and unnecessary paperwork. Efforts to audit the paper- 
based tool involved manually going through thousands of patients' clinical case notes and 
drug charts to  establish w hether risk assessments had been completed and if appropriate  
thromboprophylaxis had been prescribed and administered to the patient in accordance 
with the NICE guidelines. Annual audits performed from 2006 to 2009 showed the paper- 
based tool's lack of usage and acceptance in most of the clinical areas. There w ere also 
diverse interpretations of NICE guidelines across the study Trust. Additionally, there was 
lack of funding to develop and monitor a Trust-wide VTE m anagement programme.
To be brutally frank it was an uphill struggle [the paper-based tool]... the best we 
achieved was 37% [compliance] with the paper tool... very difficult to actually audit
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everyone, with 1100 beds in the Trust and about 10 000 patients per month... about 
a dozen people helping and going out to look at rates [of compliance]... it wasn't being 
widely used and that was really disappointing despite maximal efforts from a number 
of people...
TILeadConsultant
In 2009, the NPSA surgical checklist was added to the study Trust's surgery pathway for 
use alongside the existing paper-based VTE risk assessment tool. Subsequently, VTE risk 
assessment was included in mandatory training for those newly joining the study Trust 
and annually for all existing clinical employees. However, the VTE risk assessment session 
was only allocated 15 minutes of a day long training session that covered many other high 
priority issues such as infection control and thus its impact was reported to be low. The 
study Trust had also recently changed the mandatory training (including VTE training) to  
an eLearning portal in line w ith shifting national standards. The T l  project leaders 
expressed concern that this new form at of VTE training was unsuitable for most Trust 
employees.
We have quite a good package [of VTE training] included in the mandatory training. 
Unfortunately, it was perceived that there was lots of mandatory training which could 
be done electronically, a move towards the national VTE training tool. The Trust are 
saying we have to use that as part of the electronic staff record... a national tool in 
order to tick a box... its about 3 hours long, way beyond what most people need, 
besides myself, and possibly TILeadNurse, I would argue that pretty much no one 
else needs that level of detail. In fact, it does not even mention VTE risk assessment...
I have gone back to say I think we need to re-think...
TILeadConsultant
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T1ANP also noted the effectiveness of the face to face VTE mandatory training.
The session [VTE mandatory training] has quite a lot of shock tactics in it about how 
important it is for the hospital to comply - not in a nasty way but it drills home quite 
effectively the importance of it - the importance of nurses' role within it... It is 
reasonably effective.
T1ANP
In February 2010, the Thrombosis Committee became aware of the study Trust's 
m andatory responsibility to collect and report VTE data through the CQUIN fram ew ork  
from  April onwards. For this, the study Trust was required to risk assess at least 90% of all 
adult patients adm itted. Non-compliance would result in a reduction of £750,000 in 
operational income from commissioners. Following meetings w ith the study Trust's Chief 
Medical Officer and M anagem ent Board, a multidisciplinary VTE project team  (T l project 
team ) led by TILeadConsultant was set up to  develop the study Trust's strategy towards 
achieving the VTE CQUIN goals. The T l  project team  included Thrombosis Com m ittee  
members, senior clinicians who had prior experience working w ith the inform ation and 
communication technology departm ent (ICT), ICT project managers, nurse leaders and 
divisional business managers. In addition the Strategic Health Authority covering the study 
Trust's region set up a VTE Steering Group that was made up of senior clinicians and 
managers to provide support and advice on implementation of VTE prevention projects 
across the region.
The T l  project team  agreed that an electronic risk assessment tool was the best way of 
achievingthe CQUIN goals. The team had initially considered developing an electronic tool 
that would be embedded onto T3 (see Chapter 7). T3 was a handheld electronic track and 
trigger CDSS that was widely used by nurses in the study Trust. The T l  project team
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decided however to  build T l  on the study Trust's existing electronic clinical results 
reporting system platform because it was widely used by doctors, who would be 
responsible for performing VTE risk assessments and prescribing thromboprophylaxis. 
Another advantage of using this platform was that it was developed internally and the T l  
project team  expected that this would make it cheaper and faster to  develop and make 
any changes easier in the future. Additionally, this platform would provide an audit trail 
using existing parameters such as clinical specialty, consultant team , ward and individual 
patient levels. It was also decided that T l  would be based on the existing Departm ent of 
Health tem plate and the newly published NICE guidelines [NICE, 2010]. TILeadConsultant 
developed the VTE operational policy at the beginning of 2010. The policy was revised in 
2012 in line with the national VTE prevention policy, the updated NICE guidelines and 
additional guidance from the Royal Colleges. It outlined the national VTE prevention  
strategy, its implementation within the study Trust, and the roles and responsibilities of 
key stakeholders with respect to VTE risk assessment and use of T l  (see Figure 5.2). The 
study Trust's Chief Medical Officer approved the plan and gained the support and funding 
from  the Trust Board. T l  was made a priority project for the ICT departm ent. Around the 
same tim e, the Departm ent of Health extended the CQUIN reporting deadline to the end 
of June 2010. This allowed the T l  project team  more tim e to develop and test the tool 
before Trust-wide rollout.
I am under no illusion if it wasn't for the CQUIN money I don't think this could have 
happened [successful T l implementation] and it's absolutely pivotal to have the 
support of the executives and that really helped as it started the ball rolling...once 




T l  is an expert clinical decision support system (CDSS) that was used to assess the risk of 
patients developing VTE in acute hospital settings. It was designed to assist clinicians to  
systematically assess VTE risk at the point of care for hospitalised patients. T l  was based 
on NICE guidelines for the prevention and treatm ent of VTE. It was developed by an in- 
house multi-disciplinary team  of clinicians, nurses, ICT project managers and technicians 
and senior Trust executives. T l  replaced the paper-based VTE risk assessment tool which 
had been in use for several years in the study Trust. However, the paper-based tool was 
not widely used and thus did not provide the study Trust with adequate audit data to m eet 
the expected requirements. T l  was expected to improve clinical decision making and 
patient outcomes as well as collection and presentation of data in a form at that would 
satisfy the requirements of regulatory authorities and ensure that the study Trust secured 
funding for meeting VTE CQUIN targets as set by the commissioners.
How T l works
T l  automatically populated the patient's demographic data from  the study Trust's existing
clinical results reporting system using a patient specific NHS number or locally allocated
hospital number. To initiate the VTE risk assessment, users were required to  input the
patient's clinical data by ticking relevant boxes as applicable. T l  then processed the
patient's data and recommended appropriate actions depending on the level of risk
presented. These actions included prescription of appropriate thromboprophylaxis on the
paper drug charts based on the patient's weight, pre-existing risk factors and blood
results. Additionally, T l  also calculated the appropriate dose of thromboprophylaxis
based on the clinical information provided. The user was then prompted to  confirm that
they had prescribed the thromboprophylaxis dose as recommended. In cases w here it was
clinically justifiable, users could override the T l's  recommendations and add an
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explanation using a free text box provided, noting the reasons for deviation. At this point, 
the top part of the patient's electronic profile changed to  am ber colour to indicate that 
VTE risk assessment has been initiated. W ithin 24 hours of admission, users w ere required 
to  reassess the patient's risk, particularly bleeding risk or any change in the patient's 
condition. W here the risk was deemed minimal, the risk assessment was completed and 
the top part of the patient's profile changed colour to  green. W here the risk of bleeding 
or other adverse event became imminent, then a further risk assessment was required 
before completion and the profile colour code remained amber. In instances w here VTE 
risk assessment had not been initiated within 24 hours, the colour code automatically  
changed to  red, indicating that VTE risk assessment was overdue. The "traffic light system" 
(Green, Amber, and Red) was incorporated into T1 because it was being used on the  
existing risk assessments within the study Trust and clinical staff were already fam iliar 
with the sequence of the colour codes. The study Trust's Information Departm ent 
electronically collected and submitted to  the national database the total num ber of 
monthly admissions and valid VTE risk assessments that had been carried out, i.e., those 
initiated and completed within 24 hours of admission.
Expected benefits of T1
T1 was customised to suit existing work streams in the study Trust and to  ensure 
compatibility with existing legacy systems. The customisation was primarily done to  
enable the collection and reporting of audit data as required by the commissioners and 
regulatory authorities. The project team  expected T1 to be safe to use and also that it 
would improve work processes and the overall VTE managem ent system. It was the first 
such system to be developed in the UK and w ent on to win regional and national awards 
for innovation.
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5.3.4 Implementation of T1 in the study Trust
Following efficacy testing and clinical validation of T1 (see Section 4), online user training 
packages were developed for doctors. On completion of the training, users were assessed 
online before they could carry out VTE risk assessments on patients. VTE awareness 
campaigns detailing the CQUIN requirements and correct usage of T1 were published on 
the study Trust's Intranet and added to the agenda of multidisciplinary team  meetings. T1 
was im plem ented at the beginning of April 2010, four months earlier than the reporting 
deadline in order to give the project team  tim e to  monitor its usage and compliance 
against the set CQUIN targets and with a view to  resolving any problems arising. 
TILeadConsultant revealed that there was significant resistance immediately, particularly 
from  senior clinicians in the surgical specialties. They believed that the VTE incidence 
published in the Health Select Committee report in 2005 were exaggerated and that T1 
would deliver little benefit to their patients.
There are significant groups of people who don't regard hospital associated VTE as 
something that happens to their patients and think of this process as bureaucratic 
and of little clinical benefit. Part of the problem is that VTEs usually happen weeks 
after the admission episodes... we didn't have a mechanism to feedback to some of 
those consultants [before the Root cause Analysis process], as often they will not be 
reviewing these patients until weeks later...
TILeadConsultant
Despite the opposition, initial Trust-wide compliance following T l's  im plem entation was 
70%, compared w ith the 50% forecast by the T1 project team  and 35% previously achieved 
using the paper-based VTE risk assessment tool. The T1 project team  attributed the  
unexpected success to T l's  mandatory nature as well as the awareness campaign and
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training that accompanied its introduction. However, the wording of the VTE CQUIN 
fram ew ork inferred that all patients, including those admitted for minor procedures and 
routine tests in outpatients' clinics, would be risk assessed. This included patients who 
would normally be considered as being at low risk of developing VTE. This inevitably led 
to disruptions in routine processes such as the day surgery unit and other patient groups 
who were considered to be at low risk of developing VTE. T1 Im plem entationNurse noted 
the extent of operational disruptions following T1 im plementation.
There wasn't time for a pilot. It [Tl] had to go [live]. It did work but there were 
departments where it absolutely caused mayhem. The way it was worded meant that 
every admission had to be risk assessed, even minor procedures... For example, in the 
Surgical Day Unit, day surgery lists for minor procedures were held back. On the day 
the tool went live, most of the VTE project team were away and I had to deal with 
the various issues.
TllmplementationNurse
In response to  these challenges (around July 2010), the study Trust and others in the
region approached their Strategic Health Authority to seek permission to rew rite local
policies to exclude low risk patient groups w ithout incurring penalties and losing VTE
CQUIN payments. A subsequent meeting between the Strategic Health Authority and all
regional Medical Directors led to an agreement for cohort exclusion for day surgery
patients on the basis that they were at low risk of developing VTE. To improve compliance
further, the T l  project team  introduced a restriction that denied access to  the patient's
clinical profile on the clinical results reporting system in cases where the VTE risk
assessment had not been completed within 12 hours of admission. In cases of
emergencies or where patient safety was paramount, permission to defer a VTE risk
assessment for a further tw o hours could be obtained and tem porary access granted to
155
the user to  view the clinical results reporting system in the meantime. This sanction was 
remarkably successful. W ithin tw o months of im plem entation, the clinical results 
reporting system access blocking and exemption of day surgery admissions had improved 
CQUIN compliance to  the required minimum of 90%.
In some areas, particularly surgicai specialties and obstetrics and gynaecology, provisions 
were made for senior nurses began to perform VTE risk assessments following online 
training and assessment. However, thromboprophylaxis prescription remained the  
responsibility of doctors. T1ANP questioned the effectiveness of the online training for 
senior nurses who were carrying out VTE risk assessments.
I don't think it [online VTE training for nurses] was effective. It was almost like a task.
I remember it being quite hard to work through, not that it was a difficult assessment, 
just not very user friendly. Those online assessments are sometimes like tick box 
exercises. How much that actually adds to the assessment being complied with, I 
really don't know. I don't think it adds much knowledge as to why it's important. I 
don't think the training itself added much to my knowledge... I can't even remember 
what was in that training... it just doesn't stick really
T1ANP
T1ANP argued that face to face VTE risk assessment training for assessors could have been 
more effective.
Maybe if it was delivered in a group environment where you were being talked 
through it and you could ask questions, it stimulates discussion - those things could 
be so open to different interpretations -  in a group setting, rather than being left to 
just doing it yourself.
T1ANP
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Following recommendations by the VTE Exemplar Centre Network, in January 2011 the  
study Trust appointed a VTE Specialist Nurse (TILeadNurse) to  champion VTE prevention  
at ward level in collaboration w ith the Trust's VTE Link Nurse Network. The role of the VTE 
link nurses was to champion VTE prevention in their respective ward areas. This initiative 
was expected to increase VTE awareness and also improve overall VTE compliance across 
the study Trust. Additionally, TILeadNurse was also responsible for performing VTE root 
cause analysis with support from  TILeadConsultant as well as coordinating the study 
Trust's mandatory training and the Link Nurse Network.
Although the study Trust's VTE risk assessment figures continued to improve, the T l  
project team  reported variations in how T l  was used in various clinical specialties across 
the Trust. For example some theatre departments requested that VTE risk assessments 
be completed before patients were transferred to theatre, although the VTE guidelines 
recommended post-operative risk assessment instead (depending on the post-operative 
risks presented). In some cases, Advanced Nurse Practitioners (ANPs) w ere asked to  
initiate the VTE risk assessments in pre-theatre outpatient clinics to  ensure th at CQUIN 
compliance was met. This initiative was also m eant to minimise the workload for doctors 
on the day of surgery. However, most interviewees (including the T l  project team  leaders) 
expressed concern that the nurses could not prescribe thromboprophylaxis and in some 
cases this resulted in patients not having their Exnoxparin© doses because doctors 
assumed that risk assessments had been completed. However, TILeadConsultant noted 
that his role was to facilitate and support other clinicians to  m eet CQUIN compliance 
rather than dictate how they ran their departments.
There are lots of ideas, for example, to block patients from theatre until the risk
assessment has been done... The actual requirement is for post-operative
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thromboprophylaxis, not preoperative [so] from a NICE compliance and 
thromboprophylaxis point of view, it doesn't make a difference. ... I am happy to 
support them [departments' compliance ideas], but ultimately, they are the ones 
who best understand their patients. I can't tell them how to do things. I only give 
them the minimum requirements, in a facilitative role.
TILeadConsultant
However, these different interpretations had little effect on the study Trust's m onthly  
CQUIN compliance, which remained above 90%. VTE prevention remained a key feature  
of the study Trust's annual quality accounts since 2010, in line w ith NICE and the  
Departm ent of Health's recommendations. By the end of 2014, T l  had not required any 
technical alterations apart from maintenance of its clinical aspects, particularly additional 
training, ensuring correct usage and addressing ad-hoc operational issues, which were  
largely undocumented but said to be tim e consuming by T l  project team  leaders. At the  
end of 2012, TILeadConsultant presented a business case to the Trust Board seeking 
additional funding for an administrator and another VTE Specialist Nurse to  ensure 
adequate oversight of all VTE-related operational issues. However, by the end of 2014, 
the funding had not yet been approved despite the increasingly demanding workload.
5.4 T l evaluations
A number of evaluations were performed during the developm ent of T l  and following its 
implementation. These evaluations are shown in Table 5.2 in chronological order. Some 
of these evaluations, particularly those that were carried out during its developm ent, 
focused solely on T l's  technical and patient safety aspects. Others took a broader 
approach and covered the study Trust's w ider VTE m anagem ent system. The m ajority of 
evaluations were undertaken internally by the T l  project team  using peer reviews, clinical
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audits and root cause analyses. Informal evaluations were also undertaken by various 
















































5.4.1 Peer review of study Trust's VTE operational policies
At the beginning of 2010, the study Trust's VTE operational policy was peer reviewed by 
a senior Haematologist and approved by the Chief Medical Officer in line w ith the Trust's 
policy. The peer review was repeated in 2012 following the newly published NICE 
guidelines. It was unclear how long the review process lasted on both occasions. The 
purposes of the peer reviews were to assess w hether the study Trust's operational policies 
were compliant with NICE guidelines and other published clinical standards. The review  
process involved a Senior Haematologist reading through the study Trust's VTE 
operational policies and comparing them  with the key aspects of the NICE VTE guidelines 
for the management of VTE. The policies were found to  be compliant w ith NICE VTE 
guidelines and were used as a reference point for the development, im plem entation and 
use of T l .  The peer reviews were also im portant because the VTE operational policies 
were used by healthcare professionals and managers as a reference document in their 
routine clinical work. Apart from the clinical members of the T l  project team  and the  
Thrombosis Committee, most interview participants were unaware of this peer review  
process although the policies were available on the study Trust's intranet. The peer 
reviews looked at the operational policies' conformity with the underlying guidelines that 
supported T l ,  rather than an evaluation of T l  itself.
5.4.2 Peer review of paper-based VTE rules and algorithms
In April 2010, the paper-based T l  rules and algorithms were reviewed by clinicians who  
were involved in its development. The purpose of the peer review was to  assess their 
compliance with the study Trust's VTE operational policy and NICE guidelines fo r VTE 
management. Additionally, the T l  project team  wanted to assess w hether the rules would  
enable them  to appropriately capture the information required to fulfil CQUIN
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requirements for VTE data collection. The Thrombosis Committee also wanted to  ensure 
that all of the study Trust's work streams and appropriate prescriptions were adequately 
covered and any amendments made before T l  software algorithms were developed. 
According to  T IDeveloper, the peer review involved checking the accuracy of the rules 
and algorithms against NICE guidelines. The rules and algorithms were found to adhere 
with NICE guidelines and were subsequently translated into software algorithms to  
support the development of T l .  All T l  project team  members interviewed noted that the  
validation of the rules was an im portant step to prove that T l  adhered to NICE guidance. 
Apart from members of the T l  project team  and the Thrombosis Committee, none of the  
other interview participants were aware of this peer review.
5.4.3 Validation of T l software rules
T l's  software rules were validated by TILeadConsultant from April to  M ay 2010. The 
purpose of the validation process was to  assess w hether T l  software worked as intended  
in line with NICE VTE guidance. Furthermore, the T l  project team  also wanted to  ensure 
that the software rules covered all the potential clinical scenarios in the various clinical 
specialties across the study Trust. According to T ldeveloper, the review process involved 
"iteratively going through all the rules line by line over several weeks to  check that the  
tool was working as intended". T l's  prescription aspects were also tested to  assess their  
compliance with NICE guidelines and to ensure patient safety. To achieve this, the T l  
software development team  used simulations with synthetic and anonymised real patient 
data. All the test results were reviewed and "signed off" by TILeadConsultant. T l  software  
rules were found to be "robust" and the results were reported to the Thrombosis 
Committee and the Chief Medical Officer. The validated electronic software rules were  
used to  develop T l .  Apart from members of the T l  project team  and the Thrombosis
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Committee, none of the interview participants were aware of these evaluations. However, 
there was an assumption amongst participants that these tests had been carried out.
5.4.4 VTE tool usability and user acceptance testing
According to  T IDeveloper, the project team  carried out usability and user acceptance 
testing with "actual clinical users over a few  weeks" in M ay 2010. The purposes of these 
tests were to  assess T l's  interface and user friendliness. Additionally, the T l  project team  
also sought to assess T l  audit trails and its effectiveness as a data collection tool to  satisfy 
CQUIN reporting requirements. Clinical users were asked to describe their experiences of 
using T l.  Their feedback was relayed to the software developm ent team  and necessary 
changes made where appropriate. T ID eveloper described this process as a continuous 
communication link whereby clinical users reviewed and tested every stage of T l's  
developm ent process and gave real tim e feedback to the software developm ent team . 
This process was repeated over "a few  weeks" until all the possible clinical scenarios and 
prescription options were tested. T l  was found to be user friendly and im plem ented as 
planned. However, most of the interview participants w ere unaware of these tests but 
assumed that they had been carried out as part of the T l  developm ent process. Also the  
clinical users who were involved with the usability and acceptance testing w ere members 
of the T l  project team . These tests could have been expanded to include nurses and 
doctors in real clinical settings where T l  was intended to be used to gain feedback from  
users outside the T l  project team .
5.4.5 VTE compliance audits
From June 2010, the study Trust started performing monthly audits in some of the clinical
departments to check VTE compliance as required by the VTE CQUIN fram ework. The
purpose of these audits was to check w hether patients that w ere adm itted to  the hospital
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had been appropriately risk assessed as required under the NICE guidelines and the VTE 
CQUIN fram ework. To m eet the CQUIN targets and secure funding from the  
commissioners, the study Trust had to achieve a minimum of 90% valid VTE risk 
assessments every month. The audits involved an electronic census of all patients 
adm itted to the hospital. Audit reports were auto-generated and published monthly by 
the Information Departm ent on the study Trust's intranet by departm ent, and then  
collated across the Trust. They were then submitted monthly via the Unify2 database to  
the Departm ent of Health. The CQUIN targets were achieved by September 2010  
following measures such as exclusion of patient cohorts that were not considered to  be 
at risk and blocking users' access to the clinical results reporting system w here risk 
assessments had not been completed within the stipulated tim efram es. The study Trust 
was one of a few  NHS Trusts to achieve and maintain these targets up to  end of 2014.
The VTE compliance audits were focused on achieving the CQUIN goals, rather than  
evaluating T l  itself. The majority of the participants interviewed showed awareness of the  
VTE compliance audits, particularly those relating to  their own clinical areas. M ost nurse 
managers and doctors argued that more could have been done to  assess T l's  effect on 
clinical practice and patient outcomes, rather than just counting the num ber of patients 
who were deemed to have had a valid VTE risk assessment. One senior doctor fe lt that 
VTE evaluations should be carried out by individual departments using existing clinical 
structures and the clinical governance fram ework, w ith overall checks by the T l  project 
team  annually to  ensure concordance with national guidelines.
Each departm ent should have its own evaluation system s... w e are all responsible fo r  
our patients, and w e do th a t actually. I attend m onthly meetings fo r my w ard  and 
look at results fo r the ward. Ask how w e are doing. If w e are not doing alright, w hat 
are w e doing about it? That in itself is an evaluation. A bout fu rth e r evaluation, I do
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not think it's necessary as long as individual evaluations are being done. Maybe there 
should be a team looking at it at the end of the year, to see if we are following the 
guidelines.
TIRegistrar
Apart from  the T l  project team  members, most participants noted th at they generally did 
not look at monthly VTE compliance figures but monitored their respective departments' 
performance through Quality Improvement Plans and w ider clinical governance 
platforms. Two ward managers noted that ward nurses considered issues such as infection 
control more im portant than VTE risk assessments. T lW ardSister noted th at her ward 
consistently achieved the monthly VTE compliance targets. However, she argued that the  
VTE compliance figures had become 'mundane' and 'lost meaning" once targets were  
achieved.
For other important issues for nurses, such as infection control, real achievements 
can be seen visibly; the ward gets a certificate for reaching infection control targets 
every 3 months. Monthly figures [for VTE compliance] become mundane and lose 
meaning once the ward achieves 100% [VTE CQUIN compliance].
T lW ardSister
T lW ardM anager argued that because VTE compliance figures were reported per 
departm ent rather than individual wards, key contextual issues relating to  individual 
wards were potentially being ignored or overlooked.
I appreciate that for certain reports it is practical but for a roll-out like this we [wards] 
should be kept apart because we did a lot of work on this and other things and when 
you put all the results together, it should be clear which individual components of the 
department are not up to speed as other issues may not be taken seriously . . .
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T lW a rd  Manager
5.4.6 Enoxaparin® and Doppler scanning cost-effectiveness audits
At the end of 2012, the study Trust's Pharmacy and Haematology Departments undertook 
jo int audits looking at the cost effectiveness of prophylactic and treatm ent doses of 
Enoxaparin® and the appropriateness of Doppler scanning requests for suspected cases 
of deep vein thrombosis. The audits lasted tw o weeks. They were triggered by a surge in 
the volume of Enoxaparin® usage across the study Trust. Treatm ent doses of Enoxaparin® 
were recommended for patients with a suspected or confirmed VTE, while prophylactic 
doses w ere administered for VTE prevention. Enoxaparin® treatm ent doses were  
administered to at risk patients at a ratio of 1.5mg/kg of a patient's weight, and 
prophylactic doses were typically 40mg per dose and thus cheaper.
These audits did not address T l  itself but the services that were supported by its usage 
and the implications of inappropriate diagnosis and prescriptions. Due to staff turnover in 
these departm ents, there was no documentation available for these audits. However, 
TILeadNurse explained that the Enoxaparin® audit involved looking at the  
appropriateness of prescriptions against the standards set out in the NICE guidelines. For 
the Doppler scanning audit, the evaluators looked at the numbers of scans th at had been 
requested and also w hether the results of the scans were positive or negative. The audits 
found that the majority of prescribed Enoxaparin® doses were appropriate and 
comparable with national averages and that most Doppler scans w ere requested  
appropriately. Findings from  these audits were presented in a multidisciplinary 
departm ental meeting (Haematology, Radiology and Pharmacy Departm ents). The 
existing Enoxaparin® and Doppler scanning pathways were m aintained. Only 
TILeadConsultant and TILeadNurse were aware of this audit. TILeadNurse noted th a t the
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results of the audits attracted a lot of interest during the multi-disciplinary meetings, 
especially from the Consultants. She noted that they (Consultants) w ere primarily 
interested in the "numbers" because that was how they judged the success or failure of 
any intervention.
Some patients were not being scanned on time ana pharmacists noted that Ciexane® 
was being used increasingly... I did an audit to see how many patients were admitted, 
how many doses were prescribed and were we diagnosing more patients? Were we 
doing more scans? The audit showed that the service was getting busier, not doing 
any more than other Trusts. There were concerns about length of stay waiting for 
scans. Ciexane® usage went up by 200%. ... Doctors were really interested in the 
figures about patient waiting times. The audit probably needs repeating...
T ILeadNurse
5.4.7 External CQUIN compliance audit
Towards the end of 2012, the regional Strategic Health Authority tasked auditors from  a 
leading accounting firm  to  audit the study Trust's VTE compliance figures. According to 
TILeadConsultant, the motivation for the audit was not disclosed. TILeadConsultant 
noted that the Strategic Health Authority may have wanted to confirm the robustness of 
the study Trust's compliance reports. Alternatively, he argued that they may have known 
that "our reporting systems could withstand such scrutiny" (i.e., the systematic audit) and 
could then prove the robustness of the positive results to the Departm ent of Health and 
commissioners.
The SHA (Strategic Health Authority) did send auditors to look at our figures. I don't 
know what the motivation was for that - whether they were being asked to justify 
our figures or whether they sent them because they knew we could justify our
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figures. The auditors literally went through the finer detail of those 30 cases [using 
patient notes]. I am sure if the same was done for other Trusts, they would produce 
some interesting results.... The problem of having an electronic system is we were 
then victims of our own figures; our figures can't lie. If other Trusts deliberately don't 
deal with day surgery, it makes them look like they are doing a better job than us and 
then you are not comparing like for like and that is really frustrating.
TILeadConsultant
The external auditors examined thirty sets of patient case notes in detail and assessed 
them  against the NICE VTE standards and the study Trust's VTE treatm ent pathways. 
However, the audit results were not fed back to  the T l  project team  but were reported  
positively in the study Trust's annual report and quality accounts. Only TILeadConsultant 
was aware o f this audit. He noted that the abolition of the Strategic Health Authority in 
April 2013 may have been the reason for the lack of feedback to  the study Trust.
5.4.8 Root cause analysis of hospital acquired VTE
From the end of 2012, all NHS Trusts were required to  complete a root cause analysis for 
every patient who developed a hospital acquired thrombosis. The root cause analyses 
w ere to  be reported every three months to the Departm ent of Health. Hospital acquired 
thrombosis was defined as a VTE occurring within 90 days of an admission. A separate 
CQUIN incentive was agreed with commissioners for the achievement of at least 90%  
minimum compliance, with the expectation that the target would be increased to  95% in 
the future. The purpose of the root cause analyses was to  provide a systematic and 
evidence based method of finding out what factors or events led to patients suffering VTE 
while hospitalised and also to  learn from these experiences and im plem ent remedial 
actions plans. The NPSA's "basic steps of the root cause analysis" model was adopted by
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the study Trust (see Figure 5.3). TILeadConsultant and TILeadNurse noted that root cause 
analyses had helped to  improve VTE compliance and to maintain CQUIN targets because 
most clinicians and nurses were now aware that VTE data were being m onitored. They 
also revealed that the root cause analyses had unearthed operational and patient safety 
issues in some poorly performing clinical areas. In such cases, the T l  project team  involved 
clinicians, nurses and managers from the affected areas in the developm ent and 
im plem entation of remedial action plans. This was done to encourage ownership and 
responsibility for those who were directly involved in delivering patient care to  ensure 
that similar failures did not recur in the future. These failures were also reported to  have 
presented opportunities for the T l  project team  to engage directly w ith "willing" 
stakeholders who were keen to make changes in their respective clinical areas.
Some departments repeatedly get RCAs (root cause analyses). One ward has 
identified two nurses to champion VTE and trial thromboprophylaxis stockings on the 
ward. I met with the matron and the nurses and got good feedback from the 
meeting.... They want to turn it around from a ward with issues to one that does VTE 
risk assessments very w e ll.... They may continue to have some problems due to the 
nature of their patients, but they would have done the best they could do. ... I like 
talking to nurses about real patient outcomes. It strikes home with nurses. The 
human side gets people on board. Every RCA is a chance to approach wards and it 
will mean more than just talking about CQUIN targets, i.e., this [the VTE] has 
happened ..., the guideline says this ..,... wasn't followed, you can't do that on every 
ward. I really have to hold back, but you can't turn down an opportunity to teach, 
disseminate. I just get excited if anybody else is interested - any interest really.
T ILeadNurse
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However, despite the additional CQUIN incentives for the study Trust for meeting the root 
cause analyses targets, no additional funding was allocated to  the T l  project team  for the 
additional work that was involved. TILeadConsultant and TILeadNurse took this 
additional responsibility and often worked in their spare tim e to  m eet the deadlines for 
root cause analyses submission. TILeadConsultant described the process of performing  
root cause analyses as "more onerous and time-consuming" than the VTE compliance 
audits. The root cause analysis process often involved going through paper-based clinical 
notes as well as electronic sources and sometimes meeting w ith nurses and doctors to  
fram e their investigations.
The problem at the moment is that the RCA process is a national CQUIN and is much 
more onerous to actually do so inevitably a lot of our time and focus is to make it 
happen. Because the risk assessment tool [Tl] is hitting the targets, we haven't had 
a chance to go back to areas where there are non-compliances and trying to 
straighten things out. We don't have enough capacity to do everything, in fact, we 
are requesting additional support... Because TILeadNurse is just one individual, she 
spends a significant amount of her time doing admin duties, which is clearly 
inappropriate. We are producing all these figures but there is no point producing all 
these figures for the sake of it. It is not of any benefit to anyone.
TILeadConsultant
Despite the challenges, TILeadConsultant and TILeadNurse noted that this process 
helped to spread awareness of VTE as a clinical problem especially to  clinicians who were  
initially sceptical about VTE prevention initiatives. They argued that this awareness helped 
to improve patient outcomes, although these had not been directly measured. 
TILeadConsultant and TILeadNurse expressed disappointment that most NHS Trusts 
were not including incidental VTEs such as those identified from  MRI scans, (which w ere
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som etim es as high as 4-5  per w eek  fo r the  study Trust). They argued th a t these omissions 
resulted in low er rates of hospital acquired throm bosis for o th er NHS Trusts, w hile the  
study Trust ended up looking worse in the  national ratings. T IL ead N urse  argued th a t the  
governm ent "could do m ore to  ensure m ore accurate reporting".
The root cause analysis CQUIN is labour intensive and we are looking to catch all 
hospital acquired VTEs. Other Trusts are not looking at incidental VTEs such as MRIs 
and yet it's a requirem ent.... Because we are looking harder for them, we may end 
up looking worse. This is where statistics can be made to look anything you like [by 
other Trusts].... It feels like we are shooting ourselves in the foot.
T IL ead N urse
Figure 5.3 shows the  basic steps of carrying out a root cause analysis.
Identify
Define the ^  f  effective
problem T  solutions
Determine J , Implement
the causal ' and track
relationships solutions
Figure 5.3 Basic steps o f a Root Cause Analysis (adapted from  the NPSA (2014))
5.4.9 The Enoxaparin® prophylaxis and treatment doses7 audit
In O ctober 2012, T ILeadN urse  and T lW ard S is te r approached the  study Trust's A udit and
Effectiveness D epartm ent for help w ith  a "structured audit" to  look at th e  use o f an ti-
em bolic compression stockings. The Audit and Effectiveness D ep artm en t had previously
received an National Patient Safety Agency a lert in 2010  which highlighted th a t
throm boprophylaxis  was not being optim ally  used for high-risk patients, but had not been
addressed. It was agreed th a t an audit looking at th e  in terp re ta tio n  and use of NICE
1 7 2
guidelines and the study Trust's w ider VTE m anagement system would address questions 
about the use of antiembolic stockings and concerns raised in the NPSA alert. 
TILeadNurse and TlW ardSister looked at 50 random sets of patient notes on four wards 
and the acute DVT clinic. The risk assessment, prescription and Enoxaparin® 
administration aspects were compared with the NICE VTE Prevention Quality Standard 
(NICE, 2010b). A summary of this standard is shown in Table 5.3.
The audits showed variations between the prescription, administration and 
documentation of VTE treatm ents. Generally, VTE documentation in clinical notes was 
found to be inadequate. There were also inconsistencies and incidences o f poor 
application of T l .  Patient safety issues arising from the audit were reported to  respective 
clinical line managers and appropriate action plans were put in place. TILeadNurse  
revealed that there were plans to  repeat the audits and to develop other evaluation tools 
but resources were very limited.
Some [Doctors] were writing [Enoxaparin®] up but not ticking, 'and where 
recommended, Enoxaparin® not prescribed'. When contacted, some would say, 'it is 
just a paper/electronic exercise [the VTE risk assessment], but you will find the 
patient is getting the care'... but now on the system it says they should have 
Enoxaparin®, and it's a black mark on the Trust. Some doctors would write 'patient 
on Warfarin®', but if you tick that option [initially on T l] then the system won't 
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The findings from this case study will now be discussed in the context of the key factors 
of evaluations that were identified in the literature review as illustrated in Figure 2.2 (CDSS 
evaluation fram ework).
5.5.1 Purposes of evaluations
The main purposes of T1 evaluations were to assess its adherence with NICE guidelines, 
achievement of CQUIN targets, and its technical robustness, usability and patient safety 
aspects. Most of these evaluations were form ative, and focused primarily on T l's  ability 
to generate information for submission to  the Departm ent of Health, translation of NICE 
guidelines, technical and clinical accuracy and some usability issues. The target audiences 
of these evaluations were primarily regulatory bodies, commissioners, the Trust Board 
and senior clinicians. The clinical validation evaluations were fully funded by the study 
Trust, perhaps reflecting their importance and decision impact. None of the evaluations 
focused specifically on patient outcomes. However, TILeadNurse argued that by showing 
that they were compliant with national guidelines and achieving CQUIN targets, they had 
also improved patient outcomes. Regardless, this was not necessarily the case as seen in 
the NPSA triggered audit which showed that a significant number of patients w ere not 
being treated in accordance with the NICE guidelines despite the study Trust having 
achieved and maintained the required CQUIN compliance. Also some patients who had 
been deemed appropriately risk assessed in the monthly audits were found to  be over or 
undertreated. These revelations highlighted the shortcomings of evaluations undertaken, 
especially the narrow focus of T1 evaluation purposes.
The purposes of these evaluations can be viewed as aimed at providing accountability to  
key stakeholders such as the government, commissioners and patients through
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compliance w ith NICE guidelines and achievement of VTE CQUIN targets. The evaluations 
also provided justification to the study Trust's decision makers for investing in the  
developm ent and implementation of T l .  Indeed a senior clinician who was also a member 
of the Thrombosis Committee argued th a tT l  was "one of the most successful projects..", 
and noted that "it achieved everything it set out to  achieve..." This view was also shared 
by senior ICT managers and T l  developers, who considered T l  to  be the most successful 
IT project they had implemented in the study Trust. T ID eveloper noted that the m ulti­
disciplinary collaboration and the fact that T l  was "clinically, rather than ICT driven" had 
led to  its success.
I would actually say it's [Tl] one of the most enjoyable projects I have worked o n ....
It helped that TILeadConsultant knew exactly what he wanted, he had clear 
specifications and knew the value of the project to the Trust as well as clinical 
practice.... We didn't want it to be seen as just another cumbersome chore just to 
collect data as we wouldn't get any value out of it and nobody would use it.
T ID eveloper
5.5.2 Evaluation approaches and methods
The main evaluation methods used were peer reviews and audits of the study Trust's 
performance against national standards before and after im plem entation. All the  
evaluations, apart from the root cause analyses, focused on single issues and did not 
address contributory factors that led to the reported outcomes. The limited evaluation 
methodologies may have contributed to the focus on single outcomes, which resulted in 
evaluations missing key contextual issues that may have provided better inform ation to  
decision makers. The methodological limitations themselves may have contributed to the  
narrow focus of the evaluations undertaken.
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No summative evaluations were carried out. This may have been because the main 
priority for the study Trust was to  show that they were adhering to national initiatives and 
thus improving patient outcomes as set out in the NICE guidelines. TILeadConsultant 
revealed that they had not evaluated "real benefits to  patients" because o f lack of tim e  
and funding. However, he argued that they had "largely cracked the nut" and would look 
at "real patient benefits" in the future.
We could always do more [evaluations], but it's all about resources - its capability 
issues. I could spend more time and yes it would be better I'm sure.... I feel that we 
have largely cracked the nut to a large extend. To improve further in a clinically 
meaningful way to patients would probably take a lot more e ffo rt.... We are a fairly 
small team compared to others [the leading VTE Exemplar Centres]. Of course, they 
will be doing a lot better than us. If you ask how much, I would say the difference is 
very small.
TILeadConsultant
The T l  project team  had considered performing a "before and after study" to  compare
p re -T l implementation audits with CQUIN audits to  establish the extent of improvements.
However, this project was abandoned because of lack o f funding. Additionally,
TILeadConsultant noted that tw o other NHS Trusts had published similar studies around
the same tim e which had shown improvements in the performance of VTE risk
assessments of 20%. He did not feel that the study Trust could make any further
contributions to  the discourse. Although TILeadConsultant accepted that there were
differences between NHS Trusts, he believed that the findings from  the tw o Trusts would
be comparable to  the study Trust. However, although the other Trusts may have been
comparable in some ways, they had not developed and im plem ented electronic VTE risk
assessment tools that w ere similar to T l .  The study Trust may have missed an opportunity
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to evaluate the effects of T l  for its own internal purposes. In that way, they could have 
learnt and shared knowledge with other NHS Trusts who may have been considering 
developing or implementing similar electronic tools. TILeadConsultant noted that the 
haematology departm ent lacked the necessary resources to carry out further evaluations 
and effectively utilise the data generated.
I regret that I've got data just sitting, pre and post T l . ... I could have checked to see 
if VTE rates had changed.... I would have loved to publish that data. We have data 
from 2006, before any trust-wide policy, around 2008 with the VTE paper tool but I 
haven't had time to look at the raw data; it's quite labour intensive, all DVTs, all CT 
scans. To be honest, in the last year, there have been one or two other Trusts [who 
have published]... so now not sure I am going to be able to add anything new to the 
discourse. You would hope that we are at similar levels [as the two other Trusts]....
It would be very interesting but I am not sure I would add much.
TILeadConsultant
5.5.3 Contextual and organisational issues related to evaluation
T l  was implemented Trust-wide, w ithout a pilot because the project team  was working 
under tight deadlines. It is possible that a pilot or phased im plem entation could have 
allowed the project team  tim e to consider T l's  w ider implications on staff and clinical 
workflow across the organisation. This could have possibly widened the scope of 
evaluations, duration and context while resources were still available to  the T l  project 
team . All interview participants noted that there were many operational issues and 
resource shortages across the study Trust. They argued that these issues affected the  
uptake of T l  and how it was used and embedded into routine clinical workflow. However, 
although th e T l  project team  showed awareness of these challenges, none of these issues
181
w ere considered in any of the evaluations that were carried out. TILeadConsultant argued 
that their primary focus was to  ensure that the evaluations showed that the study Trust 
was compliant with NICE guidelines and to ensure that they provided enough information  
to  secure VTE CQUIN funding. TILeadConsultant also further noted that the challenges 
regarding "buy in" by intended users and resistance to T l  were expected w ith any change 
project.
There was resistance ... Very predictable, again, junior doctors are not the ones who 
will necessarily be seeing these patients when they develop VTEs. There is innate 
resistance to paperwork, especially when it is centrally generated.... We did consider, 
do we get to a point where everyone should be on Clexane® unless there is a contra­
indication? Sooner or later, they [patients] will come to harm by Clexane® 
undoubtedly. ... Unfortunately bitter experiences have shown us that if you don't 
have these kinds of systems, no one thinks about it at all. They will probably just write 
it [prescribe thromboprophylaxis] up and realise later that they shouldn't have 
written it u p .... trying to get people to stand back a minute ...
TILeadConsultant
TILeadConsultant also noted that compliance was improving because doctors w ere aware 
that there was an electronic audit trail.
Surprising thing is that, not all, but a significant number [of doctors], as soon as they 
know that it's their name, details, with time and date, they take it a bit more seriously.
But of course, some will just do a shoddy job, or it may be they get caught up 
especially if there is an adverse event... But as soon as it's their name, they know that 
there are potential implications ... As long as they are just scribbling their name, or 
signature which is illegible with no contact details, a lot of people don't worry too
TILeadConsultant
Although T l  was reported to have improved the collection of VTE risk assessment data, 
its implementation did not necessarily result in improved clinical decision making. CQUIN 
targets were only a census of patients that were deemed to  have been appropriately risk 
assessed. Apart from the financial benefits for the study Trust, achieving these targets did 
not necessary imply that patients had received adequate care. The audits and peer 
reviews did not address key issues such as T l's  interoperability with existing legacy 
systems, compatibility with clinical workflows, effects on professional and m ulti­
disciplinary relationships, the organisational changes instigated by T l  and the potential 
and actual disruptiveness to the organisation and the interdependencies between all 
these aspects. No comparisons were made with data from the years prior to  T l  
implem entation so it was not clear how much impact T l  had on patient and organisational 
outcomes. Operational issues such as staff shortages and turnover, pressures on the  
hospital's bed capacity, increasing demand for services and constant top down changes 
within the study Trust also appeared to have contributed to low prioritisation of T l  in 
ward areas. Although members of the T l  project team  spent several months briefing all 
clinical departments regarding how and why T l  was developed, its significance to  the  
study Trust and training and assessing users throughout the im plem entation, there was 
lack of awareness of such processes amongst most interview participants. This may 
suggest lack of feedback from  line managers to frontline staff, particularly ward-based 
nurses. It may also be a result of high turnover of junior doctors who moved to  different 
departments within the study Trust and between hospitals in the region as part of their 
rotational training. Although adequate funding was made available for the VTE project at 
the development and implementation stages, no further funds were allocated for T l
evaluation following implementation. Furthermore, the complete lack of funding for the
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VTE root cause analysis process further depleted already limited resources that were  
available to  the T l  project team . This may be a reflection of the study Trust's lack of 
com m itm ent to  T l  evaluations beyond the im m ediate regulatory requirements. 
Additionally, failure to pass on CQUIN incentives for the root cause analysis process may 
have been a disincentive for managers and clinicians to carry out any evaluation activities 
beyond m andatory requirements that were specified in the CQUIN goals.
5.5.4 Barriers to evaluation
Although T l's  compulsory nature was lauded for improving compliance, it may also have 
contributed to  resistance by specialties such as Accident and Emergency and Surgical 
departments. TIProjectNurse revealed that some clinicians only did the "bare minimum" 
that was required to  "tick the box", while some deferred the risk assessment or gave 
inadequate reasons for not completing the risk assessment within the specified tim e. This 
resistance was reported to  have been influenced by lack of acceptance of the VTE project 
itself and some key aspects of its evaluations, particularly the monthly VTE audits.
Understanding the clinical importance, whether using paper-based tool or T l, is an 
ongoing battle, particularly with nurses. Doctors do it because they are required to 
do it, but I do sometimes wonder whether they just pay lip service. Do they just do 
enough to change it [Tl portal] from red to amber?
TIProjectNurse
The majority of the interview participants fe lt that evaluations such as the CQUIN audits 
were target driven. TIRegistrar argued that these audits were "bureaucratic d iktat" which 
did not benefit patients in any way and only served the needs of policy makers and the  
study Trust's Executive Board.
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That's where politics comes in. I wouldn't want to do it [VTE risk assessments] just to 
keep somebody's figures high and to meet a target [and] to be politically right in this 
situation. I look at it from the patient perspective, not for the purpose of keeping 
managers happy. We have to understand that what we are doing is right, and that it 
is worth doing, but if it's purely chasing a target, I'm not sure that is something I 
subscribe to. I will do it because I feel as a clinician, that it is necessary, to prevent 
this. And there should be some more discipline if people don't do it voluntarily ... it 
has to be done with a little bit of blocking tactics [i.e. access blocking]. That is not 
something I prescribe to.
TIRegistrar
Additionally the involvement of various government departm ents and arms-length 
organisations further fuelled these speculations. It could be argued that the barriers to  
T l's  evaluation may have mitigated the purposes of evaluation, which in turn lim ited the  
methods employed and the scope of evaluations, duration and context undertaken. These 
barriers may also have limited the benefits of evaluations undertaken, especially the  
production of information that was useful for decision making rather than producing 
patient census figures for the Department of Health. The T l  project team  argued that 
despite the shortcomings of their evaluation methods, by proving compliance w ith NICE 
guidelines and achieving CQUIN targets, they delivered their professional and 
organisational duty of care and in effect improved patient outcomes. This was indeed also 
the view expressed in the study Trust's annual reports and quality accounts since 2010.
5.5.6 Overview of T l evaluations and missed opportunities
There were many limitations of evaluations which resulted in various missed
opportunities. The majority of evaluations that were adequately funded by the study Trust
were formative. They were carried out during T l's  developm ent and their purposes were
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to establish the functionality, safety and accuracy of T l .  By failing to  adequately invest in 
post im plem entation evaluations, the study Trust may have missed key information about 
the effects of T l  in clinical areas. Also by failing to undertake summative evaluations, the  
study Trust missed the opportunity to understand the wider implications of T l .  Such 
learning could have informed both the VTE project itself and related future projects, as 
well as the w ider healthcare sector. Table 5.4 summarises the opportunities that were  
missed by the T l  evaluations.
The evaluations undertaken were limited both in scope and methodology. They also failed 
to  comprehensively address the key aspects identified in the literature review. The 
purposes of evaluation were primarily focused on T l's  compliance with NICE guidelines 
and achievement of the VTE CQUIN targets. The methods of evaluation w ere limited to  
peer reviews and audits which were commonly used for service evaluation in the NHS. 
Although randomised controlled trials and other experimental methods w ere widely  
believed to be the "gold standard" for CDSS evaluation, none of the methods were used 
or even considered for evaluating T l .  There was lack of funding for evaluations that were  
focused on patient outcomes, effects of T l  on users and its interoperability and 
compatibility with existing systems and w ider clinical workflows. There w ere many 
barriers before T l  was even developed, during and following im plem entation. To 
overcome these barriers, the project team  focused on benefits of evaluations, which in 
turn directed their purposes of evaluation and the evaluation methods employed. These 
































Chapter 6 T2 risk assessment tool
This chapter looks at the evaluations that were carried out for T2 using the CDSS evaluation 
fram ework that was developed in the literature review. T2 is an expert electronic clinical 
decision support system (CDSS) that was developed to  help nurses monitor patients with  
stable prostate cancer following interventions such as surgery and radiotherapy. Sections 
6.1 and 6.2 provide a broad overview of prostate cancer, its treatm ent and the  
management of patients with stable prostate cancer. Section 6.3 introduces the technology 
(T2) and sets out the context of the case study and describes how T2 was im plem ented in 
the study Trust. The evaluations undertaken pre and post adoption are described in 
Section 5 and in Section 6, these evaluations are examined in the context of the key factors 
of CDSS evaluation that were identified in the literature review (CDSS evaluation  
fram ework). The participants who were interviewed for this case study are identified  
throughout the chapter as follows:
1. Project Lead Consultant (Uro-oncologist/Surgeon) at the study Trust -  
T2LeadConsultant
2. Software Developer at the developing Trust -T 2D eve lo p er
3. Specialist uro-oncology Nurse 1 at the study Trust -T 2 N u rs e l
4. Specialist uro-oncology Nurse 2 at the study trust -  T2Nurse2
Additional information from key actors in T2 promotional videos that are available in the  
public domain is also included. They will be identified as follows:
188
5. Lead Consultant (Uro-oncologist/Surgeon) at the developing Trust - 
T2DevelopingConsultant
6. Lead Nurse at the developing Trust -T2ProjectN urse
6=1 Introduction
Prostate cancer is the commonest type of cancer affecting men in Europe. In England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, over 36 000 new cases are diagnosed annually and around 9 
000 deaths were reported (NICE, 2014). It is more prevalent in men aged over 65 years, 
particularly black men (National Cancer Intelligence Network, 2009). Hsing et al. (2000) 
noted a substantial increase in prostate cancer prevalence across the world since the late 
1980s. Much of this increase was attributed to  incidental diagnosis following transurethral 
resection of the prostate (TURP) surgery and the uptake of the prostate-specific antigen 
(PSA) screening test (Brewster et al., 2000; Bray et al., 2010). Despite the increase in its 
prevalence, Cancer Research UK (2014) reported that prostate cancer death rates have 
declined over the past tw o decades. However, they noted that the actual numbers of 
deaths from prostate cancer had risen due to the increase in the number of men surviving 
into old age. Some have attributed the decline in death rates to the wide uptake of PSA 
testing (Gilliland et al., 1994; M oore et al., 2009; Quinn and Babb, 2002). Others argued 
that there was little evidence to support this claim, noting that other factors such as 
improved cancer treatm ent regimens could explain these changes (Oliver et al., 2001; 
Coldman et al., 2003; Collin et al., 2008). A comparative study by Collin et al. (2008) looking 
at the incidence and deaths from prostate cancer between the UK and USA from  1975 to  
2004 found no conclusive evidence that screening based on PSA testing reduced prostate 
cancer deaths
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6.1.1 Prostate cancer interventions
There are a number of interventions available for treating prostate cancer. These include 
active surveillance, radical surgery, radiotherapy, and brachytherapy and hormone 
therapies. However, there is wide variability in the natural history of prostate cancer. M any  
patients do not present any clinical problems, while others present w ith severe symptoms 
which require aggressive treatm ents. This variation leads to  challenges in monitoring and 
measuring the clinical benefits and cost-effectiveness of interventions given to the various 
patient groups. Cancer Research UK (2014) noted that the main consequence o f the  
increasing prevalence of prostate cancer was that there were now more men living w ith  
the disease who required long term  monitoring. To address this problem, collegiate 
organisations such as the British Association of Urological Surgeons and the British Uro- 
oncology Group supported the uptake of NICE guidelines for prostate cancer (NICE, 2008; 
NICE, 2014) and also developed additional guidelines for their members. Likewise, cancer 
charities such as Cancer Research UK, Prostate Cancer UK, and arm's length organisations 
such as National Cancer Intelligence Network and the Prostate Cancer Research Centre 
worked closely w ith the Department of Health and NICE to improve the outcomes of 
patients with prostate cancer. Monitoring patients with prostate cancer involves the  
detection of spread or recurrence of disease, assessing symptoms, performing ongoing 
clinical examinations, PSA testing and managing psychosocial problems. T2 was designed 
to  provide clinical decision support to help monitor this patient group.
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6.2 Prostate cancer: the UK clinical context
Since the 1990s, the management of prostate cancer has been primarily focused on the  
timeliness of diagnosis. The tim eline in Figure 6.1 outlines the key initiatives that were  
im plem ented nationally to support patients with stable prostate cancer. However, Moore  
et al. (2009) noted that despite the increase in PSA testing, the overall reduction in the  
number of deaths from localised prostate cancer had only marginally fallen. In the early 
2000s, the focus shifted from diagnosis to the reduction of deaths from  prostate cancer. 
The Cancer Intelligence Network (2009) analysed a cohort of 83, 701 men diagnosed with  
prostate cancer in England from 1999 to  2002 based on information from  cancer registry 
records and the British Urological Surgeons' staging data. The study identified delays in 
screening and variations in the presentation of prostate cancers, especially w here patients 
did not present any symptoms. They also reported that deaths from  advanced prostate 
cancers were much worse than previously thought, and that relative survival significantly 
dropped after five years.
In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the management of stable prostate cancer is
primarily based on NICE guidelines and recommendations from the British Association of
Urological Surgeons Section of Oncology, British Uro-oncology Group and the British
Prostate Group. The first NICE guidelines for the diagnosis and treatm ent of prostate cancer
were published in 2008 using evidence available from randomised controlled trials and
systematic reviews (NICE, 2008). These guidelines emphasised the need for healthcare
professionals to  inform patients and their relatives adequately about prostate cancer
diagnosis and the various treatm ent options available and offer advice on the effects of
treatm ents on patients' quality of life, physical and psychological wellbeing. The NICE
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guidelines also required NHS Trusts to ensure that appropriate referrals to specialist 
primary care services were made to  address post-surgical complications such as 
incontinence and erectile dysfunction. The guidelines further recommended that patients 
who were unsuitable for primary care referral should be followed up in a hospital under 
the active surveillance program. Stable patients were to  be put on a 'watchful waiting' 
regimen whereby treatm ent would be withheld until significant disease progression. NICE 
guidelines recommended that these patients should be followed up in primary care using 
locally agreed protocols. Those patients who had stable PSA levels for at least tw o  years 
w ithout significant complications following radical treatm ent w ere to  be offered follow up 
in primary care by secure electronic communications. However, these patients could also 
be followed up in hospital-based clinics if they were participating in clinical trials. 
Regardless of w hether these patients were seen in hospital or primary care, NICE 
recommended that patients should be offered direct access to  the urological cancer 
multidisciplinary team  and that their PSA levels should be checked annually. Patients who  
had stable PSA levels for at least tw o years with no significant complications following  
radical treatm ents and those on the watchful waiting regimen were said to have stable 









































Many of the issues covered in the NICE guidelines (NICE, 2008) primarily pertained to  
procedures that were undertaken in secondary care settings (NHS hospitals). They did not 
address the effects of service organisation and management of symptoms in primary care. 
Furthermore, there was lack of robust evidence to inform the NICE guideline 
development. Consequently most of the NICE recommendations were based instead on 
consensus opinion of the Guideline Development Group. Also in 2008, NICE published a 
costing tool and im plem entation pack to facilitate uptake of the new guidelines in the  
NHS. In Novem ber 2009, the British Uro-oncology Group, the British Association of 
Urological Surgeons Section of Oncology and the British Prostate Group published a m ulti­
disciplinary guidance for managing prostate cancer (British Uro-oncology Group, 2009). 
The focus of the guidance was to  promote integrated care to ensure consistency across 
the various stages of prostate cancer treatm ent. The guidance also sought to  develop a 
structure that would facilitate auditing and peer review of prostate cancer services that 
were provided and to support the existing clinical governance fram ew ork in NHS Trusts. 
The British Uro-oncology Group guidance largely adopted NICE guidelines (NICE, 2008) 
and provided clarity on how they would be implemented throughout the patient's 
treatm ent journey. The British Uro-oncology Group guidance were revised in Septem ber 
2013 (British Uro-oncology Group, 2013). The revised guidance emphasised th at patients 
who were on watchful waiting regimens should be reviewed by the urological cancer 
multi-disciplinary team  and sought to put in place structures for collaborative working. In 
January 2014, NICE published updated guidelines for diagnosis and treatm ent o f prostate 
cancer (NICE, 2014). The revised NICE guidelines recommended wider prostate cancer 
management based on new evidence from  observational studies, clinical and cost 
effectiveness studies, consensus surveys and randomised controlled trials. However, due
to the continued lack of evidence, new recommendations for the follow up of stable 
prostate cancer patients were mainly based on the experience and opinion of the NICE 
Guideline Development Group. The updated NICE guidelines included newly licensed 
treatm ents such as radiation-induced enteropathy. They also aimed to  reduce variations 
and uncertainties that still existed in practice, especially the managem ent of effects of 
radical treatm ents and investigations such as flexible sigmoidoscopy for patients w ith  
stable prostate cancer.
6.3 Management of stable prostate cancer in the study 
Trust
The study Trust offers a wide range of services for the diagnosis, treatm ent, assessment
and support for patients with prostate cancer. Emergency and acute admissions come
through the Accident and Emergency departm ent. They may be transferred to  theatres
for surgical procedures or urology ward for monitoring, further investigations and
treatm ent. Elective patients are also adm itted for planned procedures through the
urology wards and the day surgery unit. GPs can refer patients who are suspected of
having prostate cancer via fax or email, using a proforma that was recommended by NICE
guidelines. According to the NICE guidelines all patients who are referred by GPs have to
be seen within 14 days. A team  of consultant uro-oncologists and specialist uro-oncology
nurses performs minor procedures and monitors patients with stable prostate cancer and
other urological problems in outpatients' clinics. The specialist uro-oncology nurses' role
has expanded as the range of radical treatm ents offered has increased. Their additional
responsibilities include health promotion, routine urological assessments, advising
patients and their relatives regarding treatm ent options, symptom and side effects
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management and supporting patients throughout their disease journey. Non-clinical 
support and advice is available from the MacMillan Cancer Information and Support 
Centre. There are also support groups that offer prostate cancer patients opportunities to 
m eet w ith other people who have experienced prostate cancer. Additionally, service users 
are sign-posted to  other community-based cancer services to access further support. Prior 
to  T2 im plem entation, the stable prostate cancer outpatients' clinics were managed by 
tw o senior uro-oncology nurses with support from a team  of consultant urologists. The 
study Trust's clinical pathways and protocols for the m anagement of prostate cancer were  
based on locally developed clinical pathways, NICE guidelines (NICE, 2008), and 
recommendations from cancer charities and collegiate organisations. Appointments, 
referrals and follow up schedules were managed by the nurses with support from the  
consultant uro-oncologists' secretaries. The study Trust's electronic clinical results 
reporting system was used to check and update tests and results, make referrals and as a 
repository for clinic records and GP outcome letters. All clinic visits were also recorded 
manually by the uro-oncology nurses in the patients' paper-based medical notes which 
were also used by the uro-oncology multi-disciplinary team .
In 2011, the study Trust looked at the feasibility of transferring patients w ith stable 
prostate cancer for management by GPs in primary care as recommended in the NICE 
guidelines (NICE, 2008). The study Trust's Lead Uro-oncologist (T2LeadConsultant) worked  
with a senior General Practitioner who was the clinical lead for prostate cancer in primary 
care to assess the suitability of transferring this patient group from hospital to  GPs. They 
found that most GPs lacked the expertise and capacity to  effectively manage this patient 
group. They concluded that over 50% of the patients w ere unsuitable for m anagem ent in 
primary care because they were too complex.
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Only half o f the  patients w ere suitable fo r fo llow  up by GPs but they [GPs] hadn't 
quite appreciated that. They thought all prostate cancer patients would the same 
w hereas it w asn 't t h a t . ... W e  then explained to  the w hole body o f GPs to  see if 
they  w an ted  to  manage these patients in prim ary care and they fe lt it was too  
com plicated. They asked us to  find a cheaper w ay o f managing these patients.
Additionally, primary care services were undergoing significant structural changes at the  
tim e, which eventually resulted in the formation of Clinical Commissioning Groups to  
replace Primary Care Trusts. Consequently, local NHS Commissioners tasked the study 
Trust with developing a cost-effective strategy to  continue following up these patients in 
hospital-based outpatient clinics. Figure 6.1 shows how the study Trust responded to  
various national initiatives that led to the implementation of T2.
T2LeadConsultant
D Impact of reduction of hospital junior doctors1 hours on patient care




Services provided by GPs with 
special interest found to be more 
expensive than those provided 
by hospital consultantsAim - Train junior (Band 5 
nurses) to use T2 and 
manage stable prostate 
cancer patients in primary 
care
Management of patients 
with stable prostate cancer 
found to be inconsistent 
with national guidelines
DLack of definitive advice to manage stable prostate cancer patients
Figure 6.2 Problems that were expected to be resolved by implementing and using T2
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6.3.1 The technology
T2 was developed over a tw o year period from 2006 to 2008 by a medical software 
development company, with support from a pharmaceutical company, a regional NHS 
Innovations Hub, a regional Development Agency and an NHS Trust (the developing Trust). 
The project partners provided resources to free up tim e for a multi-disciplinary team  of 
software developers, specialist uro-oncological nurses, consultant uro-oncologists and 
NHS executives to support the T2 software development team . The developers focused 
on introducing various CDSSs to  improve the management of chronic diseases in 
community settings and to reduce the costs of healthcare w ithout affecting the quality of 
care. Prostate cancer was identified as one of the high priority disease domains. T2 was 
designed for use by Band 5 nurses w ith appropriate training to  provide a nurse led service 
for stable prostate cancer m anagement in local GP practices across the region. Band 5 
nurses are junior nurses who are sometimes referred to as staff nurses.
T2 developers sought to promote 'Practice Based Commissioning' o f NHS services, 
whereby GPs would take the lead in the commissioning of technologies to  support their 
clinical work. The developing company's Medical Director (T2DevelopingCounsultant) was 
also a practising consultant uro-oncology surgeon in the developing Trust. He was 
involved in various healthcare IT projects and medical research projects th at w ere linked 
with the local medical school and other regional partners. T2Developer argued that 
T2DevelopingConsultant's diverse background and understanding of the NHS helped to  
support their concept of Practice Based Commissioning. These developments were  
against the backdrop of continuing increases in the aging population whose risk of 
developing prostate cancer was higher. Furthermore, there were also political factors
such the then proposed reforms that were eventually outlined in the government W hite  
Paper, Liberating the NHS (The Department of Health, 2010) and the Health and Social 
Care bill (The Departm ent of Health, 2011), the rising cost of healthcare services and the  
shrinking public purse. T2 developers expected these issues to have significant effects on 
hospital services. The developers noted findings from a briefing paper published by the  
NHS Service Development Organisation which showed that services delivered by General 
Practitioners (GPs) with special interests (such as prostate cancer) were 50% more 
expensive than those delivered by hospital-based consultants (NHS SDO, 2006). The 
majority of the costs that were identified related to  human capital costs. They also noted 
a research paper by Denvir and Leslie (2008), which showed that only 50% of heart failure 
patients w ere investigated and treated according to the national guidelines. The T2 
developers argued that despite widely held assumptions that prostate cancer was easy to  
manage, it was a complex condition with over 30 different clinical scenarios. T2 was 
designed to  counter these identified shortcomings by providing "definitive advice" for 
junior nurses to  effectively manage patients w ith stable prostate cancer in primary care 
settings.
6.3.2 How T2 works
T2 is a web-based expert clinical decision support system which was accessed via a secure 
online portal that is provided by the developers. Its software algorithms and system alert 
levels were based on NICE guidelines for the diagnosis and treatm ent of prostate cancer 
(NICE, 2008). It has built-in alerts, prompts and reminders, which are aimed at reducing 
the risk of missing key symptoms, ensuring appropriateness of referrals, reducing 
variability in practice and adhering to NICE guidelines. The software algorithms w ere
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designed to allow amendments such as updates to guidelines and recommendations from  
clinical practice. The original design premise was that T2 developers would assist 
commissioners with the procurement process, provide the nurse to  manage the T2 clinics 
as well as the required training and implementation. The initial patient clinic visit would  
be carried out face to  face by the T2 nurse at the patient's local GP practice. For 
subsequent visits, the patient would then be offered a choice between a telephone  
(virtual) clinic or a visit in person at their local GP practice. During the initial clinic visit, the  
T2 nurse would input the patient's demographic and historical clinical data, ask quality of 
life related questions, assess clinician and patient reported symptoms and blood results, 
collate routine and specialist investigations and results, medications and treatm ents to  
date. T2 then processes the information and identifies trends that indicate disease 
recurrence or progression. It also suggests further tests where required and referral to  a 
hospital-based consultant uro-oncologist where indicated. On conclusion o f the visit, T2 
generated a clinic outcome letter; one for the patient and another for the patient's GP. 
The outcome letter notes progress to date, suggests further tests and clinical 
management, follow up required and recommends booking of future tests where  
indicated. The outcome letter can be generated in multiple languages. It can be printed 
out and posted, emailed directly to the GP or even integrated into existing electronic 
patient record systems where possible. The key design criterion was to  ensure that nurses 
spend very little tim e inputting data, but instead, focusing on the patient. The problems 
that were expected to be resolved by T2 are shown in Figure 6.2.
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6.3.3 Expected benefits of T2
The overall aim of T2 was to enable the monitoring of patients w ith stable prostate cancer
in primary care through nurse-led clinics. T2DevelopingConsultant noted th at there were
many "shared desires" amongst the various stakeholders that would be enabled by T2
im plem entation. Among these "shared desires" were cost reductions, improved patient
outcomes and safety of care, tim ely referrals where indicated and data security. Using T2,
patients were expected to  receive the same quality of care regardless of w hether they
were followed up by hospital based uro-oncologists or primary care based T2 nurses.
T2DevelopingConsultant argued that patients would receive localised "hospital quality
care in the community". The variability of care was expected to  decline because
adherence with NICE guidelines would improve through T2 use. The developers argued
that T2 would provide a mechanism to identify problems and recommend appropriate
action plans. Additionally, patients would also have a choice between telephone and face
to face clinic appointm ent at their local GP practice. For the targeted T2 users (Band 5
nurses), the risk of missing key clinical indicators was expected to decline because T2
would allow the continuous collation of patient reported outcomes and clinical outcome
measures, trigger key indicators and provide tim ely recommendations through in-built
alerts and reminders. Availability of comprehensive clinical data was expected to  enable
decision makers to implement appropriate interventions w here required.
T2DevelopingConsultant noted that the inbuilt alerts and prompts would help to  provide
the required expertise and a "safety net" for nurses, thus reducing the risks associated
with clinical decision making, while at the same tim e "upskilling" Band 5 nurses.
The developers expected the introduction of T2 into primary care to reduce the need for
patients to attend hospital-based outpatient clinics. The number of patients re-referred
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back to hospital inappropriately following interventions was also anticipated to decline. 
As a result, hospital-based consultant uro-oncologists and specialist uro-oncology nurses' 
tim e would be freed. T2DevelopingConsultant argued that consultant uro-oncologists 
would perform more operations, dedicate more tim e to  trainee doctors and follow up 
only the most appropriate patients in outpatients' clinics. Specialist uro-oncology nurses 
would concentrate on more complex patients as well as performing other interventions 
in outpatients' clinics. These benefits were also expected to result in improved patient 
satisfaction, more efficient workload management and substantial savings for the  
hospitals.
T2DevelopingConsultant noted that the "T2 model" entailed that the developers would
provide the "T2 nurse", delivered the required training and equipm ent, as well as
assistance in developing the business case required to  apply for funding. Furthermore, he
argued that there would be significant tariff reductions and transparency through a
"contracted in service model" (T2DevelopingConsultant). T2's inbuilt managem ent tools
would provide regular reports on patient outcomes. Commissioners w ere also expected
to be reassured by T2's safety, which had been proven through clinical trials and following
strict guidelines that were required for its registration with the MFIRA as a software
medical device and for CE marking. T2Developer noted that MFIRA registration was
required because T2 provided therapeutic effects to patients. MFIRA registration was also
im portant because it enabled the developers to  show T2's robustness to  potential
commissioners and users. The developers argued that they had followed the same rigour
as that observed in clinical trials for drugs and pharmaceutical products in evaluating T2.
The developers also obtained clearance from the Care Quality Commission and level 2
clinical governance clearance as a third party supplier to  the NFIS. T2 also had support
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from  various cancer charities and related services and was mandated as a standard of care 
for NHS providers in the region where it was developed. The developers also argued that 
T2 was cheaper than existing alternatives, because Band 5 nurses would manage the  
stable prostate cancer clinics with T2 support instead of consultant uro-oncologists or 
other specialist nurses in hospitals. T2DevelopingConsultant noted that using T2, the NHS 
would save £500 million annually w ithout affecting quality of patient care or in some cases 
even resulting in better care. T2Developer argued that T2 was "relatively easy" to  
commission using the developers' tem plates which required completion with local data.
For many primary care settings, the developers envisaged working with various GP
practices, with one site acting as a hub that would take referrals for appropriate patients
from  other practices. Commissioners would thus benefit from improved economies of
scale and save money, with full reassurance of the effectiveness of treatm ents and
interventions, improved quality of care, safety and improvement in outcomes. GPs were
expected to improve their management of patients with stable prostate cancer, make
substantial cost savings and reduce bureaucracy through the proposed 'Practice Based
Commissioning' model. T2 was also expected to mitigate the effects of reorganisation of
primary care services because it would introduce uniformity across various GP practices.
GPs were expected to benefit from graphical presentation of clinical trends, cohort
reporting and T2 customisation to local pathways and protocols. Additionally, T2 could be
integrated with existing legacy systems to  allow seamless sharing of clinical data between
users and systems, avoid double entries and minimise human errors. O ther expected
benefits included alleviation of tim e pressures on GPs and mitigation of the lack of
expertise to deal with this patient group in primary care. T2DevelpingConsultant argued
that there were too few  GPs with special interest in the m anagement of prostate cancer
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and that T2 would bridge the knowledge gap because it was "not too complex for the  
average GP" to  use.
In their efforts to rollout T2 in primary care, the developers found that patient data were  
spread over various servers and often GPs used different systems from practice to  
practice. Consequently, T2 uptake in primary care was reported by the developers to be 
unremarkable. T2Developer revealed that there was lack of integration between T2 and 
the disparate systems used by GP practices.
Some GPs have the skills to  do stable prostate cancer follow  ups and some are less 
com fortable. As GPs are organised in clusters, it is challenging to  agree on the  
logistical and organisational issues such as w ho is going to  head up th e  service in 
th a t area, w here will the  data reside, and how to  filte r patients into th a t particular 
service. The successful ones w e have had are w here  the  organisation is acting as a 
hub and th ere  is a structure in place w here  patients actually m erge to  one  
particular location, and they m ight have several patients from  various outlying  
G P s.... That problem  had been solved already before w e got th ere  so that's  good, 
but [it is] m ore complicated in some situations.
T2Developer
However, T2LeadConsultant argued that the main reason for T2's failure in primary care 
(in the region where it was developed) was that Band 5 nurses who were originally 
intended to  use it did not have the skills to manage this patient group, even w ith T2 
support. Consequently, the Band 5 nurses reportedly referred many patients back to  
hospital based consultant uro-oncologists. He also noted that there was widespread  
speculation about the proposed changes to  the structure of Primary Care Trusts during
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this period, which added uncertainty for decision makers regarding T2 uptake. As a result, 
the developers explored new opportunities to  also im plem ent T2 in hospitals. 
T2Developer noted that hospitals had many advantages over primary care such as high 
patient volumes to justify IT investment for decision makers, better economies of scale, 
centralised decision making and easily accessible patient data. The study Trust was the  
first to adopt T2 for use in a hospital setting.
In the hospital, you have a num ber o f consultants th a t are on board and they  have 
a few  meetings and agree to  send patients to  clinic. Hospitals provide patient 
volum e and good access to  the data, unlike in com m unity settings w here  data are 
spread around several servers, making it m ore challenging. And in some situations 
nurses m ay have to  key inform ation in a g a in .... There is equal interest from  both 
GPs and hospitals but there are probably m ore economies o f scale w ith in  the  
hospital environm ent and possibly financially, it m ay be difficult to  put forw ard  an 
argum ent in the com m unity, and politically, it w ould appear to  be m ore difficult 
on the face of it to  justify the system in a com m unity setting but com pelling  
argum ents are being developed fo r com m unity use.
T2Developer
6.4 Implementation of T2 in the study Trust
The initial plan was to  implement T2 in the study Trust at the beginning of 2011. However, 
the implementation was delayed for several months because the study Trust's ICT 
departm ent had concerns about information governance. This was mainly because 
patient data were going to be kept by T2 developers rather than on the study Trust's own 
servers. Additionally, the ICT departm ent did not feel that T2 provided the value for
205
money that had been claimed by the developers. However, the decision had already been 
made to adopt T2 and funding had been agreed with the commissioners. T2 was 
eventually im plem ented at the end of 2011. However, the im plem entation was not 
supported by the study Trust's ICT departm ent and the planned integration of T2 w ith the  
study Trust's existing clinical results reporting system did not occur. T2Developer revealed 
that that integrating T2 with existing legacy systems was not challenging itself but getting 
access to  the study Trust's ICT infrastructure was. He noted th at this was mainly due to  
information governance concerns by adopting organisations and lack of com m itm ent to  
the project by key decision makers (especially the ICT departm ent).
M aking one com puter ta lk  to  another is relatively straightforw ard. The problem  is 
not technical... it is dealing w ith  the hospitals in general, protocols, th e  red tape, 
getting to  the data... I understand the m any good reasons fo r data security... The  
biggest problem  is securing the hospital IT resource, obtaining inform ation  
governance clearance, to  release inform ation or make sure th a t inform ation will 
be used in a safe m anner... agreeing w ith  IT departm ents a m ethod th a t is m utually  
acceptable, especially across Trusts because w e are having to  get tw o  discreet 
team s jellying together... it's quite a challenge.
T2D eveloper
Training to  use T2 was provided to the uro-oncology nurses by the developers over tw o
half-day sessions. T2Nurse2 described the training as "basic but adequate'' and noted that
T2 processes w ere largely similar to the study Trust's clinical pathways that w ere also
based on NICE guidelines. Newly referred patients were to be seen through the T2
telephone clinics, while existing patients remained in the "old clinics". However, the lack
of integration with existing legacy systems m eant that the nurses had to  log into T2
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separately and manually enter demographic data and clinical results. T2 generated clinic 
letters also needed to  be downloaded and then uploaded onto the study Trust's clinical 
results reporting system which initially caused a challenge because of incompatibility 
issues. The lack of integration also resulted in duplication of many of the clinic processes. 
Preparing for and managing the clinics was reported to  be taking a lot longer than  
anticipated and consequently few er patients were being seen in comparison w ith the  
previous system. This meant that the tim e savings which had been promised by the  
developers were not being realised. In some instances, the nurses had to  override T2 
recommendations. Examples include instances where T2 recommended that the nurse 
should order blood tests or scans or refer the patient to  the uro-oncology consultant. In 
most of the cases, the patients were already known to  have abnormal results, w ithout 
necessarily implying that their condition was worsening.
It is m ore tim e consuming, obviously, because you are navigating th ree  systems 
[w ithin one clinic] and you have to  m ake sure to  find tim e  before the  clinic to  input 
data from  the o ther [legacy] systems into T2. But w ith  tim e you get used to  it, and 
the  fact th a t you are not dictating letters fo r GPs makes it easier in the end, but 
w hile you are running the clinic and while you are speaking to  the  patien t you are 
having to  navigate th ree d ifferent systems and th a t takes tim e but eventually you 
get used to  it, w hether it a good thing or not, but then you don 't see it as a 
hindrance in the long run because you have gotten used to  th e  process.
T 2 N u rs e l
T2N ursel also argued that background knowledge of uro-oncology nursing was essential 
because T2 was not capable of making such distinctions.
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You couldn't rely on the system [T2] to  generate all th e  answers fo r you or just 
accept everything it recommends... it w ill generate a lot o f medical issues but 
sometimes you need to  have the clinical knowledge to  deal w ith  the practical 
issues... clinical knowledge such as th e  treatm ents  they have had and th e ir side 
effects, reading the results and appropriate fo llow  up...
T 2 N u rs e l
6.5 T2 evaluations
A number of evaluations were performed during T2's developm ent and following its 
adoption by the study Trust. These evaluations are summarised in Table 6.1 in 
chronological order. These evaluations included clinical efficacy and patient safety testing 
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6.5.1 Validation of software rules
From 2006 to 2009, T2Developer noted that they attem pted to validate the T2 software rules 
through "iterative tests" to  check T2's alert levels, patient safety aspects and adherence with  
NICE guidelines.
The system was ready after 18-24  months and the  first operational system installed 
afte r 3 years. The rem ainder o f the tim e was used for testing rigorously w ith  lots o f 
iterative tests over various sets o f data to  make sure th a t th e  system was safe.
T2 Developer
The tests were performed by a team  of software developers, clinicians and academics from  a 
regional medical school. The evaluators used contrived clinical information to test T2's 
responsiveness to different clinical scenarios that w ere typically encountered in practice. This 
was followed by similar tests on sets of retrospective anonymised clinical data that were  
sourced from  existing electronic patient record systems at the developing Trust. In this case, 
real patient profiles, demographic data and co-morbidities were utilised, together w ith actual 
PSA levels, other blood results and radical treatm ents performed. T2Developer noted the high 
level of precision that was required to write clinical decision support software in comparison 
with other industries. He argued that this was especially so for intelligent systems like T2 that 
provides advice and guidance for managing patients.
Translating the paper algorithms into softw are is relatively challenging because there  
is zero margin fo r error... the biggest challenge was to  m ake sure th a t w e had robust 
testing... developing CDSS requires specialist clinical knowledge and understanding o f 
the  safety requirem ents, an intim ate knowledge o f how  hospitals and com m unity  
settings w ork, as w ell as guidelines among o th er essential issues... Testing regim en is
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extraordinary and lengthy; clinical trials, peer reviews, consultant feedback and review  
to  cover loops... strict adherence to  NHS standards.
T2 Developer
All the T2 software rules were found to be adherent w ith NICE guidelines [NICE, 2008]. The 
targeted audiences of the validation tests were mainly the MHRA and NHS commissioners. 
These tests were considered a key factor in making the decision to  adopt T2 by the study 
Trust. T2LeadConsultant noted that T2's validation was more rigorous than the other systems 
they had looked at, thus considered to  be more robust and safe to  use. The reports of these 
tests were not made available to the researcher because the developers considered them  to  
be commercially sensitive.
6.5.2 Clinical evaluation of the system
A team  of academic researchers together with the T2 developers undertook a clinical 
evaluation of the system over a three-year period from 2006 to  2009. The objective of the  
evaluation was to test T2's ability to  follow NICE guidelines and generate clinically accurate 
recommendations for managing patients with stable prostate cancer. The evaluators 
compared outcomes generated by T2 with those of three clinicians; tw o consultant urologists 
and a urology specialist registrar. 100 sets of retrospective anonymised patient clinical data 
were obtained from the existing electronic patient record system at the developing Trust. 
They included demographic data, relevant history, co-morbidities, blood results, symptom  
scores, diagnoses and radical treatm ents undertaken. The data sets were given to  the  
clinicians to individually assess each case and make a decision regarding how they would 
manage the patient. The same data sets were also input into T2. M anagem ent plans 
generated from the assessments were in the form of codes. The codes were collated and
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comparisons were made between the recommendations that were made by the clinicians and 
those th at were generated by T2. A total of 236 codes were produced for 100 patients but 
there was complete agreement between the tw o sets of codes for only 46 of the 100 patients. 
An expert panel of three consultant urologists reviewed the discrepancies and found that they  
were mainly related to  different interpretations of data by the participating clinicians. The 
expert panel concluded that in every one of the cases, T2 had adhered to the NICE guidelines 
and had recommended an appropriate management plan. T2DevelopingConsultant noted 
that the clinicians missed some "significant" clinical information in their assessments. He 
noted a 10% human factor error rate, which he argued was common in human investigations. 
Some of the errors are noted below:
•  missed abnormal liver function tests while patient was on hormone therapy which 
could have potentially resulted in liver failure
•  wrongly diagnosing prostate cancer recurrence
•  multiple missed blood tests
•  patients brought back to  clinic too early
•  patients brought back to  clinical too late, e.g., patients showing signs of recurrence 
following surgery
•  missed high creatinine and potassium levels which could have potentially resulted in 
renal failure
Also in some instances, the participating clinicians did not follow NICE guideline 
recommendations. For example, NICE guidelines recommend that patients should be offered  
a flexible sigmoidoscopy five years after radiotherapy. A rem inder is embedded into the CDSS 
to  ensure that the test is booked when the patient attends a routine clinic visit. The clinicians
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were given an opportunity to  review their own codes against recommendations made by T2. 
The revisions resulted in agreement on a further 44 patients. The expert panel reviewed the  
discrepancies for the 10 remaining patients again and confirmed that the T2 m anagement 
plans had fully adhered to NICE guidelines. One of the T2 software rules was amended in the  
clinical pathway to  reflect the expert team 's findings to improve patients' managem ent plans. 
After the rule change, the 100 cases were reprocessed by the system and resulting 
management plans were compared w ith suggestions that were recommended by the expert 
panel. Again, T2 adhered completely to the updated guidelines so the evaluators w ere able 
to  conclude that T2 followed the defined algorithms and generated m anagem ent plans that 
m et the NICE guidelines (NICE, 2008) requirements. The targeted audiences for this 
evaluation were the MHRA, T2 developers and NHS Commissioners. T2Developer revealed 
that the T2 project team  faced various challenges in undertaking the clinical evaluations, 
particularly getting uro-oncology experts to participate in pre-im plem entation evaluations 
and to validate the system.
W e are fairly fo rtunate  to  have a Consultant Urologist as M edical D irector 
[T2DevelopingConsultant]... otherwise getting expert knowledge, th e ir tim e... borne  
out when w e tried to  get the expert panel together to  look at the  data. They are such 
busy people w ho can't even spare a few  hours... fo rtunately , w e secured 3 fe llow  
Consultant Urologists... if you w eren 't in the privileged position in a hospital o f having 
a Consultant involved in the project w holeheartedly it would never get o ff the  ground, 
which makes it doubly difficult to  do w hat w e do...
T2D eveloper
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6.5.3 Pre-T2 adoption evaluations
At the beginning of 2011, the 12  developers delivered a PowerPoint presentation to  
T2LeadConsultant, the divisional service manager and his fellow  consultant urologists at the  
study Trust. The presentation covered aspects such as how T2 was developed and the  
evaluations that had already been carried out by the developers. The purpose of the  
presentation was to enable the developers to  outline the potential benefits that would be 
achieved by the study Trust from implementing T2. For the study Trust, the purpose of the  
presentation was to assess w hether T2 was suitable for their needs in comparison with tw o  
other CDSSs that T2LeadConsultant had already assessed. The first tw o systems that were  
considered were developed by consultant urologists in other NHS Trusts. They were both 
deemed too small for the study Trust's requirements. Additionally, they had not undergone 
satisfactory clinical validation to  ensure patient safety. T2LeadConsultant selected T2 for a 
number of reasons. First, the Medical Director of the company that developed T2 
(T2DevelopingConsultant) was known to him and they had previously collaborated on other 
projects. As such, he had confidence in T2 because he trusted his peers who had developed  
it, noting "we know them  (developers), so we believed them . If it had been a purely 
commercial product, we would have been wary of w hat they were trying to sell us..." 
Additionally, the T2 Medical Director was also a senior consultant urologist at the developing  
Trust and he was using T2 for his patients. T2LeadConsultant noted that the urology 
departm ent at the developing Trust was in many ways similar to  the one at the study Trust. 
As such, he expected T2 to work in the study Trust in the same way as it had done in the  
developing Trust.
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They [T2 developing Trust and the ir com m ercial partners] w ere  looking fo r site to  roll 
it [T2] out. W e  have previously collaborated w ith  them  [T2 developing Trust] and w e  
knew the  guys w ho developed it and it seemed to  be working well fo r th em . They had 
a sim ilar unit to  ours, so w e thought w e w ould give it a go, particularly as the  
im plem entation  costs w ere  going to  be paid by th e ir commercial partners.
T2LeadConsultant
Also, unlike other systems they had considered, T2 was a commercial product that was 
registered with the MHRA and had CE marking. This further proved to the study Trust that the  
necessary clinical and technical validations had been carried out in accordance w ith  
regulatory requirements.
W e had looked at another system developed by a Consultant in the  South W est. It had 
not been commercialised or tested [and had] grown organically out of th e  Consultant's 
own special interest in-house and only had capacity fo r 500 patients. A nother system, 
again in-house, was not ready fo r im plem entation elsewhere ... The o th er thing w e  
liked about T2 was the CE mark; th a t and th e  fact th a t w e trusted the guys w ho  
developed it.
T2LeadConsultant
T2LeadConsultant noted that if he were to carry out T2 evaluations himself, he would "do 
exactly the same as they had done [T2 developers]... and there was no point to  do it 
[evaluations at the study trusty] because they [developers] had already done it", i.e., 
comparing the decisions of participating clinicians with those generated by T2. The study Trust 
was also reassured that there would be continued technical support following adoption. 
Furthermore, T2 allowed patients to be seen in nurse-led clinics, which the study Trust
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deemed to be more cost-effective than consultant-led clinics. Finally, adoption and 
implem entation for T2 was fully funded by the Primary Care Trust and one of the 
pharmaceutical companies that had co-developed it using the 'Practice Based Commissioning' 
model which was being championed by the T2 developers. There was no requirem ent for the 
study Trust's decision makers to  submit business plans to  commissioners to  justify the 
required investment in its adoption. T2leadConsultant also noted that if they were to  carry 
out any evaluations, they would perform similar evaluations to  the one carried out by T2 
developers.
The best evaluation is comparing Consultants' decisions and w h a t the com puter would  
have done but th a t takes too  much tim e. The attraction fo r us is th a t they  [T2 
developing Trust] had already done th a t so w e w ere  happy to  take the ir w ord and w e  
w ere  only happy to  take the ir w ord because w e knew them  from  before and w e  
trusted them , w hereas if it was a com pletely com m ercial o u tfit th a t would m ake us 
m ore suspicious as to  w hat they w ere just trying to  sell to  us.
T2LeadConsultant
6.5.4 T2 post market surveillance audit
The T2 developers reported undertaking a "post market surveillance audit" for 6 months 
following its implem entation in the study Trust (from January 2012 to  June 2012). The 
purpose of this audit was to  inspect the accuracy of T2 recommendations and to  ensure 
patient safety. The developers were required by the MHRA to collect data and report on T2's 
safety following implem entation. However, it was up to  individual developers to  im plem ent 
their own methods of surveillance and define their own testing parameters. T2 developers 
inspected only 10% of the outcome letters generated from  T2 clinics in the first 6 months at
216
the study Trust. The recommendations from the outcome letters were checked for 
compliance w ith NICE guidelines (NICE, 2008) and local clinical pathways. The developers also 
reported using a computerised methodology to test for T2's accuracy. They reported that 
there had not been any patient safety concerns since T2 was im plem ented in the study Trust. 
Interestingly, none of the interview participants at the study Trust (including 
T2LeadConsultant) were aware of this audit. Requests by the researcher for the post market 
surveillance audit report were unsuccessful because it was considered by the developers to  
be commercially sensitive.
6.5.5 T2 patient satisfaction survey
From Septem ber 2012 to October 2012, clinical researchers from a medical school th at was 
linked with the study Trust undertook an exploratory survey of the patients who had had 
consultation in the T2 outpatient telephone clinics at both the developing and study Trusts. 
The primary objective of the survey was to assess patient satisfaction levels w ith the T2 
telephone clinics. They also sought to establish how many patients had access to  the Internet, 
and w hetherthese patients would be w illingto use a personalised and confidential web based 
portal to give the T2 nurses information about their symptoms and concerns and to  choose 
from  a range of health topics that were im portant to  them  or wished to discuss w ith the nurse 
prior to the T2 telephone clinics. 25 questionnaires were returned from  the study Trust and 
29 from the developing Trust. However, it was unclear what the response rate was because 
the survey was not fully documented or publicised. Figure 6.3 shows a comparison between  
the respondents from the developing and study Trusts in relation to  the T2 telephone clinics.
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Number o f respondents Percentage o f respondents who Percentage o f respondents who
use in ternet had telephone consultation
■  Study Trust ■  Developing Trust
Figure 6.3 Respondents who participated in T2 telephone clinics (showing comparison between developing and 
adopting Trusts)
O vera ll, T2 te le p h o n e  clinics w e re  p o p u la r w ith  th e  vast m a jo r ity  o f re s p o n d en ts  in both  
Trusts. 60%  o f th e  resp o nd en ts  in th e  s tudy T rust had had a t least o n e  te le p h o n e  co n su lta tio n  
w ith  th e  nurse. 75%  o f resp o nd en ts  fro m  th e  d ev e lo p in g  T ru s t had had tw o  o r m o re  
te le p h o n e  co nsu lta tion s  w ith  th e  nurse. T he  m a jo r ity  o f p a tie n ts  in bo th  Trusts (o v e r 85% ) 
re p o rte d  th e ir  e x p erien ce  o f th e  te le p h o n e  c o n su lta tio n ; a b ility  to  discuss th e ir  sym p to m s  
w ith  th e  nurse; th e ir  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  in fo rm a tio n  th a t  th e y  w e re  g iven; and h o w  it 
h e lp ed  th e m  to  m an ag e  th e ir  h ea lth  as ranging fro m  good  to  e x c e lle n t. H o w e v e r, th e  m a jo r ity  
o f th e  p a tien ts  in bo th  Trusts, especia lly  th o se  aged 75  and a b o ve , had no access to  th e  
In te rn e t a t h om e o r e ls e w h e re . O n ly  2 0 .8 %  o f th e  resp o n d en ts  re p o rte d  th a t  th e y  w o u ld  find  
th e  in te rn e t p orta l to  give th e  nurse in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t th e ir  sy m p to m s  p rio r to  th e  te le p h o n e  
clin ic usefu l, w h ile  1 5 .1 %  re p o rte d  th a t  it w o u ld  n o t be usefu l and a n o th e r  1 5 .1 %  did  n o t 
k n o w . 49%  o f th e  resp o nd en ts  n o te d  th a t  it w o u ld  be in a p p lic a b le  to  th e m . T h e  m a jo r ity  o f  
re s p o n d en ts  (6 2 .3 % ), m ost o f w h o m  had been  d iagnosed  w ith in  th e  last five  years , d id n o t
218
feel that submitting their clinical information online prior to  the clinic would be useful. 60%  
of the patients who reported that the portal would not be of any use or would not be 
applicable did not have internet access. This group of respondents was mainly aged 75 and 
above. These findings were im portant because NICE guidelines (NICE, 2014) strongly 
recommended both telephone and secure electronic follow up (i.e., via the Internet) instead 
of the traditional face to  face outpatients' clinics in hospitals. The evaluators concluded that 
a more thorough evaluation was warranted. In 2014, plans were underway to  prepare a 
proposal for a collaborative project between the university and both Trusts. 
T2LeadConsultant indicated that the evaluators were most likely to  undertake an audit rather 
than "actual research". It was unclear why the evaluators were choosing an audit over other 
forms of evaluation. The results of the exploratory study are shown in Figure 6.4. This figure 
shows the number of respondents at the developing and study Trusts who thought that using 
an electronic portal to  report their symptoms before attending T2 telephone clinics would be 
useful.
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Number o f respondents who thought in ternet 
portal to  report symptoms and concerns before 
nurse consultation would be useful
Number o f respondents who thought in ternet 
portal fo r selecting health issues to  discuss at 
consultation would be useful
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Very useful *  Useful t: Not useful m Don't know m Not applicable
Figure 6.4 T2 exploratory survey results showing comparison between respondents from  the developing and 
study Trusts
6.6  Discussion
In th is  section , th e  e va lu a tio n s  th a t  w e re  carried  o u t in re la tio n  to  T2 a re  e x a m in e d  in th e  
c o n te x t o f th e  key aspects o f eva lu a tio n  th a t w e re  id e n tifie d  in th e  lite ra tu re  re v ie w . This is 
d o n e  to  estab lish  th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e s e  e va lu a tio n s  w e re  s im ila r o r d if fe re n t fro m  th o s e  
u n d e rta k e n  in o th e r  h e a lth c a re  settings, as w e ll as es tab lish in g  m issed o p p o rtu n it ie s .
6.6.1 Purposes of 12 evaluations
T h e  m a jo r ity  o f T2 e v a lu a tio n s  w e re  p e rfo rm e d  by th e  d e v e lo p e rs  d u rin g  its d e v e lo p m e n t in 
c o lla b o ra tio n  w ith  th e  p ro je c t partn ers . T he  purposes o f th e s e  eva lu a tio n s  w e re  p r im a rily  to  
check T2 's  tech n ica l and clinical accuracy, te s t p a tie n t s a fe ty  p a ra m e te rs , g u id e lin e  a d h e re n c e  
and  re g u la to ry  re q u ire m e n ts . A lthough  th e  d e ve lo p ers  m a d e  w id e  ranging cla im s a b o u t th e  
e c o n o m ic  b e n e fits , im p ro v e m e n t in p e rfo rm a n c e  and p a tie n t o u tc o m e s , n o n e  o f th e  re p o rte d  
b e n e fits  w e re  specifica lly  addressed by th e  e v a lu a tio n s  p e rfo rm e d . Im p ro v e m e n ts  in user
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performance and clinical efficacy were assumed rather than proven by evaluations. 
T2LeadConsultant acknowledged the need to  establish these benefits, noting that "it would 
be great if I could tell you how many slots we freed up... how many more patients w e saw..." 
but revealed that they that did not have the financial and human resources to perform such 
evaluations.
There is no evaluation at all [at the  study Trust]. They [the T2 developers] had pretty  
much the  only system th a t was out there  so our choice was to  use th e ir system or 
develop our ow n. I haven't got the expertise to  do it and som eone was going to  pay 
fo r this one. ... There are a lot o f patients w aiting fo r appointm ents, nobody knows 
how  m any out there , if things are going w ell, the  secretaries will just book them  and 
if it's unwell, there  is a backlog... At no point am I aw are o f exactly how  big my 
outpatien t population is or how long they are w aiting over w h at I have suggested. In 
a perfect world I w ould be aw are o f th a t data and I would be able to  say how m any  
slots I have freed  up every w eek. I do know they are seeing patients every w eek  
because if they w eren 't, I w ould be having to  see th em . W h a t the  benefit is, I have no 
idea...
T2LeadConsultant
The patient satisfaction survey was the only evaluation which looked specifically at patient 
outcomes. However, it was a small, partially documented exploratory study which had little 
impact on decision making in the study Trust. It did nonetheless dispel some of the  
assumptions which were held by both the developers and decisjon makers at the study Trust. 
For example, in line with NICE guidance, the developers highlighted that this patient group 
preferred to be followed up in primary care settings and over the telephone or internet rather 
than in face to face outpatients' clinics. However, the survey results showed th a t while
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patients gave positive feedback about the telephone clinic, they were less keen on using the  
internet or related tools to communicate with the T2 nurses regarding their symptoms. 
T2Nurse2 also reported that most patients preferred face to  face clinics compared with the  
telephone clinics because it gave them  a chance to  maintain human contact and also to  
discuss other problems that they may have. The post market surveillance audit was primarily 
focused on satisfying MHRA requirements and CE marking. However, the developers were  
keen to label these audits largely as evaluations of patient safety. Although effectively these  
longitudinal data contributed towards patient safety in as far as guideline adherence was 
concerned, the primary motivation for the developers was the commercial value of having an 
MHRA approved and CE marked product that they could sell to other NHS Trusts.
6.6.2 Approaches and methods used to evaluate T2
The tw o evaluations that were carried out by the developers used quantitative clinical 
validation methods that are commonly used in the NHS. These methods were primarily used 
to  test the systems' robustness, usability and adherence to clinical pathways or guidelines. 
The key variables that were measured include system accuracy, system and patient outcomes 
and user performance. It could be argued that T2 developers carried out these evaluations 
because they knew that their peers who are responsible for commissioning T2 in NHS Trusts 
would approve their methods. Indeed, T2LeadConsultant acknowledged that the validations 
that were carried out by the developers were an im portant factor in his adoption decision 
and that he would have used similar methods to evaluate T2. However, clinical validations 
and audits do not explain the effects of T2 on the environment where it was introduced. 
Examples of these effects include changes to targeted users' roles, shifts in responsibilities 
and existing workflow. Indeed the system might prove accurate and efficient in a controlled
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environm ent using contrived data but may fail to  achieve the same results in a real clinical 
setting where various competing priorities are at play. For example, T2N ursel reported that 
additional jobs that were undertaken simultaneously with T2 clinics could not be coded, such 
as unexpectedly long clinic visits, dealing with related clinical problems which patients 
presented with and circumstantial clinical examinations or referrals that were not always 
"picked up" by T2. T2N ursel also reported having to  override some 12  recommendations, 
noting that it was "too sensitive to the guidelines" and did not consider the nurses7 expertise 
and experience.
I am not particularly aw are o f the ir thought processes [at the  tim e o f adoption], but 
looking at it from  w here  w e are, it w ould be helpful fo r a person coming in on a 
developm ental role [not for an experienced nurse]... They w ould still need training to  
run the clinic but it would be interesting to  see w h ether they would be able to  navigate  
th e  systems w ithout as much training or [prostate cancer background] knowledge.
T2N ursel
However, T2Nurse2 argued that regardless of their expertise and experience, T2 was an 
im portant "safety net" which ensured that they followed the NICE guidelines fully and did not 
miss any im portant symptoms or tests regardless of w hether it was used in primary or 
secondary care settings.
Introduction o f the  system [T2] was an im provem ent in identifying and minimising  
risks in term s o f decision making. W ith  risk m anagem ent, it is very im portant th a t you 
are able to  identify if there  is any e lem ent o f risk in the w ay you manage the  patient.
The system [T2] prompts you. It's not som ething th a t you w ou ldn 't th ink about but it 
makes you look at o ther avenues, because it looks at certain aspects such as bone
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pain, frequency, erectile dysfunction, whereas you may fail to  ask the specific 
questions, and it makes sure you are asking the righ t/re levant questions which will 
lead you to  make an inform ed decision. You can never have too  many rem inders fo r a 
condition like prostate cancer - as long as it reminds you about som ething th a t will 
benefit patients, it's a w in-w in in term s o f minimising patient risk and improving the  
quality o f care. ... The system itself prom otes a high standard o f care, reduces 
variability; w e are asking the same questions, the m andatory fields, that's  a benefit in 
itself. I find it very beneficial but obviously, w ith any system, people will have d ifferent 
opinions.
T2Nurse2
Both T2DevelopingConsultant and T2LeadConsultant also argued that there was no guarantee  
that the specialist nurses were following the guidelines appropriately or that their clinical 
decision making was always accurate.
Guidelines cannot tell you everything. The attraction [of T2] is th a t changes in practice 
can be im plem ented by making necessary changes to  th e  algorithm . ... It makes it 
easier to  change things as patients are managed c e n tra lly .... The algorithm  has to  be 
capable o f coping w ith  any eventuality. There are tim es w hen a senior nurse can make  
the  right decision but jun ior nurses may not be able to  do so, so the com puter thus 
makes perfectly reasonable decision. ... To my mind, it [T2 nurses overriding the  
system] doesn't happen often to  w arran t changing the  algorithm .
T2LeadConsultant
However, the evaluations undertaken by the developing Trust looked at a system designed 
for use by Band 5 nurses in primary care, rather than senior specialist nurses (i.e., T2N ursel 
and T2Nurse2) who worked autonomously in hospital settings. The specialist nurses may not
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require the same level of decision support that would be appropriate for junior nurses (e.g., 
Band 5 nurses) although clinical decisions should be the same for both groups of nurses. 
However, the study Trust may not have achieved the purported financial benefits because 
these nurses would cost more than junior nurses. The developers explained that senior nurses 
w ere used for patient safety reasons while they were waiting to being fully registered with  
the MHRA, i.e., submission of post market surveillance audit data. This may suggest that T2 
was not suitable for primary care settings by junior nurses as originally intended. However, 
its usefulness for nurses who had a higher level of proficiency about urological cancers was 
questionable and in this case had not been evaluated. Although both T2N ursel and T2Nurse2 
valued T2's structured form at and clinic outcome letters, they disagreed regarding its added 
value to  their work. T2N ursel viewed T2 as an "unnecessary" system which instead of helping, 
created more work for them  while T2Nurse2 argued that regardless of the "teething  
problems" which had surrounded its introduction, T2 was an invaluable CDSS th at would  
ensure patient safety and improved clinical decision making.
Probably the  full potential o f the  system will be noticeable once fully in tegrated. ... 
W henever you introduce something new in a big organisation w here there  are o th er  
things in place, you have to  learn about the new system, w h at aspects you w an t to  
m arry. Obviously there  are tw o  or m ore systems so you w an t to  reduce duplication in 
the  system... [Asking] w hat can be added from  th e  new  system to  support th e  old
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system can take a w h i le . ... I w ould not say delay [integration], I w ould say getting a 
b e tte r understanding before establishing w h a t can be done.
T2N ursel
Additionally, T2N ursel noted that they had to  summarise clinic visits in patients' medical case 
notes because they were unsure w hether the printed T2 outcome letter alone would suffice 
as a medical record and they wanted to  "cover their backs". These concerns exposed grey 
areas around professional duty of care, ethics and legal imperatives of novel technologies in 
tightly regulated healthcare environments.
6.6.3 Contextual and organisational issues that affected T2 evaluations
None of the evaluations performed looked at the contextual and organisational issues such 
as the differences between the originally intended T2 implementation context and the study 
Trust. There was an assumption by project leaders that T2 would also work in the study Trust 
because of its similarities w ith the developing Trust. T2Developer revealed that having 
T2DevelopingConsultant as their Medical Director and also being a senior consultant at the  
developing Trust was invaluable to the team . This dual position carried significant influence 
on T2's adoption and evaluation in the developing Trust. Indeed, the clinicians at the study 
Trust did not have the same influence as those in the developing Trust as evidenced by the  
lack of support from key decision makers such as the ICT departm ent. Also the assumption by 
T2LeadConsultant that the urology departments in both Trusts were similar only took into 
consideration technical and structural aspects of T2 and the NHS in general. Indeed, this 
assumption effectively removed the evaluation agenda from the adoption process w ithout 
involving other stakeholders in the study Trust. It would appear that the complex interplay 
between the actors involved, political, social and other organisational factors were ignored.
The literature review (see chapter 2) suggested that CDSS evaluations needed to consider the  
interdependencies between these factors and also coordinate all the key stakeholders in any 
evaluation activity. It appears that the study Trust's ICT departm ent were not involved in the  
T2 adoption process until the tim e of implementation. Failure to involve the ICT departm ent 
earlier may have been a missed opportunity to assess T2's suitability for the study Trust and 
its compatibility and integration with existing systems before the adoption decision was 
made. There may also have been an opportunity to set the boundaries for evaluation activities 
in line w ith the Trust's strategic goals. The uro-oncology nurses were also not involved in the  
T2 adoption decision. However, T2 brought about significant changes in their ways of working. 
For example, they were now spending more tim e in p lu tting  data, and consequently seeing 
few er patients per clinic in comparison with the previous system. These issues were not 
addressed in any of the evaluations. T2N ursel noted that they did not raise these and other 
operational issues because the adoption decision had already been made and they "just got 
on with it".
Looking at the m anagem ent point o f view , they have a d ifferen t idea o f w h at the  
system is supposed to  do. ... W hen you are actually working w ith it, you have a 
differen t point o f view . ... So from  a m anagem ent point o f view, I understand th a t 
som ebody less qualified can run the clinic w ith  support from  the system rather than  
getting to  another person, so that's fine.
T2N ursel
6.6.4 Barriers to T2 evaluations
There were many barriers to T2 evaluation. The main barrier was that the study Trust did not 
see the need to  undertake any evaluations at all. The primary reason given by
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T2LeadConsultant was that the evaluations that had already been carried out by T2 
developers were satisfactory. This was mainly because he had previously worked with 
T2DevelopingConsultant and was prepared to  "take his word" regarding the robustness of 
these evaluations. Additionally, he noted that T2's registration w ith the MHRA and CE marking 
had "reassured" him of its robustness. It would appear that the decisions both to  adopt and 
not evaluate T2 following adoption were based on trust of the developers rather than the 
robustness of evaluations undertaken as reported. However, as noted above, these prior 
evaluations looked at the use of T2 in a completely different context and w ith different users. 
It is therefore difficult to generalise the benefits or appropriateness of these evaluations to  
the study Trust's context. T2Nurse2 argued that the study Trust needed to give T2 tim e to  
"settle" before undertaking any evaluations to  assess its effectiveness. However, by that tim e  
T2 had already been in use in the Trust for over a year and had become a central part of the  
m anagement of stable prostate cancer patients. Other barriers to T2 evaluations noted 
included the lack of tim e and resources, the lack of motivation to  evaluate due to  
organisational changes and the top down nature of the departm ental structure. These 
barriers were closely linked with the decision made by T2LeadConsultant not to evaluate at 
all in the study Trust. At the tim e of T2 adoption there were many structural changes to  NHS 
funded primary care services. The local Primary Care Trust reorganised into tw o Clinical 
Commissioning Groups, which subsequently evolved into three within a year. 
T2LeadConsultant argued that it became unclear who was responsible for funding and 
monitoring the performance of T2 because many of the key stakeholders who w ere originally 
involved in its commissioning were now focusing on different priorities or had moved on 
completely.
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I have heard th a t most people th ink they [the T2 developers] charge too  much per 
patient, but w e have negotiated a good ta riff so that's  not an issue fo r us. W e may 
have a problem  in fu ture  if the  PCT (Primary Care Trust) look at the  ta r iff and say "we  
can't pay this". ... The CCGs (clinical commissioning groups) have reorganised 
them selves in a d ifferen t fashion. I would be amazed if anyone in the  new  structure  
would rem em ber th a t it was negotiated; our m anager w ho negotiated this is no longer 
w ith  u s .... I don 't know who he was talking to  in th e  CCG. I know that's  not the w ay it 
should be but how  on earth do you determ ine w h eth er it's working or not?
T2LeadConsultant
6.6.5 Benefits of T2 evaluations
The main benefits of T2 evaluations were the satisfaction of regulatory requirements and 
facilitating its registration with the MHRA and CE marking. In turn, this gave T2 credibility as 
a robust CDSS that was safe to use and satisfied the organisational, ethical and professional 
duty of care for the study Trust. However, the limitations of these evaluations were not 
addressed. During T2's clinical evaluation at the developing Trust, it was noted that the  
clinicians missed some relevant clinical information in their assessments and in some 
instances did not follow NICE guideline recommendations. It could be argued that regardless 
of how experienced or senior a clinician is, there is no guarantee that they will follow the  
guidelines fully or deliver safe and appropriate patient care. The same could also be said for 
the hospital-based specialist nurses who felt that T2 was developed for junior nurses who  
required that level of guidance and clinical decision support. It could then be argued that T2 
promoted best practice, regardless of the users' seniority or lack of experience. However, 
there was a gap in the evaluations that were undertaken because they did not look at how T2 
would be used by hospital based specialist nurses and how such a CDSS would affect their
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established working patterns. Also the originally intended use of T2 had significantly changed 
and it was unlikely that the originally "sold" benefits would be achieved in hospital settings. 
Clearly, there were many questions that had not been answered by the evaluations that were  
carried out and there was insufficient economic or cost-effectiveness evidence to support the  
continued use of T2 in hospitals as claimed by the developers.
6.6.6 Overview of T2 evaluations and missed opportunities
The T2 evaluations did not address many im portant issues that were identified in the  
literature review. The evaluations performed by the developers were only concerned w ith the  
technical and safety aspects as required by the regulators. These evaluations w ere also 
focused on T2 use in primary care settings by junior nurses rather than by senior nurses in 
hospital settings such as the study Trust. Also the adopting Trust did not commission any 
evaluations at all. It was difficult to judge w hether they achieved the expected benefits or if 
there were any benefits at all from adopting T2. By not formally evaluating T2, the study Trust 
missed an opportunity to  establish the effects of T2 on the users and patients, clinical 
workflow and the w ider organisation. There was a lack of motivation to  evaluate and 
challenge assumptions about the effectiveness of T2. Also, the developers only performed  
form ative studies that were necessary during CDSS development. A summative evaluation  
would have identified w hether T2 had solved the problems that it was designed to solve. 
However, the study Trust accepted the benefits of T2 based on the evaluations reported by 
the developers. This was based mainly on trust of their peers and its links w ith NICE, MHRA  
and CE marking rather than robustness of evaluations. The gaps in evaluation mainly related  
to contextual and organisational issues and the range of evaluation approaches employed.
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Key evaluation factors T2 evaluations carried out Missed opportunities
based on the CDSS
evaluation framework
Purposes of evaluation • Most evaluations carried out • T2 fit for study Trust
should cover a range of by developers • T2’s economic effectiveness
issues, rather than focus • Primary purposes of • Patient benefits in a typical
on single issues evaluations were to test T2’s 
clinical and technical 
effectiveness, guideline 
adherence and immediate 
patient safety aspects
hospital setting
Various approaches and • Quantitative clinical • ‘Sold’ benefits not tested in study
methods of evaluation validation methods Trust
should be applied • Assessment of guideline • No evaluations carried out in a
throughout the CDSS’s adherence using contrived hospital setting with experienced
lifecycle and actual patient data uro-oncology specialist nurses
within controlled • Lack of integration with legacy
environments system and T2 impact on 
workflow settings not evaluated
Contextual and • Study Trust contextual and • T2 could have been evaluated in
organisational issues organizational issues not the context o f the study Trust,
should be considered in evaluated formally rather than informal assumptions
any evaluation activity based on ‘sold’ benefits
Benefits of evaluation • No formal evaluation o f T2 • ‘Sold’ benefits o f T2 could have
should be made clear to all benefits to study Trust been evaluated at different stages
stakeholders
•
of its adoption in the study Trust 
T2 project team could have 
looked at workflow effects and 
benefits to patients
Barriers to evaluation • No formal evaluation of T2 • Assumptions by decision makers
should be mitigated by barriers that evaluations carried out by T2
widening the purposes, developers would apply to study
approaches and methods, Trust hampered opportunities to
taking into consideration assess the fit o f T2 to study Trust
contextual and
organisational issues as
well as highlighting the
benefits of evaluation
Table 6.2 Opportunities that were missed by T2 evaluations
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Chapter 7 T3 track and trigger tool
This chapter looks at the evaluation of T3. It is an expert electronic track and trigger clinical 
decision support system (CDSS) that was used to  monitor, identify and respond to  
deteriorating patients in acute hospital settings. The introduction section provides a broad 
overview of the key aspects relating to  acutely ill medical patients and how T3 was 
intended to resolve these problems. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 look at the key national 
initiatives that were developed to manage this patient group in the UK. The study Trust 
context is introduced in Section 7.4, noting how T3 was im plem ented. The evaluations 
that were carried out for T3 are discussed in Section 7.5. The key aspects of evaluations 
undertaken are discussed in Section 7.6.
The participants who were interviewed for this case study are identified as follows:
1. T3 Lead Consultant-T3LeadConsultant
2. T3 Lead N urse-T3LeadNurse
3. T3 Implementation Nurse -T3lm plem entationN urse
4. Critical Care Outreach Sister -  OutreachSisterl
5. Critical Care Outreach Nurse -  OutreachSister2
6. W ard Sister in Combined Specialties -  W ardSisterl
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7.1 Introduction
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) reported that over 13 million patients were  
adm itted to acute hospitals in England and Wales annually (National patient Safety 
Agency, 2007). They noted that although the majority of patients received safe and 
effective care, many were at risk of deteriorating and becoming critically ill during their 
admission, which in some cases resulted in avoidable serious adverse events or even 
deaths. Previous studies had shown that in most cases, patient deterioration was well 
documented but inadequate interventions were commenced and sometimes delayed (Sax 
and Charlson, 1987; Smith and Wood, 1998; Goldhill et al., 1999). Goldhill e t.a l. (1999) 
found that patients who were transferred from the wards to  intensive care units had 
higher levels of deaths compared with those who were adm itted from operating theatres  
or emergency departments. Other studies found that although most of these deaths were  
predictable and preventable, physiological deterioration was not identified early on the  
wards and many patients received suboptimal care (Massey et al., 2009; McQuillan et al.,
1998). Goldhill et al. (1999) highlighted the importance of early identification of patients 
at risk and ensuring that the appropriate interventions were commenced before they  
deteriorated further. Another study by Goldhill et al. (2004) concluded th at the longer 
patients were on hospital wards before an intensive care unit admission, the worse their 
chances of survival were. They also found that nearly 25% of deaths following admission 
to  intensive care unit occurred after discharge to the wards and many of these deaths 
were in patients who were previously considered to be relatively low risk (Goldhill et al., 
2004).
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In 2005, the NPSA received 484, 441 reports of patient safety incidents and 1804 deaths 
in NHS hospitals (NPSA, 2007). Most of these incidents and deaths were related to  failures 
by healthcare workers to  recognise physiological deterioration and commence 
appropriate interventions on tim e. Previous studies had shown that such failures often  
resulted in further physiological deterioration, which in turn led to admissions and 
prolonged stay in intensive care units, avoidable deaths and significant costs to  healthcare 
organisations (Schein et al., 1990; Franklin and M athew , 1994; McQuillan et al., 1998). The 
NPSA reported that NHS hospitals were now increasingly treating older patients who often  
presented with more complex and acute problems with additional co-morbidities (NPSA, 
2007). Furthermore, resource limitations meant that only a few  patients could be 
adequately monitored and treated in intensive care units (NICE, 2007).
7.2 Interventions for acutely ill medical patients
This section will discuss the critical events, interventions and research studies that 
influenced the development and adoption of T3. The Early W arning Score (EWS), also 
known as track and trigger tool was a bedside physiological evaluation tool (Subbe et al., 
2001). It was a paper-based tool that was developed to  secure the tim ely presence of 
appropriately skilled clinical help by the bedside of those patients exhibiting physiological 
signs compatible with established or impending critical illness in acute clinical 
environments. Patients' blood pressure, tem perature, respiratory rate and heart rate 
were recorded and a risk score was calculated based on w hether they w ere within or 
outside acceptable ranges. The higher the score, the higher the likelihood of the patient 
deteriorating physiologically and potentially requiring admission into the intensive care
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unit. Additional clinical parameters such as urine output and patients' alertness levels 
were later added to  create a Modified Early W arning Score (MEWS) based on local 
protocols or clinical specialties. Gardner-Thorpe et al. (2006) demonstrated the value of 
the MEWS in appropriately identifying patients who would benefit from being adm itted  
onto intensive care unit beds. Similarly, in a prospective cohort study, Subbe et al. (2001) 
validated the MEWS to identify medical patients at risk and its feasibility as a screening 
tool to trigger early interventions or determining patients' suitability for intensive care 
unit admission. They concluded that the MEWS was a simple and effective bedside tool 
that could be effectively used by nurses in busy clinical areas. NICE guideline 50 for acutely 
ill medical patients (NICE, 2007) recommended the use of electronic track and trigger 
systems based on the MEWS across the NHS. However, the NPSA reported many 
shortcomings in NHS systems which made it difficult to monitor, prevent, detect and trea t 
physiological deterioration even though the MEWS had been widely adopted in the  
majority of NHS hospitals (NPSA, 2007). Hammond et al. (2013) also argued that despite 
widespread use of MEWS, clinical monitoring on the wards was often poor. They noted 
many inaccuracies in the recording of physiological vital signs and MEWS calculations, 
which in turn affected the detection of those patients at risk of deterioration. This in turn  
delayed interventions and resulted in needless overuse of limited resources. Since the  
early 2000s, many NHS Trusts invested in the developm ent of in-house and acquisition of 
commercially developed electronic track and trigger systems that were based on the  
MEWS score. Some small scale studies concluded that electronic track and trigger systems 
were more accurate and efficient in comparison with MEWS based paper charts (Smith et 
al., 2006). Some studies (Gao et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2008a; Elliott et al., 2015) concluded
that electronic track and trigger systems reduced hospital deaths. However, they argued 
that many of these systems had not been formally evaluated. As such, there was limited 
information about their cost-effectiveness, effect on patient outcomes, resource 
allocation and use, and w hether NHS organisations were benefiting from investing in 
these systems.
7.3 Management of acutely ill patients in the NHS
Most clinical studies that were carried out from  the late 1980's to the late 1990s found 
overwhelming evidence that acutely ill patients in hospitals were receiving suboptimal 
care. Since the mid-1990s, critical care services focused on im provem ent of patient 
outcomes and appropriate use of resources. Rowan et al. published a large study looking 
at the outcomes of patients in 26 intensive care units across the UK and Ireland (Rowan 
et al., 1993). They concluded that comparisons of death rates were misleading indicators 
of hospital performance. They also noted the heterogeneity of data collection methods 
and the need for case mix adjustments when comparing outcomes from  different 
hospitals. Subsequently, the UK Intensive Care Society submitted proposals to  establish a 
nationally coordinated comparative audit and research centre for critical care services. 
The Departm ent of Health acknowledged the importance of the APACHE II study (Rowan 
et al., 1993) and emphasised the need for updated information on intensive care services. 
Financial support was provided for the establishment in 1994 of the Intensive Care 
National Audit and Research Centre (ICNARC). It was a separate organisation from  the  
Intensive Care Society. The main aim of ICNARC was to provide an independent national 
resource to  monitor and evaluate NHS intensive care services. Additionally, ICNARC
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provided data to  intensive care practitioners and commissioners on the most effective 
interventions and organisation of services. The im m ediate objectives of ICNARC focused 
on existing service provisions and practices in intensive care units across the UK. This led 
to  the developm ent of models to evaluate and monitor performance of intensive care 
units and evaluation of various aspects of service provision and patient outcomes. To that 
end, ICNARC required all NHS Trusts in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to submit 
monthly data on patient outcomes to its national Case M ix Programme. The Case Mix 
Programme was an audit of all adult general critical care units in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. Since ICNARC's establishment in 1994, over 1.5 million patients have 
been added to  its database. These data are analysed and disseminated to  critical care 
practitioners and commissioners to provide them with accurate outcome measurements 
and state of service provision. ICNARC established the National Cardiac Arrest Audit in 
2008 in partnership with the Resuscitation Council (UK). The audit monitors and reports 
the incidence of cardiac arrests in hospitals and subsequent patient outcomes. ICNARC 
also established a Clinical Trials Unit alongside the national audit activities. The Clinical 
Trials Unit primarily carried out randomised controlled trials and cohort studies aimed at 
utilising collected data to improve critical care practice and guide policy developm ent.
In 1999, the Audit Commission published its Critical to Success report (Audit Commission,
1999), which introduced the concept of Intensive Care Outreach Services. It 
recommended that NHS Trusts should agree on "danger signs" that would enable the  
identification of patients at risk of deterioration in acute hospital settings. The concept of 
Intensive Care Outreach Service was further developed in the Departm ent of Health's 
Comprehensive Critical Care report (Departm ent of Health, 2000). It recommended that
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all NHS Trusts should set up Outreach Services staffed by senior critical care nurses and 
doctors. Their role was to support ward areas to  identify and appropriately respond to  
deteriorating patients (McArthur-Rouse, 2001). They primarily used paper-based clinical 
observation charts accompanied by local escalation protocols based on the MEWS. 
However, various studies found little evidence of im provem ent to patient outcomes 
resulting from  the introduction of MEWS (Gardner-Thorpe et al., 2006; Subbe et al., 2003). 
Other studies also concluded that the MEWS scores were being inaccurately calculated, 
which undermined the effectiveness of Outreach Services and resulted in suboptimal care 
being provided to patients (Smith et al., 2008a; Smith et al., 2008b; Prytherch et al., 2010).
In 2007, NICE published its clinical guideline 50, which focused on the recognition of and 
response to  acute illness in adults in hospital environments (NICE, 2007). It recommended  
that healthcare workers should correctly measure and record physiological observations 
in line with existing MEWS-based clinical track and trigger systems. Emphasis was placed 
on full clinical assessment and tailoring of physiological observations and clinical 
m anagement plans to  individual patients. NHS Trusts were tasked w ith ensuring that 
healthcare professionals were appropriately trained to  adequately assess and escalate 
care. Additionally, NHS Trusts were tasked with developing and implem enting local 
strategies for tracking patients and ensuring appropriate responses to  clinical 
deterioration. NICE guideline 50 also recommended that NHS Trusts should adopt 
electronic track and trigger systems to  improve the quality of care provided. Some NHS 
Trusts had already introduced electronic track and trigger systems to  manage acutely ill 
patients based on MEWS protocols in the early 2000s. However, they were mostly small 
standalone systems that were used in the units where they had been developed [NICE,
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2007]. It was also up to individual NHS Trusts w hether to  use paper-based or 
computerised track and trigger systems to adhere with NICE guidance. In support of the  
recommendations, a study by M oham m ed et al. (2009) concluded that handheld 
computerised systems improved the accuracy and efficiency of MEWS based electronic 
systems in acute hospital settings in comparison w ith traditional pen and paper methods. 
They also noted that the computerised systems were found to  be acceptable to nurses.
Also in 2007, the NPSA published its fifth Patient Safety Observatory report (NPSA, 2007). 
The report highlighted the importance of the National Reporting and Learning Systems 
used in England and Wales to  identify where patients were being harmed, rather than  
helped by healthcare interventions. It also identified that too little attention was being 
paid to data collected from these safety reporting systems in order to  learn from these 
experiences to  improve patient safety. The report noted the existence of systemic failures 
in NHS hospitals, which resulted in healthcare professionals failing to identify and mitigate  
acutely ill patients. These failures resulted in further deterioration, clinical complications, 
severe disability, prolonged hospitalisation and sometimes avoidable deaths in acute 
hospital settings. The NPSA complemented the NICE guidelines and w ider national 
programme to improve the outcomes of patients in acute hospital settings. However, the  
NPSA noted that because the National Reporting and Learning Systems was voluntary, it 
may have been subject to bias and data incompleteness. To mitigate these limitations, the  
NPSA also looked at information from litigation organisations and new research to gain a 
better understanding of the causes of adverse events and deaths in acute hospital 
settings. Furthermore, there was also evidence of poor documentation and 
communication between healthcare teams. This often resulted in delays in seeking
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appropriately skilled help and interventions. Additionally, the NPSA also recommended  
that NHS Trusts should improve resuscitation procedures, communication amongst the  
MDT, appropriate training and development and ensuring that frontline staff had the  
appropriate equipm ent to perform their roles (NPSA, 2007)..
The Royal Medical Colleges and related collegiate and professional organisations also 
supported NICE guideline 50. They helped to set up ongoing training and developm ent 
programmes to  ensure that all clinical staff were com petent in measuring and recording 
vital signs in line with NICE recommendations. In 2012, the Royal College of Physicians 
published the National Early W arning Score (NEWS) (Royal College of Physicians, 2012). It 
was based on MEWS and aimed to standardise the assessment of acutely ill patients 
across all NHS hospitals and to  replace all existing early warning scores. The Royal Colleges 
of Physicians and Nursing, the National Outreach Forum and the NHS Training for 
Innovation developed online programmes to  support NHS staff to  use the NEWS 
appropriately. Many NHS Trusts, including the study site adapted the NEWS into routine 
clinical practice. However, in 2014, there were no published formal evaluations of the  
NEWS despite its widespread implementation across the NHS. Recent studies looking at 
the impact of early warning systems on patient outcomes found that most of the available 
evidence was of poor quality (McNeill and Bryden, 2013; Kolic et al., 2015). They noted  
th at most studies reviewed used uncontrolled before and after designs which made it 
difficult to  attribute causation to  the early warning scores. They also noted that most early 
warning scoring systems were implemented with little control of confounding factors that 
may potentially affect outcomes.
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7.4 Management of acute medical patients in the study 
Trust
In the study Trust, acute medical patients were primarily adm itted through the Accident 
and Emergency departm ent. They were assessed using the triage system and then  
transferred to  appropriate wards or theatres depending on their clinical needs, 
investigations that were required or confirmed diagnosis. A key part of the clinical 
assessment was the taking and recording of clinical observations such as blood pressure, 
tem perature, respiratory rate and oxygen saturations. To ensure uniformity across the  
study Trust, a paper based Early Warning Score clinical observation chart was adopted in 
2001. However, audits that were carried out at the tim e showed variable usage of these 
charts across the Trust. Manual calculations of MEWS scores were found to be inaccurate. 
The audits also found that the higher the MEWS scores were, the greater the failure 
occurrence and delays in instigating remedial action. Also in the early 2000s, the study 
Trust set up a nurse led Critical Care Outreach service. The key outcomes of this service 
were to identify and respond to acutely ill or potentially deteriorating patients in the  
hospital, prevention of admission/readmission to critical care, advanced clinical skills 
training for nurses, and induction and support for junior doctors. The outreach service ran 
from  8am to 6pm and linked ward areas, the hospital at night team , ward based medical 
teams and the critical care departm ent. OutreachSisterl reported that prior to  T3 
im plem entation, it was difficult to  coordinate the activities of the outreach team , keep 
track of referrals for deteriorating patients and ensure that ward areas requested help on 
tim e. There were also challenges in tracking patients between wards, to and from theatres
and ancillary services such as radiology. The Outreach Sisters also noted that it was 
difficult for medical teams to  prioritise their work and track patients spread across the  
hospital.
I was involved in the introduction o f paper-based MEW S charts in the  Trust... it 
was difficult to  decipher, hit and miss, illegible writing, ill patients often missed, 
hence T3 was a natural progression th a t allows instant access to  scoring patients... 
you can see rem otely what's going on instantaneously...improves com m unication  
w ith  patients' team  and critical care doctors...
OutreachSisterl
Since the early 2000s, T3LeadConsultant had a dual role as the study Trust's Lead 
Consultant for acute services and developing its clinical technology strategy. He had 
previously worked on a national project with the Lead Clinician who co-developed T3. In 
2006, the company that developed T3 was looking for a large Trust to  partner with and 
im plem ent T3 hospital-wide. At the same tim e, the Trust Board (study Trust) was keen to  
adopt a tracking system to manage patient flow  in line with NICE guideline 50. 
T3LeadConsultant noted that he was more concerned with patient safety aspects of any 
new, technology adopted. The study Trust saw an opportunity to develop processes 
around patient tracking using T3. Due to provisions in financing of the hospital facilities, a 
business case was not required at the tim e and the Trust Board approved the required 
funding for T3 adoption at the study Trust.
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7.4.1 The technology
T3 was developed by a third party supplier in collaboration with another NHS Trust (the 
developing Trust) from 2005 to  2007. Its software algorithms w ere initially based on the  
developing Trust's MEWS protocol. During this period, there w ere various concerns that 
acutely ill patients in NHS hospitals were receiving suboptimal care. Various initiatives 
resulted in the NPSA commissioned reports looking at clinical incidents, adverse events 
and deaths in hospitals (NPSA, 2007) and the NICE guideline 50 for acutely ill patients in 
hospital (NICE, 2007). Recommendations from these tw o  documents were incorporated  
into T3 software algorithms to  ensure that patients were appropriately monitored, 
assessed and the necessary interventions commenced before they deteriorated further 
(see Figure 7.1). These algorithms could also be adapted to  local clinical pathways or 
changes to clinical guidelines as necessary. T3 was registered with the MHRA as a software  
medical device and achieved CE marking following the necessary clinical validation  
procedures at the developing Trust. The developing Trust reported that T3 
implementation led to significant financial, operational and clinical benefits. However, the  
developers were looking for a large NHS Trust to  partner with and im plem ent T3 across 
the hospital. The study Trust was the first to im plem ent T3 across the hospital in 2007. 




Track and trigger potentially deteriorating 
patients
Identify and treat potentially deteriorating 
Aim-implement T3 to patients before they get worse
manage acutely ill 
patients across the Trust
Improve the Trust's adherence with NICE 
guidelines
Improve patient outcomes
Achieve financial and operational savings for 
NHS Trusts
Figure 7.1 Problems tha t were expected to  be solved by implem enting and using T3
7.4.2 How T3 works
T3 w as an e x p e rt s o ftw a re  CDSS th a t  w as accessed via a h a n d h e ld  p erso na l d ig ita l 
assistant (P D A ). It w as designed fo r  use by nurses and h e a lth c a re  w o rk e rs  a t th e  p a tie n ts ' 
beds id e . It w as a d o p te d  by th e  s tudy T ru st in 2 0 0 7  to  rep lace  a p a p e r based M E W S  c h a rt  
w h e re b y  nurses and o th e r h e a lth c a re  w o rkers  used to  in p u t clin ical in fo rm a tio n  th e n  
c a lcu la te  M E W S  scores m an u a lly  using p a ra m e te rs  p rin te d  a t t h e  back o f th e  c h a rt. T 3  had  
5 core  ap p lica tio n s  designed to  c a p tu re  and analyse clinical d a ta  a t th e  p o in t o f care  as 
w e ll as p ro v id in g  a d d itio n a l fu n ctio n s  fo r  d a ta  m in in g  and m a n a g e m e n t re p o rtin g  (see  
Figure 7 .2 ). T h e  P a tie n t Flow, N urse and Clinical ap p lica tio n s  w e re  th e  m o st w id e ly  used  
in th e  s tu d y  T ru s t to  record and v ie w  clin ical o b serva tio n s .
244
Nurse Application
Recording of clinical 
:>bservations at flic point 
of care on '1 3 PDA
Performance Application
Reviewing observation 
workload, compliance and 
escalation moni tonne
ration
Tracking patient location, 
patient flow and bed 
capacity management
Figure 7.2 T3 core applications
T h e  orig inal T3 design p rem ise  w as th a t nurses and h e a lth c a re  care  assistants w o u ld  in p u t
th e  p a tie n t's  b lood pressure, te m p e ra tu re , re s p ira to ry  ra te  and h e a rt ra te  in to  T 3 's  N urse
A p p lic a tio n . A d a te  and t im e  s tam p  w o u ld  be g iven fo r  ev e ry  set o f clinical o bserva tio n s
re c o rd e d . T3 th e n  analysed th e  e n te re d  d a ta  against set p a ra m e te rs  based on th e  M E W S
p ro to co l and gave an e a rly  w a rn in g  score on its screen. It also suggested  th e  fre q u e n c y  o f
su b seq u en t o bservations  accord ing ly. W h e re  o bserva tio n s  w e re  o u ts id e  n o rm a l ranges,
T3 w o u ld  advise th e  user to  in fo rm  a sen io r nurse or d o c to r d e p e n d in g  on th e  s e v e rity  o f
th e  a b n o rm a lity . A d d itio n a lly , it also had th e  ca p a b ility  to  p ro m p t users to  s ta rt
in te rv e n tio n s  such as oxygen th e ra p y  and secure th e  t im e ly  p resen ce  o f a p p ro p ria te ly
skilled clinical help  fo r  th o se  p a tien ts  exh ib itin g  signs o f physio log ical d e te r io ra t io n . T3 's
in b u ilt p ro m p ts , a lerts  and rem in d ers  w e re  designed to  red u ce  th e  risk o f m issing key
o bserva tio n s  o r id en tify in g  and respond ing  to  p a tie n t d e te r io ra t io n . T h e  a le r t  levels and
p a ra m e te rs  w e re  based on NICE g u id e line  5 0  and NPSA re c o m m e n d a tio n s  on h o w  ac u te ly
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ill patients should be managed in acute hospital environments. Clinical observation trends 
could be viewed on the T3 PDA as well as desktop computers within the study Trust's 
network. During ward rounds, the medical teams used the study Trust's "computers on 
wheels" to view clinical observations and trends while moving from patient to  patient. T3 
was linked by a wireless local area network to  the Trust's electronic clinical results 
reporting system. This link allowed accessibility to  patients' clinical information to  
members of the multi-disciplinary teams from  dispersed locations across the hospital (see 
Figure 7.3). Viewing trends was im portant because it allowed healthcare workers to  
"track" the patient's clinical vital signs over a period of tim e.
The Critical Care Outreach team  rem otely monitored MEWS scores, and offered  
telephone support and prompts for wards to  commence interventions where indicated. 
W here necessary, the Outreach team physically w ent to ward areas to review patients 
and liaise directly with the responsible medical and nursing teams. Sometimes they  
initiated the appropriate clinical interventions to prevent further patient deterioration  
and avoid admission to the intensive care unit. T3 also gave an automatic visual alert when  
clinical observations were overdue by displaying a red icon next to the patient's name. 
The Nurse Application was linked directly to the Patient Flow Application, which provided 
a prompt for users to  enter the ward name, patient's bay and bed location when the first 
sets of clinical observations were entered. Users were required to update this information  
whenever a patient was transferred to another bed or different ward. The Clinical 
Application displayed electronic patient observation charts through T3 PDAs, desktop 
computers and the "computers on wheels". Patient lists could be viewed by ward, 
consultant, MEWS scores or individual searches using NHS or locally allocated hospital
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numbers. The Performance Application was designed to give ward managers, hospital 
matrons and senior clinicians reports about how their individual clinical areas were  
performing. They were then expected to use these reports to improve performance and 
patient outcomes in their clinical areas. The Administrator Application was used by the  
study Trust's ICT departm ent for the overall management of all T3 applications.
7.4.3 Expected T3 benefits
There w ere many expected benefits for the various actors involved with T3. For patients,
the main benefit was that they would receive improved care that was based on national
guidelines as set out by NICE. Automated MEWS calculation was expected to improve
patient safety through prompt recognition of physiological deterioration and tim ely
instigation of interventions. For nurses and healthcare assistants, T3 provided a quicker,
more reliable and safer way to calculate MEWS and track patients. The additional triggers
provided through prompts, alerts and reminders were designed to  upskill junior and
inexperienced nurses to provide care to acutely ill patients. O ther benefits for nurses
included easy clinical data accessibility and visual presentation to highlight key aspects of
clinical observations and a move away from variable and often illegible handwritten
paper-based forms. Nurses and healthcare assistants were expected to  save tim e and to
focus more on attending to  patients' needs rather than manually calculating MEWS and
writing them  in paper charts. The main benefit for the Critical Care Outreach team  was
that T3 would enable them  to view all in-patients from their rem ote base. This facility was
expected to help to prioritise their workload, identify and offer support to non-compliant
wards, identify learning needs and tailor training accordingly. The Outreach team 's PDAs
also provided alerts of patients that had a MEWS score of four and above. This additional
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function was expected to help the team  to identify patients that needed to be reviewed 
and to prioritise the commencement of interventions. For doctors, the main T3 benefit 
was that they would prioritise their workload by evaluating and responding to patients 
that were most in need based on their MEWS scores. Additionally, they could also provide 
advice to wards and initiate clinical m anagement plans over the phone from rem ote  
locations. For clinical and service managers, T3's patient tracking and triggering functions 
provided an auditable and guideline compliant way to  monitor patients transferred across 
the hospital and report the hospital's performance. Based on the Performance 
Application's management reports, they could also benchmark their performance against 
other comparable NHS Trusts, identify failing wards and im plem ent remedial actions. 
Additionally, they could also evaluate hospital bed utilisation to ensure that patients were  
in the most appropriate specialties depending on their condition and expedite discharge 
planning. For the Trust Board and departm ental Clinical Directors, T3 was a safe and 
validated product that would help them  to m eet the study Trust's organisational duty of 
care by meeting NICE guidelines and NPSA recommendations and satisfying key 
stakeholders such as the government, commissioners and patients. As such, they could 
justify resource allocation for T3 procurement. Additionally, because T3 was provided by 
a commercial third party supplier, the study Trust expected continued technical support 
and capability to allow revisions and additions to  T3 software algorithms in line with  
guideline changes and advances in clinical practice.
7.4.4 T3 implementation in the study Trust
T3 was implemented in the study Trust at the beginning of 2007, starting w ith a single
ward pilot, then Trust wide rollout. T3LeadConsultant revealed that T3 was found to  be
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"unusable" at the tim e of adoption. This conclusion was based on informal assessments 
that were carried out by the implementation team  at the initial stages of the pilot 
im plem entation. The study Trust worked with the T3 supplier to establish the clinical 
needs and map T3 to the various clinical processes before Trust-wide rollout. There was 
also no business continuity plan at this stage. Consequently, T3LeadConsultant co­
developed a business continuity plan with the supplier to  ensure continued post 
im plem entation support. Additionally, a T3 operational policy was developed for use by 
clinical staff with responsibilities for recording or reviewing patients' clinical observations. 
This was done to ensure the safe use of T3 applications in line with the study Trust's 
corporate objectives. The T3 operational policy also stipulated the duties and 
responsibilities of the key actors involved in the implementation and use of T3 (see Table 
7.1). The policy could be updated whenever there are changes to  guidelines, service 
requirements, processes, system/software upgrades and new system module releases. 
The initial plan was to have tablet computers by every bedside but due to  high set up 
costs, the study Trust settled for a few  handheld PDAs on each ward.
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Actors Duties and responsibilities
T3 Steering Group (Trust • Support the implementation of T3 in clinical areas, its updates
board members, senior and any related systems in line with the Trust’s corporate
clinicians, and senior objectives
nurse managers) • Ensure appropriate use of T3, its associated modules and any 
future developments
• Ensure T3 supports clinical systems, improves patient safety and 
that it is fully integrated into the Trust’s clinical and operational 
processes
• Identify and ensure the realisation of clinical and operational 
benefits that can be achieved from T3 implementation
T3 Clinical Users (Nurses, • Safe and correct use of T3 in accordance with the Trust’s
doctors and allied operational policy
healthcare workers) • Adherence with published national guidelines and local clinical 
protocols
• Appropriately escalate care within existing multidisciplinary 
structures in respective clinical departments and the Critical 
Care Outreach team
Clinical line managers • Implement appropriate measures within respective clinical
(modern matrons and departments to support T3 use
ward managers) • Ensure adherence with T3 operational policy
• Ensure adherence with published national guidelines, Trust 
clinical protocols and departmental objectives
ICT department • Manage operational and technical issues related to T3 software 
and hardware
• Manage service user alerts and system availability
• Implement new functions and updates
• Provide training for new and existing users for software and 
hardware devices
T3 Supplier • Provide technical support to maintain reliable operation of T3
• Offer appropriate training for the safe use T3
• Respond to and resolve support calls for software and hardware
Table 7.1 Duties and responsibilities of key actors involved with T3
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T3 pilot implementation
In January 2007, T3 pilot im plementation was commenced on the study Trust's renal ward. 
This ward was selected for the pilot because it had high patient turnover and adequate 
medical cover to  support the nursing staff during implem entation. T3LeadNurse, who had 
previously worked as a senior nurse manager and had been involved with the  
im plem entation of clinical software, headed the T3 pilot implem entation team . Other 
team  members included T3LeadConsultant, T3lm plem entationNurse, ICT departm ent 
project managers and technicians, renal consultants, nurse managers and nursing teams 
and T3 company representatives. The im plem entation team  focused on the integration of 
T3 PDAs onto the ward's clinical processes and w ith existing electronic systems. User 
training and support was provided on a daily basis. T3lm plem entationNurse noted that 
the implem entation team  also had to set up user accounts for a significant number of 
nurses and healthcare support workers who did not have access to  the study Trust's 
Intranet at the tim e. This was unexpected because the majority of nurses and healthcare 
workers were expected to be already using the Trust intranet to access their emails and 
to  view test results among other things.
It was a big job [the im plem entation]... quite a lot o f nurses d idn 't even have 
com puter login details or access to  the  system fo r electronic charts...lots o f 
facilitation, getting line managers to  sign things off, just trying to  make things easy 
fo r them ... account set up [problems w ith ] w ere  unexp ected , although th e re  was 
an inkling... little has changed regardless o f th e  num ber o f projects th a t have been  
rolled out since... w e are still bringing form s to  get people logged in... it's becom ing  
role specific, nurses have access, but th ere  is a huge gap w ith  healthcare
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assistants, but now w ith  ESR, it's becoming m ore im portant fo r them  to  use 
computers...
T3 Lead Nurse
At the end of each day, the implementation team  m et to  discuss and resolve any issues 
arising. For the first 6 months, clinical observations were recorded on both T3 and the 
paper-based MEWS charts. For the latter, the MEWS scores were manually calculated. The 
dual recording of the clinical observations was reported to be very labour intensive. 
During this period, changes were made to the T3 software algorithms to  adequately track 
patient movement and instances where observations were delayed or missed. The 
implementation team  reported significant resistance from nursing and medical teams 
who perceived T3 as an additional and irrelevant system. The T3 PDA also encountered  
various technical problems such as delays in loading data, failures in synching w ith the  
electronic clinical results reporting system, in term ittent data losses, low battery life, and 
poor presentation of clinical trends. T3LeadNurse noted that most nurses and clinicians 
preferred to use paper-based observation charts because they clearly showed clinical 
trends between sets of clinical observations and patient progress over tim e. There were  
also problems with accessing data from the PDAs due to  the connectivity issues caused by 
layout of the new hospital.
The first PDA broke regularly, batteries w ere poor and the  screen dented... in- 
betw een patients, it would say "w e are networking and buffering", and only  
allowed you so many observations before the  battery ran out... the  stylus was not
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attached and people w ere using ball pens... ink all over the screen, got stuck in 
itself...
T3Lead Nurse
The im plem entation team  spent several weeks identifying 'blind spots', while the T3 
suppliers worked on optimising wireless connectivity. The renal ward pilot was extended  
from 6 to 9 months to  allow the T3 implem entation team  and suppliers tim e to resolve 
outstanding issues. The layout of T3 results was changed to allow ease of use and 
integration w ith the existing clinical results reporting system. Paper-based charts were  
completely w ithdrawn from the renal ward at the end of the extended pilot in October 
2007.
Trust-wide T3 implementation
In September 2007, a project plan was drawn up by the T3 implem entation team  leaders
for Trust-wide T3 rollout. The implementation team  was expanded to include 6 senior
nurses split into 2 teams of 3. These nurses had extensive experience in d ifferent clinical
specialties, patient-flow management and training and developm ent. They were
responsible for training and supporting ward teams as well as troubleshooting any issues
arising during and following the im plem entation. T3 w ent live 2 wards at a tim e, w ith a
small number of wards allocated per team . The plan was to rollout T3 rapidly, using the
SCOPE project management model and involving the key actors such as nurses, healthcare
assistants, doctors and line managers. Rollout was based on the wards' geographical
location, clinical specialties, and interrelationships and co-dependencies between ward
areas to ensure workflow continuity. T3LeadNurse noted that the im plem entation was
flexible, in order to  facilitate the necessary changes and respond to  issues arising in ward
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areas. The im plem entation team  used a checklist to  systematically introduce T3, starting 
with the ward staff on duty list, scheduling training, establishing the number of PDAs that 
were required and w here they would be located on the ward. Once a group of wards was 
identified, the im plem entation team  had a week of preparation with ward managers. This 
was followed by 2 weeks of "intense training" (T3LeadNurse) using T3 and paper-based 
MEWS charts, then a paperless period of 2 weeks. On completion of the 2 week paperless 
period, an agreem ent was signed with respective ward manager to  acknowledge that they  
were satisfied that the ward had been adequately prepared for transition to  paperless 
clinical observations. During the second week, the implem entation team  would start 
preparing for the next group of wards, while allowing tim e for additional support and 
ensuring that all staff had been adequately trained.
Our approach to  user training was flexible and pretty  mixed... it was easier to  fit 
training around the  nurses' station rather than sisters' office, so the nurses w ere  
still accessible on the  ward if [they w ere] needed. It was broken training, because 
em ergency buzzers, phones ringing... but they [the nurses] had faith in th a t w e  
w ould let them  attend to  th e ir w ork, and they actually concentrated during  
training... W e  also w en t on observation rounds, and w ere  all in nurses' uniforms.
W e w ere  able to  freely  go around the w ard, be w ith  patients and looked  
professional... it helps w hen patients know th a t you are a nurse...
T3 Lead Nurse
The im plem entation team  made various changes to  their rollout plan to suit d ifferent 
working patterns across the study Trust and to  resolve logistical challenges during both 
im plem entation phases. T3LeadNurse noted that in some areas, T3 was deemed
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unsuitable for implementation and collaborative work was undertaken with the relevant 
clinical departments to revise the software algorithms to local needs and adapt it to suit 
the processes.
If you walk on to a ward and realise there is no chance [i.e., if wards are busy]... 
it's being responsive, having a backup ward, flexibility to move between wards and 
being known around the Trust gave it some credibility... you have the contextual 
piece, not somebody who doesn't have a clue about doing clinical observations... 
that was important... bringing feedback and responding to things, removing 
blockages, resolving problems... encouraging culture change to an electronic 
process...
T3 Lead Nurse
Some clinical specialties did not believe that T3 would be beneficial to  their wards. For 
example, one of the line managers from a specialist ward (W ardSisterl) questioned the  
suitability of T3 for such clinical areas, noting that their existing monitoring systems had 
more advanced capabilities than T3. She particularly questioned the study Trust's motives 
for introducing T3 across the hospital, noting that it was more likely to cover the Trust in 
case of litigation rather than improving patient outcomes. However, she also 
acknowledged T3's relevance in general wards and for inexperienced nurses.
It's a bit like big brother watching you... to keep an eye on people who don't know 
what they are doing, in a helpful way. It's like an idiot's guide when to do 
observations. It takes away professional judgment and tells you what and when to 
do it... It's for the Trust and everyone must have it... legally they [senior Trust 
managers] can prove that patients' observations have been done because they
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have it down on a computerised system. I am not dead against it... we got used to 
it and I probably wouldn't want to go back to paper charts now...The idea was that 
doctors aren't called unnecessarily, and they can look up for observations without 
having to go to the ward. We do that ourselves when we get referrals from other 
wards [general wards]...
W ardSisterl
By the end of 2013, T3 had been implemented in all adult in-patient beds except for the  
Accident and Emergency, maternity services, theatres and recovery, and general critical 
care departments. The T3 implementation team  worked closely with the supplier 
throughout the implementation process. T3LeadNurse noted that they received extensive 
support from  T3 developers throughout both im plem entation phases. This included 
project m anagement and T3 customisation to suit local needs where feasible. T3 modules 
were also updated and sometimes redeveloped to  suit clinical processes, especially in 
specialist wards.
It was an agile approach to software development, going back and forth and trying 
to support the rollout. It was their [T3 supplier] first ever roll out of such 
magnitude so they were quite willing to work with us and provide the 
functionalities that were needed... It had benefits for them because if we were 
asking for something, other Trusts were bound to want the same... they actually 
began to have a comprehensive package that they could sel l . . .  they wanted us
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to  roll it out Trust w ide and could then say, "w e have this system, which w e rolled 
o ut in this big university hospital in 6 months..."
T3LeadNurse
On completion of the Trustwide implem entation, T3LeadNurse and 
T3lm plem entationNurse were seconded to the ICT departm ent. This was done to  allow  
continuity and ongoing support for the wards, as well as to ensure that T3 was being used 
appropriately and implementing contingency plans where necessary. The study Trust's ICT 
departm ent and the supplier jointly managed T3 maintenance. Updated T3 PDAs were  
introduced following Trust wide implementation. This was done after a trial involving 
nurses and the infection control departm ent.
W e are out there... it is involving everybody and finding out requirem ents... w e  
w ere  not brought in fo r the initial T3 im plem entation, so I d on 't know  how  this 
was addressed but w e are certainly involving all user groups... you can 't do 
som ething this big w ithout involving the users...
T3lm plem entationNurse
Although, there was no documentation of this trial. The new PDAs w ere reported to  be a 
vast im provem ent on the old ones. However, there were some changes to  how T3 was 
originally intended to be used. The original design premise was th a t alerts would 
automatically be sent to  the Critical Care Outreach team  once MEWS scores of 4 and 
above were recorded. This led to large numbers of alerts which instead of helping became 
a hindrance to  the Outreach team . Most were false alerts and in the m ajority o f cases, the  
necessary interventions would already have been started. This led to  the alert function
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being switched o ff by the Outreach team . Instead, they logged into T3 early in the morning 
when they got handover from the Hospital at Night team  to  review MEWS scores of 4 and 
above. They then checked again at lunchtime and responded to  direct referrals from  
wards and medical teams in-between. All the work undertaken by the Outreach team  and 
their communication with ward areas and clinical teams was documented in patients' 
paper-based medical notes and added to  the MedlCUs national database. This 
information was used for audit purposes and as a reference point for future admissions 
and interventions. W ard areas adopted various methods to  ensure that observations were  
appropriately recorded and followed up. It was noted that most nurses continued to  
record observations on the discontinued paper charts, handover sheets and also in patient 
clinical records. Some were reported to  be scribbling observations on pieces of paper and 
then loading them  onto T3 afterwards. This posed risks of data loss, incorrect submissions 
as well as having the wrong date and tim e stamp.
The implementation team  also reported significant resistance from  doctors, especially 
those from surgical specialties during im plem entation. T3LeadNurse noted that most 
doctors preferred the paper-based MEWS charts because they could see the trends better 
than on T3. In some cases T3LeadNurse revealed that she had to request 
T3LeadConsultant to "come along to meetings" with senior surgeons to  explain why they  
had to im plem ent T3. She noted that T3LeadConsultant "would then say exactly the same 
things as I would have said" and all the senior clinicians would agree w ith him 
(T3LeadConsultant) because they were "big customers" of the critical care departm ent's  
services and as such they wanted to be seen to  be complying to ensure that they secured 
critical care beds for their patients. It would appear that T3 im plem entation was being
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used as a political tool to enforce compliance and also allocate limited resources to those 
who came on board. However, there was ultim ately poor "buy in" by key stakeholders, 
which goes against the core principles of the benefits realisation model.
There was more reluctance from medical staff. Since it was a big change for nurses 
rather than doctors, you would have expected it to be the other way round... some 
doctors insisted that nurses print all observations, some wanted charts at the end 
of the bed, which defeats the object of T3... I admire nurses, we gave them 
something, not necessarily the best, and they learnt and make their own 
adaptation...the new PDAs are better, so its breaking the bad habits formed out of 
necessity [with the old PDA], that's how they did it because they had to... our 
challenge is trying to prove to them the system is now reliable and fits the 
purpose...
T3lm plem entationNurse
W ardSisterl argued that despite some advantages, T3 could not replace experienced 
nurses and could potentially deskill ward nurses. She also argued that resources could be 
better spent on training nurses and ensuring that wards were adequately staffed and the  
appropriate skill mix maintained.
Night sisters and the Outreach team can now identify them [deteriorating 
patients] and intervene appropriately... for a system that I imagine costs a lot of 
money, I'm not sure whether it's worth it. If it has cost more than making sure that 
you have enough staff on the wards, senior nurses to keep an eye on things rather 
than machines on the ward ... you can't beat someone being physically there.Jt is
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Prior to adoption by the study Trust, T3 developers and the developing Trust performed  
various evaluations. These evaluations included clinical validation of the MEWS protocol 
(supporting T3), evaluation of the long-term effects of MEWS scores in acute medical 
settings and comparison between manual paper-based MEWS calculations and those 
electronically calculated using T3. Additionally, T3 was validated to  assess its effectiveness 
in the surveillance and m anagement of acutely ill patients. These studies concluded that 
the MEWS was a useful tool to  identify and manage deteriorating patients in acute 
settings. Manual MEWS calculations were found to  be inconsistent, often w ith omissions 
and incorrect entries. In contrast, T3 was reported to  be faster, safer and more accurate. 
Significant reductions in ITU admissions and deaths w ere also noted in the developing  
Trust. Table 7.2 shows the evaluations that were carried out within the study Trust 
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7.5.1 Evaluations during implementation
From 2007 to 2009, a multidisciplinary team  of nurses, doctors, project managers, IT 
technicians and the T3 supplier carried out various evaluations during its implem entation in 
the study Trust. The purposes of these evaluations were to review the im plem entation  
process, assess T3's suitability to the study Trust's clinical processes and workflow and to  
obtain feedback from wards to inform the developm ent team . Additionally, the  
implementation team  sought to  evaluate the effectiveness of user training delivered, 
deployment and testing of PDAs, checking integration with legacy systems and the transition  
from  paper-based to electronic clinical observations.
T3LeadNurse noted that the majority of these evaluations were informal and undocumented. 
They primarily focused on responding to  daily im plem entation activities through m ulti­
disciplinary 'wash up' meetings to  address any issues arising. The team  performed audits of 
ward profiles and used standard checklists to establish hardware needs in ward areas, staff 
training needs and work out contingency plans. Following im plem entation on each ward, the  
checklists were completed and signed by T3LeadNurse and respective ward managers to  
confirm that they understood the T3 operational policy and business continuity plan as well 
as their ward's readiness to  go paperless. T3LeadNurse noted that the "culture" around 
observation taking and recording and the use of the MEWS had improved across the study 
Trust. However, she also highlighted that it was difficult to adapt and link T3 with the Trust's 
existing clinical results reporting system and clinical processes. This was mainly related to  
multiple problems with the T3 PDA such as poor battery life, poor layout of clinical trends and 
connectivity with the study Trust's Intranet, persistent data loss and a detached stylus.
T3LeadNurse argued that some of these problems could have been identified through pre-
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implem entation evaluation of T3's suitability to  the study Trust. The im plem entation team  
also reported that "buy in" by clinical users remained low throughout the implem entation  
phases. They noted that most nurses did not trust T3 due to general apathy towards 
technology and its associated technical problems. As such, they continued to use paper charts 
alongside T3 as well as writing in patients' clinical notes. In some specialist clinical areas, it 
was found that T3 was unsuitable for the patients' clinical needs. In response, T3 
implementation was delayed to allow changes to  the software algorithms and addition of new  
functions. T3LeadNurse noted that the T3 suppliers were supportive and worked with the  
implementation team  to respond to user feedback and make the necessary software and 
hardware adaptations as required at the tim e.
I don 't th ink w e w ere  com pletely aw are o f the challenges [w ith T3 im plem entation]...
I w asn 't involved in evaluating it [T3] prior to  purchase, but on first impressions 
seem ed it w ould do as expected; it records the observations, it calculates MEW S, but 
w hen issues arose... it's about making changes to  m ake it a better system, im prove  
things fo r users, changes to  oxygen screen, patient flow  e lem ent is com pletely new... 
looks nothing like w h at they originally presented to  us. Still w ork in progress... they  
w ere  very open at th a t point in tim e to  make changes required regarding patient 
safety and clarity. At 3pm  every day, the  team  w ould m eet and bring back issues, deal 
w ith  them  quickly, being responsive and listening to  people, taking on board th e ir  
ideas...
T3LeadNurse
The unavailability of T3 implementation and evaluation documentation made it difficult to  
grasp the full breath of evaluations carried out and corresponding results. It would appear
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that the im plem entation team  mostly responded to activities rather than following a clearly 
structured evaluation form at using a clear methodology. Instead, professional judgements by 
the individual actors and clinical groups, particularly members of the critical care departm ent 
were taken as evaluations. There was also no formal implementation report to corroborate  
the verbal accounts of various actors involved in the implementation and evaluation of T3.
7.5.2 Benefits realisation studies
In 2008, T3LeadConsultant carried out a "formal benefits realisation study" w ith support from  
the Critical Care Outreach Team Lead Nurse. The purpose of the study was to  assess one year 
following im plem entation w hether T3 had achieved the expected operational, financial and 
clinical benefits as those achieved by the developing Trust. These benefits included critical 
care avoidance rates, reduction of cardiac arrests and length of stay in intensive care units, 
compliance w ith NICE guideline 50, uptake of the critical care outreach service, releasing 
nurses' tim e, tracking patients and identifying patients fit for discharge to  ensure appropriate  
use of resources. The benefits realisation study was repeated at the end of 2013. The second 
study was triggered by the tender process to  replace or continue to use T3 by establishing 
w hether the improvements identified in the initial study had been sustained. This study was 
performed by the T3LeadConsultant and the Critical Care Outreach Lead Nurse. It also 
included some key issues that were national priorities for the NHS at the tim e. These included 
compliance with the Sepsis 6 bundle for treatm ent of patients w ith severe infections, audit of 
the Dr Foster hospital standardised mortality ratio, preventing, tracking and managing 
infection outbreaks, assessment of quality of life following critical care discharge, compliance 
with the national emergency pathway, assessing the effectiveness of the critical care outreach  
service, hospital and user performance and improvement in crude mortality rates.
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T3LeadConsultant argued that T3 was continually being evaluated and improved since it was 
adopted to  show clearly the benefits such as improving operational processes and ultimately  
patient outcomes and to justify the study Trust's investment in T3. Both T3LeadConsultant 
and T3LeadNurse reported that T3 benefits had been "overwhelmingly proven" on all the  
outcomes that had been measured. T3LeadConsultant argued that justifying the Trust's 
investment in T3 was im portant because the like many NHS Trusts at the tim e, it was facing 
significant financial challenges.
The current cost o f replacing T3 is about £450  000 annually so the  Trust has to  justify  
the  IT investm ent. Like many Trusts, w e have a significant deficit and have to  introduce  
cost im provem ents, which is o ften quite difficult. It was therefore  im perative to  
analyse th e  benefits [of T3], and continually im prove this product, especially towards  
th e  m obile platform , which is now  cheaper and m ore readily accessible... the  
additional functions w e would w an t from  them  [T3 supplier] are too  expensive...
Existing functions such as Perform ance Application could be b e tte r utilised by nurse 
managers and departm ental managers...
T3LeadConsultant
It was difficult to  assess the effectiveness of the benefits realisation studies due to lack of 
evaluation documentation. Although the study reports and related presentations that had 
been delivered to  various stakeholders within and outside the Trust, peer groups, potential 
users and national platforms were said to be available, the researcher was not given access 
to them  because of the ongoing tender process. Additionally, T3LeadConsultant revealed that 
he could not "release any information" because he was looking to  publish a series of research 
papers related to the adoption and evaluation of T3 in collaboration with the developing Trust
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and T3 suppliers. It was unclear w hether the benefits realisation model had been used. 
However, the lack of involvement of other actors outside the critical care departm ent 
suggests that the studies were primarily focused on departm ental aspects and how they  
relate to  the w ider Trust rather than Trustwide issues. There was also no apparent awareness 
of any shortcomings or "blind spots" in both benefits evaluation studies. It appeared the  
evaluators were confident of the robustness of the methodologies they had applied and the  
results that had been produced.
7.5.3 IQNARC audits
Since the late 1990s, the study Trust had been submitting performance data to  ICNARC in line
with national audit requirements. The mandatory key performance indicators of the ICNARC
audits included mortality, management of sepsis and length of stay in critical care. These
indicators were driven by issues that were considered im portant at national level. As part of
ongoing service evaluation, the Critical Care Outreach team  submitted monthly data
regarding all their activities to ICNARC's Case Mix Programme through the MedlCUs database.
The MedlCUs software was developed by a private company to  manage and m onitor the
performance of all NHS critical care outreach services. The submitted data were then analysed
and results published by IQNARC on its national database. Various m anagement reports were
generated periodically to  help critical care departments to assess the effectiveness of care
delivered. The MedlCUs software provided a database resource to  collect and organise
information for patients who were seen by the Outreach Service. It also provided tools to
analyse the effectiveness of interventions delivered and generated annual activity reports on
a wide range of issues such as comparisons of MEWS, effectiveness of interventions th at w ere
carried out, escalation decisions made, management at ward level, Do Not A ttem pt
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Resuscitation orders initiated, end of life decisions made, and w hether critical care admissions 
had been avoided. The critical care departm ent carried out quarterly performance reviews 
and benchmarked itself against other NHS Trusts o f similar size using data available on the  
national database.
T3LeadConsultant noted that following T3's im plem entation, the study Trust had improved 
compliance w ith key indicators for ICNARC's Case M ix Programme from  94% to  100%. Internal 
audits that were performed by the emergency departm ent since 2010 showed that deaths 
following sepsis were lower than the national case mix data sets. Additional audits 
undertaken internally to measure outcomes of patients who had suffered cardiac arrest in 
hospital had been in line with national averages reported by the Resuscitation Council (UK). 
At the end of 2014, the Trust was preparing to  submit the required minimum data sets for 
ICNARC's Cardiac Arrest Audit. T3LeadNurse also noted that admissions to  critical care had 
been reduced because the Outreach team were identifying and responding to deteriorating  
patients quicker. However, she also acknowledged that these improvements were  
"coincidental" and could not be solely attributed to  T3.
There was a coincidental reduction in key perform ance indicators using evidence from  
ICNARC data, although not solely attributable to  T3... fo r exam ple, length o f stay in 
critical care and admissions averted from  critical care because the Outreach team  are  
getting to  patients earlier and escalating cases. Proven benefits such as ICNARC data  
and reduced length o f stay, it's an evaluation... describing the  benefits going forw ard
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for the business case to support the new tender... asking questions such as 'are we 
continuing to sustain those lower mortality rates from 6 years ago?'
T3LeadNurse
The reported improvements in ICNARC audits were focused on general patient outcomes as 
defined at national level and did not directly evaluate T3. Despite the general consensus 
within the critical care departm ent that improvements in key performance indicators resulted 
from T3, there was no clear causation. However, it was possible that the accessibility of 
patient information through both T3 and MedlCUs could have improved the reporting of key 
performance indicators. Despite the lack of direct cause and effect, these reported benefits 
were published in the study Trust's annual accounts and reports, as well as supporting the  
developments of the business case towards the continued use of T3 in the study Trust.
7.5.4 Dr Foster mortality audits
Like many NHS Trusts, the study Trust used Dr Foster's Real Time Monitoring tool to  monitor 
its clinical outcomes. A key elem ent of this process was the Dr Foster hospital standardised 
m ortality ratio (HSMR) audit. Data collection is based on the Dr Foster alert system to  monitor 
specific diagnoses that are known to cause death and procedure related deaths in NHS 
hospitals. In 2009, Dr Foster Intelligence rated the study Trust as Level 1, w ith m ortality rates 
of 114.2 annually, which were the third highest in the region. However, the study Trust 
challenged these results by issuing a press release which highlighted various initiatives which 
they had implem ented, favourable ratings from other regulatory bodies and awards such as 
the ICT Excellence Award for best Added Value Project (T3). They argued th at Dr Foster's 
results, which were based on a questionnaire survey and other submitted data lacked depth
269
and failed to recognise the high quality of care that had been achieved by the study Trust, 
ratings by other regulatory bodies that the Trust considered more in-depth and independent 
reviews. Additionally they noted that the methodology used for analysis had not been shared 
with the Trust and had been based on incomplete data. The purpose of this press release was 
to reassure patients and other stakeholders of the high levels of patient safety maintained by 
the study Trust by highlighting the inaccuracies in the Dr Foster rating. Around the same tim e, 
a study by M oham m ed et al. [2009] concluded that Dr Foster Intelligence's case mix 
methodology was unsafe for case mix adjustment and was likely to increase the bias which 
the case mix was intended to reduce and lacked credibility. Following the study Trust's press 
release, the regional Strategic Health Authority tasked Dr Foster Intelligence to  investigate
the causes of high mortality and work together w ith the study Trust to make the necessary
\
improvements. Dr Foster's investigation found the study Trust's monitoring and reporting 
processes to be reactive and poorly understood by clinicians and managers. Working with  
the study Trust's clinical governance team  and senior clinicians, Dr Foster integrated its Real 
Time monitoring tool into the study Trust's existing systems. They recommended that 
m ortality data should be monitored at both whole Trust and specialty levels using Dr Foster 
tools. Additionally, the study Trust's Quality Governance Group was tasked w ith reporting the  
number and causes of deaths quarterly to the Patient Safety and M ortality  Review  
Committees. All deaths were reviewed in departm ental meetings to m onitor clinical 
performance, share learning and highlight and respond to systemic concerns identified.
Since 2010, the study Trust's HMSR dropped below 100 and its ranking in the region had 
significantly improved by 2014. These results w ere reported in the study Trust's quality 
accounts and annual reports and were attributed to the use of T3 and subsequent
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improvements in work processes. However, the impact of T3 on HMSR monitoring and 
reporting had not been evaluated and thus no direct cause and effect link could be 
established. In fact, by the tim e of the controversial HMSR rating, T3 had already been in use 
for nearly 2 years in the study Trust. It was more likely that the improvements reported were  
a result of changes to  reporting deaths following direct intervention and continuing support 
from Dr Foster. Also challenging the Dr Foster rating goes to show the difficulties in measuring 
performance where multiple initiatives are concurrently running. However, the same 
principle was not applied when directly linking T3 to  the dramatic improvements in HMSR 
improvements. In 2014, the Dr Foster Intelligence methodology was also challenged by 
leading academic, Professor Nick Black (Triggle, 2014), who argued that the key 
measurements for hospital death rates were misleading and should be ignored.
I don 't think there's any value in the publication o f HSMR and I'd go fu rther, I th ink it's 
actually a distraction because it gives... a misleading idea o f the  quality o f care o f a 
hospital... Personally, I would suggest th a t the public ignore them ...
Professor Black (Triggle, 2014)
In response, Dr Foster Intelligence argued that while the HMSR data w ere not necessarily 
confirmation of poor care, they were im portant indicators of potential problems. They noted 
the example of death rates which had been used to  identify problems such as those which 
later unfolded at Mid Staffordshire hospital.
7.5.5 Critical Care Outreach service evaluation
In 2012, the Critical Care Outreach team  carried out an evaluation of its services. The purpose 
of the evaluation was to assess the utilisation of the outreach service and its impact across
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the hospital. OutreachSister2 also noted that the evaluation was also an im portant way to  
"justify our existence" and to remind decision makers of "our worth" to  the Trust. Proving 
their w orth was im portant because it would ensure their continued existence, ring-fencing of 
available funds and potentially attract more funding to expand their service. The evaluation  
report was mainly descriptive, noting the key achievements of the Outreach service since 
2006. The report concluded that the Outreach service had vastly improved since 
im plem entation of T3. Improvements highlighted included increased efficiency of the  
outreach service, accessibility of real tim e patient data and quicker response to potentially 
deteriorating patients using both referrals from wards and rem ote access monitoring. 
Consequently the necessary interventions were being instigated timeously and patients were  
now being diverted from  intensive care. OutreachSister2 noted that there had been "huge 
changes" in ward nurses' skills and practice and improved identification of "problem areas". 
The Outreach team  reported that routine audits that used to take several days of manual 
work w ere now being done in "just a few  clicks". Examples of these audits included the  
previously paper-based tracheostomy audit of patients adm itted to  the Critical Care 
Departm ent.
Anecdotally, from  the  beginning looking at the skills o f the  nurses, th ere  is a huge 
change in practice... people are more proactive now, early interventions started, which  
never used to  happen... w e also teach on the high dependency course, assessment o f 
patients... this em powers the nurses to  think and links w ith  SBAR, ensuring b e tte r
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communication... fits with NICE guideline 50, wasn't formally assessed before, now it 
will be a formal course, management of the acutely ill...
T30utreachSisterl
Additionally, the availability of information such as real tim e reports of patients with high 
MEWS, ward performance, clinical specialties, ward or consultant enabled the team  to  
identify and troubleshoot issues arising. They also reported improvements in staffing and skill 
mix on the wards, establishment of training needs and implementation of relevant training 
programmes for nurses and healthcare assistants. In 2013, the Outreach team  started to  
assess nurses in various wards on the skills for high dependency course. The course involved 
clinical teaching to enable nurses to  systematically assess patients on wards and improve 
communication when escalating unstable and deteriorating patients to doctors and the  
Outreach team . It linked with the MEWS protocol that was integrated into T3. The course was 
supported by line managers and senior clinicians. Further improvements w ere expected when 
additional software updates such as the sepsis pathway were implemented.
The Outreach team  noted that the effectiveness of training delivered was difficult to measure
because previously nurses' clinical skills were not formally assessed. However, they argued
that despite the lack of evaluation, there were improvements in awareness and response to
patient deterioration. By 2014, plans were underway to develop a course for healthcare
assistants, whose skills were reported to  vary considerably. The Outreach team  noted that
some healthcare assistants did not understand the processes behind the MEWS and that they
would sometimes override T3 prompts and did not effectively escalate out of range clinical
observations to  nurses. Likewise, nurses' skills were also reported to  be varied across different
specialties. These variations were reported to  guide nurses' responses to  MEWS scores and
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thus effectively affect patient outcomes. Some nurses were reported to  be more proactive, 
initiating early interventions and liaising with specialty medical teams, while others needed 
continuing prompting and support from the Outreach team . The Outreach team  also reported  
instances of overreliance on T3 by ward nurses. They noted that this often resulted in nurses 
failing to  recognise patient deterioration, thus delaying appropriate interventions to  stop the  
patients' condition getting worse. They also reported lack of support for junior doctors from  
senior clinicians. They highlighted that junior doctors were often left to manage wards and 
had become heavily reliant on support from the Outreach team .
There is a risk o f overreliance on T3. Nurses are now  taught on the high dependency  
skills course, but skills utilisation on the wards is variable, as they are not expected to  
do such assessments. Outreach team  now requires nurses to  handover systematically 
to  encourage a change o f culture and reduce variability... [Prior to  T3 im plem entation]
The Outreach service was very isolated and guidelines have im proved awareness and 
nurses b e tte r inform ed. T3 has im proved access and is a massive safety net fo r nurses, 
especially jun ior or inexperienced nurses. MEW S prom pt initiation o f interventions  
and seek senior review at w ard level...
T30utreachSisterl
This was the only T3 evaluation where documentation was available. The Outreach team  
acknowledged the limitations of their evaluation. OutreachSister2 noted that most of the  
improvements reported were based on anecdotal evidence because they did not have the  
resources to carry out formal studies with specific focus. The Outreach team  argued that the  
current T3 PDA, although much better than the previous one was small and limited w hat they  
could do. They instead preferred Ipads, arguing that they would improve their productivity
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because they would have access to additional applications such as the British National 
Formulary for medicines, better viewing of chest x-rays, real tim e emails to  colleagues for 
referrals and fast tracking escalations, easy access to observation trends and instant access 
to  the MedlCUs database among other advantages. They also acknowledged that both the  
MedlCUs database and T3 were underutilised and resources available for the service were  
very limited. They were also keen to  extend the service to  cover the study Trust for 24 hours 
like w hat many NHS Trusts were doing, rather than the current provision between 8am and 
6pm. This evaluation was focused on various aspects of the critical care outreach service, and 
not directly at T3.
7.5.6 Root cause analyses for VTE
T3LeadConsultant noted that his role included "frequently" performing root cause analyses 
to investigate adverse events and clinical incidents reported in the study Trust in collaboration 
with the Clinical Governance Department. The process of carrying out root cause analyses 
were based on the National Patient Safety Agency's pathway (see Figure 5.3). Each 
investigation was treated and reported as an individual case. The purposes of the root cause 
analyses were to identify potential or actual clinical, operational and other problems that 
resulted in adverse events and ensure that remedial actions were taken to stop them  
recurring. The root cause analyses were used for the study Trust's internal structures, such as 
supporting the serious the incidents group, preparing the Trust's legal reports and for 
coroner's reports. Prior to  T3 implementation, these investigations w ere undertaken using 
paper-based MEWS charts and hand written patient notes were reported to be varied and
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often illegible. T3LeadConsultant noted that the process of carrying out investigations prior 
to T3 im plem entation had been cumbersome and unreliable.
O perationally, you can track w here patients are... you can track the num ber o f clocks 
on T3, the  num ber o f critical care reviews... w e w en t up from  2 0 /2 5  to  120 reviews per 
w eek being triggered... rescued needless deaths, im proved clinician confidence, 
im proved outcom es, worked w ith  the NHS M odernisation Agency which showed  
stepwise changes... I frequently  do RCAs for internal reviews serious incidents group 
and the  coroners' and legal reports... ability to  actually look fo r and find notes, I can 
get from  these systems w ith o ut worrying w here they  w ere... often notes w ere  
handw ritten , illegible, but w e can now  get these... charting processes, timeliness o f 
observations, w e also know th a t if you don 't have a significant num ber o f observations 
at night, nursing staff aren 't actually looking at patients...
T3LeadConsultant
T3LeadConsultant argued that T3 had vastly improved access to and timeliness of clinical 
observations. Findings from root cause analyses were reported to have contributed to  
improvements in acute care service provision across the study Trust. For example, 
T3LeadConsultant noted that following T3 implementation, it took some tim e to find out that 
nurses were not doing observations correctly at night. NICE guideline 50 recommended that 
hospitalised patients should have at least tw o sets of clinical observations taken per day. 
Additionally, observations should be individualised depending on the patients' MEWS scores, 
clinical presentation and current treatm ent regimens. Root cause analyses revealed that 
some ward nurses were not performing clinical observations at night, arguing that they did 
not w ant to  disturb patients' sleep. Findings from root causes analyses led to  the observation
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that several patients were deteriorating at night because key observations were being missed 
or not acted upon. Additionally, some nurses continued to w rite  observations on pieces of 
paper, then updating them  on T3 afterwards. The Outreach and hospital at night teams 
worked with the affected ward areas to improve education about the recording of clinical 
observations, correct use of T3 and escalation processes and improving understanding of NICE 
guideline 50. T3LeadConsultant noted "stepwise changes" following these interventions. 
There was awareness of the root cause analysis process amongst interview participants and 
general consensus that T3 had led to  improvements in carrying out investigations. However, 
these assertions were based primarily on professional judgements because no evaluations 
were specifically carried out to  look at the improvements that resulted from T3. Additionally, 
there was no overall assessment or report of the root cause analyses that had been carried 
out apart from  in-depth case by case reports of investigations.
7.5.7 T3 user group network
T3 suppliers, in collaboration with the developing and study Trust set up a user group 
network. The purpose of the network was to bring T3 users together to  share experiences 
and find solutions to  common problems, as well as helping to  evaluate and contribute  
towards the further developm ent of T3. By 2014, several NHS Trusts had adopted T3 and 
regular meetings were held between the user group and the supplier. However, T3LeadNurse 
revealed that the focus of meetings had shifted to  national issues affecting m em ber Trusts 
and how T3 could be used to mitigate some of the issues rather than the need of the individual 
Trusts in relation to  T3.
It is not the usual user group, more of a help group or informal network... This is very
much the software supplier presenting, 'this is our next great thing'... very little time
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to  explore some o f the issues [related to  T3], probably a very good reason w hy they  
do that. W e know  w here i f  s been im plem ented, being the  flagship organisation. W e  
did lots o f site visits fo r o ther Trusts to  come here, and w e com m unicate w ith  them  
directly... It's about gaining consensus and priorities am ongst the many customers.
People tend to  norm ally agree as there  will be national issues th a t are im portant at 
th a t point in tim e ... It is m ore like the supplier just horizon scanning... "W h at w ill sell?
W h at do people w ant? W h at w ill get us new business or keep us in business?"
T3LeadNurse
The frequency of the user group meetings was dictated by T3 supplier and the prevailing 
national initiatives. As noted by T3LeadNurse, the user group meetings were an opportunity  
to involve users in the evaluation and continued developm ent of T3. However, opportunities  
were missed to learn from individual m em ber Trusts' experiences. Instead, the meetings 
appear to have focused on the commercial interests of T3 suppliers and identifying  
commercial opportunities based on prevailing national initiatives rather than identifying and 
responding to the needs of the individual Trusts. Furthermore, the expansion of the user 
group m eant that unlike the early development stages, updates to the T3 software algorithm  
would have to  be agreed within the user group. T3LeadConsultant noted that the costs of 
updates and customisation work had soared as the user group had grown and it was 
increasingly becoming difficult to  make any changes to  T3. Consequently, the study Trust 
could not afford some additional functions that had been added to T3.
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7.5.8 Informal evaluations
All the interview participants discussed many informal evaluations that were carried out for 
T3, particularly observations and professional judgments in the course of their routine work. 
The reported evaluations were mainly focused on monitoring the progress of T3 
im plem entation and its usage in various departments across the study Trust. 
T3LeadConsultant noted that immediate improvements were reported in orthopaedics and 
traum a departm ents following T3 im plementation. However, he also noted that it took longer 
to notice improvements in general medicine wards. T3LeadConsultant noted that "step wise" 
changes were only realised after the introduction of a Medical Assessment Unit in the study 
Trust, which relieved pressure on beds in the Accident and Emergency departm ent as well as 
on general wards. However, it was not clear w hether the improvements were a result of T3 
or the introduction of the Medical Assessment Unit.
T3LeadNurse and the Outreach team  reported a culture change regarding taking and 
recording of patient observations since T3 im plementation. This change was attributed to  
ward nurses' fam iliarity with the clinical assessment of acutely ill patients, which resulted in 
improvements in escalation processes. However, W ardSisterl argued that nurses' fam iliarity  
with T3 also brought problems such as failure to act on observations that were out of range 
and general complacency. She noted that these trends were essential to  effectively assess 
patients and introduce appropriate interventions. She argued that such omissions would have 
been picked up using paper-based MEWS charts because they clearly showed observations 
trends. Furthermore, healthcare support workers performed most of the clinical observations
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and some were unable to identify impending deterioration and sometimes did not escalate 
high MEWS scores to  nurses.
The problem  is w hen you have a system in place I d on 't th ink they  [Healthcare  
Assistants] always look at w hat it tells you, they just pop observations in and at the  
end it says inform  the nurse... sometimes they don 't inform  us... m ay lead to  
complacency, fam iliarity... The paper observation chart had a place... one o f the  
problems w ith  T3 is th a t doctors have stopped looking at the trends... they  just ask fo r  
last observations and I keep asking them  about the  trends, which is w h a t w e used to  
do...
T3W ardSisterl
Medical cover and doctors' response times were reported to  be inadequate due to  changes 
in junior doctors' working hours, especially in the evenings and weekends. In such cases, 
T3lm plem entationNurse argued that ward nurses were "em powered" to  directly contact the  
patients' respective consultants or the Outreach team  to  escalate high MEWS scores. 
Furthermore, because nurses were now being trained in high dependency skills by the  
Outreach team , they were reported to be more confident and "just run w ith it" (T3LeadNurse) 
by starting and escalating interventions. This had reportedly led to significant improvements, 
although they had not been formally assessed. There was consensus amongst most 
interviewees that T3 had improved awareness of the MEWS scores around the Trust. The 
uptake of T3 and improvements in attitudes around observation taking were reported to have 
improved across the Trust. These improvements had reportedly made the work of the  
Outreach team  easier. OutreachSister2 argued that T3's impact was "obvious" and did not 
even require evaluation. These assertions were based on informal comparisons w ith the
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period prior to  T3's im plem entation. Furthermore, the Outreach team 's conclusions further 
illustrated a consistent view amongst clinical managers and decision makers that T3 was a 
m anagement control system.
Prior to  T3, there  was no w ay to  know w hat's going on... docum entation was poor, 
som etim es illegible, o ften observations w ere recorded but not acted on, but MEWS  
require you to  act, and now w ith  T3, instant alerts o f out o f range or abnorm al 
observations are available fo r the Outreach team  and across the  w hole Trust; so how  
do w e m easure that?  It's obvious, it doesn't even need to  be m easured, it makes our 
job  m ore stream lined, less tim e consuming, sits very well w ith  w hat w e do, a picture 
o f the  w hole T r u s t . . .  real tim e access...
T30utreachSister2
Some W ard based nurses and line managers raised concerns regarding their lack of
involvement in the adoption of technologies such asT3. However, the Outreach team  argued
that the nursing hierarchy were not actively involved with T3. The Lead Outreach Nurse
arranged regular meetings w ith nursing line managers and modern matrons to improve their
involvement and address the concerns they faced on their wards. They also sought to  help
nurse managers to utilise the Performance Application to  identify areas of improvements on
their wards. Some nurses were reported to  distrust T3 and did not value it as a decision
support tool. Some line managers reported that T3 did not adequately cover patients in
specialist areas. Some nurses and line managers argued that the patient monitoring systems
they had in place in their departments were more sophisticated than T3. Some T3 fields w ere
reported to  be too rigid and instead of helping nurses, they were said to be taking away
nurses' independence to make professional decisions. However, T3 was thought to  be
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appropriate for most general wards, which were generally staffed by inexperienced nurses 
w ithout adequate skill mix.
You need it [T3] for some people, not for everyone. If you design a system to help 
inexperienced nurses, you can't take anything away from it as it has to be fool proof 
for them and the rest of us have to continue using this system but we aren't 
inexperienced here are we? T3 doesn't make a difference to us helping patients [in 
this unit]... if a patient was unwell, then we would be regularly checking their 
observations anyway and T3 may actually become a hindrance... often if you call a 
doctor to review a patient, they prioritise a high MEWS score but often unwell patients 
may not necessarily have a high score and you know from experience that 
observations alone do not reflect that... I would look more bn the patient and our own 
monitors here. The first thing you do is [patient clinical] observations so T3 is irrelevant 
really, it's just a device you enter data into, but for some people it guides them...
T3W ardSisterl
W ardSisterl also questioned the decision to adopt T3 and its value in supporting clinical 
processes. Instead, she felt that it was only useful for the Trust's legal obligations by ensuring 
that observations were kept on computerised records.
Decisions to adopt technology are probably made by senior nurses who have not been 
in a clinical environment for a long time... it [T3] just came and nobody asked us for 
opinions... It may be useful to show relatives, to prove that observations have been 




In this section, the T3 evaluations that were carried out are discussed in the context of the 
key aspects of evaluation that were identified in the literature review (CDSS evaluation 
fram ework). This was done to establish w hether these evaluations provided enough 
information to  the various actors involved with T3, especially the key decision makers at the  
study Trust.
7.6.1 Purposes of T3 evaluation
The primary purposes of the formal evaluations were to show that the study Trust was 
compliant with national guidelines and to  justify its investment in T3. However, the audits 
performed for Dr Foster and IQNARC were not focused on T3, but instead on the production 
of information that was required by the Departm ent of Health and other regulatory bodies. 
These audits were also important for the Trust because they were used to rank NHS Trusts 
across the UK, which in turn would have an effect on the image of the Trust to  various 
stakeholders, public perception and potentially affect funding from commissioners. The 
purposes of these audits were determ ined at national level and the Trust Board had a 
responsibility to ensure that the study Trust complied with the requirements. Investing in T3 
was one way of showing that the study Trust was taking the necessary steps to adhere to  
guidelines and consequently improve patients' outcomes.
The benefits realisation studies only looked at w hether the study Trust had achieved the  
expected benefits as defined by the developing Trust. However, it would be expected th at the  
contexts of the tw o NHS Trusts were different and the benefits that w ere realised by the  
developing Trust would not necessarily be achieved by the study Trust. Additionally, T3
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evaluations at the developing Trust were based on its im plem entation on a single ward unlike 
the study Trust where it was im plem ented across the hospital. As such, im portant issues that 
may have been relevant to the study Trust may thus have been missed. Also the second 
benefits realisation study focused on w hether the initial benefits had been sustained seven 
years following T3 im plem entation. This information was required to  support decision makers 
to decide w hether to continue using T3 or replace it with another track and trigger system. 
This appears to be a limited focus for the evaluation because it did not consider other issues 
that may have arisen within the study Trust over the seven year period. Additionally, the  
outcome measures of the benefits realisation studies were based on parameters that were  
directly related to  the critical care departm ent but generalised across the study Trust. 
However, focusing on the priorities of one departm ent over many others in the Trust may not 
give a balanced picture of the effects of T3 in such a big NHS Trust.
Evaluations that were carried out by the developing Trust focused on assessingthe robustness 
of th e T 3  software algorithm and patient safety levels using commonly used clinical methods. 
These evaluations were considered im portant by the study Trust and partly influenced their 
adoption decision. However, the developing Trust did not evaluate the effects of T3 on the  
whole patient care system. This level of evaluation could have looked at the w ider context of 
the environm ent where acutely ill patients were managed. It would ideally have involved T3 
users, the differences between the clinical specialties and T3's suitability to  those patient 
groups and its interoperability with the existing workflow and legacy electronic systems. By 
not evaluating these aspects, the study Trust missed an opportunity to understand the w ider 
effects of T3 beyond the critical care departm ent and reporting requirements of the relevant 
national audits. It would appear that the evaluators were primarily concerned with showing
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that they were carrying out the appropriate evaluations as expected by the key stakeholders 
such as the Departm ent of Health, taxpayers and commissioners. The evaluation purposes 
could have been widened to look at T3 effects across the study Trust rather than just the  
critical care aspects and those dictated at national level. However, there appears to  have been 
a lack of motivation to commission such evaluations. The lack of motivation may have been a 
result of the absence of incentives to  carry out evaluations beyond the minimum  
requirements. The lack of incentives could have influenced the study Trust's decision makers 
to only fund the evaluations which would produce the results that they could use, such as the  
Dr Foster and ICNARC audits. The limitations in the purposes of evaluations may also be 
because the key decision makers, such as T3LeadConsultant did not believe that any other 
evaluations apart from the ones that they carried out would have produced useful 
information.
The purposes of formal evaluations could have been widened to look at T3 effects across the  
study Trust rather than just the critical care aspects. Also, many claims that w ere made about 
the benefits of T3 were not backed by evidence. Some benefits were related to general service 
evaluation and other ongoing initiatives and not specifically T3. It was therefore difficult to  
attribute some of the improvements to  T3.
7.6.2 Approaches and methods used to evaluate T3
The scope of the evaluations that were carried out by the study Trust was lim ited. Like many  
examples identified in the literature review, these evaluations were based on positivist 
approaches that looked at the achievement of measurable outcomes. However, these 
evaluations were informal and primarily based on professional judgments at d ifferent stages
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of T3's adoption, particularly in the course of implementation and routine clinical working. 
Apart from the benefits realisation studies, all internal evaluations w ere form ative and based 
on professional judgements. Most of the benefits that were reported were primarily based 
on audits with a particular focus on measuring and reporting improvements to  key 
stakeholders. However, the study Trust had no control over the methodologies of these 
audits. Internal studies used uncontrolled before and after designs which made it difficult to  
attribute causation to  T3 and with little control over confounding factors that may have 
potentially affected the observed outcomes. Most evaluations undertaken in the study Trust 
were related to the provision of critical care services, track and trigger functions and patient 
safety aspects of T3. There was no summative evaluation at the end of the pilot or Trust wide 
implementation.
Evaluations such as the Dr Foster and IQ.NARC audits did not consider the human and 
organisational issues that w ere already present when T3 was introduced. For example, the  
assumption by the implementation team  that T3 would work across different clinical 
departments ignored the differences between the various intended user groups and patients. 
As such, key contextual issues such as the differences between clinical workflow across the  
study Trust and the interrelationships between the key stakeholders were not evaluated. 
Although positivist approaches are widely credited for their ability to control confounding 
factors, the audits that w ere carried out were focused on w ider services such as the critical 
care departm ent and Trust-wide measures such as deaths, which were not directly linked to  
T3. It was likely that some of the improvements that were attributed to T 3  could have resulted 
from other concurrent change efforts. Although T3 was reported to have brought 
"overwhelming improvements" from both benefits realisation studies, it was surprising that
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three was no documentation at all available apart from superficial references in the study 
Trust's annual reports and quality account reports. Additionally, using the same methodology 
to repeat the benefits realisation study seven years following im plem entation either assumed 
that there had not been any im portant changes to  take note of during this period or ignored 
them  completely. The benefits realisation model emphasises the importance of identifying 
stakeholders and their respective responsibilities to ensure delivery of the intended benefits. 
It appears, however, that T3 implem entation, benefits prioritisation and evaluation became 
a critical care departm ent rather than Trust-wide project. The lack of involvement of other 
key stakeholders such as nurses who were the intended T3 users may have created barriers. 
Indeed some of the nurses and nurse leaders noted that T3 was imposed on them  and that 
issues they considered im portant in their clinical areas had not been considered.
The majority of the form ative evaluations that were carried out during the pilot and Trust- 
wide im plem entation phases were primarily based on professional judgements by the  
im plem entation team . Most of the claims made about the "overwhelming improvements" 
and other benefits following T3 implementation were based on anecdotal evidence. There 
w ere assumptions by the Outreach team  members and T3 im plem entation team  that T3 
introduction had automatically led to  improvements because the previous paper-based 
system had many shortcomings. Also despite the lack of evaluation docum entation, the 
m ajority of the interview participants believed that the necessary evaluations had been 
performed appropriately by the T3 project team . This was primarily because they trusted their 
colleagues in the critical care departm ent, Outreach team  and the project team . As such they  
did not question the methodologies that were employed and the results that w ere reported. 
However, the evaluation methods that were used, such as the audits could not prove that the
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reported benefits were directly attributable to  T3. Instead, they focused on general service 
evaluation and other ongoing initiatives that were not specifically related to  T3. For example, 
the IQNARC and Dr Foster audits were already being used before T3 im plem entation and the  
study Trust had been meeting the related national targets. Also in 2009, the Trust had 
undertaken remedial action with support from Dr Foster and the Strategic Health Authority  
to reduce death rates as part of the HSMR reporting. Similarly, root cause analyses were  
already being undertaken as part of the w ider clinical governance fram ework through the  
existing departm ental structures before T3 implem entation. Although the processes of 
performing root cause analyses may have been improved by T3 introduction, it is difficult to  
attribute other claimed improvements solely to T3.
7.6.3 Contextual and organisational issues
All the evaluations that were carried out in the study Trust were performed by members of
the critical care departm ent (including the Outreach team ). This may explain why most of the
evaluations were primarily focused on critical care services and not the study Trust in general.
However, T3 was implemented in different departments across the study Trust, which had
diverse groups of patients and different healthcare professionals who had varied skill sets,
which may have a bearing on how it was used and perceived. For example, W ardSisterl
argued that MEWS scores that required urgent remedial action in a typical medical ward may
be "normal" in specialist wards. She argued that arbitrary use of the MEWS across the Trust
was inflexible and resulted in increased workloads in already busy wards. There appears to
have been an assumption by the T3 implementation team  that standardisation of processes
through T3 would automatically result in improvements in patient safety and outcomes.
However, none of the evaluations appeared to have considered the differences between the
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various clinical departments. The formal evaluations also did not look at how the introduction 
of T3 would affect existing work patterns, professional responsibilities and its interoperability 
with existing electronic systems. For example, although alerts and prompts were designed to  
be vital aspects of T3, they were reported to be too frequent and in some cases resulted in 
delays in commencing or continuing with the necessary interventions. The discontinuation of 
the alert system by the Outreach team  and the reported complacency by nurses and 
healthcare workers regarding T3 alerts and prompts revealed that the original design premise 
may not be practical in real clinical practice and that T3 was not used as intended. Although 
failures of paper-based MEWS charts were well documented, it was unclear w hether the  
study Trust or by extension patients had benefited from T3 introduction. Evidence of T3's 
benefits from  the developing Trust (prior to  adoption) was limited to a small ward which was 
easier to control compared with Trust-wide implementation at the study Trust.
None of the evaluations looked at how the introduction of T3 would affect the existing work  
patterns, changes in responsibilities and its interoperability with existing electronic systems. 
The study Trust's focus on standardising clinical workflow using T3 may also have affected  
clinical areas that may have been already achieving acceptable patient outcomes. This 
appeared to have been particularly so for specialist areas that were already using early 
warning systems embedded into electronic or paper systems and effectively serving local 
needs. However, no comparisons were made between T3 and other legacy systems that were  
already being used in the study Trust.
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7.6.4 Barriers to evaluation
There were a range of methodological, human, organisational, professional and technological 
barriers that mitigated all the key aspects of evaluation that were identified in the literature  
review (CDSS evaluation fram ework). The audits that were used as the key method of 
evaluation had explicit blind spots emanating from  their focus on measures that were  
considered im portant to the decision makers at the tim e. These blind spots primarily related 
to  non-technological issues, such as T3's effect on the intended users, lack of consideration 
of existing clinical workflow and the prevailing w ider organisation issues. There was also no 
effort to  address or even acknowledge these blind spots by the evaluators and the key 
decision makers in the study Trust. These assumptions may also have had an im pact on the  
commissioning of evaluations, particularly the key aspects such as motivations for 
evaluations, methods used, who and w hat was evaluated and the intervals o f evaluations. T3 
project leaders argued that T3 had achieved its purposes as a safe and efficient track and 
trigger system that improved patient outcomes and also produced auditable data for the  
study Trust. However, apart from the audits, these claims had not been measured. It could be 
argued that the study Trust could not justify investing in further evaluations when they were  
already achieving the intended benefits, however faulty the intended benefits may have 
been. Furthermore, some of the key stakeholders, such as the Outreach team  did not even 
see any reason for carrying out any evaluations because "things were much better" just by 
introducing T3 compared with the previous state of affairs.
T3 is very much part o f w hat w e do... before, w e relied on referrals, now w e have 
instantaneous observations... w e  used to  w rite  in our sheets, piles o f papers, which w e  
m anually added to  the database... now most things are there  and all w e have to  do is
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sync... T3 is invaluable as the existing systems, if w e  see patients, w e  tend to  also do 
observations, and w e sync into the national databases and subm it straight away but 
som etim es w e  have to  w rite  and input later... th ere  was no w ay to  know w hat's going 
on, docum entation was poor, illegible, som etim es observations w ere  recorded but not 
acted on, but MEW S im proved as people w ere required to  act... now w ith  T3, w e get 
instant alerts fo r out o f range or abnorm al results... as the Outreach team , w e get 
instant access, w e  can see the w hole Trust... so how do w e  m easure [evaluation]?, it's 
obvious, it doesn't even need to  be measured...
T30utreachSisterl
Another barrier to evaluation was that T3 was introduced as an agent to change the habits of 
nurses around observation taking and recording and to  improve clinical workflow. However, 
Garg et al. (1995) found that CDSSs that were introduced as change agents had high failure  
rates. The initial T3 device had many technical shortcomings that hindered its use such as the  
poor battery, poor layout of trends, loss of connectivity and poorly fitting stylus. Nurses and 
doctors imm ediately disliked T3 and continued to use paper charts alongside it thus resulting 
in increased workload and defeating the purposes of T3 altogether. Although the technical 
issues and unintended uses were identified during the extended pilot, Trustwide  
im plem entation w ent ahead regardless. Trustwide im plem entation could have been delayed 
until the necessary improvements had been effected. This could have resulted in improved 
"buy in" from  the nurses and doctors on the wards.
Many of the key stakeholders believed that various benefits had been achieved just by 
implementing T3. Some did not even see the need to undertake any evaluation at all. Also 
many benefits that were attributed to T3 may have been caused by other ongoing initiatives
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which were not taken into consideration by any of the evaluations that were carried out. 
Furthermore, none of the evaluations were clearly focused on T3. Instead, adherence to  
routine audits such as IQNARC, Dr Foster and clinical governance appears to have been 
attributed to  T3. The evaluations that were performed only involved T3 project team  
members and members of the critical care services such as the Outreach team . These 
evaluations could have benefited from involving the w ider multi-disciplinary team s across the  
study Trust. The benefits realisation studies only looked at w hether the study Trust had 
achieved the expected benefits, as defined by T3 developers and evaluations undertaken in 
collaboration with the developing Trust. However, the contexts of the tw o NHS Trusts were  
likely to  be different and this may have affected the focus and methods of evaluation. 
Im portant issues that may have been relevant to  the study Trust may thus have been missed. 
Also the second benefits study focused on whether initial benefits had been sustained seven 
years following implementation to support the decision makers to decide w hether to  
continue using T3 in the study Trust. This appears to be a limited focus because it did not 
consider key organisational and other changes over this period of tim e.
7.6.5 Benefits of T3 evaluations
The main benefits of T3 evaluations were to  produce information that would satisfy
regulatory requirements and key stakeholders such as the government, commissioners and
taxpayers. Other benefits included sharing knowledge with other NHS Trusts who w ere part
of the T3 user group and those who looked up to the study Trust as the T3 flagship Trust.
However, the lack of structured evaluations directly focusing on T3 did not help to  fully
understand T3 as a novel technology and its w ider impact on the patient care system. Claims
of T3 benefits such as minimisation of risk to patients, improved user performance, efficiency
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and improved patient outcomes were not specifically evaluated. Additionally, benefits such 
as appropriately tracking and triggering patients based on the MEWS scores relied on the  
appropriate use of T3. However, the multitude of barriers resulted in various unintended uses 
which could have resulted in patients being put at more risk compared with the previous 
paper-based MEWS charts. No evaluations were carried out to  identify and address the  
unanticipated, unwanted and potentially harmful effects of T3. Additionally, T3 was not 
optimally used and may not have been a justifiable use of resources as claimed by the project 
leaders but this was not addressed by any of the evaluations.
7.6.6 Overview of T3 evaluations and missed opportunities
The T3 evaluations did not address many im portant issues that were identified in the  
literature review. The formal evaluations were based on expected benefits based on 
outcomes that were considered im portant by the developing Trust rather than those that 
were relevant to  the study Trust context. As a "flagship Trust" where T3 was heavily 
customised beyond recognition from the original product, many lessons could have been 
learnt and shared with other potential users. However this opportunity was missed because 
the evaluations focused on the original benefits that had reportedly been achieved by the  
developing Trust. There were also assumptions that by implementing T3, most of these 
benefits would be achieved by the study Trust. These assumptions were based on 
T3LeadConsultant's knowledge and trust of evaluations performed by his peers at the  
developing Trust. Evaluations could have looked at the w ider effects of introducing 
technology into human and social systems. This could have unearthed the effects of T3 on 
different groups of healthcare professionals, different clinical specialties and different patient
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groups. Additionally, the experiences and perceptions of the various actors involved would 
have added to the knowledge of effects of T3 in real clinical settings.
It would be expected that T3 brought some changes to the ways of working and ultimately  
patient outcomes. However, there was a perception by the key actors that T3 had largely 
brought positive results to  the study Trust. None of the evaluations looked at potential and 
actual harmful, unwanted and unintended effects of T3. It was difficult to fully evaluate the  
evaluations that had been carried out due to lack of project and evaluation documentation  
that would have corroborated verbal accounts of the key actors involved in the adoption and 
evaluation of T3. Requests made by the researcher for this information was declined on the  
basis that there was an ongoing tender process to replace or retain T3 and T3LeadConsultant 
was looking to publish some research papers with collaborators from the developing Trust 







Chapter 8 Cross Case Analysis
8.1 Introduction
This chapter uses some of the key findings of the literature review to compare the three cases 
th
at were presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Section 8.2 discusses the evaluations th at were  
carried out using the CDSS evaluation fram ework as a guideline. Section 8.3 looks at the key 
contextual factors that affected the evaluations, including existing technological 
infrastructure, organisational readiness for CDSS evaluation, the attitudes of key stakeholders 
towards evaluation of computerised health information systems and the external CDSS 
market. Section 8.4 looks at the purposes of the evaluations and Section 8.5 discusses the  
evaluation methodologies that were employed. The barriers to  CDSS evaluations are 
discussed in Section 8.6 and the benefits of evaluations highlighted in Section 8.7. In Section 
8.8, the factors of evaluation that were identified in the three case studies are discussed. The 
limitations of the evaluations that were carried out and an overview of the chapter is given 
in Sections 8.9 and 8.10.
8.2 CDSS evaluations that were carried out
The evaluations th at were carried out can be broadly classified as pre-im plem entation, during 
im plementation or post-implementation. Table 8.1 shows the split between these categories 
for each of the three cases. As Table 8.1 shows, T l's  pre-im plem entation evaluations 
included peer reviews of the VTE operational policies and validation o f the paper and
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software algorithms. Additionally, the T1 project team  also carried out efficacy and user 
acceptance testing with real clinical users towards the end of its developm ent phase. T1 
evaluations that were carried out during im plem entation included monthly CQUIN audits and 
informal evaluations by the project team . T1 evaluations that were carried out following its 
implementation include the following audits; CQUIN, Enoxaparin and Doppler Scan 
effectiveness, VTE management system and the Link Nurse-led NICE Quality Standards audit. 
Additionally, the Haematology Departm ent also carried out Root Cause Analyses, while 
various informal evaluations and professional judgments were also undertaken at various 
stages of its adoption.
T2 pre-implementation evaluations included validation of its clinical rules and clinical 
evaluations that were performed by the developers. T2LeadConsultant carried out informal 
evaluations through peer groups and discussions with the developers prior to  its adoption at 
the study Trust. During T2's implem entation the key stakeholders carried out informal 
observations and professional judgments relating to its benefits. T2 post im plem entation  
evaluations included the post market surveillance audits by the developers, a patient 
satisfaction survey by a local medical school linked with the study Trust and various 
observations and professional judgments by key stakeholders. The study Trust did not 
commission any formal evaluations throughout the cycle of T2's adoption. Table 8.1 shows 
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The NHS Trust that developed T3 carried out feasibility, technical, clinical and economic 
evaluations during its adoption cycle at the study Trust. In part, these evaluations were  
an im portant factor in making the adoption decision for the study Trust. Also, 
T3LeadConsultant had previously worked with the lead clinicians from  the developing 
Trust and therefore had faith in their evaluations. Additionally, T3LeadConsultant also 
carried out informal evaluations in the form of discussions with the developers and other 
peers in collegiate groups and related national forums about its benefits. During the T3 
pilot phase, the im plem entation team 's focus was on training users and customising T3 
to the study Trust's clinical workflow and existing electronic systems. The majority of the  
reported evaluations during this period were informal and often based on anecdotal 
evidence. For example, the multi-disciplinary T3 project team  met every afternoon for 
"wash up" meetings whereby issues arising from the pilot ward were discussed. These 
meetings were considered im portant by the T3 project team  because they reportedly  
unearthed contextual issues that would then be fed back to  the developers and rectified 
where necessary. The "wash up" meetings continued throughout T3's Trust wide rollout 
phase. The T3 implementation team  also reported that they carried out needs 
assessments of wards before T3 implementation and meetings with specialist clinical 
areas to establish their additional needs. They considered the needs assessments as 
additional evaluations of T3. It could be argued that their genuine understanding of w hat 
they considered to  be evaluations could have resulted in misleading other stakeholders 
about evaluations that had been carried out. The following evaluations were carried out 
following T3's im plem entation at the study Trust:
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•  first and second benefits realisation studies
•  informal evaluations, observations and professional judgements by the key 
stakeholders
•  the Critical Care Outreach Team service evaluation
•  Dr Foster audits and Good Hospital Guide mortality rankings
•  IQNARC audits
•  Root Cause Analyses
One year following Trust wide implementation, th e T 3  project team  performed a benefits 
study, which looked at w hether the study Trust had achieved the expected benefits from  
T3 im plem entation. The benefits study concluded that all the expected clinical, 
operational and financial benefits had been achieved. The benefits study was repeated  
seven years following T3 implementation in part to  establish w hether the originally 
achieved benefits had been sustained and also to inform the re-tender process for T3 or 
alternative replacement. The Critical Care Outreach Team also carried out a service 
evaluation, which included an informal assessment of T3's impact on the outreach  
service. Other evaluations noted by the T3 project team  included the Dr Foster and 
IQNARC audits and the Root Cause Analysis that were undertaken in collaboration with  
the Clinical Governance and other relevant departments. However, IQNARC audits and 
Root Cause Analyses were already being carried out in the study Trust and did not directly 
evaluate T3. Similarly, the Dr Foster audits were focused on analysing and reporting the  
number of deaths while patients were hospitalised and were not directly focused on T3. 
None of the three CDSSs had a systematic evaluation portfolio. In some cases, key
stakeholders were unaware of the evaluations that had been carried out by the project 
teams and vice versa. This was particularly so for T1 and T3, where users were unaware 
of the ranges of evaluations that had been performed. This was unexpected for T1 
because departm ental monthly VTE audits were published on the study Trust's intranet 
and discussed in multi-disciplinary team  meetings on a regular basis.
This section has shown that the range of evaluations that were carried out for the  
individual CDSSs were form ative and mostly focused on their successful im plem entation. 
The evaluation portfolios did not consider the different types of evaluations that could be 
carried out at different phases of the CDSSs' lifecycles. Additionally, the lack of linkages 
between the various evaluations that were carried out for the individual CDSSs and across 
cases did not allow for transfer of information to inform the key stakeholders and the  
evaluations themselves. Such transfer of information would have enabled learning from  
prior evaluations and contributed to the usage and ultim ately decision making regarding 
the CDSSs.
8.3 Key contextual factors affecting evaluations
All of the case material was gathered in the same hospital so at least in one respect it is 
true to say that the evaluations were conducted in the same context. However, some 
im portant contextual differences were identified between the individual clinical 
specialties involved. These differences include:
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•  variations in existing computersied health information system infrastructures 
across the study Trust
•  w ider NHS and healthcare technological contexts in the form  of national 
guidelines, professional bodies and peer groups
•  existing culture of CDSS evaluations within the study Trust
•  attitudes of the various members of the multidisciplinary team s towards 
evaluation of CDSSs
Each of these differences will now be considered in turn.
8.3.1 Assessment of existing technology infrastructure
An assessment of existing legacy systems infrastructure was identified in the literature  
review as being critical to  successful evaluation of new CDSSs. This assessment would 
help to identify and optimise existing resources across the NHS and regulatory authorities, 
as well as at organisational and individual levels. Table 8.2 shows the factors th at need to  
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Variations were noted in the existing legacy systems' infrastructures across the different 
departm ents where the three CDSSs were im plem ented. Although there were a number of 
legacy systems that were being used across the study Trust prior to the adoption of the three  
CDSSs, none of these systems were specifically designed to support VTE risk assessment, 
managem ent of prostate cancer patients or the assessment of acutely ill patients. T1 and T3 
were im plem ented to directly replace paper-based risk assessment tools. They also introduced 
new ways o f working and new responsibilities to  some stakeholders, while also taking away  
responsibilities from  other stakeholders. The existing legacy systems in these areas were not 
being used to  directly support the services for which T1 and T3 were eventually developed to  
support. In contrast, the Uro-oncology specialist nurses were already routinely using existing 
computerised legacy systems supported by paper-based clinical pathways prior to  T2 
adoption. Although no formal evaluations had been carried out with respect to  these legacy 
systems, the urology team  were familiar w ith the electronic processes and were in a position 
to  make comparisons between the previous systems and T2 as well as informal evaluations 
and professional judgments. In contrast, T1 and T3 users were using electronic technologies 
for these processes for the first tim e so the degree of CDSS novelty would have been greater 
than that of T2 users. However, there was no evidence of formal evaluations of any of the  
existing legacy systems on which the respective CDSS project teams could learn from .
The decisions to adopt all three CDSSs were made on the assumption that they would be
integrated seamlessly with the legacy systems that were already in use in the study Trust.
However, by the end of 2014, full integration had not occurred. For T2, users w ere using tw o
or even three disparate systems, while some T3 users were now concurrently using the "old"
paper-based charts to complete routine tasks. T1 and T3 were integrated w ith the existing
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clinical results reporting system to varying degrees. All three project teams sought to assimilate 
the respective CDSSs into routine clinical practice, thereby redesigning clinical processes in 
accordance with the NICE guidelines. This was achieved to  varying extends by the T1 and T3 
project teams. They sought to integrate the respective CDSSs with existing electronic legacy 
systems in order to  try to encourage their use while also monitoring compliance using existing 
administrative parameters that were embedded within the legacy systems. Only the T1 project 
team  form ally undertook a systematic assessment of existing legacy systems infrastructure 
prior to  adoption. This resulted in T1 being developed and integrated onto the study Trust's 
clinical results reporting system platform, which was widely used by clinicians, who in this case 
w ere the targeted users and ultimate clinical decision makers. This platform also enabled the  
T1 project team  to carry out formal evaluations using existing parameters in the clinical results 
reporting system and to create management reports. Additionally, the T1 im plem entation  
team  were able to  identify and deal with specialty specific factors that would have been 
difficult to identify using the paper-based system. In contrast, T2 and T3 encountered various 
integration problems with the clinical results reporting system. In turn, the lack of integration  
with legacy systems affected how they were both used in practice and also lim ited the  
opportunities for evaluation. However, these issues w ere not addressed by any of the  
evaluations that were carried out.
This sub-section has shown that:
•  an assessment of existing legacy systems infrastructure is essential for CDSS evaluation
•  an assessment of non-computerised decision support systems helps to  understand the  
wider effects of CDSSs
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•  previous evaluations that have been carried out w ith respect to  existing legacy systems 
and non-computerised decision support systems should be drawn on to inform CDSS 
evaluations
•  the potential effects of CDSSs on existing workflow and users responsibilities should be 
assessed
•  CDSS interaction with existing legacy systems, non-computerised systems and clinical 
workflow should be assessed
8.3.2 External pressures for CDSS evaluations
Since the early 2000s, there had been a drive by regulatory authorities, particularly NICE, with  
support from professional groups for NHS Trusts to adopt CDSSs to  support clinical practice 
and improve clinical decision-making. All three CDSSs were based on NICE guidelines. It could 
be argued that the pressure exerted on NHS organisations to  fulfil these guidelines led to  the  
adoption of these CDSSs. However, there were no clear recommendations regarding how to  
evaluate the technologies. Also because of the novelty of these systems and their limited  
commercial availability on the UK market, there was little evaluation information to  inform the  
project teams.
The VTE CQUIN fram ework required monthly reporting on the number of valid VTE risk 
assessments that were carried out. T1 enabled the VTE project team  to collect and report VTE 
CQUIN data electronically as well as identifying and addressing problems in poorly performing  
clinical areas. T3 project leaders were also required to report the study Trust's performance  
with respect to numbers of deaths and Accident and Emergency waiting times amongst others. 
Background data collected from  T3 were used to show improvements in these areas as well as
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supporting ICNARC and Dr Foster audits. Root Cause Analyses were also carried out with  
respect to  patients who developed VTE during or following hospitalisation. However, Root 
Cause Analyses had no specific correlation with T3. There were no regulatory requirements for 
the urology departm ent to report their performance in relation to  T2. This may have resulted 
in the limited range of evaluations that were performed for T2. All three CDSSs also brought 
greater control and reporting capabilities to support regulatory requirements. This was 
particularly so for T1 and T3 because they were under direct regulatory pressure to  report their 
performance on specific aspects that were related to the respective CDSSs. External pressure 
played a significant part in determining the range of evaluations that were carried out for the  
CDSS albeit with a different focus. Evaluations such as the VTE and Dr Foster audits required  
system-wide evaluations rather than CDSS specific evaluations. It could be argued that external 
evaluation pressures can create confusion between CDSS-specific evaluations and broader 
evaluations of clinical management systems or services.
This sub-section has shown that there were external pressures from regulatory bodies and 
commissioners to adopt CDSSs. Although there were no corresponding recommendations on 
how to carry out CDSS evaluations, regulatory reporting requirements affected the range of 
evaluations that were carried out. CDSS evaluators need to be aware that externally driven 
evaluations may not necessarily reflect or serve the best interests of the organisation. There is 
need to carry out separate evaluations that look at CDSS effects on the organisation because 
externally driven evaluations may not be sufficient.
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8.3.3 The attitudes of key stakeholders towards evaluations
The attitudes of the key stakeholders towards evaluation of the three CDSSs varied widely. 
Although these differences were likely to  affect how the CDSSs were evaluated, they w ere not 
addressed by any of the evaluations that were carried out. The following factors affected the  
attitudes of the key stakeholders towards CDSS evaluations:
•  their characteristics, experience and backgrounds
•  previous evaluations that they had been involved in
•  their role w ith respect to  the CDSSs
•  perceived usefulness of the CDSSs
•  the effect of the CDSSs on their way of working
Each of these factors will now be discussed in relation to  each CDSS.
The attitudes of the key stakeholders involved with T1 evaluations varied across professions 
and clinical specialties. Although the Haematology departm ent was in charge of the overall 
m anagement of VTE across the study Trust, each departm ent had its own approach to  the  
im plem entation of the NICE VTE guidelines to  suit their respective patient groups and 
additional guidance from their specialty professional groups. This was particularly relevant for 
specialist departments such as the cardiology, stroke and neurology services that widely used 
thromboprophylaxis treatm ents before T1 was im plem ented. Their experiences prior to  T1 
introduction informed their attitudes and understanding of VTE as an im portant clinical 
problem. Senior doctors and nurses in these departm ents hailed 11  as one of the most 
successful IT projects that had been implemented by the study Trust. However, despite the  
positive feedback, there were concerns by some key stakeholders in these departm ents that
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the rigid nature of T1 data collection and the resultant monthly VTE CQUIN audits were not 
representative of the complexities in their departments. Some key stakeholders argued that 
VTE CQUIN audits were designed to produce m anagement data and were not geared for 
looking at patient outcomes and clinical processes that supported these outcomes. The T1 
project leaders reported meeting challenges in obtaining "buy in" from  some specialties, 
especially the surgical departments. However, they noted that once clinicians realised that it 
was compulsory to  use T1 and that penalties would be incurred if they did not do so, they  
subsequently changed their attitudes. Consequently, compliance was reported to  have 
improved but some clinicians were reported to  be "just doing the minimum that was required" 
to  result in w hat would be considered a valid VTE risk assessment. A significant number of 
clinicians also deferred the VTE risk assessment process as many times as the system allowed 
them  to w ithout incurring penalties. In cases where they could no longer defer, they were  
reported to do "just enough to  tick the box" (T llm plem entationNurse). These practices were  
not picked up by the monthly VTE CQUIN audits and were instead identified by VTE specialist 
nurses during routine follow ups, through monitoring of the deferrals and sometimes through 
Root Cause Analyses.
T2 nurses were the only user group that had previously used computerised health information
systems for their routine work prior to  CDSS im plem entation. However, no form al evaluations
had been carried out despite their assertions that the legacy systems w ere better than T2.
T2N ursel noted that T2 did not add any value to her clinical decision making, noting that it
was now more cumbersome to run the clinics using three disparate systems, including T2. To
get around these complexities, the T2 nurses reported finding "ways around" T2, whereby they
would input just enough data to  obtain the GP outcome letter. They were aware th at as long
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asth eysaw th e  required number of patients in th e T 2  virtual clinic, as measured bythe number 
of GP outcome letters produced, then their managers and commissioners would be satisfied. 
Consequently, it would appear to decision makers that T2 was being appropriately used. 
However, T2Nurse2 argued that despite the additional workload and lack of T2 integration 
w ith existing electronic systems, it was an im portant tool to reduce the risk of harm to patients 
and also an essential aid to improve nurses7 clinical decision making. T2Nurse2 noted that 
despite the fact that all the Uro-oncology specialist nurses were highly experienced, there was 
no guarantee that they would all follow the NICE guidelines in the same way. He argued th at  
T2 would thus be a "safety net77 to counter human errors and to ensure uniformity of decision­
making. He also argued that it was too early to evaluate T2 and that it should be given tim e to  
settle down before looking at ways to evaluate the benefits to  the  study Trust.
In similar fashion to  T l ,  the attitudes of the key stakeholders towards T37s evaluation varied 
between the various departments and healthcare professionals. Specialist departm ents that 
had traditionally managed the care of deteriorating patients saw T3 as an unnecessary addition 
to w hat they were already doing. In contrast, less experienced departm ents viewed it as an 
opportunity to upskill their staff's performance. However, the evaluations undertaken did not 
address the differences between the departments across the Trust. There appears to have 
been a general assumption by T3 project leaders that every departm ent would benefit from  
the CDSS w ithout assessing their existing capabilities and the disruptiveness th a t could be 
caused by T3 introduction. Additionally, the shift in responsibilities from  clinicians to  nurses 
and their readiness to  adopt new ways of working were not explored in any of the evaluations. 
There was a general feeling amongst some key stakeholders that T3 had been imposed on 
them .
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The majority of existing computerised health information systems (including CDSSs) in the 
study Trust were mostly used by clinicians and a small but growing number of nurses, 
particularly in specialist areas. Most nurses were reported to exhibit negative perceptions and 
scepticism about the clinical value o f computerised health information systems in general, and 
specifically the three CDSSs. All the three project teams reported that most nurses did not 
routinely use these systems. In contrast, most doctors considered the study Trust's clinical 
results reporting system and related computerised health information systems to be useful 
and complimentary to their clinical roles. Additionally there was a general perception amongst 
doctors that the study Trust's legacy systems and CDSSs, particularly T l  and T3 were superior 
and better integrated than those used in comparable regional hospitals where they had 
previously worked. Consequently, the adoption of all three CDSSs was reported by the key 
stakeholders to have improved the study Trust's standing as a leading and innovative teaching 
centre in the region. However, there was awareness amongst most senior clinicians, managers 
and some CDSS users that both T l  and T3 were under-utilised. Often they cited lack of capacity, 
conflicting priorities and other operational barriers as the causes of such limitations. Although 
nurses and clinicians in the urology outpatients' departm ent extensively used the existing 
legacy systems prior to  T2 adoption, T2 was also reported to be under-utilised. There was 
uncertainty about CDSS evaluations for all three cases, even for those stakeholders who were  
involved in the developm ent/adoption and evaluation of the CDSSs. These uncertainties 
related to questions about w hat needed to be evaluated, how to evaluate and who was 
responsible for evaluations. Many interviewees reported having to  "cover their backs" or 
"covering the Trust's back", which often m eant doing just enough to "tick the box" and be seen 
to be doing the right things. This also applied to senior clinicians and senior managers who
were keen to be seen to  be complying with national guidelines and be seen to be accountable 
professionally, ethically and legally to the key stakeholders such as the government, taxpayers, 
commissioners and professional bodies. There was a shared belief by most of the key 
stakeholders that things were generally better following the im plem entation o f the three  
CDSS. However, these beliefs were mainly based on personal and professional judgments and 
w ere not backed by evidence from formal evaluations. It would also appear that there were  
some vested interests amongst some of the key stakeholders who were keen to show that the  
CDSSs had been successfully implemented and that the expected benefits had been realised. 
Some of the key stakeholders, particularly the Lead Consultants and the ICT departm ent were  
in a position to exert significant power to  ensure compliance and usage of the CDSSs. However, 
this did not necessarily result in acceptance of the CDSSs.
This Section has highlighted that the key stakeholders' vested interests can result in less 
effective evaluations because they may primarily focus on protecting their interests. Also, the  
level of user engagement in the evaluations was variable. Indeed, in the m ajority of 
evaluations, there was minimal, or no user engagement at all. The m ajority of the key 
stakeholders argued that the primary evaluations were designed to  "tick the box" and protect 
the interests of senior consultants and Trust executives rather than improving their work  
processes and patient outcomes. This raises questions about how much these evaluations 
reflected the real effects of CDSSs in these clinical areas.
8.4 Purposes of evaluations
The purposes of the evaluations that were carried out at the different stages o f the CDSSs'
adoption are summarised in Table 8.3. Pre-implementation evaluations primarily focused on
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assessing the clinical and technical efficacy of each CDSS. For T l ,  these evaluations included 
the validation of software algorithms, clinical evaluation and interface and user testing. 12 
developers carried out similar evaluations to those th at were carried out for T l  in collaboration 
with the developing Trust. Prior to its adoption in the study Trust, T3 underw ent various 
evaluations at the developing Trust. These evaluations were focused on outcomes such as T3's 
technical and clinical efficacy, cost effectiveness, guideline adherence and reducing the rates 
of mortality. Table 8.3 shows the purposes of CDSS evaluations at d ifferent phases of their 
adoption lifecycle.
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T l T2 T3
To ensure appropriate 
translation of NICE guidelines 
into practice
To ensure appropriate 
translation of the Trust’s VTE 
policy
To assess efficacy of the tool’s 
software
To check usability of tool 
interface and rules with real 
clinical users
To check compliance with 
VTE CQUIN targets
To assess the cost-effectiveness 
of Doppler scans, prophylactic 
and treatment does of 
Enoxaparin®
To test the robustness of the 
Trust’s VTE management 
systems
To establish causes of VTE in 
hospitalised patients
To audit Trust performance 
against NICE quality standards 
for VTE
To test system’s alert levels and 
safety parameters
To evaluate system’s accuracy in 
making guideline adherent 
management plans compared 
with humans
To assess the merits of T2 before 
adoption
Inspecting system’s accuracy 
and checking patient safety
To establish patient satisfaction 
with telephone clinic and 
internet access
To ensure full implementation of 
T3 and resolve issues arising
Assess whether expected benefits 
had been realised
To assess the effectiveness of the 
Critical Care service
To monitor the effectiveness of 
acute care services and deaths 
rates in the Trust
To evaluate the uptake and impact 
of the Outreach service
To assess the cause of adverse 
events in hospital and put in place 
remedial actions
To assess the effects of T3 on 
clinical processes and existing 
systems
Table 8.3 Purposes of CDSS evaluations at different phases of their adoption lifecycle
316
Only the T l  project team  carried out formal evaluations during its im plem entation. Informal 
evaluations were performed for all three CDSSs during and after the im plem entation phases. 
T l's  post implementation evaluations primarily focused on maintaining CQUIN compliance and 
benchmarking the study Trust with other NHS Trusts. Post im plem entation evaluations for T2 
included a 'post-market surveillance7 audit that was carried out by the developers as required 
by the MHRA and an exploratory patient survey funded and performed by academics from a 
medical school linked with the study Trust. However, none of the T2 project members at the  
study Trust were aware of the 'post-market surveillance' audit (including T2LeadConsultant). 
Only T2LeadCnsultant was aware of the patient satisfaction survey. The primary purposes of 
formal post implementation evaluations for T3 were to  assess w hether initial benefits had 
been sustained. For all three CDSSs, the primary evaluation purposes w ere limited to  the stated 
project objectives, which were to m eet the NICE guidelines and to satisfy regulatory 
authorities. Some additional evaluations were also undertaken to  assess improvements in 
clinical processes and patient outcomes. Examples include the root cause analyses for hospital 
acquired VTEs, patient safety audits and the T3 benefits realisation studies looking at patient 
outcomes, as well as operational and financial benefits. However, these evaluations did not 
clearly focus on the respective CDSSs, and instead looked at the w ider clinical services that 
were supported by the CDSSs. The benefits realisation studies also sought to justify the  
technology investment by proving that the expected outcomes had been achieved and 
maintained. O ther evaluations, such as the Critical Care Outreach Team service evaluation and 
the T2 patient survey sought to assess the existing services and identify ways in which they  
could be further improved using the respective CDSSs. However, it would appear that most of 
the evaluations were not consistently viewing the same system because the boundaries o f the
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systems kept changing in line with organisational, clinical and regulatory priorities. 
Additionally, there were a range of complex interrelationships between various stakeholders 
who were directly and indirectly involved with the CDSSs.
This section has shown that the focus of evaluations should correspond to  the different phases 
of the CDSSs' lifecycle. Caution should be taken when carrying out CDSS evaluation as part of 
w ider service evaluations because it becomes difficult to  separate and measure the effects of 
different interventions. Consequently improvements or other consequences may be wrongly 
attributed to CDSSs w ithout clear evidence of correlation. The complex interrelationships 
between CDSSs and various stakeholders as well as w orkflow  integration should be explored. 
The boundaries of CDSS evaluations may also change in line w ith the constantly shifting 
organisational and regulatory priorities.
8.5 Approaches and methods of evaluations used
All three CDSSs were subject to both formal and informal evaluations. These are summarised 
in Table 8.4. Formal evaluations were primarily in the form  of clinical and technical validations 
of the respective CDSSs' software algorithms and underlying guidelines. Informal evaluations 
w ere often in the form  of routine observations and professional judgments by the key players 
who were involved with the CDSSs in the course of their routine work. For example, all three  
Lead Consultants reported that their respective CDSSs had led to substantial improvements in 
practice and patient outcomes compared with the state of affairs prior to  their adoption. Their 
adoption was often interpreted as resulting in automatic improvements in patient outcomes 
because of the improved accessibility of information and in some cases, im provem ent in data 
collection and reporting processes.
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T l T2 T3
Peer review of the Trust’s Clinical validation Informal observations and
revised VTE operational policies 
Peer review of paper-based VTE
Comparison of human and 
computer decisions
assessments during the pilot and 
Trust-wide implementation
algorithms
Assessment of presentations and
Benefits realisation studies
Validation of software rules and developer’s literature IQNARC audits
validation
Audits Dr Foster audits
VTE tool usability and user 
acceptance testing
Patient survey Outreach service evaluation





External audit of the Trust’s
VTE management system




Table 8.4 Evaluation approaches and methods used
All three CDSSs were deemed to have been successfully adopted on the basis tha t they had 
achieved their stated objectives, even though they had not been evaluated to  that effect. It 
also appeared that the key stakeholders did not make any distinctions between the form al and 
informal evaluations and those conclusions were made w ithout the necessary evidence to back 
them  up. It would also appear that the fitness for purpose of the evaluations th at w ere carried 
out was not a key consideration as long as the desired results were achieved. For example, the  
methodologies of data collection and reporting for VTE CQUIN audits were changed several 
times to  match the changing regulatory requirements w ithout any corresponding
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improvements in clinical processes or patient outcomes. Although the T l  project leaders 
showed awareness of this disparity, their focus at the tim e was to  ensure that the study Trust 
secured the CQUIN incentives. TILeadConsultant also noted that the T l  project team  had 
"largely cracked the nut" by securing funding for the T l  project and producing the monthly  
VTE CQUIN audit reports. He noted that evaluations that would be "clinically meaningful to  
patients" would be carried out in the future. No evaluations were commissioned for T2 by the  
study Trust. In part, T2LeadConsultant was satisfied with the methodologies that had been 
used by the developers, arguing that there was "no need to evaluate again because I would do 
exactly the same (methodology) as they did". Similarly, T3LeadConsultant was satisfied with  
the evaluation methodologies that had been used by the T3 developing Trust and hence only 
carried out evaluations to assess w hether the study Trust had achieved the same benefits as 
those reported by the developing Trust. T2 and T3 had been co-developed by leading 
consultants in their respective fields and both T2LeadConsultant and T3LeadConsultant had 
confidence in the robustness of their peers' evaluations. However, while these evaluations 
might have been adequate at the developing Trusts and also at the tim e of developm ent, the  
context of the study Trust was different and would have benefited from  new evaluations that 
took into consideration the local contextual factors.
Another im portant evaluation factor was that the novelty of these CDSSs m ade them
challenging to  evaluate. This was evident in the limited evaluation portfolios and evaluation
methodologies that were applied for all three CDSSs. Additionally, for all three CDSSs, decision
makers in the study Trust were primarily looking to  address the im m ediate problems such as
data collection, monitoring and reporting of compliance with national targets rather than the
w ider implications of the CDSSs' adoption. However, some of the methodologies th at were
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applied, such as the audits and informal service evaluations were not geared to address other 
contributory issues that may have affected the observed outcomes. For example the monthly 
VTE CQUIN audits did not pick up disparities in practices that were identified by the VTE Link 
Nurse audit because the form er was designed to  just record the number of valid VTE risk 
assessments that had been performed within the stipulated tim efram es. In contrast, the  
patient safety audits that were performed by the VTE Link Nurses highlighted poor usage of 
T l .  This could be attributed to  inadequate training and shortcomings in the im plem entation  
process. These issues were also not picked up by the monthly audits. In fact, the methodology 
that was used for the Link Nurse audit revealed that VTE compliance was about 50%, and not 
above 95% as reported by the monthly VTE CQUIN audits.
Apart from the VTE risk assessment audits, the majority of the evaluations w ere only 
disseminated to a few  members of the project teams and senior m anagement. Some key 
evaluations such as the T3 benefits studies were not disseminated outside the senior members 
of the project team , apart from  references in the study Trust's annual quality accounts. The 
validity of the range of evaluations that were carried out could be open to  criticism because of 
their informality. This was particularly so for those evaluations which w ere based on key 
stakeholders rationalising their personal and professional judgments as well as the checklists 
and informal audits.
This Section has shown that the evaluation methodologies that were used widely varied. For 
any evaluation activity, there is need to:
•  consider the tim ing of evaluations and match w ith appropriate methods
•  establish w hat system level is to be studied and match to appropriate methods
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•  distinguish between formal and informal evaluations
•  question the level of evaluators' neutrality (w hether from the project team , other parts 
of Trust or external to the Trust)
•  consider evaluations from outside the Trust and decide w hether follow-up in-house 
evaluations are necessary
•  test assumptions regarding the perceived or "sold" benefits of CDSSs
•  carry out evaluations beyond the achievement of stated objectives
•  document and disseminate evaluations to  all key stakeholders (including CDSS users)
8.6 Barriers to evaluations
A range of human, methodological and organisational barriers were identified within the  




T l • Lack of funding to undertake evaluations that would be “clinically meaningful to 
patients”
• Assertions by some key stakeholders that Tl had been a success without the 
necessary evaluations to support
• Perception by some users that Tl was bureaucratic diktat without clinical benefits for 
patients
• Perception by some key stakeholders that CQUIN framework was target driven and 
did not have any patient benefits
• Top down approach to both Tl project and evaluations carried out
• Audit results not accepted by some key stakeholders as representative of real clinical 
environment
• Acceptance by project leaders that evaluation methods were limited
• Tl used as an agent to change the behaviour of users
• Tl used to restructure clinical workflow
• Tl fit in some key clinical areas not formally evaluated
T2 • Project leaders did not see the need for evaluations
• Project leaders satisfied with evaluations carried out by the developing Trust
• T2 registration with MHRA and CE approval reassured project leader of T2 
robustness
• Notion by key stakeholders that T2 required time to “settle” in the study Trust before 
undertaking evaluations
• Lack of motivation to evaluate
• No regulatory pressure to evaluate T2
• Lack of evaluation customers due to reorganisation of primary care services
• T2 used as an agent to change the behaviour of users
• T2 used to restructure clinical workflow
• T2 fit to the study Trust not formally evaluated
T3 • Lack of evaluation documentation
• Assertion by some key stakeholders that there was no need to evaluate T3
• Primary focus of evaluations on achievement of the “sold” benefits
• Evaluations based on professional judgments rather than structured methods
• T3 used as an agent to change the behaviour of users
• T3 used to restructure clinical workflow
• T3 fit in some key clinical areas not formally evaluated
Table 8.5 Barriers to CDSS evaluations
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8.6.1 Human barriers to evaluations
One of the main barriers was that some key stakeholders did not see the need to evaluate the
CDSS concerned at all. This was particularly so for T2 and T3 because the Lead Consultants
w ere satisfied with the evaluations that had been performed by their peers at the respective
developing Trusts. Another barrier was that the project teams made assumptions based on
their professional judgment and anecdotal evidence that the CDSSs had led to  improvements
in the services that they supported and ultimately patient outcomes. The main basis of these
assumptions was that the CDSSs made it easier for clinical leaders and managers to  have access
to data showing the performance and compliance of their clinical teams. For example, the
audits that had been carried out for the previous paper-based VTE risk assessment tool had
been difficult to  complete and did not provide enough information for decision making. T l
resolved these issues by providing various compliance and performance reports at various
levels such as by departm ent or consultant of specific patient group. Likewise, T2 resolved the
issues around disparate clinics that were held by the different urology team s by grouping
together patients into a single database. There were also plans to utilise T2 in future to  identify
patients who were suitable for clinical trials. Similarly, T3 provided a platform to  view the
performance and compliance of clinical teams and enabled the Critical Care Outreach Team
and clinicians to  prioritise their work and initiate interventions timeously. Although there may
have been improvements in the various aspects noted by the three project teams, no formal
evaluations were carried out to  confirm these improvements. Furthermore, it was difficult to
ascertain w hether all the positive outcomes that were attributed to  T3 could be entirely
separated from  other ongoing initiatives across the study Trust. These assumptions were
primarily based on improvements in the ability to  change processes to  m eet regulatory
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requirements but failed to identify and address operational problems faced by CDSS users 
whose contribution to their evaluation could have brought a unique perspective based on their 
experiences.
For all three CDSSs, the main evaluations were conducted by the Lead Clinicians and their
respective project teams and excluded other healthcare professionals. Failing to  include all key
stakeholders in the evaluations may have impacted on the ownership of evaluations that w ere
carried out. The monthly VTE CQUIN audits were produced by the study Trust's Information
Departm ent w ith support from the leading members of the T l  project team
(TILeadConsultant, TILeadNurse and TIDeveloper). T2LeadConsultant primarily carried out
informal evaluations for T2 with support from the key members of its developm ent team .
T3LeadConsultant carried out formal evaluations for T3 w ith support from the developers and
the Critical Care Outreach Team Lead Nurse. The main evaluators for all three CDSSs w ere the
key decision makers who had championed their adoption and had also taken leading roles in
their implementation at the study Trust. The involvement of the same players at every stage
of the CDSSs lifecycle raises questions around their ability to  carry out objective evaluations.
None of these stakeholders showed any concern around self-evaluation. Some external
evaluations were carried out for T l  and T2. However, the Strategic Health Authority evaluation
that was commissioned for T l  was not reported to the project team  and did not affect
decision-making. The T2 patient satisfaction survey was exploratory and also did not appear to
have had any effect on decision-making within the study Trust. Apart from  the monthly VTE
CQUIN audits, the formal evaluations were not widely disseminated. Only TILeadConsultant
and T ID eveloper were aware of the clinical and technical validations that w ere carried out
during the early stages of its lifecycle. Likewise, only T2LeadConsultant and the T2
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developm ent team  at the developing Trust were aware of the technical and clinical evaluations 
undertaken during its development. T2LeadConsultant was not aware of the post market 
surveillance audits that had been carried out by the T2 developers. Only the key members of 
the T3 project team  were aware of the evaluations that were carried out at the developing 
Trust although these evaluations had been published in professional and academic journals. 
Despite the lack of dissemination of the evaluations, the majority of the interviewees believed 
that the necessary technical and clinical evaluations had been carried out as part of the CDSSs' 
developm ent.
This sub-section has shown human barriers around CDSS evaluations relating to the following:
•  key stakeholders not seeing the need for evaluations
•  lack of scrutiny of evaluations carried out by peers
•  CDSSs primarily used as management information systems and agents for change
•  CDSS project leaders' personal and professional judgements influencing and at times  
replacing formal evaluations
•  lack of distinction between effects of CDSSs and other initiatives which were  
implemented simultaneously
•  decisions regarding how much funding was allocated for evaluations
•  the position taken by project leaders regarding evaluating their own projects
•  challenges around building ownership of evaluations by not involving CDSS users
•  how to effectively evaluate evaluations and ensure that they improve the use of CDSSs
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8.6.2 Methodological barriers to CDSS evaluations
For all three cases, there was regulatory pressure to  adopt CDSSs and related systems to
improve processes and clinical decision-making. However, there were no corresponding
recommendations regarding how to evaluate these technologies. It therefore was up to the
respective project teams to devise evaluation methods that they considered most suitable. T l
evaluations were limited to the study Trust's im m ediate requirements for CQUIN VTE audit
data and to  obtain the attached financial incentives. However, the T l  project team  showed
awareness that achieving the CQUIN VTE targets did not necessarily imply the correct usage of
T l .  The patient safety audit that was carried out by TILeadNurse and T lW ardSister also
showed wide variations in compliance between the CQUIN VTE audits and the actual decisions
that had been made in practice. There were no im m ediate evaluation requirem ents (from
regulators) for T2 and hence no formal evaluations w ere commissioned by the study Trust. T3
evaluations were focused on realising benefits that had been proven by the developing Trust.
By "taking the word" of their peers at the developing Trusts, the Lead Consultants for both T2
and T3 showed the significant influences that were exerted by peer groups and the effects
thereo f on the range of evaluation methodologies that w ere employed. The influences of the
peer groups appear to have limited the portfolio of evaluation methodologies because
clinicians who tended to use evaluation methods, which they were already fam iliar w ith,
carried out the majority of the evaluations. It would appear that the clinicians at the study
Trust were not critical of the evaluations that had been carried out by their peers because they
also believed that these were the best methodologies to  use and indeed would have also
evaluated the CDSSs in the same way. Similarly, o ther key stakeholders in the study Trust
trusted the judgm ent of the lead clinicians who w ere tasked w ith developing and /o r adopting
327
these CDSSs. However, this calls into question the validity of these evaluations, especially their 
fit for the CDSSs in the context of the study Trust. By applying the commonly used 
methodologies, these evaluations had explicit blind spots because their substantive focus 
leaned more towards the technical and clinical validations at the early phases of the respective 
CDSSs7 lifecycle and ignored the im plementation and post im plem entation stages. T1 and T3 
were implem ented across the study Trust with little regard to the differences between  
disparate clinical specialties. The novelty of T1 appears to  have been a barrier to it evaluation 
because it was the first such CDSS to be developed and im plem ented in the NHS. The T1 project 
team  noted that they did not have any reference points to  draw on and had no choice but to  
'self-evaluate'.
The sub-section has revealed the following methodological barriers to CDSS evaluation:
•  there was paucity of information regarding how to evaluate CDSSs
•  evaluation methods were selected for their ability to  generate information that would 
be reportable to regulatory authorities and to gain incentives from commissioners
•  evaluation methods were not geared to assess CDSS effects on users and patient 
outcomes
•  opinions within peer groups had significant effect on the range of evaluations that were  
carried out
•  little effort made to learn from previous CDSS evaluations or to consult w ider 
evaluation literature
•  lack of scrutiny of peer evaluations and recommendations from  collegiate and 
regulatory bodies
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•  fit of evaluation methods not assessed
•  explicit blind spots of evaluations not addressed
8.6.3 Contextual and organisational barriers to CDSS evaluations
The main organisational barrier was that the evaluation priorities kept changing, especially for 
T1 and T3. Initially, the T1 Project team  excluded some patient cohorts in order to  help to  m eet 
the 90% compliance to secure CQUIN funding. This was followed by blocking access to  the  
clinical results reporting system where risk assessment was not carried out within the initial 12 
hours of admission. Additional methodological changes and patient cohort exclusions were  
made to  m eet the new requirem ent for 95% compliance at the beginning of 2014. The T3 
project team  utilised T3 to m eet the requirements of ICNARC and Dr Foster audits even though 
they were not directly related. It would appear that internal and external priorities dictated  
the focus of evaluations that were carried out. The top down approach to  evaluations may also 
have restricted other evaluations outside the CDSS project teams. For example, T3 evaluations 
were directly intertwined with the interests of the Critical Care Departm ent, who had led its 
adoption in the study Trust. T3 evaluations were therefore automatically deferred to  the  
Critical Care Departm ent. Unlike T1 and the T3, there was no regulatory pressure for the  
Urology Departm ent to  evaluate T2 following its adoption. This was because the  
reorganisation of Primary Care Trusts into Clinical Commissioning Groups had led to  the  
disappearance of the key evaluation customers. Consequently it was unclear who was 
responsible for T2 in the newly formed Clinical Commissioning Groups and changes in the study 
Trust's internal management structure. Also unlike T1 and T3, there were no additional 
incentives for the Urology Departm ent to undertake any further evaluations beyond those 
carried out by the developing Trust.
TILeadConsultant expressed frustration at the lack of capacity to carry out additional 
evaluations that would be "clinically meaningful to  patients". This was attributed to  lack of 
additional funding for evaluations beyond the regulatory requirements. This further hampered 
the T1 project team's capacity to adequately perform the root cause analyses and follow  up 
issues raised in the monthly VTE audits and the root cause analyses. To overcome the funding 
restrictions, TILeadConsultant and TILeadNurse often carried out the root cause analyses and 
other related work in their own tim e. These limitations created new ethical dilemmas whereby  
they were increasingly concerned that findings from evaluations would require appropriate  
follow up to ensure patient safety. These new ethical dimensions further limited the  
evaluations that the T1 project team  was willing to undertake beyond the m onthly VTE audits. 
The T2 and T3 project teams, especially the nurses, also raised concerns about lack of funding 
for evaluations. The T2 nurses and the Critical Care Outreach Team were interested in carrying 
out evaluations that would show decision makers within the Trust their value and contribution  
to their respective departments. Another barrier was that the three CDSSs w ere used as agents 
of change to restructure workflow and reassign responsibilities. There was a desire by the  
respective project leaders to standardise clinical processes and user practices using the CDSSs. 
The project teams also intended to use the CDSSs to improve clinical processes, user 
performance, efficiency and compliance w ith guidelines. For all three CDSSs, there was a 
presumption by project leaders that the CDSSs would automatically result in improvements in 
patient outcomes. However, these assumptions and their impact on clinical workflow, 
professional dynamics and the wider organisation were not evaluated.
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Organisational barriers identified in this sub-section primarily related to  the following:
•  shifting organisational priorities led to  changes in evaluation focus
•  external pressures dictated the range and boundaries of evaluations
•  top down approach to evaluations that were carried out
•  pressure on evaluators to carry out only the evaluations which would be considered 
meaningful by key decision makers or funders of evaluations
•  lack of funding or other incentives to evaluate beyond the im m ediate regulatory 
requirements
•  lack of capacity or authority to effectively im plem ent changes in response to  findings 
from evaluations
•  lack of clear customers for some evaluations
•  lack of ownership of evaluations
8.7 Benefits of evaluations
For all three cases, the main benefit of evaluation was to  secure the continued funding of the  
respective CDSS projects. For T l ,  the monthly VTE compliance audits were directly linked to  
the operational funding for the study Trust from the commissioners. As such, there was a 
financial incentive to carry out this evaluation. The main benefit for T2 evaluations was to  
satisfy the regulatory requirements for its registration with the MFIRA and for CE marking. This 
exercise was im portant for T2 developers to show potential commissioners th at the CDSS had 
been robustly evaluated and that it was safe to use. Indeed, T2LeadConsultant did not see the  
need to commission any further evaluations because he was satisfied with the evaluations that
331
had been carried out at the developing Trust. The main benefits of the formal evaluations that 
were carried out for T3 were to  produce information that would show that the expected 
benefits as sold by the developers had been achieved. Producing this information was 
im portant to  justify the technology investment to  key stakeholders and also the continued 
funding of T3 at the study Trust when the tender was due to  be renewed. It would appear that 
the espoused benefits of the main studies for all three cases were primarily used for decision­
making within the study Trust. The primary benefits of CDSS evaluations w ere to  show  
adherence to NICE guidelines and to secure financial incentives for the study Trust. It would  
appear that these benefits might have been achieved at the expense o f carrying out other 
evaluations, which would have looked at the w ider CDSS effects on patient outcomes, the  
organisation and users. It would appear that evaluators primarily focused on retrospectively 
justifying investment in CDSSs by highlighting wider benefits even w here there was no direct 
correlation with CDSSs.
8.8 Further factors of evaluations identified in the cases
The three case studies revealed additional factors of evaluation that w ere not identified in the  
literature review and the resultant CDSS evaluation fram ework. These factors included the  
following:
•  funding for evaluations
•  stakeholders involved with the evaluations
•  the criteria used to judge the success or failure of evaluations 
These factors will now be discussed in turn.
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8.8.1 Funding for evaluations
Sources of funding for CDSS evaluations ranged from the study Trust to external stakeholders
and some individual CDSS project team  members. Table 8.6 shows the range of resources that
were allocated to  each CDSS project team  before, during and after implem entation. All three
CDSSs were reported to  have been allocated adequate funding for adoption and
im plem entation. However, it was unclear how much funding was allocated to  evaluations
either in absolute term s or as percentages of individual projects. The T l  project team  benefited
from  executive support and funding from the study Trust and the Strategic Health Authority
for its initial developm ent and related clinical and technical efficacy evaluations. T l  evaluations
received additional funding in the sense that key project members such as TILeadConsultant,
T llm plem entationNurse and T ID eveloper were fully seconded to  the T l  project during its
developm ent and im plem entation phases. Additionally, many projects were put on hold to
ensure that the study Trust's ICT Departm ent focused primarily on T l .  The Strategic Health
Authority also commissioned a leading accounting firm to carry out an audit of the study
Trust's VTE management system. However, subsequent evaluations such as the root cause
analyses did not receive additional funding from the study Trust and were instead funded from
departm ental resources and evaluators' own tim e. The production and reporting of monthly
VTE audits following T l  implementation was assigned to  the study Trust's Information
Departm ent. T2 was also reported to have received adequate funding for its im plem entation
from  the Primary Care Trust and other project partners. No funding was allocated for T2
evaluations by the study Trust and the T2 project did not receive any support from  the ICT
Departm ent. A medical school that was linked with the study Trust funded the T2 patient
satisfaction survey. The T3 project team received executive support and funding by the study
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Trust for its adoption and im plementation. Additionally, because the study Trust was a flagship 
site for T3 development, it benefited from  ongoing support from the developers who were  
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The VTE Link Nurse-led audit also did not receive direct funding from  the study Trust and 
was completed in the evaluators' own tim e. However, this audit widened the scope of 
evaluative activity and brought new dimensions from new evaluators outside the initial T l  
project team . This audit unearthed many issues that were missed by the monthly CQUIN 
VTE audits. However, challenges arose when it came to  acting on the findings of the audit 
because the evaluators lacked the resources and unlike the CDSS project teams they had 
no power to  enforce the necessary changes in practice. The support and funding allocated 
to  the T l  and T3 project teams enabled them  in part to  undertake some of the evaluations, 
particularly the technical aspects during the developm ent and implem entation stages and 
continuing audits related to national guidelines in the case of T l .  The VTE audits were  
im portant for the study Trust because they were directly linked to  financial incentives 
agreed with Commissioners under the CQUIN fram ework for VTE m anagement. F o rT l and 
T3, there were also financial penalties for the study Trust if the national targets w ere not 
adhered to. The potential for financial penalties due to  non-adherence w ith these targets 
resulted in significant resources being allocated to the T l  and T3 Project teams to  
undertake the necessary evaluations to show compliance. Overall, it would appear that 
adequate resources for evaluations were allocated during the initial adoption and 
implem entation stages to show CDSS technical and clinical efficacy as well as patient safety. 
It would appear that once the CDSSs were deemed safe for use within the defined patient 
groups, there were assumptions by the key stakeholders that the stated objectives would 
be achieved w ithout need for any further evaluations. Post im plem entation evaluations 
appear to  have been primarily focused on proving the study Trust's guideline compliance.
This sub-section has shown the importance of ensuring that CDSS evaluations are 
adequately funded. CDSS evaluators should consider the following:
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•  CDSS evaluations require adequate funding at every phase of CDSS lifecycle
•  funding of CDSS evaluations should be considered as part of the adoption process
•  sources of CDSS funding can be internal or external
•  funders of evaluations may influence how evaluations are carried out and reported
•  evaluations that are not commissioned or supported by key decision makers are
likely to result in minimal effect on decision making
8.8.2 Characteristics of the key stakeholders involved with evaluations
For each of the CDSSs, the owners of the evaluations were primarily the Lead Consultants 
who had championed their adoption. Table 8.7 shows the different evaluators and targeted 
audiences of CDSS evaluations. The main T l  customers were the Trust Board, the 
Thrombosis Committee, Commissioners and the Strategic Health Authority, whose 
responsibility it was to implement the government's initiatives in NHS Trusts. The primary 
customers of T3 evaluations were the study Trust Board, the Strategic Health Authority and 
Commissioners. In contrast, the circumstances surrounding T2's adoption meant that the 
original evaluation customers were no longer available. This was caused by the 
reorganisation of the Primary Care Trusts into Clinical Commissioning Groups. For T l  and 
T3 the main customers of evaluation dictated the course of evaluations by setting 
guidelines on how audit data would be reported. However, it was up to the respective Lead 
Consultants to decide the best evaluation methods to meet the nationally mandated 
requirements.
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CDSS Evaluators Target audiences
T l • Senior Haematologists
• Senior clinicians in the VTE 
Project team
• ICT technicians and project 
managers
• VTE Project team
• Pharmacy and Haematology 
Departments
• PricewaterhouseCoopers auditors
• VTE TILeadConsultant and Lead 
Nurse
• Project Lead Nurse, VTE link 
nurses and Audit and 
Effectiveness Department 
facilitator
• Thrombosis Committee, Trust Board, 
Commissioners and Regulators
• VTE Project team, Thrombosis 
Committee and Trust Board
• VTE Project team and clinical users
• VTE Project team, Thrombosis 
Committee, Trust Board, Commissioners 
and Regulators
• Departmental business managers and 
clinical leaders
• Trust Board, Commissioners and the 
Strategic Health Authority
• Link Nurse Network, VTE Project team 
and the Audit and Effectiveness 
Department
T2 • T2 developers and clinical 
researchers
• Clinical researchers and system’s 
developers




• MHRA and Commissioners
• T2 developers
• Commissioners and Trust Board
• MHRA and commissioners
• Researchers and commissioners
T3 • T3 implementation team and line 
managers
• Project Lead Consultant and 
Outreach Lead Nurse
• Critical Care Department and the 
IQNARC Case Mix Team
• Critical Care Department and Dr 
Foster
• Critical Care Outreach Team
• T3 Lead Consultant
• The implementation team and T3 
users
• T3 Steering Committee, Trust Board and 
Commissioners
• T3 Steering Committee, Trust Board and 
Commissioners
• Trust Clinical Governance team, Trust 
Board, Commissioners and regulators
• Critical Care Department
• Clinicians, Trust Clinical Governance 
team, Trust Board and regulators
• T3 users, line managers, implementation 
team, T3 steering Committee and Trust 
Board
Table 8.7 CDSS evaluators and target audiences
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The interactions between the key stakeholders varied for the three cases. In some 
instances, such interactions resulted in the users' inadvertent responses to the presence of 
the evaluators, which were taken as positive effects of the CDSSs. For all three CDSSs, users 
repeatedly reported having to "cover their backs", whereby they were aware that the 
CDSSs would be remotely monitored by the respective project teams. In response, they 
made sure that they "did enough" to satisfy their legal and professional obligations. For 
example, the T3 implementation team worked closely with ward staff to offer them training 
and support during the two-week implementation phases. They informally evaluated and 
monitored the implementation process, particularly how ward nurses were collecting and 
recording clinical observations. The T3 implementation team concluded that training and 
implementation had been successful in areas where T3 had been implemented. Flowever, 
once the implementation team left the ward areas, the culture around the recording of 
clinical observations was reported to have changed. Instead of recording clinical 
observations at the point of care as required, users were reported to be writing the 
observations on pieces of paper, and then inputting them all at once afterwards. In such 
cases, the date and time stamp would be wrong and potentially deteriorating patients also 
placed at risk. In part, the reason for this change was that the T3 PDA batteries were 
running out halfway through the cycle of clinical observation taking and also that nurses 
found it easier to collect observations and record them all on T3 afterwards. Flowever, 
formal evaluations that were carried out did not uncover these practices and it was only 
highlighted by the Critical Care Outreach team during their routine follow up sessions.
This sub-section has shown that the characteristics of key stakeholders affect CDSS 
evaluations. The following factors need to be considered:
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•  it is important to gain "buy in" from key stakeholders
•  the targeted audience of evaluations should be clearly defined
•  using CDSSs to change user behaviour may result in resistance
•  evaluations should be geared to assess interactions between stakeholders, 
including evaluators and CDSS users
•  Hawthorne effect needs to be considered when carrying out evaluations
8.8.3 Criteria used to judge the success or failure of evaluations
For all three cases, the main criteria for judging the success of CDSS evaluations were their 
ability to meet the project objectives. None of the evaluations were deemed to have failed. 
In the case of T l  and T3, the key criteria forjudging success of evaluations were primarily 
the achievement of national targets. While there was awareness amongst the project 
leaders of the importance of organisational and other related issues, their evaluation 
priorities were bound to the CDSS adoption drivers. These drivers were CQUIN targets for 
VTE; the reduction of waiting times in accident and emergency for T3; and maintaining the 
follow up visits for stable prostate cancer patients for T2. Some key stakeholders, for 
example, TllmplementationNurse and the Critical Care Outreach argued that the successes 
of their respective CDSSs were not well publicised within the study Trust. In all three cases, 
just undertaking the internal audits and informal evaluations was deemed a success given 
the resource limitations. For T2, its successful implementation and potential benefits 
ascertained from informal evaluations were considered as successes. It appears that the T3 
benefits studies were clearly defined, focusing on whether the study Trust had achieved 
the expected benefits of adoption based on the outcomes from the developing Trust. 
Although it was generally accepted by key stakeholders that such benefits had
overwhelmingly been proven, it was difficult to judge these claims due to unavailability of 
evaluation documentation. Furthermore, there were several other Trustwide service 
improvement initiatives running simultaneously with T3 that were not considered in the 
evaluations. It is quite likely that some effects of these concurrent initiatives overlapped 
with T3 but may have been attributed to T3 instead. Although there was awareness 
amongst the T3 project leaders that these benefits may have overlapped, they did not 
believe that this diminished the benefits of T3 in anyway. It appeared that all three project 
teams were keen to show the benefits of the CDSSs to the key decision makers both 
internally and externally so that they would gain support and continued funding. However, 
in many cases, there were no direct causal relationships between the reported outcomes 
and clinical practice. It was also unclear which evaluations had resulted in resource 
allocation decisions within the study Trust. This was particularly so in relation to external 
decisions.
This sub-section has shown that the criteria to judge the success or effectiveness of CDSS 
evaluations should go beyond the stated objectives of CDSS projects. The following should 
be considered:
•  CDSS evaluations should assess various outcomes, including patient, organisational, 
social and users outcomes
•  caution should be taken to avoid just focusing on satisfying the drivers for CDSS 
adoption
•  successful implementation of CDSSs should not be used as the only parameter to 
judge successful evaluations
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•  efforts should be made to separate the effects of concurrent service improvement 
initiatives from those of CDSSs
•  efforts should be made to establish causal relationships between reported 
outcomes and CDSSs
8.9 Limitations of the evaluations carried out
All three CDSSs were driven by NICE guidelines and other related national priorities at the 
time. As such, all evaluations were related to the guidelines in order to be seen as credible 
and to elicit the support of key decision makers and funders. The evaluations undertaken 
for all three CDSSs missed some important issues. Although the study Trust was reported 
to have adhered to NICE guidelines and met the national targets for the respective clinical 
issues, the evaluations did not address contextual, methodological and user specific issues 
that would have a bearing on the primary evaluations. For example, the criteria for judging 
the success of the CDSSs were based on untested assumptions by key stakeholders 
regarding guideline adherence and perceived improvements in workflow and patient 
outcomes. Only a few evaluators acknowledged the limitations of the evaluations that they 
had carried out. TILeadConsultant noted that they had evaluated as best as they could 
within the limited resources and in the absence of comparable systems in the UK at the 
time. T2LeadConsultant also showed awareness of the limitations of the evaluations that 
had been carried out but did not feel that any further evaluations were necessary at the 
time. Flowever, T2Nursel did not feel that the evaluations that had been carried out for T2 
addressed the additional challenges that were brought by its introduction. Similarly, the 
Critical Care Outreach Team also admitted that most of their evaluations were based on
incidental and anecdotal evidence. However, they were confident that many benefits had 
been achieved although they had not been formally evaluated and could not be proven by 
actual evidence.
All three CDSSs introduced unanticipated and unwanted problems which led to resistance 
in clinical areas and expected users finding ways to "get round" them. This led to many 
unintended uses. However, the evaluations performed did not address these problems. 
Furthermore, the evaluations undertaken were not geared to pick up unintended 
consequences of both adoption and evaluation. Some of these consequences resulted in 
disincentives. For example, following an audit by the Strategic Health Authority, the study 
Trust was ranked lower than some regional Trusts which were known to be poorly 
collecting and reporting CQUIN VTE risk assessment data. Although this was informally 
identified as a consequence, it also highlighted the shortcomings of using audits as a 
methodology to compare and rank different NHS Trusts. Another key issue that was missed 
by the CDSS evaluations was the effectiveness of the dissemination of evaluations to key 
stakeholders. This was made worse by the lack of project and evaluation documentation 
regarding the inputs of evaluations, such as funding and other resources made available, 
methodologies applied and detailed outcomes of evaluations. Most evaluations were not 
documented at all and some were based on anecdotal evidence and professional 
judgements and observations in the course of CDSS implementation or routine work. 
Additionally, documentation of the implementation and evaluation processes was also 
inadequate for T l  and T3, and unavailable for T2. However, the key stakeholders did not 
seem concerned about the lack of project and evaluation documentation. The evaluations 
could have benefited from interactions between evaluators, the respective CDSS project 
teams and targeted users to allow appropriate utilisation of evaluation information to
improve the evaluation of similar projects in the future. The evaluators could have looked 
at the wider effects of CDSSs on users and how the intended users interacted with the new 
technologies. They could also have considered the CDSSs' interaction and integration with 
existing legacy systems as well as non-electronic systems. However, the improved 
availability of information often led to further operational problems, such as lack of 
capacity to implement action plans and interventions to improve failing areas. Other key 
issues that were not evaluated include the training, implementation and evaluation 
documentation processes. These issues were important because all three CDSSs were being 
used for the first time in the study Trust.
The evaluations that were carried out for all three CDSSs had many limitations. To counter 
these limitations, CDSS evaluators need to consider the following:
•  CDSS evaluations should look beyond guideline adherence and securing financial 
incentives from commissioners
•  CDSS evaluations should look at wider effects on outcomes relating to patients, the 
wider organisation, clinical workflow and users
•  evaluators should consider the limitations of their evaluations
•  criteria to judge the success of CDSS evaluations should look beyond the stated 
project objectives
•  assumptions about CDSS effectiveness should be based on clear evidence
•  unanticipated and unwanted CDSS outcomes should be assessed and 
acknowledged
•  unintended CDSS uses should be evaluated
•  disincentives of evaluations should be assessed
•  evaluations should be fully documented and disseminated to key stakeholders
•  CDSS integration with clinical workflow and existing legacy systems should be 
evaluated
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•  Improved availability of management information through CDSSs does not 
necessarily translate to improved outcomes or successful evaluations
•  NHS Trusts should put in place mechanisms to ensure that there is capacity to 
appropriately respond the evaluation findings
8.10 Overview of CDSS evaluations that were carried out
This chapter has looked at the evaluations that were carried out across all three cases in 
relation to the key factors of evaluation that were identified in the literature review and 
the ensuing CDSS evaluation framework. These factors of evaluation include the purposes 
and context of evaluations, approaches and methods of evaluations as well as the barriers 
and benefits of evaluations. Other evaluation factors that were identified in the three cases 
include funding for evaluations, the attitudes of the key stakeholders towards evaluations, 
the criteria used to judge the success of evaluations and impact of evaluations on decision­
making within the study Trust. The limitations of evaluations that were carried out were 
also discussed. The next chapter is going to focus on the how the key factors of evaluations 
that were discussed in this chapter relate to the wider CDSS evaluation literature and to 
the research questions. This discussion will also help to show how this research contributes 
to the CDSS literature in relation to the key evaluation factors that were identified in this 
research.
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Chapter 9 Discussion and Conclusions 
Introduction
This chapter discusses the implications of this research project and draws conclusions from  
the research findings. Section 9.1 revisits the research questions that were raised following 
the literature review. An overview of what was known about CDSS evaluation before this 
research was carried out is outlined, including some of the key research studies. An outline 
of what was done to answer the research questions is also given. The research findings are 
discussed in Section 9.2. This discussion is based on the CDSS evaluation framework that 
was developed from the literature review (see Figure 9.1). Section 9.3 presents the 
research findings in the context of the CDSS evaluation framework, noting the expected, 
conflicting and unexpected findings. Section 9.4 outlines the key research findings, and the 
evaluation factors that extend the CDSS evaluation framework discussed in 9.5. Section 9.6 
discusses the key contributions of this research to CDSS evaluation literature, and potential 
limitations noted in 9.7. In Section 9.8, the recommendations for further research and 
conclusions are given.
9.1 Research questions
This research project sought to make contributions to CDSS evaluation literature across all 
the five key factors identified in the CDSS evaluation framework (see Figure 9.1). Using this 
framework, this research sought to answer the following questions:
1 W hat are the key factors that affect CDSS evaluations in a typical NHS hospital 
setting?
2 How do these factors relate to the CDSS evaluation framework that was developed 
from the CDSS literature review?
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3 To what extent do evaluations affect decisions to adopt CDSSs in healthcare 










































































The five key factors of CDSS evaluations noted in CDSS evaluation framework (Figure 9.1) 
were evident to varying extents in all three case studies. Some evaluation factors were 
more relevant to individual CDSSs depending on the circumstances around their adoption. 
These factors are now discussed in turn.
9.2.1 Contextual and organisational and social issues that affect CDSS 
evaluations
Since the early 2000s, contextual, organisational and social factors have increasingly been 
identified as important to any CDSS evaluation activity. Interviews that were carried out 
with key stakeholders across all three cases revealed a general consensus that contextual 
and organisational issues were considered important. The interviews also revealed that the 







Figure 9.2 CDSS evaluation contexts as perceived by the key stakeholders
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The different contexts of CDSS evaluations that are shown in Figure 9.2 are now discussed 
in turn. There were assumptions amongst the key stakeholders, especially the respective 
CDSS project leaders and senior managers that the NHS was homogenous and that each 
individual NHS Trust faced similar issues with respect to CDSSs and wider clinical services 
which they supported. The level of standardisation of healthcare systems reinforced these 
views across the NHS through regulatory mechanisms such as the NICE guidelines and other 
centrally driven initiatives, with support from professional and collegiate organisations 
such as the Royal Colleges of Medicine among others. These assumptions also extended to 
the evaluation of CDSSs in the study Trust. However, the three cases revealed that although 
the study Trust itself was an important context, it was not homogenous and the three 
CDSSs in the cases operated in very specific local conditions. This lack of a homogenous 
context added to the complexity of the CDSSs7 evaluation. Although the key stakeholders 
identified the organisational context as important, little attention was paid to the 
contextual homogeneity in any of the CDSS evaluations that were carried out. There were 
a number of dimensions that affected how the local conditions within the context changed. 
To begin with, these dimensions were:
•  differences in existing IT infrastructure between different clinical specialties
•  differences in stakeholders7 attitudes towards the CDSSs and their evaluations
•  stakeholders7 attitudes to NICE guidelines and related clinical pathways
•  existing professional and organisational culture
•  motivation to comply with national guidelines and recommendations from 
professional and collegiate bodies
•  stakeholders7 ethical, professional and legal accountability
The introduction of T l  and T3 brought new powers to the Haematology and Critical Care 
Departments respectively. The individual project leaders also had the backing of the study
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Trust's CEO and Medical Director amongst other key stakeholders and decision-makers. 
This enabled them to implement interventions across the study Trust and enforce 
compliance, which had previously failed for many years. According to the project leaders, 
some clinical departments that had previously failed or refused to comply with national 
guidelines suddenly had no choice but to cooperate with the T l  and T3 project teams. The 
main consequence to mitigate these powers was the tendency by some CDSS users to "tick 
the box" and "cover their backs". This meant that they did just enough to be seen to be 
compliant even though they did not believe that this would result in any improvements in 
their work processes or patient outcomes. This also applied to senior clinicians and 
managers who were keen to be seen to be complying with national guidelines and show 
their accountability professionally, ethically and legally to the key stakeholders such as the 
Trust Board, the Commissioners as well as professional and regulatory bodies.
There was a tendency by some of the key stakeholders to take both internal and external
CDSS evaluations at face value across all three cases. For example, T2 and T3 project leaders
trusted their peers who had developed and evaluated these CDSSs at the respective
developing Trusts and did not question the evaluations that had been carried out prior to
their adoption in the study Trust. This may be because all three project leaders were
physicians and like most of their peers in other NHS Trusts, tend to favour quantitative over
qualitative methods because they are perceived to be bias free and evidence-based. It
could also be argued that where evaluations have already been carried out externally, it
may be perceived as wastage of resources to carry out further evaluations internally.
However, external evaluations should be interpreted cautiously in part because the
contexts of evaluation are different and also because these evaluations may not necessarily
reflect or serve the best interests of the adopting organisation. The evaluations that were
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carried out for T2 and T3 at the respective developing Trusts addressed single outcome 
measures that assessed changes in the care management system, user performance and 
perceived effects on patient care within the settings where they were developed, rather 
than the wider organisational effects of these CDSSs. Additional evaluations needed to be 
carried out by the study trust to look at the CDSSs' wider effects on the organisation and 
local clinical contexts. There was also a notion by some senior clinicians that "we cannot 
evaluate everything" because there were limited resources to carry out the evaluations and 
also that evaluations would be detrimental to CDSS adoption efforts. Other key 
stakeholders (for example TILeadNurse and TILeadConsultant) were also concerned that 
they did not have adequate resources to deal with findings from CDSS evaluations and 
therefore it "would be pointless" to carry out any additional evaluations. Consequently, 
this raised new ethical questions regarding how much evaluation they were willing to carry 
out given the limited resources that were allocated for evaluations and the subsequent 
follow-up which they felt was required to make the evaluations worthwhile. There was also 
a general consensus by most of the key stakeholders that the three CDSSs were required 
by the study Trust regardless of whether their benefits had been proven or not. This belief 
was based on the assumption by the key stakeholders that by adopting the CDSSs, the study 
Trust had resolved many existing problems thus rendering any evaluations irrelevant. In all 
three cases, the project leaders saw opportunities to acquire investments in CDSSs whose 
clinical benefits may not have been immediately apparent at the time but would eventually 
be realised in the future. Expected future uses of the CDSSs included the ready availability 
of audit trails and performance data that could be used to monitor the clinical areas. All 
three project leaders were also keen to build patient databases for future clinical research 
projects.
This section has shown the dilemma faced by CDSS adopters regarding whether they accept 
external evaluations or carry out their own evaluations before implementation. By taking 
external evaluations at "face value", they risked adopting CDSSs which may not be suitable 
for their local clinical environments. On one hand, it could be argued that even where 
external evaluations had been carried out, it may still necessary to carry out internal 
evaluations to assess their suitability and potential effects on the local clinical settings 
before implementation. On the other hand, it could also be argued that limited resources 
could be wasted by repeating evaluations which had already been carried out externally. 
The onus is therefore on local decision makers to systematically evaluate external 
evaluations to establish their validity and also to ensure that they provide answers to 
questions which they may have. This is particularly important because as shown in Figure 
9.2, the perceived contexts of evaluations may be different depending on the stakeholders 
involved. External evaluations that may be satisfactory for one professional group may be 
considered inadequate for another group.
9.2.2 Purposes of CDSS evaluations
The purposes of CDSS evaluations were affected by key factors such as the attitudes of the 
key stakeholders, motivations of the evaluators and related organisational issues. The 
majority of the CDSS evaluations were driven by the need to show the study Trust's 
compliance with the respective NICE guidelines and the national priorities at the time. It 
appeared that the evaluators were keen to show that they had demonstrated that the 
clinical interventions, which were supported by the CDSSs, had adhered to NICE guidelines. 
Guideline adherence was seen as a way to show the credibility, technical efficacy and safety 
of the CDSSs and also justify the technology investment. Aligning CDSS evaluations to the
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respective NICE guidelines and other important issues at the time was also done to secure 
funding and gain support from key decision makers in the study Trust and commissioners 
who were under constant pressure to respond to national initiatives and show compliance 
with guidelines. The main challenge with aligning evaluation purposes to national issues 
was that the motivations for evaluations were defined by national guidelines and current 
priorities at the time rather than issues that may have been considered important at 
organisational or other contextual levels. Some key stakeholders were concerned that once 
another issue became important at national level, decision-makers at the study Trust would 
shift their interest in guideline adherence and related evaluations accordingly. This was 
particularly the case for T1 and T3 because funding for the respective projects was directly 
linked with meeting national targets. However, by primarily targeting the evaluations to 
commissioners and regulatory authorities, the project teams inadvertently alienated the 
users of the CDSSs. Although some evaluations of T2 (at the developing Trust) related to 
NICE guidelines, there was no pressure for the T2 project team at the study Trust to  show 
that national targets were being met. However, the Uro-oncology nurses who expected to 
use T2 had not been involved in the adoption decision or any evaluations that had been 
carried out and thus lacked ownership for these evaluations.
The attitudes of the different professional groups and their disparate departments had
significant repercussions for the CDSS evaluations that were carried out. T1 and T3 were
implemented across the study Trust with little regard to the differences between the
clinical specialties which they supported. There appeared to have been general
assumptions by some of the key stakeholders that T1 and T3 would fit any department in
the study Trust and that the intended users would appreciate the CDSSs' importance
because they were both linked to NICE guidelines. However, there were significant
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variations in existing computerised legacy system infrastructures between the different 
departments. Additionally, the key stakeholders had diverse attitudes towards the value of 
these CDSSs. Their value sets around CDSS evaluation were also confined to their respective 
departments and in some cases, their professional and collegiate affiliations. Some clinical 
areas did not feel that they needed these CDSSs and did not see any value in their 
evaluation. For example, highly specialised areas such as the cardiology and neurology 
departments felt that their existing computerised legacy systems were more specialised 
and better suited to their clinical environments than T3. They also felt that their existing 
clinical pathways adequately covered the new NICE VTE guidelines which T1 was based on 
and therefore their respective departments did not require the additional decision support. 
To these departments, T1 evaluations, such as the CQUIN VTE audits were viewed as 
administrative exercises that did not fully report the extent of their existing VTE 
management efforts. There were also important departmental differences between 
specialised and high demand areas, which were often in the spotlight regarding national 
issues compared with general medical departments. By virtue of their experiences dealing 
with these issues, these departments felt that they were better equipped to make their 
own decisions to suit their respective clinical areas without involving the CDSS project 
teams. However, their capacity to effectively implement and adhere to these guidelines 
had not been evaluated. It could also be argued that allowing individual clinical 
departments to autonomously implement national guidelines and subsequently evaluate 
their own adherence would potentially result in variations in guideline adherence, clinical 
practice and ultimately, patient outcomes. Indeed, the clinical departments were likely to 
have different priorities and motivations for evaluation which would have affected the 
wider organisational goals. Furthermore, not all the clinical departments had the
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experience, expertise or the necessary resources to carry out such implementation and the 
required evaluations.
The evaluators for all three CDSSs showed a desire to improve clinical processes and patient 
outcomes. However, it could be argued that some of the evaluations that were carried out 
had no causal links to the respective CDSSs as reported, although the evaluators sought to 
emphasise such links. For example, the root cause analyses investigations were reported 
to have improved as a result of T1 and T3 introduction. However, the root cause analysis 
investigations themselves were not evaluations of T1 orT3 but instead looked at failures in 
the wider clinical processes that were supported by these CDSSs. However, the root cause 
analysis investigations exposed some of the shortcomings of the primary CDSS evaluations. 
For example, some patients who had been deemed to have had valid VTE risk assessments 
had not been prescribed the thromboprophylaxis as recommended by the NICE guidelines 
and where prescribed, in some cases the nurses did not administer thromboprophylaxis. 
T1 and T3 project leaders also reported that the processes of carrying out routine audits 
had significantly improved following the successful implementation of both CDSSs. 
However, the improvements in these processes were not in themselves improvements in 
patient outcomes as claimed by the evaluators.
By aligning the CDSS evaluations to NICE guidelines and other national initiatives, there was
an expectation by the decision makers that patient outcomes would improve by default.
Nevertheless, none of the evaluations focused on specific patient outcomes. The respective
CDSS project team leaders were also keen to show that introduction of the CDSSs had
resulted in the improvement of their overall clinical management systems. This premise
was primarily based on the improved accessibility of previously unavailable management
information. This information enabled CDSS project leaders and line managers to
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undertake audits and benchmark their services against national standards. However, none 
of the evaluations were specifically focused on looking at the clinical management systems. 
Furthermore, all three project leaders and other key stakeholders revealed that the CDSSs 
were not being fully optimised as intended by the developers. For example, although all 
three CDSSs had the capability to provide various management reports and data mining 
opportunities, the project leaders noted that these facilities were not being utilised to learn 
about the CDSSs, nor help to improve clinical processes and patient outcomes. The main 
reason given for not taking advantage of these opportunities was the lack of time and other 
high priority issues that line managers and departmental leaders had to deal with 
simultaneously. Most line managers and some of the departmental leaders were reported 
to have been unaware of the availability of this information, and in some cases did not 
know how to access or use this information. The primary evaluations for all three CDSSs 
were focused on financial incentives that were attached to the services which they 
supported. For T1 and T3, these incentives were related to direct payments from the 
commissioners towards their operational budgets when they showed compliance with 
NICE guidelines. The main evaluations that were carried out for T2 were also fully funded 
by the commissioners who were keen to show compliance with NICE guideline 
recommendations and gain clinical, operational and financial benefits in the long run.
The purposes of CDSS evaluations should include a range of technical, clinical,
organisational, human and social issues. These evaluations should take into consideration
the human CDSS interaction within the context of complex hospital settings where there
are multiple professional groups who exhibit different attitudes towards CDSSs and their
evaluations. It is essential to evaluate the CDSS for technical and clinical efficacy as well as
its adherence to the underlying guidelines. However, successful technical and clinical
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evaluations do not necessarily guarantee that the CDSS will be accepted and used as 
intended. There is also no guarantee that guidelines will be adhered to and ultimately, 
patient outcomes may not be improved or maintained. It is therefore essential to widen 
the purposes of evaluations to cover sociotechnical aspects to understand their effects on 
established social systems. Figure 9.3 shows the factors which affected the purposes of 
CDSS evaluations for all three cases and some key questions which need to be considered 
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9.2.3 Approaches and methods of CDSS evaluations
The literature review suggested that there was scope to use a range of evaluation methods 
throughout a CDSSs7 lifecycle. However, positivist approaches dominate CDSS evaluation 
literature, thus restricting the range of methods used and hence limiting the scope of 
findings and recommendations for practice. The majority of the evaluations that were 
carried out for all three CDSSs in the cases adopted a positivist stance and focused on single 
outcome issues which were isolated from the real clinical environments. The methods 
applied were often informal before and after assessments, simple audits and peer reviews 
to show compliance with national guidelines and related regulatory requirements and to 
ensure financial stability for the study Trust. Interpretivist and critical approaches could 
have helped to set the wider boundaries and scope of evaluations by identifying the 
interrelationships between key stakeholders and the related contextual issues. There was 
inadequate project and evaluation documentation for all three CDSSs. Indeed, most of the 
evaluations were not documented at all. Some evaluations were based on anecdotal 
evidence as well as personal and professional judgements, and routine observations in the 
course of CDSS development/procurement, implementation or in the course of the routine 
work of the stakeholders involved. The lack of documentation may suggest lack of rigour 
of evaluation methods or even deliberate attempts to restrict access to evaluations in some 
cases.
The majority of evaluations that were carried out for all three CDSSs were formative. While 
formative evaluations are essential, especially for the developmental and early 
implementation phases of the CDSS lifecycle, summative evaluations could have provided 
a wider view of the real effects of the CDSSs across the care delivery system and wider
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organisation. It does appear that there were no incentives for commissioning summative 
evaluations because decision makers at the study Trust were gaining enough information 
to satisfy the primary CDSS evaluation audiences from the formative studies. Although 
some of the key stakeholders acknowledged the methodological limitations, they were 
satisfied with the respective evaluations that had been carried out. Also the novelty of all 
three CDSSs appears to have affected the range of evaluations that could be carried out 
because there were limited studies of evaluations that had been carried out within the NHS 
context. T3 project leaders reported that they had carried out two benefits realisation 
studies. However, due to lack of evaluation documentation, it was difficult to assess how 
the benefits realisation methodology had been applied to the benefits studies that were 
carried out for T3. However, a key flaw of the reported benefits realisation evaluations was 
the lack of involvement of any stakeholders outside the core T1 project team and their 
peers from the Critical Care Department. Table 9.1 shows some of the key questions that 
evaluators need to ask to enable them to establish which evaluation methods would be 
most suitable to provide them with adequate answers throughout a CDSS's lifecycle.
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What problem (s) is the CDSS intended to solve? How does it work? Is it 
integrated with existing legacy systems? What are the expected benefits 
of the CDSS? How do we know when we have achieved these benefits?
Does the CDSS work as intended? Does it improve work processes? Is it 
accepted by users? Is it being used as intended? Does it increase their job 
satisfaction?
What is the cost of developing or buying the CDSS? Is it worth developing 
or buying the CDSS? How does it compare with current system?
What are the actual and potential pitfalls of the CDSS? How much is it 
integrated into clinical workflow?
What are the CDSS's organisational and social consequences? How well 
does it f it the organisation and clinical contexts where it is introduced? 
What is the impact of the CDSS? Are the benefits sustainable?
Table 9.1 Key evaluation questions that could guide which CDSS evaluation methods to use
The key evaluation questions that are noted in Table 9.1 and possible evaluation methods 
to help to answer them are now discussed in turn. Questions relating to the problems which 
the CDSS is intended to solve relate primarily to the assessment of the users' needs. This 
requires CDSS developers to engage with the intended CDSS users to gain a full 
understanding of their work processes and the context where the CDSS will be used. 
Indeed, the needs assessment can inform decision-makers whether the CDSS is required at 
all. These needs assessment can also guide decision-makers whether they develop the 
CDSS internally, buy off the shelf or commission external developers to develop a bespoke 
system. Qualitative methods such as interviews, documentary analysis and observations 
may be used at this stage to gain an in-depth understanding of the users' requirements. 
Documentary analysis may include a review of related literature, clinical pathways and 
related guidelines. It may also be necessary to write paper based algorithms which take 
into account all aspects of the clinical guidelines that support the CDSS. These algorithms
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can then be translated into software algorithms which will form the basis of the CDSS. Cost- 
benefit analyses will also need to be undertaken to establish whether it is worthwhile to 
replace the existing systems. The key evaluation audiences at this stage include the 
developers, intended users and those who are responsible for funding the CDSS. The next 
stage involves the design and development of the CDSS. This phase may be guided by 
clinical guidelines and pathways to ensure that the software algorithms adhere to the 
expected standards of care. It may also be necessary to adhere to the requirements of 
regulators such as the MHRA and product certification agencies. For CDSSs to be registered 
with the MHRA and to attain CE certification, they have to undergo clinical trials to ensure 
patient safety and to show that they function as intended by the developers. The key 
audiences for the evaluations at this stage include the regulatory authorities, certification 
agencies, CDSS funders and the developers. It will be necessary to carry out CDSS usability 
tests with real clinical users to test whether its key functions and ensure that it is usable 
within the intended environment. These evaluations are essential for both the developers 
and users. Where necessary, changes should be implemented before progressing further. 
Additional evaluations may also be carried out in artificial or simulated environments to 
test various clinical scenarios using contrived and real patient data. These tests are 
important, especially where the CDSS is based on guidelines, with direct effects on clinical 
decision making and therapeutic effects for patients. These tests enable developers to test 
the CDSS's adherence to the key aspects of guidelines and clinical practice. The key 
evaluation audiences at this stage include the CDSS developers, users, funders and the 
wider healthcare and research community.
Field tests of the CDSSs in the clinical environments where they are intended to be used
are essential. Evaluations may be carried out at the pilot implementation stage to establish
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whether the CDSS functions as intended and that it fits into the clinical workflow. Some 
CDSSs may require testing with different groups of professionals such as nurses, physicians 
and administrators to see whether they function as intended, help to carry out tasks and 
whether users accept and use them. Most CDSSs bring about changes which result in 
significant service redesign and require changes to users' behaviour. The literature review 
and the case studies showed that such CDSSs were likely to meet resistance from intended 
users. Evaluations at this stage may help to understand the patterns of CDSS usage and 
users' attitudes towards the CDSSs. Users may also contribute to the CDSS's evaluation, 
thus informing further understanding and additional developments where necessary. User 
training also needs to be evaluated to assess its effectiveness and sufficiency and to ensure 
that the CDSS is fully understood and used as intended. Where CDSS are based on existing 
clinical guidelines and pathways, it is essential to highlight these linkages and show how 
the CDSS can help users to continue or improve their adherence to these guidelines. This 
may also help to improve "buy in" from users if these benefits are highlighted. The key 
customers of these evaluations include CDSS developers, users, funders and potential 
purchasers. These evaluations can also be shared with the wider research community for 
peer reviews and further contributions.
Evaluations during the implementation stage help to assess the effects of the CDSS on the
intended processes and users' behaviour. Evaluators should look at both the positive and
negative effects of the CDSSs rather than just focusing on the intended outcomes. The key
aspects of implementation evaluations include the CDSSs' effects on clinical workflow,
quality of care, users' job satisfaction and whether it is being used as intended. Indeed,
some CDSSs may produce high quality information but may be difficult to use, time
consuming and poorly integrated with existing systems and clinical workflow. Evaluators
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should assess structural and sociotechnical aspects to help to gain an understanding of why 
CDSS may or may not be accepted and used. User satisfaction also has an impact on the 
outcome quality such as patient care if they are not used as intended. Where CDSSs are 
implemented across a hospital, there may be different effects in different departments, 
which may also reflect the different attitudes and usage patterns. Evaluators should treat 
these departments as different entities rather than treating all clinical areas as a single 
context. The key customers of evaluations at this stage include the CDSS developers, users, 
funders, potential purchasers and the wider research community. There may also be 
regulatory requirements to report the technical and clinical evaluations to regulatory 
authorities.
Finally, it is essential to carry out impact evaluations on different aspects of the CDSS. This 
may be a series of evaluations or a summative study looking at the effects of the CDSSs in 
relation to the original problems which it was intended to solve. There may also be 
unintended consequences of the CDSSs and the evaluations themselves that may affect 
how the CDSS is perceived or used. For example, some evaluations may reveal negative 
aspects of the users, their attitudes or performance. If not handled correctly, this may 
result in a backlash or poor buy in. Similarly, there may be lack of acceptance and 
unintended uses especially where CDSSs' usage is compulsory. Summative evaluations help 
to establish all the operational benefits and pitfalls overtim e and how improvements can 
be implemented. Additionally, the actual CDSS costs in terms of the total investment and 
operational aspects can also be established. The organisation may thus be able to calculate 
its return on investment throughout the CDSSs' lifecycle.
This section has shown that there is scope for various methods of evaluations that can be
used at different stages of a CDSSs' lifecycle. The evaluation methods should be determined
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on the basis of the stages of the CDSS's lifecycle and the questions which need to be 
answered. These evaluations can be at CDSS level, professionals, organisational or 
sociotechnical levels. There is wide scope to use positivist, interpretivist and critical 
approaches to broaden the scope of evaluations and gain a better understanding of their 
effects. There is also need to involve members of the healthcare multi-disciplinary teams 
to gain expertise from various evaluation traditions. Such collaborations can involve 
academic researchers and the wider research community to reduce the research-practice 
gap. Figure 9.4 summarises this section and shows the focus of evaluations at the pre­
implementation, implementation and post implementation stages of the CDSS lifecycle. It 




9.2.4 Benefits of CDSS evaluations
M any interview participants, including the project leaders, perceived that the primary 
benefits of the CDSS evaluations were to  secure the financial stability and reputation of the  
study Trust. These evaluations provided a means to  show compliance with national 
guidelines, and in return gain funding from commissioners for the CDSS projects and secure 
operational income for the study Trust. There was also a desire by the decision makers to  
change and standardise clinical processes using the CDSSs because they were based on 
NICE guidelines. This resulted in assumptions by the CDSS project leaders that introduction 
of the CDSSs would automatically result in improvements in clinical processes and patient 
outcomes. However, these assumptions were not tested and the  w ider organisational 
implications of each CDSS were not evaluated. There was also an assumption that any 
improvements that were observed following CDSS im plem entation were a result of the  
CDSS, although in most cases, there was no evidence gathered to show causal links 
between the CDSSs and the reported operational, financial and clinical outcomes. Indeed, 
none of the evaluations explored the links between the CDSSs and patient outcomes: It 
could be argued that given the number of simultaneous im provem ent initiatives that had 
been implemented at the same tim e, it was difficult to clearly establish the links and to  
separate the effects of other contributory variables.
T1 evaluations were reported to  have helped to secure funding to develop the  
Haematology Departm ent. The funding was used to create a new role for a Specialist VTE 
Lead Nurse (VTELeadNurse) and a new position for a Consultant Haematologist. However, 
other comparable NHS Trusts were reported to  have invested in larger multi-disciplinary 
VTE management teams and created new roles for nurses to carry out the Root Cause
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Analyses for hospital acquired VTE. T1 project leaders argued that similar investments in 
the study Trust could have improved their capability to carry out more evaluations and also 
enabled them  to follow up any issues that w ere raised by the current evaluations. Although 
patient outcomes were not directly evaluated, the VTE project team  reported th at T1 had 
improved VTE awareness and clinical decision-making across the study Trust. They also 
noted that a significant reduction of variations in clinical practice had been observed 
through improved guideline adherence and easy accessibility of data. As a result, the VTE 
project team  and line managers were able to  monitor performance and the validity of VTE 
risk assessments that had been carried out. The improved accessibility of VTE data helped 
the audit and reporting processes as well as the Root Cause Analysis for VTE processes. 
These benefits were expected to improve the awareness and quality o f VTE risk 
assessments and ultimately reduce the overall incidence of hospital acquired VTE. Although 
no formal evaluations were commissioned for T2 by the study Trust, T2LeadConsultant 
noted various expected benefits. To start w ith, T2 provided a single database to manage all 
patients w ith stable prostate cancer (from different consultants), which was reported to  
bring operational, financial and clinical benefits. Although these benefits had not been 
evaluated, T2LeadConsultant believed that there would ultim ately be improvements in 
patient outcomes in the long term . There w ere also expected future uses of the patient 
database to identify patients who were suitable for clinical research projects, which would  
be beneficial for both the study Trust and the patients themselves. Furthermore, the CDSS 
project leaders expected that changes in clinical practice and guideline requirements would 
also be easily implementable by revising the software algorithms that underpinned T2. 
Other expected benefits that were reported to  have been achieved by the T2 developing 
Trust, such as financial savings, upskilling inexperienced staff and integration o f T2 w ith
existing legacy systems were not evaluated at the study Trust. Similarly for T3, it was not 
clear to w hat extent the study Trust had achieved the clinical, operational and financial 
benefits that had been reported by the T3 developing Trust. The lack of evaluation 
documentation from the tw o benefits realisation studies that had reportedly been carried 
out for T3 made it impossible to  assess w hether the reported benefits had been achieved 
and to  w hat extent. T3 was also reported to have brought improvements to  operational 
processes around tracking and triggering potentially deteriorating patients in comparison 
with the paper-based clinical observation charts. Additionally, it was reported to have 
enabled the upskilling of less experienced nurses to  support their clinical decision-making. 
The easy accessibility of patient data made it easier to  monitor ward areas remotely, 
identify failing areas and target interventions aimed at improving performance and 
ultim ately patient outcomes through the Critical Care Outreach Team . However, these 
benefits had not been formally evaluated. Also, some of the reported improvements in 
patient outcomes were based on w ider service evaluations which did not directly assess 
the effects of T3 on the reported outcomes. Other aspects that w ere not formally evaluated 
include the usage and acceptance; unintended usage; anticipated, unanticipated, 
undesirable and unwanted problems.
This section has looked at the range of benefits of CDSS evaluations that were reported in
the three cases. These benefits were mainly in the form of financial incentives and adhering
to the national guidelines. Some benefits were departm ent specific rather than Trust-wide,
while others related to  the easy availability of performance information for line managers
and clinical leaders. The majority of the benefits of evaluations w ere based on assumptions
that were not backed by evidence. Also, there was no causal link between the reported
benefits and patient outcomes. Figure 9.5 summarises the main benefits o f CDSS
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evaluations in the order of their priority to the evaluators of the three CDSSs. It also shows 
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9.2.5 Barriers to CDSS evaluations






These barriers w ere evident in varying degrees for all three cases. The main barrier that 
was reported by the key stakeholders was the lack of funding for CDSS evaluations. 
However, even where funding was made available, there were also limitations in the  
purposes, scope and methods of evaluation. A key contributory factor was th at while the 
national guidelines encouraged the adoption of CDSSs, they did not provide any 
recommendations for their evaluation. T1 project leaders highlighted barriers to  effective  
evaluations, which they argued were caused by failure of government (through its arms7 
length bodies) to insist on more robust reporting of VTE audit results by NHS Trusts. They 
fe lt that the study Trust's VTE data collection and reporting methods w ere more robust 
than some of the NHS Trusts that were ranked higher that the study Trust on national 
league tables. They also fe lt that the relative view of evaluations by the Departm ent of 
Health accepted individual Trusts7 self-reporting on face value while inadvertently  
penalising the study Trust and others whose evaluations w ere "more robust77. Another 
organisational barrier to  evaluations was the compulsory nature of all three CDSSs, which 
led to  resistance and unintended uses. Although on face value it appeared th at the three  
CDSSs were being used as intended, the VTE Link Nurse-led audit revealed th at users w ere
mainly doing just enough to  be seen to be using T1 and did not value it as a CDSS or the  
evaluations which were being carried out. It would appear that some CDSS users may have 
modified their behaviours to  appear as if they were using the CDSSs as intended because 
they were aware that they were being monitored. This is commonly referred to  as the  
Hawthorne effect. None of the CDSSs w ere geared to identify when users had done just 
enough to  "cover their backs" or enough to  "just tick the box". The changes in the structure 
of NHS organisations and shifts in the focus of evaluation customers also affected all three  
CDSSs. This was particularly so for T2 because it was commissioned by the now defunct 
Primary Care Trust, which evolved into three Clinical Commissioning Groups in the city 
where the study Trust was based. This led to  the phenomenon of the "disappearing 
advocate", whereby the key decision makers and customers of evaluations, who had 
commissioned T2, moved to new departments or to  other organisations and thus the key 
evaluation audience was lost. Unlike T1 and T3, there was thus no pressure for the T2 
project team  or the study Trust to commission any evaluations once it was adopted.
The main human barrier was that some of the key stakeholders did not see the need to
evaluate the CDSSs at all. For example, T2LeadConsultant and T3LeadConsultant were
satisfied with the evaluations that had been carried out in the Trusts that developed the
CDSSs. Their justification for not carrying out any further evaluations was th at they were
satisfied with how their peers had carried out the evaluations and also that there was no
need to  repeat these evaluations. Furthermore, T2 and T3's registration w ith the MHRA
and CE marking provided additional evidence of their technical and clinical efficacy.
However, although these registrations provided some reassurance regarding the CDSSs
efficacy and safety, they did not provide any information about their socio-technical
aspects and fit into the study Trust context. Indeed, T2 was registered with the MHRA as a
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CDSS that would be used in community settings by less experienced Band 5 nurses rather 
than in acute hospital settings by very experienced Band 7 and 8 Uro-oncology Specialist 
Nurses as was the case with the study Trust. It was unlikely that the study Trust achieved 
the financial benefits that had been achieved by the developing Trust because the Uro- 
oncology Specialist Nurses cost a lot more than Band 5 nurses. Furthermore, these 
experienced nurses may not have required the same level of decision support as that 
required by less experienced Band 5 nurses. However, it could also be argued that any 
CDSS, especially those that are based on NICE guidelines or local clinical pathways should 
be fool-proof, regardless of how experienced the targeted users are. Although T3 project 
leaders reported that they were satisfied with the evaluations carried out by the  
developing Trust, they found T3 "completely unusable" on pilot im plem entation because 
it was not compatible with the existing legacy systems at the study Trust. This raises 
concerns regarding the robustness of prior evaluations and the information that was used 
to  support its adoption in the study Trust. It also supports the argument that evaluation 
contexts are different between NHS Trusts and systematic local evaluations should be 
carried out to assess CDSS suitability before implementation.
For some senior clinicians and clinical line managers, the introduction of these CDSSs had
resolved many existing problems. Some argued that they had grappled w ith non-
compliance w ith NICE guidelines and local clinical pathways for many years and the
solutions that had been provided by these CDSSs were "clear for all to  see", therefore no
need for evaluations. However, these solutions mainly related to  the fact that line
managers and senior clinicians could now m onitor users7 performance through the
monitoring features of the CDSSs and could also ensure adherence with guidelines because
of the compulsory nature of the CDSSs. The key stakeholders7 perceptions of the CDSS
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evaluations were another barrier to evaluations. For example, TILeadConsultant revealed 
that he had considered carrying out a before and after study following T l's  
im plem entation, looking at VTE audits and rates of hospital acquired VTE pre and post T1 
im plem entation. However, this project was abandoned in part because of lack of funding  
but also because tw o other NHS Trusts, which were amongst the leaders in the VTE 
Exemplar Network, had published their data and TILeadConsultant fe lt that the study Trust 
could not add "anything new to the discourse". Similarly, T2LeadConsultant and 
T3LeadConsultant took the evaluations that had been carried out at the developing Trusts 
at face value and expected to  gain similar benefits as had been reported by their peers at 
the developing Trusts. The views of the Lead Consultants and other key stakeholders 
revealed a general consensus that NHS Trusts are generally similar and w hat works in one 
Trust is bound to work in other Trusts because they are structured in similar ways and 
follow the same guidelines.
This section has looked at a range of technical, methodological, organisational and human 
barriers to  CDSS evaluations. The evaluators had limited experience, expertise and 
methods to carry out the necessary evaluations. The attitudes of the evaluators and other 
key stakeholders towards evaluations limited the range of and extent of evaluations that 
were carried out. A key contributory factor was that the three CDSSs w ere treated as 
panaceas to  existing problems in the study Trust and untested assumptions w ere made 
about their benefits. There were no clear customers of the evaluations, which resulted in 
minimal scrutiny of both internal and external evaluations. External evaluations were taken  
at "face value", and their validity and fit with the study Trust w ere not assessed. Table 9.2  
highlights some of the main barriers to CDSS evaluations that were noted in the case
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The majority of the barriers to  CDSS evaluations noted in Table 9.2 primarily related to  the  
attitudes of the key stakeholders, most whom did not see the need to  evaluate the CDSSs. 
There appeared to  be an inherent resistance to carrying out any evaluations on the basis 
that the CDSS benefits were clear. To these stakeholders, undertaking evaluations was a 
waste of limited resources, which they felt could be better used elsewhere. Also, the  
existing professional and organisational hierarchies limited the level of scrutiny that the  
CDSS evaluations were subjected to. Most of the evaluators were senior physicians, who 
w ere also departm ental leaders responsible for the clinical conditions that were supported 
by the CDSSs. It also appeared that the compulsory nature of the CDSSs and the  
involvement of key opinion leaders in their evaluations may have influenced the findings 
of these evaluations. For example, some clinical departments were reported to  have 
complied with the CDSSs when it became apparent to them  that they would be penalised 
operationally and financially if they did not comply. They were also reported to  be reluctant 
to  criticise or highlight the shortcomings of the CDSS evaluations because they worked  
closely with the evaluators and did not w ant to be seen to be criticising them  or publicising 
the weaknesses of the CDSS projects and the evaluations. As such, the existing power 
dynamics were a key barrier in themselves. It was not clear w hether the evaluators w ere  
aware of these power dynamics and their potential contribution to  the general lack of 
scrutiny of evaluations.
The lack of openness around some of the key evaluations may be seen as a deliberate effort
to keep evaluations away from some of the stakeholders. This could be viewed as
inappropriate use of power to suppress any criticism and push through CDSS projects and
publish only the evaluations or aspects of evaluations which produced the answers that
suited the evaluators and decision makers. The reticence around evaluations may also be
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viewed as showing the organisation or evaluators' reluctance to publicise any evaluations 
that showed negative outcomes and may result in unnecessary scrutiny and criticism or 
even litigation. Such concerns could be addressed by using robust methods to evaluate  
CDSSs at every stage of their lifecycle and disseminating results to all key stakeholders. 
W here failures are identified, the organisation and evaluators should highlight and address 
them , showing what lessons were learnt to ensure th at future CDSS developers and 
evaluators do not repeat the same mistakes. However, there was a limited range of 
evaluation methods that were used, which in turn limited the evaluation portfolios of the  
CDSSs. It could be argued that the evaluators did not see the need to  expand the range of 
methods because the purposes of their evaluations were limited to the im m ediate issues 
at hand, i.e., collecting enough information to report to their compliance w ith guidelines 
to regulatory authorities. However, there does appear to be a limited range of evaluation  
methods and guidelines within NHS settings. Furthermore, there was lack of awareness of 
the w ider implications of the CDSSs on organisational and social issues. This may be 
because these issues were not considered as priorities in comparison w ith  ensuring the  
technical and clinical efficacy of these CDSSs and ensuring that they adhered to clinical 
guidelines. Also, there was lack of interdisciplinary collaboration which could have helped 
to engage with and involve others stakeholders from different traditions within the study 
Trust and also those from partner organisations such as the affiliated local universities. The 
lack of evaluation documentation and poor dissemination of CDSS evaluations may have 
denied some of the key stakeholders within and outside the study Trust opportunities to  
appraise these evaluations and use them  to  make more informed decisions within their 
own settings. In particular, other NHS Trusts who may be looking to  adopt or evaluate
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similar technologies would stand to benefit from these evaluations if they were made 
available.
9.3 Research findings that support the CDSS evaluation 
framework
In line with the literature review findings, there was consensus amongst the key 
stakeholders that the three CDSSs had the potential to facilitate clinical and operational 
improvements in the study Trust. The three CDSSs themselves w ere fairly novel; T1 being 
the first such system to be developed and implemented in an NHS hospital; T2 being the  
first such system to be made commercially available in the UK and T3 being the first system 
to  be implemented across an NHS hospital. The findings that support the CDSS evaluation  
fram ework (see Figure 9.1) are now discussed in turn.
9.3.1 Organisational, contextual and social issues that support the literature 
review model
The context of evaluation has been identified as essential to fully understand CDSSs and
their effects. However the literature review revealed that most CDSS evaluation studies
often ignore the context of evaluation and thus fail to  fully comprehend the complex
interplay between CDSS and the different actors and the organisational settings into which
they are introduced. Mum ford (1983) argued that despite the technical nature of
computerised information systems, developers of these systems should consider human
factors and aim to enhance users' job satisfaction before introducing computerised
systems. Mum ford argued that it was critical to  assess how computerised systems would
affect users in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Kaplan and Harris-Salomone (Kaplan
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and Harris-Salamone, 2009a) also noted the challenges relating to the technical issues 
brought by health information technologies (including CDSSs), particularly problems 
around their functionality and interoperability with legacy systems and integration with  
clinical workflow. They argued that most problems w ere related to sociological, cultural 
and financial issues and thus more managerial rather than technical (Kaplan and Harris- 
Salamone, 2009a).
The desired outcomes were reported to have been achieved for all three CDSSs despite the
main focus of the primary evaluations having been on their technical aspects. The
complexity of the new CDSSs and interrelationships w ith organisational and social issues
introduced new sociotechnical aspects that were difficult to  evaluate. For all three CDSSs,
there was a tendency by evaluators to  look at the w ider service provision in relation to
guidelines and clinical pathways, while ignoring organisational and individual user needs.
By primarily focusing on evaluations that looked at technical efficacy, the evaluators failed
to pay attention to the users' needs, which inevitably resulted in poor 'buy in' and
unintended uses of the CDSSs. It was unclear w hether these shortcomings were due to  the
inadequacies of the evaluation methods, the narrow purposes of evaluations or both. It is
likely that the purposes and motivations for evaluation certainly limited the range and
boundaries of evaluation methods that were used. A modified version of Kaplan and
Norton's (1995) balanced scorecard has been suggested as an alternative to  cover the
w ider perspectives of evaluations at technological, economic, organisational and individual
levels for information system projects (Land, 2000; Martinsons et al., 1999). A t the CDSS
level, the balanced scorecard would cover the customer, financial, internal efficiency,
learning and growth opportunities and employees' perspectives. Similarly, the Health
Technology Assessment (HTA) method could have helped to provide d ifferent decision­
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makers with information from various angles such as the benefits, risks and costs of an 
intervention. However, it could be argued that the peer reviews and audits provided 
adequate information to the project leaders and key stakeholders and thus there was no 
motivation to  look at the w ider effects of the CDSSs.
Walsham (2006) noted that the increasingly pervasive and complex nature of information  
systems and their use as tools for organisational change entail new demands from  
evaluation activities. This was evident in the study Trust's shifting organisational priorities, 
which in turn led the shifts in the focus of the CDSS evaluations. The changes in the  
organisational priorities and subsequent changes in the range and boundaries of 
evaluations were primarily directed by changes in national priorities at the tim e. In 
response to these changes, the evaluators adapted the existing evaluations to  suit the new  
regulatory reporting requirements regardless of w hether there was any correlation to the  
CDSS and w ithout due consideration for their effects on practice and patient outcomes. For 
example, the CQUIN VTE fram ework required all NHS Trusts to change the baseline for the  
achievem ent of minimum VTE risk assessments from 90% to 95%. The study Trust (and 
other NHS Trusts) responded by excluding certain patient cohorts on the basis th a t they  
w ere at low risk of developing a hospital acquired VTE and thus did not require a risk 
assessment. The study Trust immediately achieved the minimum requirem ent of 95% VTE 
risk assessment compliance and continued to  secure the related CQUIN operational 
funding. For an outsider, it would appear that corresponding changes had been 
im plem ented to  achieve these improvements. However, there had been no change at all 
in clinical practice and also no corresponding improvements in patient outcomes. Similarly, 
w ider evaluations such as the Critical Care Outreach Team's service evaluation, Dr Foster 
and IQNARC audits all attributed substantial improvements to T3 w ithout any evidence of
correlation or regard for simultaneous improvement initiatives that had been implem ented  
in the study Trust. It would appear that the evaluators were under constant pressure to  
keep up with internal and external reporting requirements and in response, they focused 
on carrying out only the evaluations that would adequately provide the necessary answers 
and would also be considered meaningful by the decision-makers and funders, who were  
the key customers of the evaluations. The top-down approach to evaluations filtered from  
the regulatory authorities to  the Trust executives, who in turn passed the responsibility to  
clinical leaders and their respective project teams. Little consideration appears to  have 
been taken of the effect of these pressures on other stakeholders, especially the users of 
the CDSSs. It would appear that the lower the stakeholders were in the decision-making 
ladder, the lower the ownership w ith respect to  CDSS evaluations. Also, the lower the  
evaluators were in the decision-making hierarchy, the lower the impact o f their evaluations 
on decision-making. For example, the VTE Link Nurse-led audit of the study Trust's 
adherence with the NICE VTE Quality Standards found huge disparities between the  
reported and actual compliance. It would appear that the method that was being used to  
collect the monthly VTE CQUIN audit data primarily focused on the quantity rather than  
quality and validity of risk assessments. Despite these findings, there w ere no changes in 
the way monthly VTE risk assessment data were collected and the study Trust continued to  
report that they were achieving over 95% valid VTE risk assessments. It could be argued 
that this evaluation failed to  make an impact on decision-making because it was not 
commissioned by the key decision-makers or that its findings were in contrast w ith the  
study Trust's priorities at the tim e. It was also clear that VTELeadNurse and the VTE Link 
Nurse Network lacked capacity and authority to  effectively im plem ent changes in response 
to  findings from evaluations.
M ost clinical leaders and senior managers generally agreed that the CDSSs and 
computerised information systems in general had brought radical changes that had 
impacted positively on clinical processes and patient outcomes. There were positive 
perceptions about how these technologies had enabled the modernisation of the clinical 
services which they supported and provided support for the clinical teams to cope with the 
increasing demand for healthcare services. Senior managers and clinicians expected long 
term  benefits such as improved patient safety and care, increased efficiencies, more 
effective and appropriately delivered healthcare in line with the recommendations by the 
Institute of Medicine report (Kohn et al., 2000b) and subsequent patient safety studies 
(Leape and Berwick, 2005; Stelfox et al., 2006). However, some nurse leaders expressed 
concern about the potential deskilling of nurses, the negative effects of overreliance on 
CDSSs and over-allocation of limited funding to these technologies at the expense of 
adequate training and ensuring that the skill mix on the wards was maintained. Other key 
stakeholders fe lt that all the CDSSs were inappropriately specified and unsuitable for some 
clinical areas. Even a small scale system like T2 was deemed to be unsuitable by some of 
the users. T3 lacked acceptance and trust by users in part because of poor specifications 
during the first few  years of implementation which resulted in disruptions in clinical 
workflow, job dissatisfaction and potential harms to  patients. Similarly T1 was viewed as 
an unnecessary and bureaucratic process which did not benefit patients or the users. 
Indeed, all three CDSSs were not fully integrated with existing legacy systems despite the  
original design expectations. However, none of the evaluations were geared to pick up the  
concerns of these stakeholders and any concerns raised were generally considered by the  
project leaders to be part of the expected resistance to any new innovations. Berg et al. 
(1999) noted the sociotechnical sense of computerised health information technologies,
whereby success of any system is measured on the basis of technological artefacts and the  
actors who use the technology to  make up the Information System. It would appear that 
none of the evaluations formally assessed the human-CDSS interaction and thus missed 
opportunities to  understand the w ider effects of the CDSSs beyond the technical aspects 
and stated objectives.
9.3.2 Purposes of evaluations that support the literature review framework
The literature review showed that CDSS evaluation purposes varied considerably. The main 
purposes of CDSS evaluations identified in the literature review include technical and 
clinical efficacy; user performance and accuracy of clinical decision making; satisfying 
regulatory authorities; assessing cost effectiveness and justification of IT investment to key 
stakeholders. It has been argued that the purposes of CDSS evaluations should include a 
range of technical, clinical, organisational, human and social issues (Kaplan, 2001a; Kaplan, 
2001b).
The main purposes of the CDSS evaluations in the three cases w ere to  gather information  
that would satisfy regulatory reporting requirements for the clinical conditions and services 
that were supported by the CDSSs. O ther evaluations w ere also carried out to  assess the  
technical and clinical effectiveness as well as to monitor the performance o f the users. The 
evaluators were primarily concerned with the CDSSs' im m ediate usability needs, especially 
proving that the CDSSs worked as intended, were compliant w ith guideline 
recommendations, produced reliable information and recommendations and ensured the  
security of patient data. The senior clinicians were keen to ensure th at the software 
algorithms correctly translated the underlying clinical guidelines, which was assessed 
through verification and validation of the CDSSs and their underlying algorithms. These
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evaluations are essential at the developmental and early im plem entation stages to show 
technical and clinical efficacy. However, as shown in the case studies, proving technical and 
clinical efficacy does not necessarily result in the CDSSs being used as intended. These 
evaluations were in line with the literature review findings (Kaplan, 2001b; Kaplan and 
M axwell, 2005; Garg et al., 2005b; Bright et al., 2012). The majority of the evaluations did 
not consider the complexities of introducing the CDSSs into the study Trust, especially the  
effects of the attitudes of the key stakeholders and the human-CDSS interaction. The 
attitudes of the evaluators about CDSS evaluations also affected the evaluations that were  
carried out, although most of the evaluators considered their evaluations to  be "objective" 
and based on the positivist tradition. All three CDSSs were evaluated by the same people 
who had developed them , which brought questions around their objectivity. Also, these 
evaluators were senior clinicians who had reporting responsibilities to the study Trust 
Board and regulatory authorities. These CDSSs had been commissioned w ith set objectives 
to generate information that would be sufficient to  report to  the regulators and 
commissioners. As such, their evaluation focus was driven by the need to  achieve the  
im m ediate intended goals rather than assessing the w ider effects of the CDSSs.
9.3.3 Approaches and methods for CDSS evaluations that support the 
literature review model
The literature review showed that CDSS evaluation approaches were broadly classified 
under positivist, interpretivist and critical assumptions (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2010b). 
Also, most CDSS evaluation studies are positivist, and primarily use the RCT m ethod as the  
"gold standard" on the basis that it is bias free and cause and effect can be objectively and 
precisely measured (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2010b; Friedman and W yatt, 2006; Kaplan,
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2001a). However, the majority of systematic reviews found that RCT-based CDSS 
evaluation studies were widely heterogeneous and challenging to compare and generalise 
(Garg et al., 2005b; Randell et al., 2007; Bright et al., 2012). Consequently, most systematic 
reviews resorted to  narrative synthesis rather than pooling results or meta-analysis, which 
often resulted in inconclusive results and cautions recommendations for practice (Kaplan, 
2001b). Interpretivist methods have also been used to  evaluate CDSSs (Greenhalgh et al., 
2009). These methods object to the contention that reality is objective and can be precisely 
measured. Instead, they look at reality as a social construction which is enriched by the  
researcher's identity and values throughout the research process. Critical approaches seek 
to gain an understanding of the power relations within organisations that are manifested  
through the interests of the different stakeholders (Klecun and Cornford, 2005). This 
understanding is achieved through systematic questioning of the status quo. Although 
interpretivist and critical approaches to CDSS evaluations are gaining popularity, they are 
still not widely used in comparison with positivist approaches.
The literature review highlighted that quantitative methods did not explain context-specific
issues regarding fit of CDSS, w hether CDSSs are used or not and their acceptance among
other key attributes. Although RCTs are generally reported to  be the "gold standard" for
CDSS evaluations and their popularity in clinical environments, none of the three CDSSs
were evaluated using RCTs at any stage of their lifecycle. Indeed, none o f the project
leaders even considered using RCTs. This may be because they are expensive to  set up and
challenging to  manage, and the expertise and other resources were not available. M ore
precisely for the three CDSSs, the project leaders and other key stakeholders had resolved
that the CDSSs would be implemented anyway regardless of w hether or not the evaluations
had been carried out using the "gold standard". Instead, the m ajority of the evaluations
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were based on peer reviews and simple before and after audits which w ere fraught with 
limitations and confounding factors that could have been controlled using RCTs or similar 
methods. The literature review also showed that most CDSS evaluations primarily carried 
out summative evaluations, particularly those th a t related to  the  
im plem entation/installation of the CDSS projects. However, this was not the case for the  
three CDSSs. There were no longitudinal evaluations over tim e apart from the second 
benefits realisation study for T3. For all three CDSSs, the m ajority of evaluations were  
form ative and focused on single issues during developm ent and early implem entation  
stages. For all three CDSSs, there was minimal effort to engage with the key stakeholders 
(especially users) to understand their information needs. Indeed, none of the evaluations 
adopted user satisfaction as an evaluative measure at any phase of the CDSSs' lifecycle.
There was also little evidence of organisational readiness to effectively assess the CDSSs
both in terms of organisational capacity to  carry out the evaluations and the expertise to
carry them  out effectively. Formal assessments of the existing resources, in the form  of
legacy systems infrastructure and human resources to  carry out the evaluations before the
CDSSs' implem entation would have revealed the gaps in evaluation expertise. It would have
been likely that had this been raised as an issue at this early stage, the Trust Board and
Commissioners would have been more prepared to  allocate adequate funding for
evaluations, even if it m eant externally sourcing the required expertise because they were
keen for the CDSS projects to be successfully implemented. Despite the availability of
previous audits of the "old" paper-based systems and legacy systems, none o f the CDSS
evaluations used them  as comparators to  formally evaluate the effects o f the CDSSs.
Previous evaluations would have helped to inform current evaluations as well as providing
a baseline to  measure the effects of the CDSSs, while also separating some of the
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confounding factors. However, this may have been made challenging by the lack of 
interaction between the CDSSs and existing legacy systems and in some cases, continued 
use of non-computerised systems in parallel with the CDSSs. There was also no effort to  
assess the fit of evaluation methods to  the respective CDSSs and the study Trust. Even 
where explicit blind spots were noted in the evaluation methods, it would appear that there  
were no efforts to  address them  as long as the limitations did not affect the ultim ate goals 
of collecting the audit data for reporting to regulatory authorities. Also the failure to  
undertake any formal summative evaluations was a lost opportunity to assess the w ider 
effects of the CDSSs at every stage of their adoption lifecycle. This was in contrast to  the  
literature review, which suggested that most CDSS evaluations were summative rather 
than form ative. There was also lack of scrutiny of external evaluations even w here they  
were critical to  inform adopting decisions and large scale im plem entation. In the case of 
T3, this led to  a CDSS that was "unsuitable" for the study Trust being adopted and resulting 
in additional costs and major delays in large-scale im plem entation. Although the study 
Trust reported that the expected benefits (as reported by the  developers) had been 
achieved, there was lack of evidence to support these claims and these evaluations had not 
been published or disseminated to most of the key stakeholders. This may be because there  
was inadequate evidence to  support these claims or that the evaluators did not wish to  
share this information with the other stakeholders. There was therefore lack of inform ation  
about the w ider effects of the CDSSs on the reported outcomes and the w ider organisation. 
These findings concurred with the literature review findings, which showed that CDSS 
evaluations may sometimes be used to pursue the interests of the evaluators and key 
decision makers (Rigby, 2001; Friedman and W yatt, 2006). For the three case studies, these
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interests primarily related to adopting evaluation methods that w ere likely to  assess the  
CDSSs' adherence with NICE guidelines and report such findings accordingly.
9.3.4 Benefits of evaluations that support the literature review model
The literature review found ethical, economic, professional and organisational benefits of 
evaluating CDSSs (Rigby, 2001; Rigby et al., 2001; Friedman and W yatt, 2006; Liu and W yatt, 
2011a). Most studies have generally reported benefits of CDSSs for user and system 
performance, but few  studies have looked at patient outcomes, and even few er have 
reported improvements in patient outcomes (Jaspers et al., 2011b; Buntin et al., 2011; 
Black et al., 2011; Hunt et al., 1998; Lau et al., 2010). However, few  CDSSs evaluations 
looked at patient outcomes and even few er reported benefits for patients. The novelty of 
CDSSs has been reported to bring about additional risks for users and patients. Healthcare 
professionals and organisations therefore have a moral duty to evaluate them  effectively  
to  assess that they provide the intended benefits. Additionally, these benefits need to  be 
shared with all the key stakeholders, including the users and the w ider research 
community. Furthermore, CDSSs are expensive to develop and procure. It has been noted 
that evaluators and decision makers often carry out evaluations th a t retrospectively find 
benefits to justify investing in these projects.
The main benefits of CDSS evaluations were the ease of access to inform ation th at had 
previously been difficult to obtain using paper-based systems. Obtaining this information  
was im portant for the respective project leaders and clinical managers because they could 
now monitor CDSS users' clinical performance and im plem ent remedial changes w here  
indicated. It also became cheaper and quicker to use CDSSs to make retrospective analyses 
for processes such as the root cause analyses and routine audits. Evaluations such as the
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VTE CQUIN audits had a dual purpose of reporting the study Trust's performance to the 
commissioners and to identify departments that were non-compliant with the NICE 
guidelines. The T1 project team  worked with some of the departments that were failing to  
m eet the minimum standards and remedial action plans were put in place to make 
improvements. However, the downside was that the T1 project team  was under-resourced 
to  effectively address all the issues that were being brought up by these audits. For example 
the audit that was carried out by VTELeadNurse and the VTE link nurses revealed various 
shortcomings in all the clinical areas that were audited. However, the evaluators had very 
limited resources and could only follow up the cases where patient safety had been put at 
risk. Although there were clear benefits for carrying out these audits, it became a futile  
exercise because the evaluators did not have adequate resources to  develop and 
im plem ent remedial actions. Also the decision makers in the affected departm ents had 
other competing priorities at the tim e which required their attention and the necessary 
resource allocation.
9.3.5 Barriers to CDSS evaluations that support the literature review model
The literature review highlighted human, organisational, technological and methodological 
barriers to CDSS evaluations. Boland et al. (2014) noted that despite the proven benefits of 
evaluating all innovations (including CDSSs), there were significant barriers such as lack of 
a gold standard for evaluations and scarcity of knowledge regarding user needs prior to  
health information technology development. They also noted the existence of complex 
sociotechnical aspects relating to these systems and increasingly m ulti-stakeholder teams 
that could affect the achievement of intended outcomes of health information technology 
interventions.
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The CDSSs' effects on existing communication channels, clinical workflow  and interactions 
between stakeholders, potential effects of shifts in responsibility, and different value sets 
between different stakeholders were noted in the literature review as the key factors that 
were likely to  impact on the effectiveness of CDSS evaluations. However, these effects 
were not evaluated in all three cases. There was also lack of CDSS project integration with 
the existing work environments and the w ider effects of regulatory and other policy 
requirements. Such integration was reported by some of the project leaders to be 
technically challenging, especially because of the heterogeneity of the various clinical 
departments and disparate attitudes of the key stakeholders. Others argued that CDSS 
integration w ith existing legacy systems was not difficult to im plem ent but instead, it was 
hindered by the key stakeholders' concerns around the costs and information governance 
issues. There was also minimal evidence of alignment of the CDSSs with the study Trust's 
strategic and business goals, and their lack of integration with routine clinical practice and 
clinical workflow. Instead, there was evidence of CDSSs being viewed by users as top-down  
obstacles that had to be worked around, and not as part of routine clinical practice as 
intended by the CDSS adopters. It appeared that once the departm ental clinical leaders and 
their teams realised that the CDSSs were compulsory, they devised ways to  minimally 
adhere to them  w ithout compromising their diverse and often competing interests. Little 
attention appeared to have been paid to  the information needs and legitim ate interests of 
some of the stakeholders. Indeed, the project leaders acknowledged th at some clinical 
departments did not require the CDSSs but they had to  find ways of implem enting them  in 
these areas because census reporting was required for all departments. In such cases, it 
could be argued that the departmental leaders' concerns that the CDSSs were  
administrative tools for data collection and managem ent reporting rather systems to
improve clinical processes and patient outcomes were justified. It would appear that the  
CDSSs and their related evaluations were being used for legitimising the vested interests of 
some of the key stakeholders and as tools to sway decision-making in favour of continued 
funding for the CDSS projects. The lack of formal consultation w ith the key stakeholders 
prior to  adoption of the CDSSs, especially the users, is likely to  have caused th e  poor 'buy 
in' and lack of CDSS ownership. Although T1 project leaders made efforts to  engage with  
all the relevant departm ental leaders prior to its im plem entation, the opinions of these 
departments did not really m atter because the adoption decision had already been made 
and the consultation process was a mere form ality to agree term s on which T1 would be 
implemented. The compulsory nature of all the three CDSSs and the top down approach to  
their adoption alienated key stakeholders who inevitably viewed the CDSSs as part of 
"government diktat" and management control over their work, w ith little or no effect on 
clinical practice and patient outcomes. As noted in the literature (Boland et al., 2014; Berg, 
1999; Kaplan, 2001b), introducing CDSSs requires a good understanding of user needs and 
the complex social aspects and interrelationships across multi-disciplinary stakeholders. 
There was lack of consideration for these complexities in the evaluations that were carried 
out. Indeed, none of the formal evaluations even alluded to  the existence of these 
complexities, although the project leaders and other key stakeholders acknowledged them  
during interviews. CDSS users did not share the ultim ate vision of the project leaders 
regarding the CDSSs and felt that these systems had been imposed on them  w ithout regard 
to their effects on their clinical practice and workflow, user performance and patient 
outcomes. This was especially so for the specialised clinical departments, some of which 
already had more complex computerised health information systems and did not see the  
need for these CDSSs. It was therefore no surprise that the majority of CDSS users were
"just doing enough to tick the box and cover their backs" because they did not regard them  
as useful in their clinical areas. Instead of helping to  make clinical decisions and achieve the  
intended clinical outcomes, the CDSSs thus became administrative chores that had to  be 
worked around to cover oneself against potential penalisation or litigation.
The CDSSs' novelty and the widely held views that they were panaceas to  existing clinical, 
operational and financial problems made them  challenging to evaluate. Indeed, some key 
stakeholders did not even see the need to evaluate the CDSSs because they perceived that 
their introduction as replacements for the previous paper-based systems had led to  
"overwhelming" improvements. However, these improvements were primarily related to  
the availability of previously inaccessible audit information regarding user performance 
rather than the benefits of the CDSSs themselves. It would also appear that evaluation 
methods w ere selected for their ability to  generate information that would be reportable  
to  regulatory authorities and to  gain financial incentives from Commissioners. There did 
not appear to  be any effort to learn from previous CDSS evaluations within or outside the  
study Trust or to  consult w ider CDSS or computerised health information technology 
evaluation literature. Essentially the CDSSs were being assessed for their worth as 
m anagem ent information systems, change agents and reporting tools to senior 
m anagement and regulatory authorities rather than their effects on clinical practice, user 
performance or even patient outcomes. Systematic reviews by Garg et al. (2005b) and 
Kawamoto et al. (2005) showed that CDSSs that were introduced as change agents were  
unlikely to  be successful. Other barriers related to the CDSSs' novelty included the lack of 
previous CDSS evaluation experience for the evaluators and the complexity of carrying out 
CDSS evaluations. The evaluators were not well informed about how best to  evaluate CDSSs
and there was no effort to assess or improve organisational readiness for CDSS evaluations.
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Other human barriers to CDSS evaluations included the lack of scrutiny of peer evaluations. 
There appeared to be a tacit understanding amongst the key stakeholders that the CDSSs 
had been evaluated appropriately even where there was no evidence to support these 
assumptions. The majority of the evaluations had limited documentation and in some 
cases, there was no evaluation documentation at all. The interviews revealed that CDSS 
project leaders' personal and professional judgements significantly influenced and at times 
replaced formal evaluations. This was particularly so w ith regards to  the successes of the  
evaluations that had been carried out and the effectiveness of the CDSSs. However, w ithout 
any assessment of cause and effect, it was impossible to  make a distinction between the  
CDSSs' effects and those of other improvement programmes which had been implemented  
in the study Trust at the same tim e. Furthermore, all the primary evaluations had been 
carried out by the project leaders themselves, thus raising questions regarding their 
objectivity because they were involved with every aspect of the adoption/developm ent, 
implem entation and evaluation processes. There were no structures in place to carry out 
evaluations of the evaluations that had been carried out or question the validity of the  
reported outcomes. There was also no scrutiny of external evaluations that had been 
carried out by the peers of the three CDSS project leaders. It would appear th a t the opinions 
of the peer groups and leading figures within the physicians' collegiate groups had a 
significant effect on the range of evaluations that w ere carried out. For example, 
TILeadConsultant discontinued a planned evaluation looking at the impact of T1 
implementation because tw o leading NHS Trusts had published similar studies and he did 
not feel that the study Trust would "add anything new to the discourse". Furthermore, 
TILeadConsultant felt that the study Trust was likely to have achieved similar results to  the  
publishing Trusts. T2LeadConsultant and T3LeadConsultant accepted the evaluations that
had been carried out by their peers at the respective developing NHS Trusts because in 
part, they trusted their peers and they were likely to  carry out similar evaluations 
themselves. All three Lead Consultants and other key stakeholders also disagreed with  
some elements of the NICE guidelines and other Departm ent of Health initiatives relating 
to their respective clinical specialties (which informed the CDSSs) but did not form ally raise 
any concerns. There appeared to be a tendency to work with, rather than work against the  
recommendations from collegiate and regulatory authorities.
9.4 Key research findings
This research project sought to answer the following questions in the context of a typical 
NHS hospital:
1 W hat are the key factors that affect CDSS evaluations in a typical NHS hospital 
setting?
2 How do these factors relate to  the CDSS evaluation fram ew ork that was developed 
from  the CDSS literature review?
3 To w hat extent do evaluations affect decisions to adopt CDSSs in healthcare 
settings and which evaluation methods are most likely to  inform CDSS adoption 
decisions and why?
Table 9.3 shows a summary of the key findings from this research. Each of these findings 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This research project carried out assessments of CDSS evaluations in real NHS clinical 
settings and involved the key stakeholders who were involved in adoption of the 
technologies and their evaluations. The evaluators largely took a positivist stance towards 
the evaluations, with a primary focus on the achievement of each CDSS project's stated 
objectives. Despite the widely held view that the RCT is the gold standard for CDSS 
evaluations, none of the evaluations in the three cases used this method. Most evaluations 
were informal, and based on the opinions of the key stakeholders who were also the  
project leaders.
The main purposes of the evaluations were to assess CDSS compliance w ith NICE guidelines 
and provide the means to report such compliance to  the regulatory authorities. Some of 
the evaluations were also motivated by financial incentives from service commissioners.
There was no separation between the CDSS projects themselves and their respective 
evaluations. CDSS evaluations were deemed to have been successful on the basis of their 
successful implementation and ability to  generate reportable information to  the regulatory 
authorities and commissioners. However, there were no clear definitions of CDSS failure or 
failure of CDSS evaluation, in concurrence with the literature review. The success of CDSS 
projects and CDSS evaluations was done using simple metric-specific reports that aimed to  
show adherence with NICE guidelines and service commissioners requirements. However, 
this approach ignored the complexity of the processes and environments where the CDSSs 
w ere im plem ented and resulted in disincentives and failure to  achieve the intended goals.
Another im portant finding of this research was that the attitudes of the key stakeholders 
towards CDSS evaluations were among the main barriers to those evaluations. This 
research also showed that these barriers were closely related to  the existing organisational
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culture, particularly attitudes towards computerised health information technologies in 
general and the hierarchical nature of NHS organisations. In such organisational settings, it 
is difficult to  challenge the status quo, and evaluations may be used to protect vested 
interests, encourage compliance with initiatives, and as a tool to  gain formal support from  
decision makers.
The novelty of CDSSs make them  challenging to evaluate, in part because there are limited 
methods available, but also because evaluators may not have the necessary experience and 
expertise to select the most appropriate methods and use them  effectively. Evaluators may 
inadvertently use inappropriate methods and report positive findings, even where no 
causal links may exist. This may result in decision makers using incorrect information to  
make key decisions and continue to  fund or invest in similar technologies. Interdisciplinary 
work should also be encouraged to expand the range of evaluation methods used at 
different stages of the CDSSs lifecycle.
There is need for healthcare organisations to invest in CDSS evaluations, both as part of the
CDSS projects and to  build capacity and readiness to  adopt and use CDSSs effectively, and
to  share their knowledge with the w ider healthcare and research community. To help to
build this capacity, NHS organisations need to foster relationships w ith other organisations
that have a strong culture of CDSS evaluations. This could help to  drive out the current
practice of CDSS evaluations being delegated to the same people who have developed
them . M ore independent evaluations would provide greater objectivity and counter vested
interests which may cloud evaluators' judgments about w hat needs to  be evaluated, when
and w hat methods should be used. CDSS evaluation findings should published, even where
they produce unwanted, unanticipated or equivocal results. It is essential to  discuss the
results openly and show how the organisation has learnt from  any errors and mistakes to
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ensure that such mistakes do not recur in future and that other healthcare organisations 
do not make such mistakes.
There was little evidence that evaluations had any significant effect on the CDSS adoption 
decisions. This was true of T2 and T3 where prior evaluations had been carried out at their 
respective developing Trusts. Although the T2 and T3 project leaders noted that these prior 
evaluations were im portant for their decision-making, it did appear that looking at these 
evaluations had been a mere formality; the decisions to  adopt had already been reached 
because both Lead Consultants trusted their peers who had developed these CDSSs and 
carried out their subsequent evaluations. It also seemed that the Lead Consultants were  
more likely to accept positivist evaluations because they are more commonly used within 
the medical discipline and that they would also use the same methods for their own 
evaluations. There was little evidence of considering alternative methods. This research 
showed that CDSS adoption processes w ere inextricably linked with evaluation. Successful 
implementation was reported as successful evaluation.
9.5 Evaluation factors that extend the CDSS evaluation 
framework
Having looked at the extent to which the research findings supported the CDSS evaluation 
fram ework developed from the literature, this section looks at additional factors from  the  
case studies that help to extend the fram ework. Despite the RCT being reported to  be the  
"gold standard" for CDSS evaluations in the literature review, none of the CDSSs 
evaluations that were investigated used this method. The majority of evaluations were  
informal, and were primarily based on the opinions of the project team  leaders. The
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evaluators used simple before and after comparisons looking at the wider services and 
audits and peer reviews as their key methods of evaluation. Also, despite evidence-based 
medicine being a major driver for NHS interventions, reinforced through NICE guidelines 
and other Departm ent of Health initiatives, the evaluations for the three CDSSs were  
messy, sometimes chaotic and primarily based on incidental and anecdotal evidence. Some 
of the key stakeholders did not see the need to evaluate the CDSSs at all because they 
believed that their successful im plementation to replace the paper-based systems was 
enough. There was also lack of scrutiny of peer evaluations carried out within and outside 
the study Trust. There was a tacit understanding between the evaluators and the key 
stakeholders that the CDSSs had been evaluated appropriately even where evaluation 
documentation was limited or unavailable. There was also no ownership of most of the  
evaluations and no demands from evaluation customers for evidence of quality or 
robustness of evaluations. There was also widespread lack of understanding of the  
purposes of the CDSSs and how they should be evaluated. The expected users of the CDSSs 
suspected that the primary aims of the CDSSs and their related evaluations were to fulfil 
regulatory requirements following top down pressure from  the government and regulatory 
authorities to  Trust Executives, who then passed the responsibility to Clinical Directors to  
come up with solutions that proved compliance. The compulsory nature of the CDSSs 
disregarded the need to  link these CDSSs as solutions to real clinical problems and with  
potential benefits to  the users and ultimately patient outcomes. It appeared that the  
evaluators and key decision-makers were more interested in CDSSs that would provide 
m anagement information for reporting to regulatory authorities than the w ider effects of 
the CDSSs on organisational or patient outcomes. In response, there was a prevalent 
culture across the study Trust of CDSS users just using them  enough to "cover the ir backs"
and "box ticking" because they did not believe that the CDSSs benefited their clinical 
practice or patient outcomes. The range of multi-professional stakeholders and the  
multiple service improvement initiatives added to the complexity of CDSS evaluations, 
which made it difficult to prove w hether many of the reported improvements were  
resulting from  the CDSSs or concurrent improvement efforts.
The project leaders reported that adequate funding had been allocated for the adoption of 
their respective CDSSs. However, it was unclear how much of this funding had been 
allocated to  CDSS evaluations. It appeared that funding was only allocated for evaluations 
during the early stages of developm ent and implementation to  prove the CDSSs' technical 
and clinical efficacy. Once the im m ediate objectives had been achieved, it would appear 
that they saw no benefits to be gained from funding any additional evaluations. However, 
it is possible that the real effects of CDSSs may not be im m ediately apparent and therefore  
other evaluations at different phases of the CDSS's lifecycle would be needed to assess 
continued effectiveness. The literature review highlighted the increasing investment in 
computerised health information technologies to  support healthcare delivery in most 
developed countries. Some of the expected benefits of introducing these systems include 
improved healthcare quality, opportunities to scale up healthcare delivery systems and to  
deliver financial savings. These expectations often result in increased pressure to adopt 
health information systems (including CDSSs) in order to  achieve the expected benefits but 
at present there is insufficient scrutiny as to w hether the benefits are actually achieved.
NHS Trusts need to understand the complexities and challenges of adopting these systems,
regardless of whether they are used in a single departm ent or across the whole Trust.
Although these complexities and challenges are well documented in the literature (Garg et
al., 2005b; Kawamoto et al., 2005; Kaplan and Harris-Salamone, 2009a), they did not seem
4 0 7
to  influence the evaluation of the three CDSSs. Even a small-scale system like T2, which 
was only im plem ented in a single departm ent was fraught w ith elem entary failures that 
could have easily been addressed. Failures in CDSS evaluations, and the CDSSs themselves 
was reported as an under-addressed problem (Kaplan and Harris-Salamone, 2009a; Karsh 
et al., 2010). Indeed, none of the project leaders acknowledged any failures in the  
evaluations that had been carried out. For all the three cases, the definition for CDSS 
evaluation success was the successful implementation of the CDSS and ability to  produce 
the required information to show adherence with regulatory requirements. This narrow  
definition of success limited the evaluations that were carried out and the level of scrutiny 
of evaluations and inevitably resulted in missed opportunities to  widen evaluation 
boundaries and better inform decision makers.
This research has shown that the evaluations were not geared to  provide adequate
information to the key stakeholders and decision-makers about the CDSSs and their
im m ediate and w ider effects. Furthermore, there was little effort to  engage with the
intended users to establish their needs or understand the effects of the CDSSs on their
workflow and the w ider organisation. Also, the existence of multiple im provem ent efforts
introduced initiative-fatigue, where nurses and physicians felt overwhelm ed by the volume
and demands of these initiatives. This inevitably resulted in limited connection by some of
the stakeholders between the national initiatives and clinical goals in their respective
departments. The evaluators could have done more to  separate the effects of the CDSSs
from  those of the concurrent initiatives and to highlight areas of success by disseminating
CDSS findings and making them  relevant to  the different stakeholders. Boland et al.'s
(2014) mixed methods evaluation fram ework showed the value of integrating the
assessment of user needs and user-perceived usefulness of novel technologies. Such an
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evaluation fram ework would be appropriate for CDSS evaluations because it would bridge 
the gap between constantly evolving user needs and adaptiveness of technology designs 
during the iterative early stages of a system's development and throughout its lifecycle. 
This also allows CDSS users to fully review and articulate their needs and the level of 
decision support that is required. There is need to clearly define successes and failures of 
CDSS evaluations and also to take advantage of the potential opportunities to  enhance the  
successes and to learn from evaluation failures.
9.6 Key contributions to CDSS evaluation literature
This research shows that CDSS evaluations investigated took a predominantly narrow view  
and indicates the need for a more systemic approach. To illustrate this, the CDSS evaluation  
fram ew ork developed from the literature review will be synthesised with the key findings 
from  this research. This will help to further extend the CDSS evaluation fram ew ork across 
all five factors identified in the literature review and em ergent findings from  the actual 
research. Figure 9.6 shows a revised version of the CDSS evaluation fram ew ork (see Figure 
9.1) that was developed from the literature review. It incorporates the key contributions 
of this research to CDSS evaluation literature and draws heavily on Tables 1 and 2 and 
Figures 9.2, 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5. The CDSS evaluation fram ework from the literature review  
highlighted that the context, purposes, approaches and methods, benefits and barriers 
w ere the key factors that affected CDSS evaluations. These factors w ere found to  be 
relevant throughout the research across all the case studies to varying extents. However, 
this research found additional factors that contribute to the synthesised CDSS evaluation  
fram ew ork as follows:
•  Organisational strategy and vision
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•  Goals of the CDSS project and the decisions that are likely to be affected by 
evaluations
•  Attitudes of the key stakeholders towards CDSS evaluations
•  Organisational readiness and capacity to carry out evaluations
These factors will now be discussed in turn, including their relationship with the factors 
that were highlighted in the original CDSS evaluation fram ework.
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1
NHS Trusts are under pressure to im plem ent computerised health information technologies
(including CDSSs), to  help them  cope with increasing demand for health services and to
support frontline healthcare workers w ith clinical decision making. It is imperative for NHS
Trusts to  incorporate these technologies into their w ider organisational business strategies,
technology strategies and organisational vision. This will help to create a culture within the
organisation where CDSSs are implemented in a structured manner, rather than in response
to external pressures and to solve im m ediate problems. Organisational culture has been
shown to have significant effects on other organisational variables and employees (Lund,
2003). It has been argued that organisations should maintain a strong advantageous culture
to help them  to achieve their goals and stay competitive (Daraei, 2012). For NHS
organisations, this can be achieved by providing funding for CDSS projects, including
allocating adequate resources for their evaluation at every stage of the adoption cycle.
Executive support will also be required, not only for the CDSS project teams, but for all the
stakeholders who will be affected by the CDSS, including the users and where necessary,
patients. Such an approach will help to bui|d confidence in the CDSSs, as well as encouraging
the necessary "buy in" from the key stakeholders. Additionally, this will also help to  reduce
barriers to CDSS evaluations. This research has shown that the CDSS's adoption process is
closely intertwined with its evaluations. It is therefore essential to clearly spell out the
intended goals of the CDSS project, including the key decisions that will be affected by the
CDSS and its related evaluations. These goals may be the key drivers for evaluations and lack
of understanding is likely to affect the success of both the CDSS project and evaluations.
Sharing the w ider organisational vision and how the organisation expects to benefit from  the
CDSS will help to  clarify the responsibilities and benefits to  all key stakeholders. The literature
review showed that CDSSs that are integrated with the existing clinical processes, w orkflow
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and legacy systems are likely to be more accepted and used as intended. Interoperability with  
existing systems is also likely to encourage acceptance and ownership of both the CDSS and 
its related evaluations. Once a culture is developed where evaluations are valued, barriers to  
im plem entation, acceptance and usage of CDSSs may be minimised and more stakeholders 
may also engage in evaluative activity as part of their routine work processes. This will also 
help to widen the target audiences of CDSS evaluations and encourage the utilisation of 
evaluation results.
9.6.1 Summary of research contributions to CDSS evaluation literature
This research made contributions to CDSS evaluation literature across all five factors of 
evaluation identified in the CDSS evaluation fram ework and allowed it to be extended as 
shown in Figure 9.6. The key research findings are as follows:
The CDSS evaluation framework - The CDSS evaluation fram ew ork developed in this study 
was based on an extensive and systematic literature review. This evaluation fram ew ork also 
informed the methodology that was used to undertake this research. Other evaluators and 
researchers could also utilise this fram ework for their evaluations and also to  extend it 
further.
Primary research in real clinical settings- th is  study involved primary research in real clinical
settings, looking at novel technologies that are likely to be adopted widely in the NHS. By
carrying out primary research to  understand how CDSSs were evaluated in real NHS settings,
this research contributed to  CDSS evaluation literature across all five factors identified in the
CDSS evaluation fram ework (Figure 2.2). In addition, findings from the three case studies
contributed to  an extended CDSS evaluation fram ework (Figure 9.6). These findings and the
updated CDSS evaluation fram ework provide an im portant addition to CDSS evaluation
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literature. The three case studies could also be useful for other stakeholders, such as NHS 
Trusts and the research community in general. The researcher is expecting to publish research 
papers based on the CDSS evaluation fram ework and key findings from  the three case studies.
Context of CDSS evaluations -  this research has shown that the context of CDSS evaluations 
helps decision makers to understand the complex social systems in which the CDSSs are 
introduced, their effects on these systems and how the CDSSs also affect these systems. The 
evaluation context is heterogeneous, even where CDSSs are introduced in the same NHS 
hospital. As such, it is essential for evaluators to  not only ask "what works", but "what works 
for whom , in w hat circumstances, in what respect and how"?
Purposes of CDSS evaluations -  purposes of CDSS evaluations should expand beyond clinical 
validation and technical efficacy. If fact, socio-technical aspects are as im portant as CDSS 
clinical and technical efficacy and could help to answer some of the questions raised by Kaplan 
and others regarding the poor adoption, acceptance and usage of CDSSs. Furthermore, the  
novelty of CDSSs in the NHS brings new risks and make them  challenging to evaluate. To 
understand these risks and wider effects, evaluation purposes need to look beyond 
achievement of CDSS project objectives.
Approaches and methods of CDSS evaluations - The majority of CDSS systematic reviews 
carried out since the 1990s were inconclusive and sometimes drew cautious conclusions. This 
was mainly due to  the reported lack of CDSS homogeneity and study heterogeneity, as well 
as methodological limitations that excluded non-experimental studies. Rather than carrying 
out the research using the same methods [positivist], and potentially getting the same results, 
this research sought to gain an understanding of CDSS evaluations within a real NHS clinical
414
settings. It sought to examine them  as they are, rather than how they are assumed or ought 
to be.
This research has shown that CDSS evaluations take a predominantly narrow view and that 
there is need for a more systemic approach that looks at the w ider CDSS effects beyond set 
objectives. CDSS evaluation methods should be determ ined by the purposes of evaluations 
and the corresponding decisions that need to  be made, rather than default assumptions, 
personal and professional preferences. An "eclectic mix" of evaluation approaches and 
methods is required at different stages of CDSS lifecycle.
Barriers to CDSS evaluations -  barriers that are well publicised in the literature include 
technical, methodological, organisational, social and human factors. This research had found 
that stakeholder attitudes significantly contribute to  barriers to  CDSS evaluations in NHS 
settings. Ethical barriers were also found to be an im portant factor. Evaluation barriers could 
be minimised by employing a w ider range of evaluation approaches and methods to  help 
negotiate the political and ethical dilemmas, gaps, imperfections.
Benefits of CDSS evaluations -  the benefits of CDSS evaluations were primarily focused on 
regulatory requirements and financial incentives. However, these benefits were often based 
on anecdotal evidence and were not communicated to key stakeholders. Evaluation benefits 
were sometimes exaggerated to  m eet the organisations, reputational, regulatory and 
financial needs. There was also lack of alignment of evaluations to w ider organisational goals, 
which resulted in low usage of evaluations for decision making.
Organisational strategy and vision -  alignment of CDSS evaluations to  w ider organisational 
goals, strategy and vision may help to improve 'buy in' from intended users, attracting support
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and funding from  key stakeholders and improving overall patient and organisational 
outcomes.
Attitudes of key stakeholders towards CDSS evaluations -  the attitudes of key stakeholders 
towards evaluations had an effect on when and how the evaluations w ere carried out and on 
the methods and approaches employed and the uses to which the evaluations were put.
Organisational readiness and capacity for CDSS evaluations -  organisational readiness and 
capacity for CDSS evaluation needs to  be assessed, taking into account existing technology 
infrastructure, experience and expertise of evaluators. Following the findings from  the  
literature review, there was an expectation of an orderly approach to CDSS adoption and 
evaluations. However, this research found that evaluations were at best messy. In some 
cases, there were no evaluations at all, and little or no evaluation documentation. Although 
most of the systematic reviews suggested that RCTs and other experimental studies w ere the  
most commonly methods, this research found that CDSS evaluations were mainly informal, 
and based on anecdotal evidence and professional judgments of key individuals rather than  
actual evidence. This contrary to  expectation given the fact that the majority of the evaluators 
and key stakeholders in the CDSS adoption process were physicians who are presumed to  
favour RCTs and other experimental methods.
Goals of CDSS projects -  CDSS project goals should be aligned to  w ider organisational 
strategic decision making and communicated to all key stakeholders.
Decisions that are likely to be affected by CDSS evaluations -  evaluations ultim ately have an 
impact on professional, organisational reputation and resource allocation. As such, less 
favourable evaluation results are often ignored, while some purported benefits may not be 
the direct result of CDSS interventions.
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9.7 Potential limitations of this research
The main potential limitation of this research study was that it was carried out in a single NHS 
Trust and thus the results may not be generalisable to other NHS hospitals. However, to  
mitigate this potential limitation, the study looked at three CDSSs that had different 
circumstances surrounding their adoption:
1. T1 was developed by a multi-disciplinary project team  in the study Trust on the  
existing clinical results reporting system which was already being used by the  
targeted users
2. T2 was developed by third party organisations in partnership with another NHS 
Trust and other partners. It was not integrated w ith the study Trust's existing 
legacy systems following its adoption
3. T3 was developed by a third party organisation in partnership with another NHS 
Trust. It was initially piloted on a single ward at the study Trust and was heavily 
customised to the study Trust's clinical systems and integrated w ith the existing 
clinical results reporting system before Trust-wide im plementation
It can be argued, however, that other NHS Trusts faced similar circumstances and that the
findings from the study are transferrable and could provide invaluable learning to the wider
healthcare sector. All three CDSSs were followed through the various contexts of evaluations
throughout their respective adoption cycles. All the key stakeholders who were involved with
the adoption decisions, development, im plementation and evaluation of the CDSSs were
interviewed. Additionally various documents that were related to the CDSSs were reviewed
as part of the data collection and analysis processes. These included NICE guidelines and
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related national policy documents; the study Trust's operational policies, procedures and 
clinical pathways; the study Trust's annual reports and quality accounts, and evaluations 
reports where available. There are many acute teaching NHS Trusts who share similarities 
with the study Trust and are faced with similar challenges regarding the adoption and 
evaluation of CDSSs. The in-depth nature of this study and the resultant fram ework of the  
evaluations provide opportunities for these NHS Trusts learn from  the experiences of the  
study Trust to  inform their own evaluations or adoption decisions.
9.8 Conclusions and recommendations for further research
This research has assessed evaluations of three CDSSs that were adopted by one of the largest 
acute teaching NHS Trusts in the UK. It began with a systematic literature review of the w ider 
evaluation literature, and in particular, CDSS evaluation literature. This involved published 
and unpublished academic literature, and grey literature, such as NICE guidelines and other 
government documents, Trust policies and clinical pathways, press releases, financial reports 
and quality accounts. The research adopted an interpretive case study approach, using Yin's 
(2009b) embedded case study approach. Biernarcki and W aldorf's (Biernacki and W aldorf, 
1981) snowball sampling technique was used to identify the key stakeholders and interview  
participants, who in turn referred or recommended their peers and others who had been 
involved at the different adoption and evaluation phases of the CDSSs. The interviews w ere  
semi-structured and used open-ended questions to  allow the researcher to explore new lines 
of enquiry while maintaining the research focus.
Eisenhardt's (1989) within case analysis was applied to  gain an in-depth understanding and 
"intim ate familiarity" of each CDSS as a separate entity to  establish unique attributes and
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patterns that were then followed up in the cross case analysis. The information gained from  
the interviews was corroborated with documentary evidence such as the study Trust's policies 
and clinical pathways and the NICE guidelines and other regulatory documents that supported 
them , evaluation reports and related artefacts where they w ere available, the study Trust' 
annual reports and quality accounts and other relevant internal and external documents. Site 
visits and observations were also carried out in the real clinical environments w here the CDSSs 
were developed (in some cases) and where they were used to  gain an understanding of the  
natural clinical environments. The site visits and observations further corroborated the  
interviews and documentary analysis. Cross case analysis involved presenting the data in 
different formats such as tables, lists, critical events and spreadsheets to  identify similarities 
and differences across all three cases.
This research found that CDSS evaluations were mainly focused on showing the study Trust's 
adherence to NICE guidelines and providing information to  key stakeholders such as the  
regulatory authorities and Commissioners. These evaluations were focused on assessing 
w hether the respective CDSSs had achieved their stated objectives and did not look at their 
effects on the users, clinical workflow and patient outcomes. There w ere no causal links 
between some of the reported benefits and the CDSSs. The evaluations were mainly 
form ative and informal. Most evaluations were based on the opinions and professional 
judgements of the respective CDSS project leaders as well as peer reviews, audits and before  
and after service evaluations. Evaluation documentation was minimal, and some key 
evaluations did not have any documentation at all. In contrast to the literature review, none 
of the evaluations used the RCT although the evaluators generally took a positivist stance. 
There w ere many missed opportunities to  evaluate the w ider effects of the CDSSs beyond
showing adherence to  guidelines. Furthermore, this research has shown that CDSS 
evaluations take a predominantly narrow view and evidences the need for a more systemic 
approach. This research is im portant because CDSSs are likely to be widely adopted by NHS 
Trusts in future and it is imperative to improve our understanding of how we deploy and 
effectively evaluate them .
The following recommendations are made for further research:
•  This research could be extended initially through a survey of NHS Trusts that have 
adopted similar CDSSs to  test the generalisability of the findings.
•  The CDSS evaluation fram ework that was developed in this research could be utilised 
to  carry out exploratory studies in similar settings.
•  M ore CDSS evaluations involving researchers and practitioners should be carried out 
using a mixed methods approaches.
•  M ore research should be undertaken to define successes and failure of CDSS 
evaluations and also to  establish the most effective evaluation methods that will help 
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Appendix 1 - List of key Study Trust documents and secondary materials
Appendix 1.1 - General study Trust documents
1. Study Trust Quality Accounts (2010/11)
2. Study Trust Quality Accounts (2011/12)
3. Study Trust Quality Accounts CQUIN Supplement Quality Account (2011/12)
4. Study Trust/Strategic Health Authority CQUIN Scheme Agreement (2011/12)
5. Strategic Commissioning Group - Specialised Commissioning Team meeting minutes 
(2009)
6. Award winning Trust challenges Dr Foster rating - press release (2009)
7. Study Trust clinical results reporting systems
8. Study Trust ethics approval
Appendix 1.2 - T1 study Trust documents & secondary materials
1. Responsibility of Emergency Departm ent and W ard staff during VTE RA BCP Activation
2. Responsibility of Emergency Departm ent and W ard staff during VTE RA BCP De­
activation
3. C lexane-sum m ary of product characteristics
4. Copy of DH VTE Reporting graphs static 2010 -  2011
5. Clinical results reporting system VTE risk assessment function for doctors
6. Clinical results reporting system VTE risk assessment function for nursing staff (non­
midwives)
7. Clinical results reporting system VTE risk assessment function for midwives
8. Departm ent of Health VTE Reporting graphs static 2011 -  2012
9. DH VTE Reporting graphs static 2012 -  2013
10. Displaying the VTE RA Statuses and Viewing a VTE RA Form
11. Study Trust VTE RA Process -  ED Admission
12. Study Trust VTE RA Process -  Elective Admission
13. Study Trust VTE RA Process -  Emergency Admission (straight to theatre)
14. Study Trust VTE RA Process-Theatres (Elective admission with pre-assessment)
15. Study Trust VTE RA Process -  Theatres (Elective admission w ithout pre-assessment)
16. Study Trust Venous Thromboembolism (VTE) Operational Policy
17. Strategic Health Authority letter authorising the exemption of day surgery patient 
cohort
18. Study Trust care pathway for adults with suspected DVT
19. Study Trust associated records
20. Study Trust Prescribing, Handling, Custody and Administration of Drugs Policy
21. Study Trust Patient Information Procedure UHCW NHS Trust ICT Security Policy
22. Study Trust W arfarin Guideline
23. Study Trust Heparin Treatm ent Guideline
24. An electronic tool to  help prevent potentially fatal blood clots associated with  
hospitalisation (Submission to NICE shared learning database, 2011)
25. T1 portal
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26. T1 PDA devices
27. T1 intranet updates
Appendix 1.3 - T2 study Trust documents & secondary materials
1. T2 portal
2. T2 clin ical p a th w ays
3. T2 GP outcome letter tem plate
4. T2 developer's website
5. T2 promotional video 1
6. T2 promotional video 2
7. T2 patient survey
Appendix 1.4 -T3 study Trust documents & secondary materials
1. Frequently Asked Questions and Troubleshooting Guide for T3 (M ay 2008) -T 3  FQAs
2. T3 New Ward Profile Checks (checklist)
3. T3 Training of Staff (checklist)
4. T3 Clinical Documents and process checks (checklist)
5. T3 Environmental analysis Checks (checklist)
6. Critical Care Outreach Activity Report 1st April 2012 -  31st March 2013
7. T3 Ward: Going Paperless Pilot Checklist
8. T3 Print from  PDA Profile Test for Ward
9. Printer Profile for W ard
10. T3 Operational Policy August 2012
11. T3 presentation -  "a means of hospital-wide physiological surveillance" (2009)
12. T3 Freedom of Information Request (March 2013)
13. T3 press release
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Appendix 2 - General indicative interview topics and questions
Opening remarks - Introduction, general overview of interview format, audio recording, and ethical 
issues and obtain brief background information about the participant 
Background of the CDSS
1. When did you first hear about the CDSS?
- Within or outside the Trust.'
• Were you already aware of the CDSS or did you have to obtain more information?
2. What were the key considerations for choosing this CDSS?
• Previously undertaken evaluations, potential benefits, Trust, collegial or national guidelines, 
peer networks, commercial organisations etc.
• What were the intended purposes of the CDSS? -  Clinical, economic outcomes etc. and note 
anticipated benefits
• How was the CDSS brought to the Trust? -  Prompt re: by whom and why?
• Was a business case prepared? Is there documentary evidence?
Participant’s involvement in the project
3. How was the CDSS implemented?
• Pilot, phased or trust-wide implementation
• Who did what, when and how? Level of training provided
4. What were the benefits and challenges during and after implementation?
• Is there documented evidence of benefits e.g., quality improvement, effectiveness, cost 
savings, patient outcomes etc.
• Is there evidence of drawbacks or challenges? How were they reported? To whom? Was 
there a feedback system?
• How were these addressed and by whom? -  is there evidence?
• Was there adequate support during and post implementation?
5. What was the effect of the CDSS on clinical workflow?
• Were there any issues with usability/interface of the system?
• Degree of integration with existing systems and work processes
• Effect on clinical decision-making and patient outcomes 
Participant’s involvement in the evaluation
6. Were anticipated benefits realised?
• At personal, team, departmental or hospital level
• Was success failure of the system clearly (pre)-defined? By whom and what were the 
parameters?
• Was there a communication system between the implementation team, trainers and frontline 
staff? E.g., feedback system, regular updates
• Were there any departmental/staff level meetings to discuss the implementation or respond 
to experiences in clinical settings?
• Who attended these meetings?
• What was the structure for reporting the project and evaluation? -  is there documentary
evidence? Internal/organisational use? External use?
Stakeholder perceptions about the project and evaluation
7. What were the key lessons from the implementation and evaluation?
• Would any lessons learnt affect CDSS or other healthcare technology evaluation?
• Establish whether they consider their involvement/activities as evaluation?
Closing remarks
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Appendix 3 - Guide to evaluation inputs, processes and outcomes
Evaluation inputs
1. Resources allocated e.g., budget of the evaluation and other material resources 
available to evaluators
2. Duration (s) of evaluation (s)
3. Timing/intervals of evaluation in relation to the entire project
4. Were evaluations undertaken by project personnel or dedicated team/individual (s)?
•  Who conducted the evaluation (s)? How were they selected, by whom?
•  Characteristics of evaluation personnel e.g., training, experience, com m itm ent, 
'world view' and attitudes towards evaluation
•  Characteristics of project personnel e.g., training, experience and 'world view' e.g., 
training, experience, commitment, 'world view' and attitudes towards evaluation
5. Design of methodologies used in evaluation
6. Characteristics of the project being evaluated, e.g., goals, substantive area of concern, 
client group, targeted users of the systems
7. Audience or client group or decision makers for the evaluation and purposes of 
evaluation - targeted decision makers
•  Uses of information generated by evaluation (s), e.g., decision-making about (re) 
allocation of resources
8. The evaluation setting
•  Was there a pre-determined criteria for success or failure?
•  Did the tool achieve the intended goals?
9. W hat were the key milestones, successes, drawbacks, feedback system (from 
evaluation to the project), modifications to evaluation or the project itself?
Evaluation process
Transforming inputs into outcomes -  actual decisions made
1 Types, intensity and frequency of interactions between evaluators and program staff 
members - may depend on whether CDSS evaluations are considered to be self- 
evaluations, or if independent department or third party are given the evaluation 
responsibility
2 Response of program staff and client groups to the presence of evaluators -  
Hawthorne effect (inadvertent response to evaluators by programme staff and users) 
-  may depend on how evaluation was undertaken -  in this case may not be an issue 
as above, especially within the same organisation -  Was the Hawthorne effect 
considered and what efforts were made to minimise or address it?
3 Extent to which information acquired during the evaluation is fed back to program
staff, perhaps modifying the program procedures -  maybe deliberately to influence
operation, or whether evaluators are actively involved or outsiders.
4 Extent to which information acquired during the evaluation is used to modify the 
allocation of evaluation resources -  and project resources -  how much is emerging 
info used to modify the evaluation of the project itself or alternative hypothesis or 
other uses of the CDSS (adaptability)?
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5 Adaptiveness of the evaluation design (i.e., capacity to respond to changes in the 
program) and history of adaptations -  deliberate or forced adaptations due to internal 
or external pressures and unintended effects of such activities -  to what extent is the 
project jeopardised or able to adapt to such changes?
6 Turnovers in key personnel (e.g., evaluators, program staff, client groups of both 
program and evaluation) -  effect of such changes on the project and evaluation, and 
the effect on the "decision impact" of the outcomes -  note the "vanishing advocate"
7 Testing of hypothesis regarding the program -  statistical correctness, while important, 
may not guarantee "decision impact" and statistically imperfect information may 
affect decision-making, which may be costly to the organisation. This may depend on 
the dominant school of thought.
8 Documentation of findings (in the case of SQUIN and NICE -  what are the national 
averages and how do local results compare?). Evaluation report -  is it part of the 
evaluation process or an outcome of evaluation? The report could also be viewed as 
communication of final evaluation findings, together with oral presentations, teaching 
and teaching aids to convey essential results, or any other activities to communicate 
or disseminate results.
Evaluation outcomes
1 Who is the primary group of evaluation -  who is evaluating?
•  How close are they to project staff?
2 What are the ultimate decision consequences? - Possible decisions influenced by the 
evaluation:
•  Decision by the project commissioners or organisation to fund, continue to fund, 
modify or cancel a project or effect on such future decisions (or maintain the status 
quo)
•  Decision by the project personnel to modify any of the project procedures
•  Decision by users to alter system use
•  Decisions by internal or external staff to study further questions or issues raised in the 
evaluation -  may be difficult to assess
•  Decision by other organisations, commissioners or similar project personnel to 
introduce, continue to fund, modify or terminate similar projects based on 
information from the evaluation - may be difficult to assess
•  There may be challenges in separating process and outcome (measures)
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Appendix 4 - Participant Information Sheet
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Tel +44 (0) 1908 653964
Participant Information Sheet Version 3 - 22/11/2012
Study title -  Evaluation of Clinical Decision-Support Technology in the  NHS
I am a PhD student at The Open University and I w ould like to  invite you to  take part in my 
research study looking at the  evaluation of clinical decision-support technology in th e  NHS.
Invitation to take part in a research study
You are being invited to  take part in this research study because you have been involved in 
the  im p lem en ta tion , use or evaluation of clinical decision-support technology w ith in  the  
hospital. Before you decide w h e th e r or not to  take part, it is im portan t fo r you to  understand  
w hy th e  research is being done and w h a t it will involve. Please take tim e  to  read the  fo llow ing  
in form ation  carefully and ask any questions you m ay have. Thank you for taking tim e  to  
consider this study.
What is the purpose of the research study?
The purpose of this study is to  investigate how  innovative clinical decision-support technology  
is evaluated  in NHS clinical settings. The study will also assess the  e ffect o f evaluation  on 
subsequent adoption decisions and diffusion o f healthcare technology w ith in  your hospital 
and w id er healthcare settings.
What is involved in participating in this study?
It is up to  you to  decide w h e th e r or not to  take partic ipate in this study and you should not 
feel pressurised into participating by others. If you wish to  partic ipate  please sign the  
in form ed consent form  in duplicate and w e t ink. You will then be given a copy fo r your records  
and I will retain the  second copy. A fter consenting, you will be asked to  partic ipate  in a sem i­
structured in terv iew  lasting no m ore than one hour at a tim e  convenient fo r you. W h e re  
possible interview s will be conducted face to  face, but if this is not possible, th e  in te rv iew  can 
be conducted by te lephone. During the  in terv iew  you will be asked about your experience of 
clinical decision-support technologies th a t have been adopted by the  hospital. It is in tended
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that the interviews will be recorded to ensure concise data collection and you will be given 
an opportunity to verify, delete or add to and sign interview summaries (or confirm by email) 
before they are used to develop published outputs and the PhD thesis. Please state on the 
consent form if you do not wish your interview to be audio recorded and notes will be taken 
instead. It may be necessary to contact you again to obtain clarification, ask further questions 
or request for relevant documentary data. You are free to withdraw from the study at any 
time without giving a reason (before the results are published) and It is intended that your 
data collected up to that point would be used for the study. Please state on the consent form 
if you do not wish your data to be used in the event that you withdraw.
What are the possible benefits and risks of taking part?
Taking part in this study gives you the opportunity to reflect on your practice and contribute 
your views and experiences on how healthcare technologies are evaluated. Your 
contributions will be used to develop a PhD thesis and associated published outputs, which 
will add to knowledge in this important area and inform future adoption and evaluation of 
healthcare technology, as well as decision-making in the NHS and the wider healthcare 
context. Published outputs include journal articles, peer discussions and conference 
presentations. There are no significant risks envisaged but I will undertake to resolve any 
concerns or potential risks arising in the course of the research. The Open University Human 
Research Ethics Committee (HREC) (Ref: HREC/2012/#1213/Dune/1) and the local Research 
and Development department have reviewed and approved this study. You can thus be 
assured that your time and contribution to this study will be worthwhile and will contribute 
towards the body of knowledge in this important area, improvement of clinical processes, 
NHS services and patient outcomes.
Confidentiality
All reasonable means will be taken to protect the anonymity of participating individuals and 
no person identifiable data will be used in this study. You will be given an opportunity to 
decide whether your hospital or technology is identified in the study and all efforts will be 
made to ensure anonymity where requested. However, it is important for you to understand 
that some healthcare technologies are specialist in nature and are used in only a few NHS 
organisations. As such other NHS Trusts or wider healthcare organisations may be able to link 
the study to your hospital.
Raw data generated in the course of this study will be handled in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and The Open University's research code of practice. Transcribed 
electronic data will be kept on The Open University computer, where only the researcher and 
supervisors will have access using secure passwords. All data used in the thesis will be 
anonymised following collection and on completion the thesis will be deposited into The 
Open University theses repository. Audio recordings will be retained for a period of twelve 
months following completion of the project before being deleted. However, audio-recorded 
data can be deleted immediately after the interview is summarised at your request. The 
researcher has an ethical duty to report to the relevant authority any illegal, dishonest or 
unethical practice that he might become aware of during the study. The researcher is covered 
by The Open University's professional indemnity insurance while undertaking this study.
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What will happen to the results of the research study?
Results of the study will be reported in a PhD thesis at the end of 2014 and other published 
outlets such as conferences, peer group forums and journal publications. All participants will 
be provided with links to the final PhD thesis report and other published outputs.
Rpsparrh fiinrlino. w . . . •«••• >0
The Open University funds this research project as a PhD studentship under the supervision 
of Professor Joyce Fortune and Dr Clive Savory from the Communication and Systems 
Department.
Contact for further information:
Richard Dune, PhD Student
Communication and Systems Department
Faculty of Mathematics, Computing and Technology
The Open University | Walton Hall | Milton Keynes | MK7 6AA
Tel: (0 )1908 653964
Contact for Comments and issues related to this research:
Dr. Nicky Moss, Head of Department
Communication and Systems Department
Faculty of Mathematics, Computing and Technology
The Open University I Walton Hall I Milton Keynes I MK7 6AA
Tel: +44 (0) 1908 654933
Email: n.g.mossffiopen.ac.uk
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Appendix 5 -  Consent Form
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Consent Form Version 2 - 22/ 11/2012
The Open University HREC Approval Ref: HREC/2012/#1213/Dune/1 
Study title -  Evaluation of Clinical Decision-Support Technology in the NHS
1 confirm that 1 have read and understood the participant information sheet and 1 have had 
an opportunity to ask questions about my participation
1 understand that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that 1 am free to 
withdraw at any time before the results of the study are published
In the event that 1 withdraw from the study, 1 agree that my data collected up to that point 
can be used in the study and related published outputs
1 agree to the interview being audio recorded and that anonymised data collected will be 
used in research publications
1 agree that my data gathered in this study will be kept securely at The Open University and 
that the thesis produced from this study will be added to The Open University repository. 
Electronic data will be kept securely in The Open University server
1 agree to take part in this study
Name of Participant Date and time Signature
Name of Researcher Date and time Signature
Should you require further information before, during and after the study, please contact the Chief Investigator using the
details below:
Richard Dune, PhD Student
Communication and Systems Department I Faculty of Mathematics, Computing and Technology





























Richard Dune, Mathematics, Computing and Technology 
"Clinical decision support systems (CDSS) evaluation in the 
NHS
HREC/2012/#12G3/Dune/1
28 June 2012 
10 July 2012
Memorandum
This memorandum is to confirm that the research protocol for the above-named research project, as 
submitted for ethics review, approved by the Open University Human Research Ethics Committee.
Please make sure that any question(s) relating to your application and approval are sent to Research-REC- 
Review@open.ac.uk quoting the HREC reference number HR£C/2012/#1203/Dune/l. We will endeavour to 
respond as quickly as possible so that your research is not delayed In any way.
At the conclusion of your project, by the date that you stated in your application, the Committee would like 
to receive a summary report on the progress of this project, any ethical issues that have arisen and how they 
have been dealt with.
Regards,
Dr Duncan Banks 
Chair OU HREC
The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (number RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a 













This memorandum is to confirm that the modification to the research protocol for the above-named 
research project, as submitted for ethics review, is approved by the Open University Human Research Ethics 
Committee,
Please make sure that any question(s) relating to your application and approval are sent to Research-REC- 
ReviewQopen.ac.uk quoting the HREC reference number above, W e will endeavour to respond as quickly as 
possible so that your research is not delayed in any way.
At the conclusion of your project, by the date that you stated in your application, the Committee would like 
to receive a summary report on the progress of this project, any ethical issues that have arisen and how they 
have been dealt with.
Regards,
Dr Duncan Banks 
Chair OU HREC
Ui please note the change in email address
The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (number RC Q00391), an exempt chanty in England & Wales and a 
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Appendix 7 - GAfREC Guidance -  Main Changes to the REMIT of RECs and study 
Trust approval
The following types of research do not normally require review by an NHS REC within the UK 
Health Departments' Research Ethics Service. Projects being undertaken as part of an 
educational qualification however, still require review from a University REC.
1) Research involving staff
Research involving NHS staff recruited as research participants by virtue of their professional 
role, is excluded from the normal remit of RECs under the harmonised edition of GAfREC.
2) Research involving previously collected, non-identifiable information
Research involving previously collected, non-identifiable tissue samples in accordance with 
the terms of donor consent is generally excluded from REC review.
However, REC review would be required if any of the following applied:
a) Consent for research has not been given, or the research is not within the terms 
of the consent.
b) The research also involves removal, storage or use of new samples from the living 
or deceased.
c)The research also involves the use of identifiable information held with the 
samples.
3) Research involving acellular material
Research limited to use of human biological material not consisting of or including cells (e.g. 
plasma, serum, DNA) is also generally excluded from REC review.
However, REC review would be required if the research involved:
a) Prospective collection of tissue samples from patients in order to extract acellular 
material for research.
b) Prospective collection of information from patients.
c) Use of previously collected information from which patients could be identified 
by the researchers.
d) Analysis of DNA in material from the living, where consent for research is not in 
place from the person whose body manufactured the DNA.
4) Research involving previously collected, non-identifiable information
Research involving previously collected, non-identifiable information. This exception also
4 6 7
applies to research undertaken by staff within a care team using information previously 
collected in the course of care for their own patients or clients, provided that data is 
anonymised in conducting the research.
However, REC review is required for research involving:
a) Prospective collection of information from patients or service users for research.
b) Use of previously collected information from which patients or service users 
could be identified by researchers outside of the usual care team (either directly 
from that information, or in combination with other information, or likely to come 
into possession, their possession).
5) Research involving premises and facilities
Research limited to the use of or access to NHS premises and facilities no longer REC review, 
provided that review is not required under other provisions of GAfREC.
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Dear Mr Dune..
Study Title: Evaluation o f C linical Oscision-Support Technology in the NHS
Thank you for submitting the above study for consideration by the Research & 
Development Office, I am pleased to Inform you that your study has been approved
The documents approved for use in this study are:
[.Document Version Date
I Protocol I Dec 12.
Participant Informal on Snee‘ 
* Consent Form .......................1- 30 11 2012 JI m i l l  .
* Should you wish to make any changes to the documents listed above, you 
must obtain R&D approval prior to use.
• An Annual Progress Report (APR) should be submitted to the main research 
ethics committee (REC) once a year throughout the trial or on request by 
R&D. The first report is due on 18* December 2013, In addition., for CTIMP 
studies, a Development Safety Update Report (DSUR) should be submitted to 
the MHRA and the REC once a year. Guidance on the DSUR can be found 
in SOP 41 ‘Preparation and Submission of Annual Progress Reports and 
Development Safety Update Reports'.
*  Notification of any serious breaches of GCP or the trial protocol must be 
reported to the R&D Department and a OATIX Clinical Adverse Event form 
completed within 24 hours of any suspected breach being identified and 
confirmed.
R&D Reference. RD11S512 
Version 4, 01.11.2012 Page 1 of 2
Your research sponsorship & Indemnity is provided by The Open University.
Your project may be subject to ad hoc audit by our department to ensure these 
standards are being met.
May I take this opportunity to remind you that, as a researcher, you must ensure that 
your research is conducted in a way that protects the dignity, rights, safety and well­
being of participants. Trust R&D Approval assumes that you have read and 
understand the Research Governance Framework and accept that your 
responsibilities as a researcher are to comply with it, the Data Protection and Health 
& Safety Acts.
The Trust wishes you every success with your project.
Yours sincerely
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Appendix 8 - Coding practices (examples)
Our Strategic Health Authority were producing report where they were ranking high...
[coded as NHS rankings] it was interesting and slightly frustrating you start seeing some 
Trust whereby you know their processes start reporting 98% [CQUIN compliance] success 
rates and when you talk to them, you realise they don't count day surgery and don't 
consider such patients as in-patients... [coded as self-reporting problems] that's actually 
not the spirit of what NICE want.... It seems to me no one is looking hard at the figures.
TILeadConsultant
I am under no illusion if it wasn't for the CQUIN money I don't think this [successful T1 
implementation] could have happened [coded as CQUIN incentives] and it's absolutely 
pivotal to have the support of the executives and that really helped as it started the ball 
rolling... once they signed up to it, finance became less of an issue... [coded as importance 
of executive support]
TILeadConsultant
There wasn't time for a pilot... it [Tl] had to go [live]... It did work but there were 
departments where it absolutely caused mayhem... [coded Trustwide implementation 
chaotic] the way it was worded meant that every admission had to be risk assessed, even 
minor procedures... for example, in the Surgical Day Unit, day surgery lists for minor 
procedures were held back... on the day the tool went live, most of the VTE project team 
were away and I had to deal with the various issues... [coded as unanticipated 
implementation challenges]
TllmplementationNurse
I don't think it was effective (online VTE training for nurses)... [coded as ineffective 
training] it was almost like a task...l remember it being quite hard to work through, not
that it was a difficult assessment but not very user friendly [coded as training not user 
friendly]. Those online assessments are sometimes like tick box exercises... how much 
that actually adds to the assessment being complied with, I really don't know... I don't 
think it adds much knowledge as to why it's important. I don't think the training itself 
added much to my knowledge... I can't even remember what was in that training... it just 
doesn't stick really [coded as training perceived insufficient].
T1ANP
Some GPs have the skills to do stable prostate cancer follow ups and some are less 
comfortable... [coded as variable GP skills]. As GPs are organised in clusters, it is 
challenging to agree on the logistical and organisational issues... who is going to head 
up the service in that area?; where will the data reside?; and how to filter patients into 
that particular service... [coded as organisational and logistical problems] the 
successful ones we have had are where the organisation is acting as a hub and there 
is a structure in place where patients actually merge to one particular [agreed] 
location, and they might have several patients from various outlying GPs... that 
problem has been solved already before we got there so that's good, but more 
complicated in some situations... [coded as implementation challenges]
T2Developer
Making one computer talk to another is relatively straightforward. The problem is not 
technical... it is dealing with the hospitals in general, protocols, the red tape, getting 
to the data... [coded as organisational challenges]. I understand the many good 
reasons for data security... The biggest problem is securing the hospital IT resource, 
obtaining information governance clearance, to release information or make sure that 
information will be used in a safe manner... [coded as information governance
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concerns] agreeing with IT departments a method that is mutually acceptable, 
especially across Trusts because we are having to get two discreet teams jellying 
together... it's quite a challenge [coded as co-working challenges]
T2Developer
You couldn't rely on the system [T2] to generate all the answers for you or just accept 
everything it recommends... [coded as CDSS not panacea] it will generate a lot of 
medical issues but sometimes you need to have the clinical knowledge to deal with 
the practical issues... clinical knowledge such as the treatments they have had and 
their side effects, reading the results and appropriate follow up... [coded as clinical 
knowledge and experience essential]
T2Nursel
They [T2 developing Trust and their commercial partners] were looking for site to roll 
it out (T2)...we have previously collaborated with them [T2 developing Trust]... we 
knew the guys who developed it [coded as prior knowledge of developers] and it 
seemed to be working well for them... they had a similar unit to ours, so we thought 
we would give it a go particularly as the implementation costs were going to be paid 
by their commercial partners... [coded as financial incentives]
T2LeadConsultant
The best evaluation is comparing Consultants' decisions and what the computer would 
have done but that takes too much tim e [coded as RCT gold standard]. The attraction 
for us is that they [T2 developing Trust] had already done that so we were happy to 
take their word and we were only happy to take their word because we knew them  
from before and we trusted them, whereas if it was a completely commercial outfit
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that would make us more suspicious as to what they were trying to sell to us... [coded 
as trust in peer evaluations]
T2LeadConsultant
It was a big job [the implementation]... quite a lot of nurses didn't even have computer 
login details or access to the system for electronic charts... lots of facilitation, getting 
line managers to sign things off, just trying to make things easy for them... account set 
up [problems with] were unexpected, although there was an inkling... [coded as 
unexpected organisation and logistical issues] little has changed regardless of the 
number of projects that have been rolled out since... we are still bringing forms to get 
people logged in... it's becoming role specific, nurses have access, but there is a huge 
gap with healthcare assistants, but now with ESR, it's becoming more important for 
them to use computers... [coded as computer apathy]
T3LeadNurse
Our approach to user training was flexible and pretty mixed... It was easier to fit 
training around the nurses' station rather than sisters' office, so the nurses were still 
accessible on the ward if [they were] needed [coded as flexible training]. It was broken 
training, because emergency buzzers, phones ringing... but they [the nurses] had faith 
in that we would let them attend to their work, and they actually concentrated during 
training... We also went on observation rounds, and were all in nurses' uniforms. We 
were able to freely go around the ward, be with patients and looked professional... it
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helps when patients know that you are a nurse... [coded as trust in implementation 
team]
T3LeadNurse
It's a bit like big brother watching you... [coded as negative CDSS perception] to keep 
an eye on people who don't know what they are doing, in a helpful way. It's like an 
idiot's guide when to do observations [coded as CDSS useful to some staff]. It takes 
away professional judgment and tells you what and when to do it... [coded as CDSS 
deskills nurses]. It's for the Trust and everyone must have it... legally they (seniorTrust 
managers) can prove that patients' observations have been done because they have 
it down on a computerised system [Trust 'covering back']. I am not dead against it... 
we got used to it and I probably wouldn't want to go back to paper charts now...The 
idea was that doctors aren't called unnecessarily, and they can look up for 
observations without having to go to the ward. We do that ourselves when we get 
referrals from other wards [general wards]... [coded as CDSS has benefits]
WardSisterl
It was an agile approach to software development, going back and forth and trying to 
support the rollout [coded as agile CDSS development]. It was their [T3 supplier] first 
ever roll out of such magnitude so they were quite willing to work with us and provide 
the functionalities that were needed... [coded as CDSS developers supportive] It had 
benefits for them because if we were asking for something, other Trusts were bound 
to want the same... they actually began to have a comprehensive package that they 
could sell. . .  they wanted us to roll it out Trust wide and could then say, "we have this
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system, which we rolled out in this big university hospital in 6 months..." [coded as 
commercial benefits for CDSS developers]
T3LeadNurse
Night sisters and the Outreach team can now identify them (deteriorating patients) 
and intervene appropriately... [coded as CDSS benefits] for a system that I imagine 
costs a lot of money, I'm not sure whether it's worth it. If it has cost more than making 
sure that you have enough staff on the wards, senior nurses to keep an eye on things 
rather than machines on the ward ... you can't beat someone being physically there... 
[coded as money could be better spent elsewhere] it is taking away people's ability to 
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